Haz From Infrared Finally Debates Perspective Philosophy
2021-08-08
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welcome to thank you sunday showdown
today we have
has from infrared and lewis from
prospective philosophy debating whether
veganism
is an ethical duty a quick word about
format and rules
opening statements are eight minutes
long who goes first will be determined
by a coin toss
i will warn you when you hit five
minutes so you can wrap up because when
you hit eight i cut you dead
this will be followed by two sets of
alternating five minute responses
followed by
45 minutes of open discussion and
concluding with 20 minutes
for audience questions regarding
audience questions
super chats will be prioritized and
asked in the order in which they appear
if we have time non-super chat questions
should be marked by an asterisk so i can
quickly find them in the chat
rules of conduct are strict speaking out
of turn will result in 30 more seconds
of speaking time being allotted to the
other party
so save it for the response period or
for the open discussion segment
the use of slurs or personal abuse will
be met with an immediate ban and this
applies both to the audience and to our
participants
if either participant attempts to talk
over or challenge the moderator being
myself during this debate
they will first be muted and warned and
then removed i trust all this has been
made clear and that by participating
both guests
i will take at least to have passively
agreed to the rules as just laid out
with that out of the way we will flip a
coin to see who goes first for opening
statements
has your heads louis your tails
tails louis you go first you are going
to have eight minutes
for your opening statement starting
now
[Music]
okay hi everyone all right
so animals are inherently valuable
consciousness is inherently valuable
and the inconsideration of sentient
beings is inherently wrong
that is essentially what i'm going to be
arguing when i say that veganism is an
ethical obligation
an obligation is a duty or a
responsibility
now i'm arguing from a hegelian position
something that i know that has
at least tacitly um endorses at least
from what i've seen
the endorses so hopefully we can make
some headway there
so all conscious beings have interest
desires and the capacity to feel pain
and pleasure when we are considering
when we are considering conscious beings
and
conscious interests we are considering
what is the foundation of value
and ethics as a whole
if we are to agree with the hegelian
position then what we are understanding
is that there is a right and a wrong
entailed in the world itself it's
objective it's not determined by you
or me or any given party it is something
which is
right and that we can discover that it
is right and then make it a law make it
a rule
i would say that we have already done
such a thing we already have
laws numerous laws which protect the
rights the life
and liberty of individuals within the
state
and uh usually humans of course this
wasn't always the case
the law used to protect classes of
individuals particularly
and even still is inadequate in many
cases to protect the overall
interests of the general population even
humans
not just animals veganism
is this consideration veganism is the
consideration that animals are not being
respected and treated
equally in the eyes of the law as in
their interests their desires and their
preferences are not being met
with reasonable consideration we aren't
considering that the pain of an animal
having its throat slit
is not justified because we wish to eat
them
because we wish to overpower them we are
considering ourselves more valuable
simply based on an identity
which we have constructed rather than
something which is true by nature
if we were to be honest with ourselves
and we'll be honest with the reality
that we are
spawned from the unnecessary suffering
of any conscious being
defies what we are trying to do in in
ethics
that is express consciousness and
subjectivity to the greatest overall
possible degree
to create principles which genuinely
reflect the interests and value
at one moment i'm sorry lewis um
infrared please no burgers in my window
thank you
keep going you have 30 more seconds so
when we consider when we consider
animals and we consider their interest
and their pain and their suffering
what we are doing is the same thing that
we've done for hundreds of years we are
considering
that the values that we hold today or
have held in the past
do not encompass the conscious interests
of individuals throughout society
that for example black people are not
lesser that women are not lesser and now
animals are not lesser just because of
the identities that we have
perpetuated upon them and so when we
consider the conscious interests of
other sentient beings
we are being more ethical more rational
and
essentially doing the right thing so i
hope
that explains my position
and are you wrapping up yeah all right
that was pretty fast okay so
uh has let me reset the clock here
and you have eight minutes for your
opening statement
starting now so
in this debate the main thesis i will
defend
is that lewis or prospective philosophy
plainly fails to grasp the principal
significance of the hegelian conception
of ethics
additionally not only is his conception
of ethics
incompatible with hegelian philosophy
so to art actual contents relevant to
this debate
namely veganism vegans like mr lewis
arrive
by means of conceptual abstraction at
the sweeping insight that mankind's
current and past dietary habits
are radically immoral and unethical
however such a position of radical
skepticism
towards norms in the first place the
widespread popularity of which can be
traced to the counter culture
is completely at odds with hegel's view
it's a position which assumes that the
content of morality can be arrived at ex
nihilo on the basis of an individually
contrived
standard of reason hegelian philosophy
is rather one of reconciliation one
which endeavors to arrive at the deeper
rationality of the world and its norms
whereupon the rational individual who in
hegel's case
is the modern cartesian subject
discovers itself to be radically at odds
with it the definitive case being the
newfound political anxiety
provoked by the french revolution for
the europe's ancient regime
the content of tradition taken generally
as the norms customs and culture of a
given society obviously do change
but if they do not change as a result of
being imposed upon by what hegel calls
the law of the heart
or the frenzy of self-conceit veganism
taken both as an ethical obligation for
the individual
and a collective vision of
transformation rests upon the unhappy
consciousness
which affords recognition only of a
contradiction between reality and this
same individual self-conceit
traditions change as a result of a
radical process of mutual recognition
between thinking beings
which animals could not possibly figure
into
in the past lewis has contrasted the
individualistic morality of kant to
hegel's ethical life of state and
society
while the distinction is superficially
true lewis's conception of the hegelian
ethical life
merely consists in an elevation of
kantian morality to the level of
voluntary collective enterprise
his misreading of hegel has its roots in
a form of neocontianism
that has its origins in the late 19th
century and spans from thinkers like
frederick lang
all the way to habermas hans principal
error doesn't suddenly disappear
when the same abstract and indeterminate
morality shifts from the individual to
collective level
the collective reality relevant to hegel
is not something voluntary but objective
it doesn't register some kind of common
sight of radical skepticism or
abstraction toward the world
but has us its content determinant
relations which manifest
a greater or super individual
rationality which hegel's called geist
or spirit
it is only in the harmony between the
individual will and the institutions of
the state
which the individual forms a part that
the achievement of ethical life is
possible
but the institutions of the state for
hegel are not determined voluntarily by
the product of the individual use of
reason
they are rather the form of civil
society's self-consciousness
the contents of which being not their
moral conscience but their very being
hegel's rejection of volunteerism and
individual rationalism concerning the
institutions of the state
is best epitomized by his defense of the
institution of monarchy
it is precisely on account of the pure
contingency of the monarch's position
being inherited by tradition and
completely outside the sphere of
voluntary tradition by rational will
individual rational will that hegel
defends constitutional monarchy as the
site of a truly actualized freedom
thus from the hegelian perspective the
answer to the question posed by the
debate topic can be
answered with a resounding no the
question
is itself absurd duty to whom and for
what
the hegelian ethical life is not the
product of any abstract or indeterminate
duty
but the harmony between the determinate
private interests of civil society
with the determinant rights and duties
imparted upon it by the state
there can be no real ethical duty
according to hegel that does not fit
within this scheme
it is also peculiar that lewis believes
the hegelian view would be favorable
toward veganism
given hegel's very clear distinction
between humans and animals that renders
any notion of animal rights and
absurdity
within hegel's philosophy of nature it
is precisely spirit or geist that
distinguishes mankind from the animal
kingdom
in that work hegel details that an
animal is defined by the pure immediacy
of external contingencies
its own inner nature being among them
for hegel the animal can only exist
as an immediate individuality its
existence does not contain
quoting the generality that defines it
rather comes at its expense in the form
of an unending and violent struggle for
survival
conversely human beings exist in
societies civilizations and states
the universality of their being does not
strictly stand opposed to its actuality
but is rather defi indefinitely realized
through it which hegel calls history
itself
while vegans claim that such views are
outdated according to natural science
hegel's distinction stands the test of
time at the more fundamental level
an animal cannot have rights and is
qualitatively different from a human
being
one could not be a consistent hegelian
without acknowledging as much
thank you very much all right so
perspective philosophy you're going to
have
five minutes to reply starting
now so that was actually really
interesting i was actually surprised
to be entirely honest with you you
actually know that much about hegel that
was pretty decent i mean you're
absolutely wrong about the idea of the
cartesian subject
being the hegelian subject that's not
entirely wrong
um and i think thinkers like zizek and
lacon
would uh exemplify why that would not be
the case
in fact the cartesian subject implies
some sort of inherent knowledge
and inherent self understanding which is
absolutely absent within the hegelian
dialectic
in fact self-understanding is the middle
term what's the first term is
consciousness
so no you're wrong about that but
otherwise that was actually pretty
decent
um i am not actually arguing for
veganism x nihilo
i'm not arguing it from an abstraction
that we are dismissing all of the ethics
that has come before us in fact i see it
as a rational development of the concept
of equality
that we have we have arrived to this
place and that's how i introduced
um my um opening argument i said that
the
essentially we no longer consider other
ethnicities we no longer consider
other genders as being lesser or weaker
than us hegel did actually see
animals as lesser hegel did but hegel
was a live
300 mark 200 something years ago and um
really his ethics are under his own
system outdated he understood that
ethics was a progressive system that was
developing
and his understanding of animals was
also underdeveloped as his
as his position on women he thought
women were lesser and inferior
just as he thinks that animals are
lesser inferior and he also thought
animals couldn't kill themselves we know
better now
so even in terms of raw psychological
terms we know that hegel's philosophy
did not capture the essence of an animal
which is unsurprising because it was 300
years out of date
now when we consider that you know
the concept of mutual recognition mutual
recognition does not allow for the
establishment
of what is ethical ethically right but
more the investigation of what is
ethically right mutual recognition
allows for the establishment of
self-consciousness which is the middle
term
in the hegelian dialectic which is
infinite the development of
self-consciousness allows for the
development of absolute spirit which
allows the individual to reconcile
themselves
with themselves so you say who am i
considering when i'm considering the
animal i'm considering myself because
there is only
the self understanding the self whether
that includes objects which are
absent and nihilistic in themselves and
being determinant
are ultimately unified in what is the
self
so even if i was considering an animal
uh as in its consciousness even without
its self-consciousness
i'm considering me because we are all
united in spirit that's the entire point
the consideration of consciousness
itself
does not need to recognize an
individual's self-consciousness for them
to have
uh value children do not have
self-consciousness
babies like before the mirror stage and
they are valuable and so are disabled
people
they have experiences which are
inherently valuable
which we become conscious of the whole
point of self-consciousness
is to become aware of the value which
exists which pre-exists
self-consciousness
and construct an identity which allows
for authenticity and freedom which is
the entire point of the hegelian
dialectic hegel's
hegel's dialectic is 300 years out of
date we have now
reached a point in which the concept of
equality has developed past where hegel
was
at that time the cartesian subject in
this respect is
absolutely non-existent the subject is
developing
and moving past the point of um
uh of of an inherent or innate knowledge
which is trying to reconcile itself with
we are trying to reconcile ourselves
with a logos with something which is
uh logically uh uh logically right
within being
we are reconciling ourselves with what
would be considered
natural or with abstract right within
reality you see i'm talking about some
sort of abstract terms no i'm not
i'm talking about the concrete
definitions of equality and its
application
within our society today what we are
considering in that concept
and why the development of the hegelian
dialectic has
has brought us here which is why
philosophers such as jeremy bentham
uh peter singer thomas regan they are
all developing
upon concepts of equality and applying
them to animals which is why when jeremy
bentham said
one minute lewis jeremy bentham said um
the what is it um what is it that should
trace the inseparable line is it the
faculty of reason or perhaps the faculty
of discourse
but the full-grown horse or dog is by
far a more communicable or rational
animal
than an infant a baby an infant of a
week a month
or a year old actually a day a week or a
month old
the question is but if it were not what
would it avail
the question is not can they reason nor
can they talk but can they suffer
that is the question that we are asking
ourselves today within the dialectic
and that is the question that leads us
to a resounding yes upon
the consideration of animals and their
value they matter
we should consider them and we should
protect them in law
thank you very much are you done i am
great okay so haz you're going to get
five minutes let me reset the clock
and
right you are good to start now so right
unsurprisingly you clearly don't know
what you're talking about and fail to
address any substantive point
i raised when i raised the point about
the cartesian
slash modern subject being relevant for
hegel
it is only in so far as this such
subject is relevant for the entire
enterprise of modern philosophy and
modernity
as a whole including things like the
french revolution and so on you
mentioned people like zizek and la khan
but they were among the most um ardent
defenders of this very same insight
obviously hegel goes far beyond the
limits of cartesian philosophy
and what descartes affords of the
cartesian subject
but it is still the same modern abstract
and self-relating negativity of the
cartesian subject
that modern philosophy as a whole must
begin with
as well as the modern subject in general
moreover it's really interesting that
you ground your view
of animal rights in some notion of
equality which you disgustingly also
apply
to ethnic minorities in women which are
on the same level of animal we should
assume equal
well this radical concept of equality
comes and traces its origin in none
other than descartes himself
um we can spar about that point later
now you say that when dealing with
animals you are considering the self yes
precisely and that's why there's no
dialectic process
in which the other actually participates
in that uh
consideration this is exactly why hegel
would describe it
as an example of the law of the heart or
the frenzy of self-conceit
and all the perversions and narcissism
corresponding to it
now hegel being old doesn't actually
address
the meat and potatoes of the fundamental
ontological distinction he's drawing
between animals and humans just because
it's from 300 years ago it doesn't mean
it's not fundamental to his philosophy
without which it becomes entirely
meaningless
now you compared the extending of
equality toward animals toward the
extending of equality toward women and
minorities
but the crucial piece of the puzzle
you're missing there is the actual fact
that minorities and women not only
participated but were the decisive
factor
in acquiring their own equality they
participated in a process
a dialectic and historical process of
mutual
self-recognition again this is something
that
animals are not capable of doing the
only thing animals have going for them
is people like lewis who go on the
internet and claim that we have to give
them rights
now you mentioned children and disabled
people there's two prongs of why that's
ridiculous
children may not have self-consciousness
but there's no such thing as a species
called children
children are precisely the site in which
self-consciousness develops
it's not a static object now granted
disabled people may never develop a form
of self-consciousness
but they represent in the way we treat
them the way we do
in a good way is because of the pure
contingencies to which any individual
may find themselves
as a result of accidents of birth and
other matters of chance
ultimately disabled people form a part
of a human community they come from
humans and they form a part of our human
society otherwise
the question of our obligations toward
them wouldn't even be possible
now when i accuse you of engaging in a
kind of
abstraction it seems like you don't know
what i actually mean i'm not doubting
the fact that you
uh fantasize about some process in which
we all
work together in this dialectic process
to achieve veganism
what i'm actually talking about is that
you counter pose some kind of product of
the individual use of reason to arrive
at an ethical or moral insight
against the whole of the world and
against the whole of society in the
whole of tradition
while appealing to this alone would
never possibly suffice
um it completely betrays the hegelian
spirit according to which evaluating a
tradition in reality so entrenched
as the consumption of meat should lead
the individual to the path of
reconciliation
and understanding why this uh
consumption of meat
is so widespread despite the fact that
not everyone is supposedly as smart or
intelligent as you
it completely betrays the spirit of
higgle finally there's just the final
thing
ethics is for hegel a site of statehood
now you interpret this to mean that we
merely need to pass legislation
to extend rights to animals but again
the institutions of statehood and the
laws therein are not a matter of
voluntary determination according to the
individual
or collective in the neocontinent way
moral conscience
the determinate content of society's
institutions according to hegel
uh is the product of a deeper dialectic
between the
private interests of civil society and
the f and the rights and obligations
sorry the rights and duties imposed upon
them
by the state the contents of which can
only fit
within this scheme and within this
harmony you failed to demonstrate how
veganism could possibly do that
thank you very much and that's time all
right louis you're going to get another
five minutes to respond
let me reset the clock starting
now okay so that was um
i appreciate like why you say that i do
think i did actually respond
i don't think you picked up on it and um
if you if the cartesian subject was only
brought up to recognize
you know the development of philosophy
then why didn't you
mention let's say like i don't know the
freudian subject or something along
those lines
and the ways in which we are balancing
ourselves in relation to our desires
which would be
more hergelian but whatever if you think
that it's philosophically relevant to a
you know
explic you know explicit is that right
yeah
your position that's fair enough okay so
where was i
right okay you said that i am arguing
from what is a nihilistic abstract
position now
and you're saying that i am trying to
propose some sort of
methodology is really just a you know an
affirmation of a subjective
consciousness trying to impose upon
a notion of right from its own
subjectivity which would be what hegel
considers the irony of this objective
i am not doing such a thing i'm actually
building upon the norms and traditions
of our society
which has led us to this consideration
the concepts that i'm using
are widely available in fact many of our
society already engage in notions of
welfarism
and the consideration of animals and
animal rights we have laws in the uk
which protect animals already
some of which have already been extended
and the uk has just recognized
animals as sentient hegel also
recognizes animals as sentient
hegel also recognizes animals as
conscious he
he simply says that they cannot own
themselves so they are not capable of
self-consciousness
that's unsurprising they aren't rational
ethical agents but this does not give us
the kin this does not give us the right
to them it does not give us the right to
dismiss
the fundamental rationality which is
imbued within what they are that is not
something that hegel necessarily
dictates he says they have no right to
life and so on like that
of course he does it's in his interest
he also says women who knows how to get
educated
and that's why i brought it up i'm
saying hegel is wrong on some things
and he himself admits that he can be
wrong in terms of animals yes he is
wrong he admits that conscious
he admits that sentient he admits that
they have interests he just basically
says that they're incapable of knowing
those interests
not that we are incapable of knowing
those interests he points towards
he points towards subjects which are
valuable
but dismisses their value since they
cannot become aware of it
externally from their experiences within
reality
he is dismissing an aspect of
consciousness because
it cannot become aware of itself just
because it cannot become aware of itself
does not mean
that it is not positioned within the
hegelian dialectic the hegelian
dialectic starts
at consciousness and then moves to
self-consciousness
as the middle term the infinite middle
term which is the conscious
re-evaluation of itself
has what is what has led us here the
vegan as an identity
the identity of the animal lover the
carer of animals those individuals who
see themselves
as guardians and not persecutors of
other conscious beings
are much have a much greater
consideration of consciousness
than an individual who is not
considering those interests
they are considering interests of an
animal who does communicate
their interests to us and and you know
actually the funny thing is
is it is the necessary communication
which would have had to have happened to
allow the
hegelian dialect to even form to
produce self-consciousness which is
something recognized by
thinkers such as emmanuel levanas when
he talks about the resistance in the
face
the resistance of the face um
of the ethics of the face and the
resistance the primordial resistance
which is necessary for language which
establishes
the negation required for determinate
objectivity
and the production of words so without
this
non-linguistic communication which can
be seen within the animal
we would not be capable of producing the
middle terms necessary for the hegelian
dialectic to form
so no i am actually responding to quote
unquote the meat and potatoes of your
argument one
minute and it's fundamentally wrong the
reality of the situation is yes
hegel makes a metaphysical distinction
between animals
and humans but only so far as they are
not self-conscious
that does not mean they are not
conscious it does not mean that they are
not considered within the dialectical
process
in fact they are fundamental and
integral to it the understanding of
spirit
as being one and itself with
consciousness as indiscernible from
consciousness
which is the words he uses in the
science of logic
mean that we cannot dismiss any
consciousness
which exists in nature which means we
are bound
by the laws from which we by the laws of
right
which pre-exist our consciousness of
them hegel was unconscious of them
we have become conscious of them
thank you very much let me reset the
clock and has
you have one final five minute response
yeah it wasn't only the development of
philosophy lewis
the modern subject proper begins with
descartes this isn't a controversial
view it's the view of zizek and lakhan
people you yourself mentioned
embarrassingly the freudian subject
doesn't enter the picture until hundreds
of years later
so yes the modern subject and the
cartesian subject are more or less
interchangeable for people who actually
know what they're talking about
and aren't grad students now you claim
to be building upon the norms and
traditions of our society
but you actually have to show for it
there is no imminent development of the
phenomena of veganism
among the broad strata of the people
it's only a tiny minority of overly
socialized and overly urbanized people
precisely the demographic that from as a
logical consequence of hegel's view
would be susceptible to the same frenzy
of self-conceit
and the unhappy consciousness that
propagate this cult of veganism it's not
actually gaining traction in the very
roots of our society
and there's a very clear reason for that
which you're not addressing animals
cannot
participate in a process of mutual
recognition
it doesn't now the fact that animals do
not possess self-consciousness
doesn't give us a right to them but
here's the thing
rights do not factor in this equation
whatsoever
because rights are determinate things
that are granted by the institutions of
the state
not things that come out of thin air
rights
simply don't factor into the question of
the treatment of animals
the custom mores and traditions of
society do which hegel doesn't believe
you can overturn or treat as completely
um complete uh com treating a wave
completely from scratch from the
perspective of philosophy
hegel doesn't actually seek to
annihilate things like
tradition norms culture and religion by
means of philosophy hegel's philosophy
is meant
to be reconciled with those things the
question the deeper question of
the reality of those things is left
later for other thinkers
the fact that it cannot become aware of
itself means that it could not
possibly elevate itself to the status of
the subject
hold on [Β __Β ] me goddamn i'm sorry guys
don't [Β __Β ] me
um okay now uh
it could not uh the fact that it can't
be aware of itself means it couldn't be
elevated to the status of a subject that
could be afforded rights or recognition
in the first place
for the ethical state or for the within
the scheme of the ethical life
that would be just as absurd as imported
imposing duties upon animals as well
hegel is very clear that rights imposed
upon the rights given to the individual
are conditioned also by their duties and
vice versa
now obviously there's some kind of
connection between humans and animals
but and hegel makes that very clear but
actually animals are not capable of
language proper in any meaningful sense
language for havel hegel does not simply
mean the display of some kind of
communication this still fits within
hegel's description of animals are only
capable of
being acted upon by pure externalities
the communication by other members of
the species
being among those externalities it's
premised precisely by
language is precisely premised by
self-consciousness
and the radical alienation between a
being and its own essence the very
radical alienation that renders the
subject's relationship
to themselves the self-conscious subject
not only an immediate one
impo forced upon them by pure
externalities
uh now you say that the laws of right
pre-exist our consciousness for hegel
that is true
but they don't exist in the either they
exist in the form of the state which for
hegel is the realized form of humanity's
self-consciousness
the laws of right are not to be found uh
already existing
somewhere outside of the imminent
development of
state and civil society they pre-exist
us
yes but not in a way that
but only insofar as they are already
mediated in the form of the institutions
of the state
oh you don't even need extra time are
you done yeah yeah that's it
okay fantastic so we're gonna move into
open discussion um just a heads up for
people in the audience if you want to
ask questions
um super chats of course will be
prioritized as i mentioned the
introduction
otherwise if you don't want to super
chat a question put an asterisk at the
beginning and the end so i can find it
in the chat
i can't promise we'll answer them all
but we'll we'll we'll do we can
um so i'm going to set the timer for 45
minutes uh again just
to review the rules quickly um no
personal abuse no insults yada yada i
don't mind insinuations of bad faith etc
because that can be part of a
philosophical discussion
but try to keep it civil and above all
do not
argue with me if i interject and give
someone time to finish their point
ready let's go yeah so would it be all
right if i
respond and then you can pick it apart
and look and see
yeah cool so you said um
you said that uh you know they're not
subjects
until they become and recognize
themselves in terms of
self-consciousness
um i would absolutely disagree with that
i would make the distinction between an
agent and a subject in that respect
which is something which fits really
well in the hegelian dialectic because
of the
um the development from consciousness to
self-consciousness you see that um
language presupposes self-consciousness
quite the opposite i would say that
self-consciousness is the product of
language
and i think that fits again in the
hegelian schemata and
levanas describes this as being able to
hover over our own existence
um and this is primarily from the
recognition
you know of each other as having a will
or having interests
and actions within the world which have
separated consciousness which is
the beginning of you know um absolute
spirit right the reality is
that uh the substance of spirit was
separated by action
the unifi the unit unified totality of
spirit has been separated into
individual
uh instances of consciousness because we
aren't aware of our universal nature
now the reason that we you know
when we do engage in recognition we do
gain a conception of rights we do
actually
gain a conception of self um
understanding and we do
create civil society and the product of
laws which allow us to
emulate natural right but natural
right pre-exists even civil society
um the hegel actually states the laws of
right
are also simply there we have to become
acquainted with them
in this way the citizen has more for
firm or less hold of them
than they are given to them and our
jurist also abides the same point
but there is a distinction in the
connection with laws of right and spirit
investigation is stirred up and our
attention is turned at the fact of the
laws
because they are not different not
absolute laws of right are established
and handed down by men
the inner voice must necessarily collide
or agree with them
man cannot be limited to what is
presented to him but maintains that the
standard of right within himself
he is subject to the necessity and the
force of external authority
so he even says in that quote we do hand
down the laws of right
but we must collide or agree with them
to develop them
to correspond with the laws that are
simply
there the natural laws which pre-exist
us the same as the natural laws of
physics
zero yeah i mean other than the fact
that i would mention that obviously
these natural laws
are the laws of consciousness and not
self-consciousness which is the
awareness of those laws
oh has your silent your music okay yeah
i didn't say they aren't a subject
uh i said they are not a subject
relevant for rights in the states
obviously hegel makes it clear
in his philosophy of nature that animals
are some kind of subject but they are
not the subject relevant for rights
duties
and ethical obligations now you say that
animals hover over themselves and the
world
but such a separation namely the
separation between
the animal and the world as mediated by
something like language
could never be proven hegel precisely
claims the opposite about
animals hegel claims that this very such
separation that allows a subject
to hover over the world over themselves
and the world
is not accomplished in the animal being
for the animal being there is
some kind of obvious separation but it
is not a separation that gives rise
to self-consciousness or language now
natural right may pre-exist civil
society
but you didn't actually hear what i said
with any degree of
precision these natural rights
are only mediated by the institutions
and the state
which rules over civil society for hegel
in other words
natural right does not first strike the
individual moral consciousness like
lightning and then come to determine
civil society in the state the laws
of natural right develop in a manner
that is not
premised by the insights of individual
reason or the individual moral
consciousness they develop
through a rational process that is
fundamentally supra individual um
now by super individual by the way i
don't just mean that individuals
collaborate or agree upon
certain rights and norms i mean that
it comes as a kind of cunning of reason
at their expense
even in a way and their expectations and
so on and so on
so it's com it's a completely um
irrelevant point actually
the life two hours of sleep i forgot i
was gonna say the
grasp
the um okay i'll let you i forgot i was
gonna say
yeah um just to clear something up i
didn't see animals and hovered
over their own existence i was saying
that is how language allows for the
development of self-consciousness
and in so much i would agree that
animals do not have that same
self-consciousness
and that notion of identity they're not
in the middle term in the hegelian
dialectic
they're in the first term of the
dialectic they're in the consciousness
um in like there is something as well to
say
that the you're right in saying that the
you know the the the law the abstract
rights
are not you know essentially imbued
within us they don't strike us like
lightning as you said
they're essentially developed and
uncovered
in relation to an examination of reality
itself of the self
understanding the self um but they are
premised by the immediacy of
consciousness
it is this investigation into ourselves
which is precisely what recognition is
an aspect of
and what i'm arguing in that is that
that primordial expression as leaven us
to as levana says would be the
foundation of any and all
notions of resistance which would be
necessary for the negation of our will
is the foundation of self-consciousness
that animals themselves
um display and so without recognizing
this display of will within animals we
are negating the very same display
which has allowed us to develop the
self-conscious dialect
the self-consciousness which is the
dialectical middle term
within uh the hegelian dialectic so in
other words
if we reject this conscious display of
interests and uh value within animals
then we reject the same display our
ancestors
and our traditions contain
epistemologically
uh prior to their um current
uh mediation within civil society we
reject the traditions and their
foundations
which were produced from these
individuals who recognized one
another and decided to form civil
society and create a notion of justice
and fairness and consideration of each
other within uh
abstract right which is an embodiment of
laws of fairness which exists within
reality itself
yeah but uh this examination you're
talking about isn't actually
an enterprise that occurs at the level
of the individual use of reason
the uncovering you're referring to
precisely happens at a historical
and not individual level an individual
doesn't simply examine this like
sherlock holmes and then imposes their
insights upon the whole of society
the examination happens in a way that is
fundamentally supra individual
and moreover the examination the results
of the examination in a sense are
already
predetermined i don't think you would
disagree with that but
so then the quite the burden rests upon
white explains the unhappy consciousness
of the vegan
in their kind of the manner by which
they seek to
um change the laws and impo
now impose uh their view and um
preach and so on and so on now it's
actually interesting because
even if we take into consideration
hegel's view of slavery which i would
have disagreed with at the time but for
reasons different
i would also grant the underlying
rationality for his position
hegel even opposed some
a lot of the kind of abolitionist fervor
in england and throughout europe
which simply sought to abolish the
institution of slavery hegel
actually thought that slavery would be
dissolved through some kind of gradual
historical whatever process which
reflects
hegel's radical uh conservatism now you
could say that it's just because hegel
was an old guy and it was 300 years ago
but this is what is fundamental to
hegelian philosophy now from a marxist
perspective
you could at the same time recognize
that slavery dissolved by virtue of some
kind of material
development in the forces of production
and it would be kind of this similar
insight as hegel's but ultimately
whether you're coming from a marxist
materialist or hegelian perspective this
kind of tier
again friend tyranny of frenzied
self-conceit which hegel also critiques
as
uh present throughout the french
revolution is not compatible with the
hegelian perspective now
you mentioned that uh yeah
i forgot what you said it was something
about animals um
representing a prior state of being that
premises our very self-consciousness
itself
i agree with that but i find the view
that the conclusion
that the necessary conclusion this leads
to is that we cannot eat animals
this would assume that the cultures of
mankind
uh treat in the rituals of animal
slaughter and animal consumption
animals only from the perspective of
some kind of abstract
dominating kaguto which
does not recognize the determinate
particularity of animals
but actually if you investigate from the
perspective of culture the real
rituals of animal slaughter and animal
consumption
you can even explain them in that way
you can even explain them in terms of
the way in which mankind
or self-conscious beings relate to their
antecedent
premises themselves you could even go so
far as to say that this is even true for
things like factory farming which
may appear as the quintessential example
of this dominating
cogito which does not recognize the
particularity of animals and simply
treats it as a kind of
raw material but it does not actually
succeed
in doing that in actuality and it does
reflect
if there is uh something like that
in a factory farming i say i guess i
would say from the marxist perspective
this is only insofar as it represents a
deeper relation
in our world today between mankind and
itself some kind of more fundamental
estrangement between
humanity and itself
but still there there is no reason to
think
that the recognition that
the state of animal being is a necessary
state that premises
are premises the very possibility of
self-consciousness
must lead us to the conclusion that
animals cannot be eaten
according to some abstract duty
um well i guess like the point i was
making is that it's not necessarily an
abstract duty but really the first
judy and the only judy that really
uh we are that we are really engaged in
it is the essence of the will you know
judy is the essence of the will
um that duty is seen in animals and
that's what i'm
trying to argue here that when we
consider animals
um being the fundament as in like animal
behavior as demonstrating
you know desires and interests which um
exist externally to our own we are we
are
essentially recognizing their power to
their power to negate our own interests
the the differences in terms of mutual
recognition they can't recognize our
uh power to uh negate their interests in
the same
way they don't have the necessary
faculties to form a language in a
linguistic structure which allows for
that
uh diuretic um conceptions of themselves
that can't form the eye
you know um that doesn't mean that the
relationship between us and animals does
not
necessitate our consideration of their
will
it means that they are incapable of
returning that consideration
and forming civil society with us and
that civil society
and that absence from civil society does
not
which means they are they can't be um uh
given positive rights within our society
in terms of let's say
uh the right to vote or something like
that but it does not mean that we have
the right
to you know um undermine
what we would consider necessary
faculties and i think this is why for
example i would say i would disagree
with hegel
and say the consideration of slaves um
or people who even accept their slavery
and i think this is kind of hegel's
point you know the slave enslaves
themselves for hegel
the the slave has adopted the mentality
of being slave-like
and needs to almost fight their way out
develop to develop a self-consciousness
which is independent
from the identity imposed by the
lordsman the bondsmen must work upon
themselves
um and i can see why he's arguing from
that i guess my disagreement would be
there
that the power structure from which we
um gain this self-consciousness
it necessarily does not mean that we
should
impose um unfair power dynamics
upon individuals so that they can
develop freedom
our consideration of their will is
separate from their consideration
of our will so this is how mutual
societies or mutually distinct societies
or mutually distinct spirits in terms of
abstract right
would engage with each other until they
form an uh uh you know a
um a coalescence within absolute spirit
and the laws of one land versus the laws
of another
um hegel recognizes that the laws of one
land are
superior to the laws of another and
talks about the progress
necessary within society to you know
essentially reach a more free society
um you know referencing is like
historiography
in um these philosophy of history
um this would mean that individuals in
let's say germany at the time that he
was talking
were obligated to treat other
individuals from society
that are external to germany in a way
that was considered
ethical by their standard and not by the
standard of those in an alternative
society
so if um you know a british person
disagrees with slavery then they ought
to treat individuals
as being equal and not enslave them and
this would be a matter of um
actualizing the self-consciousness which
exists within the state
this is exactly the same thing i would
say about animals
when we recognize the consideration of
animals
um as having this primordial will which
does not recognize itself
we still must consider its interests we
still must consider its value
and in that consideration of its value
we must find
that although it cannot know the
consequences of uh let's say ethical
ignorance
that its ethical ignorance does not
permit our ethical ignorance
so but the issue is that animals are not
human if there is an aspect of ourselves
uh is somehow common with the animal
it is a moment of a greater being of
which we alone
form a part i think there's a confusion
here between the view
of the animal being being a moment in
the being of geist or spirit
or the human being uh and from a broader
kind of
natural historical perspective of like
for example a kind of
evolutionary view of the way in which
animals develop and become
human these are entirely two different
processes
moreover i think this perspective is
radically not hegelian i don't think
hegel is trying
hegel believes that animals are uh
incapable of um self-consciousness on
account of some kind of uh
pure contingency like a person being
disabled would there's actually a reason
why
animals are not human there is an inner
kind of
there is an inner rationality of the
animal being
itself that makes sense so far from the
perspective of the animal
not from the perspective but taken at
the level of the animal being which
makes sense and which
reconciles some kind of some kind of
deeper unity of opposites now
insofar as animals actually do figure in
this moment
of um the premises of self-consciousness
for
the human being it is so far as they are
consumed so far as they allow us to
subsist
and satisfy our base our own base uh
animal necessities
um it's very strange that
the ways in which animals consume one
another does not somehow figure for you
in the fundamental being of the animal
world in general
now hegel's view regarding slavery is
not actually prescriptive
but descriptive he doesn't say this is
what should happen per se
taken by itself he says this is actually
what happens
so when hegel critique and this is
actually something that happens and has
actually happened across history
conquered people's become enslaved and
then
this initiates some kind of dialectic
process that produces real
historical changes and outcomes hegel
merely critiqued abolitionism
because he thought it was a vain attempt
to hover over this type of imminent
uh development in this imminent uh
process
it wasn't prescriptively saying that it
it should happen
it was happening for hagel now
you say that uh hegel
requires individuals to treat others
from different societies and states
by their ethical standard but the
reasons for this contradict
the conclusion that animals themselves
should be treated in the same way
because
plainly put animals don't have any
ethical standard animals do not belong
to a state
or a civil society and do not obey any
kind of
abstract or alienated norms or
institutions whatsoever for hegel
different societies and enter into
moreover a process again of mutual
recognition
and mutual development where it's tit
for tat they both participate and
develop
in it animals aren't capable of that now
you talk about the fact that humans
are obliged and have a duty to fulfill
animal interests but if animal interests
if they are intelligible
um would be radically incompatible with
vegan
veganism there are some animals which
for physiological reasons
must consume and lead to the death of
other animals
even beyond then the conclusion doesn't
actually follow from the premise
animal interests are in no way
compatible with the obligations
hegel believes a given citizen of a
state has
toward another human being which is part
of another state and part of another
community
or even just a random stranger
who isn't part of any clear society or
state
um the difference for hegel is that this
kind of benefit of the doubt that can be
afforded to the stranger
um this sorry emptiness and the
lack of determination apart upon on the
part of the stranger
contains and conceals uh
an imminent potentiality to enter into
the course of um
mutual recognition
and um being a part of some kind of
bigger community
um well i guess this is where i would
say
that say that animals aren't human um
neither is the the first um term in the
hegelian dialectic because humanity
presupposes a form of identity which has
not yet developed
um you know like for example like
notions of humanity even in like the
history of philosophy
um you know like seeing each other as
you know members of um
you know um like was it like homogenous
like
homogeneous like of the same species and
that didn't develop
in terms of self-consciousness even
historically until a certain
until a certain point and then in terms
of individualism
which you know allows the individual to
interact with their state
in a way which is a particular subject
versus
um you know um institutional um
obligations
which mediates the subjective freedom
and the object of freedom of the state
uh that didn't even develop as in until
like hegel really come around so
like these these notions in terms of the
development of
the dialectic um weren't even present um
at the point of the
at the point of the inception the point
of the inception at
um of the first premise of the dialect
is consciousness itself
the imminency and the foundation from
which all reality is
derived which is the consciousness is is
all that's really being considered
and you said that you know i think was
towards the start you said that
um i wouldn't disagree that the
end of history as it would like the end
of the hegelian dialectic would be the
same
well as an empty formulation in a
kantian sense
yeah it wouldn't be the same it would be
absolute knowing or absolute spirit
but what that actually looks like hegel
kind of leaves blank
deliberately because it's not something
that we are actually entitled to know
because of our
history our historicity um
and i don't think i don't know if you
would agree disagree with that um
in so much i would say that hegel would
not have predicted the rise of veganism
and the consideration of animals as the
growing dialectical process
i think that it is the consideration of
the conscious standard which pre-exists
the logic that was developed within the
dialectic
in the philosophy of uh sorry in the
science of right
he goes so far to say that um
where is it let's see if i can find it
second
and one second there just lost it
it's on the genesis of logic i do
believe
uh actually i know where i know where it
is i just realized i think it's page 45.
okay okay while he's doing that um for
people in the audience who have
questions put an asterisk on the
beginning and the end we'll be doing
audience questions in 20 minutes thank
you
um right okay he says that um
here we may quote it from like this is
from the philosophical sciences
encyclopedia of philosophical sciences
and he quotes himself um saying there is
nothing in heaven or nature or spirit or
anywhere else
that does not contain just as much
immediacy as mediation
so that both these determinations prove
to be unseparate
unseparated and inseparable and the
opposition between them
nothing real so in spirit there is no
actual opposition the negation of
negation leads to the unity of being
which is the unity of self-consciousness
and consciousness
animals are an aspect of consciousness
which we must become united
with and so with the development of the
dialectical process
and in consideration of a conscious
being would be a
lesser um media mediated and
a poor um contradictory uh position
within spirit
it would not be spirit as it is or
should be
it would be spirit as uh seen how we
would like it to be
and hegel actually mentions this in the
philosophy of right
where individuals come into conflict
with the law itself
um seeking to express what they think
ought to be the case rather than what
is the case and he says that we need to
essentially bend
to the to the existence of um value in
nature or the
value in consciousness rather than the
other way around
yeah but regarding the first thing you
said about the reason for
uh the fact that the end of history or
whatever
is not act or the philosophy of right
and so on and so on
was not realized until very recently
such changes whatever we want to make of
them is
assuming we're operating from this
strictly yelling perspective were not
physiological or natural changes
which they would have to be in the case
of animals i think again this is a kind
of false
almost caricature of the hegelian view
according to which
there is this kind of linear progression
between
lower and higher forms of being but for
hegel makes it quite clear that there is
a reason why animals exist
as animals and it makes sense animals
are not
moments in animals themselves are not
moments in humanity's being
human humanity possesses an aspect
within itself
that is comparable to the animal being
but
animals themselves uh it's not
so the fact that for most of humanity's
history it did not achieve
the kind of uh whatever you want to call
it i forgot
what you were trying to say it's all con
controversial stuff absolute knowing the
end of history
um and so on and so on this is not
actually uh this is not actually
something
that um animals this is something that
was always already possible
for human beings given their
physiological and natural
presuppositions given where they already
stand within
the philosophy of nature this is not
true for animals
and regarding this as an aside regarding
the question of absolute knowing
yes it's true that its contents are not
transparently pre-established but i
think you're confusing
uh what absolute knowing actually is
absolute knowing will not consist in a
position that's going to possess some
kind of uh
prescriptive stance toward what is truly
uh what one really ought to do and like
for example in terms of one's dietary
habits and ones
participate all of these things for
hegel uh
possess objectivity they possess
objectivity in the form of mores customs
traditions and so on and so on
the position of absolute knowing ends
from the perspective of philosophy
itself
namely the philosopher hegel himself
the one who is cognitive cognizant of
some kind of deeper harmony
of um history and being and so on and so
on
uh regarding the thing you said about
the unity of opposites
and the implication of the relation to
animals i don't really think it's
important to point out that for hegel
there are no true
contradiction it's only a matter of
reconciliation the negation
yeah it's not without it's not relevant
to what i was saying obviously yeah
but regarding this kind of end state of
the relation between humans and animals
again the practice of the consumption of
meat itself
is just as compatible with this such a
um such a consumption affirms
on the one hand uh the premises of
self-consciousness namely the need to
to satisfy physiological base animal
instincts and so on and so on
and on the other hand affirms the
self-consciousness
as a higher moment of being above the
animal kind
so the conclusion plainly doesn't follow
that we can't consume
meat just because so i think you're
making
uh an error here you're making uh you're
not taking note of a necessary
distinction
of course animals within the greater
uh within the greater
[Β __Β ] uh scheme
form a part and premise a possibility of
self-consciousness
this does not mean that we have an
obligation
to protect animals
because the manner by which this
develops
has already occurred it already has
occurred it's something that has
occurred imminently and is not
the result of um
like you so you talk about the
distinction between that the individual
must make
must bend to what is rather than what
ought right
but bending to what is in this case the
actual and um let's say uh
real relationship between mankind and
the animal world within hagel's scheme
acting in such a way that is cognizant
of what this
is in no way implies that animals
somehow
have rights and cannot be eaten and so
on and so on
um if
and again uh my argument is that the
the the best argument for what this
would look like is the very consumption
of animals
it's the very consumption of animals
that
uh that represents this
acting in regards to what is
so um
and that's why the consumption of meat
across the cultures and history of
mankind is laden with so much
tradition called careful tradition
culture and so on and so on
it can be even explained within this
hegelian scheme
um so yeah like animals
uh not being self-conscious is
not what i'm saying like i do agree
animals are not self-conscious
um animals are animals are not the
middle term
where the middle term um where the
self-consciousness which is
coming to know itself to develop in the
absolute spirit that is
that is the dialectical process and it's
been developing since the inception
which was from consciousness itself
all the way through to the development
of absolute knowing which is the unity
of this middle term with the first term
in the conclusion
which is absolute knowing that's our
absolute spirit
which contains absolute knowledge that
absolute knowledge is as we say like
indeterminate and uh is
non-contradictory in con
in relationship in nature like no
contradictions exist in nature
but the contradictions that exist within
us are what are driving us forward in
terms of the negation of negation
which is leading us to this absolute
spirit and so these contradictions
are contradictions are our awareness
of the contradiction of the mediating
term ourselves
and nature we are realizing that we
ourselves have created
our identities which are inadequately
describing the system of drives
which pre-exists that identity we are
wrongly sublimating
and um engaging in our desires within
society
as to not allow for the greatest
expression of subjectivity within this
hegelian dialect
dialectic which is why uh the conception
of a better and better society
is the greater and greater expression of
the system of drives
animals are within the system of drives
they are simply not conscious of the
system of drives
we are the mediating force they are what
we are
they are part of what we are mediating
they are subject to
our um ethics in our attempts to make
sure that they live
good lives so for example um you know
our consideration of animals an animal
might want to get like
jabbed up or like you know some sort of
vaccine but we would do that to them
regardless of their
you know of their um resistance because
they are not aware
of the positives that would be affecting
them in terms of the system of drives
itself
because we are the self-consciousness we
are what determines
um the abstract notions of right from
which are
which you know determine our treatment
to them but what
is well we are what determine the
contingent laws which are reflective of
the imminent right
which is universal and necessary within
consciousness
the consciousness itself is
immediate consciousness itself contains
immediate notions of right which we are
not aware of
so the animals like animals themselves
and all conscious beings contain this
logical necessity
from which ontological's a necessity
predating logic
actually in terms of the hegelian
dialectic spirit is the necessary
foundation for the production of logic
and in such the resistance that exists
within animals
is the necessary negation from which
logic
requires we would have no notion of
negation and the law of
non-contradiction
at all um or the notion of identity at
all
without the negative force of an
external will
which is essentially what hegel is
pointing to so when we see an external
will embodied in an animal form
if it cannot recognize us it cannot form
a dialectical relationship
and form rules of abstract right that is
absolutely true
but being a conscious being it is
governed by those rules
just as we are the we do not produce
these notions of right
and therefore determine and govern uh as
we see fit based off
our mutual power relationship with the
other the power relationship is actually
an obscurity
really which is prevent preventing us
from seeing reality
in a way which is un um corrupted
by our attempts to put our subjectivity
over the objectivity of what we both
share which is the will so when we look
at the fact that an animal cannot
engage in this power relationship or in
a state of mutual recognition
it's not that the animal is not what we
are recognizing we actually must
imminently recognize the animal
to even have began the dialectic which
is i think you agreed to the animals are
conscious and we do recognize that they
are conscious and feel pain and pleasure
and so on um
animals simply do not recognize it
themselves we do recognize that
consciousness
and we do recognize it in the other but
we recognize as well
that are the rules that we have the
embodied traditions are expressions of
right
that are embodied in consciousness
itself within ourselves
and the other animals do fulfill the
mandate of being the other
they simply cannot fulfill that mandate
within a dialectical
process they cannot um continue
um the um they cannot continue
and form a relationship which you know
constitutes either a master slave
relationship
or a um constant uh conceptual
development they can't hold notions and
concepts
uh we can and we hold notions and
concepts which embody them
and give them meaning uh just as much uh
well
sorry um highlight or uh explanate
the meaning that already exists within
them their pain and pleasure is valuable
in and of itself
we can't know that and meaning and has
to be this way
for hegel the and i think you know
thinkers such as robert brandom
um even talk about how the
some the the foundations of semantics
have to be within reality itself
if we do not allow our words and our
meanings to be given
objective reality separate from this
self-conscious mediation within the
dialectic they
would be would lose grounding it
wouldn't actually make sense there would
be no
unity between what is the mediating
force of the middle term
unconsciousness itself which again is
why hegel
sorry about that uh which is why hegel
says that consciousness or
that um uh that in spirit there is
nothing unseparabe
unseparated unseparated and inseparable
they are um okay lewis just try and wrap
it up in the next 30 seconds because
we're running up your time and i want to
get past the last one
keep going yeah that's that's absolutely
fine they are inseparable and the
notions between consciousness and
self-consciousness are unified in
absolute knowing and absolute
right and this would give us the
foundations for a perfect
will it would actually destroy um
subjectivity in terms of um
and united with objectivity the subject
would be
inherently objective if they were a
member of the community which engaged in
a law
which was absolutely perfect and
absolutely correspondent
to the law of right within nature
okay um so it seemed like you said a lot
of
extremely irrelevant things um
as to the actual debate and point at
hand um
i don't even know if we're gonna have
time to cover all of it but i think i'm
just gonna try and simplify it
to put it simply you are confusing
philosophy of right
with philosophy of nature you're
assuming
that the philosophy of right
is tasked with reproducing
voluntarily the philosophy of nature but
this isn't true
obviously philosophy of nature is a
premise
of the possibility of philosophy of
right
uh put it put differently obviously
nature
is a premise of humanity and uh
spirit and so on and so on but this does
not impose
a duty or an ethical obligation
on part of individuals to
um to uh
preserve this process in a manner
outside of the self-preservation and
self-realization of spirit itself in
other words
like i said animals are not somehow on
the ladder to becoming human agents and
we just have to cultivate
them as an aspect of our being and uh
because they represent or sorry they um
occupy this fear of drives that permit
whatever
but animals will always be animals this
is what you're not understanding this is
why you're confusing the two
things you're making a really crude kind
of
is ought to distinction which is foreign
to
hegel's position you're effectively
trying to say that
because hegel descriptively outlines
some kind of place humanity has within
the whole of nature
humanity then has an ethical obligation
to fulfill this um same
same premises but as a matter of fact
these premises are fulfilled in a manner
that is antecedent
to right and men are antecedent to
obligations
so it could not be possibly be the case
that this could
it would it would be constant right
moreover
even if in some sense this is what
happens namely humanity must
account for its premises obviously
outside of the sphere of ethics uh
and right since such a thing would not
be possible
hegel makes it very clear like if
for example if animals cannot form
within the scheme
of ethics and ethical life proper we can
just condense it that way
that is not our problem that's the
problem of nature itself
this is what is the result of nature
itself
superimposing some kind of duty
to account for our natural premises
beyond accounting for
our our determinate natural premises
for example our need to survive and our
need to satisfy
our animal base wants and so on and so
on is completely foreign to the hegelian
scheme we ourselves are
we so far as we are concerned this is a
very important distinction
we ourselves so far as we are concerned
are the only subject of um
ethics and rights and so on and so on uh
in regard sorry not ethics and rights uh
are only relevant in regard i got two
hours of sleep
in regards to our material premises now
uh you talk about
the fact that we both agree that animals
uh
are conscious i agree but only in a very
restricted
hegelian sense hegel remember is an
idealist what most people mean
colligally by consciousness
is in fact self-consciousness so i just
want to point that out for the audience
now you say that attending to the wants
or needs of animals
it has to be this way on account of the
very fact that animals comprise the kind
of premises
of thinking beings
but the manner by which animals comprise
the premises of thinking beings
happens in a way that is outside of the
sphere
of ethical uh duties of these same
thinking beings
for example hegel does not actually
speak of a right
to food or things like that
even even in so far as it concerns our
subsistence
so it's a kind of ought is distinction
we do
reproduce our physiological premises
that condition
the necessity of self-consciousness but
we do so only
in so far as it is a moment in the
realization of uh spirit we don't do so
as a
matter of imposing some kind of um
abstract duty upon
the world and upon culture and society
now
the crux uh i wrote notes separately to
remember what you were saying the manner
by which this unity of consciousness and
self-consciousness you're talking about
um expresses itself
imminently not voluntarily it doesn't
express itself
in a way that
it doesn't express itself according to
the voluntary will
of the individual it expresses itself
um in the form of the very determinate
development
of history itself so this unity between
self-consciousness
and consciousness that you're talking
about
is something effectively already
reconciled
for hegel it's not that
it's not the fact that uh we are not
vegans
means it's not reconciled no it is
precisely reconciled moreover i find it
interesting that you neglect
the wider point that why can't our
cultural dietary practices of animal
slaughter and consumption and so on and
so on which have many
cultural meaning and laden with
depth and so on and so on why does this
not
according to your view accomplish this
very same
such unity why is it that the
consumption of animals
necessarily means that
self-consciousness denies
the premises its own premises in the
form of consciousness
why could it not also mean that it
affirms its
premises and consciousness after all
isn't that why
especially upon eating meat and people
being brought together in a community to
slaughter a cow or something or a goat
that they basically express their
gratefulness
their some kind of deep gratefulness
that
in a sense not much separates us from
animals uh but at the same time
something manages to and this is of both
a very humbling and
uh both a very humbling and
empower sorry uh what's the [Β __Β ] word
dignified
experience both very humbling and uh
very dignified
so far as our humanity is concerned um
all right so we're running up to time
yeah yeah um if you guys want to take
five minutes before i go into questions
to grab water or something you've been
here for a long time
so for anybody in the audience if you
want to ask questions uh put them in
asterisks we'll go for about 15 or so
minutes i think we're not going to go
too long our participants are extremely
tired
and um well thank you very much so we'll
come back in five minutes if you're both
cool with that you can go grab a drink
or something and then we'll
get started on audience questions sound
good would house be okay with this just
like
um just making a few points just just
essentially just off what he said there
only if you let me interrupt you
um yeah yeah that seems fair enough uh
within reason i mean like going like
just interrupt like every two seconds or
something just so i don't like actually
say something
absolutely um yeah so um um
hegel doesn't outline humanity's place
um
like as in the the beginning of the
dialectic in his philosophy of nature it
does that in uh
in the phenomenology of spirit and this
is the pre-philosophical work really in
the sense that this outlines the
onological commitments
necessary in philosophy for the
development in the science of logic
so and the beginning of this is
consciousness it's not
it's not the notion of humanity so
humanity's place in nature is secondary
to the its place
in uh the dialectic which is yeah but
the philosophy of nature outlines the
process by which
such a being uh whose development is
expressed in the philosophy
philosophy of mind is possible
um somewhat i think that hegel's notions
in the i think hegel's notions of nature
are tentative and i think that will
i think for hegel at least you may not
agree with it before hegel himself this
is true
oh well for hegel it's it's certainly um
well i would say that it was it's a good
work i don't think that he's necessary
i would not i don't agree with
everything it says but that's separate
um i don't think there is a confliction
in nature in the sense that we are
consuming them
i do think that we can satisfy our uh
system of drives within a vegan society
uh we can sublimate uh our base drives
and needs
uh with a vegan diet and we can live
happy healthy lives and no
yeah i'm not i'm not denying that that's
possible although i think i would argue
that point my point was that
this is not the only manner by which
this would be possible in the most
consistent
and all manner in a way that
is in harmony with uh our
with the realization of spirit basically
um i guess that's the point of
contention because i would say that the
unity of dialectic is an
ever developing not reconciled process
between consciousness and
self-consciousness
that's precisely why it's reconciled
well it's reconciled in formal terms in
but not in but not in concrete
um real terms no it is it is precisely
reconciled
um no i think that there is the the
confliction between the individual and
themselves which is
why the development of spirit the whole
point for hegel is that development
is itself a concrete something that is
concretely reconciled
in becoming but it only is um
it is only truly reconciled when it
becomes unified absolutely with himself
which is the point of absolute spirit um
which hegel claims was
is accomplished in his own work
yes but he also claims to say that the
like
it's almost it's reconciled its absolute
spirit is an ever-developing
infinite isn't it the infiniti yeah of
course it's ever developing but
for hegel that is precisely why it is
reconciled at the same time this
development fits within the scheme
of absolute knowledge itself yeah
but absolutely no but it's the contents
of absolute knowledge are obviously not
pre-written
somewhere but um
the development hegel talks about is
already is already uh
reconciled in its form whatever form it
so happens to be
which hegel was open about yeah but i i
would say that the absolute knowing is a
development from the
logic which is also developing so it's
like yes
hegel reckons recognizes that absolute
knowing is dependent upon the
philosophical forms that are available
to us
but they themselves are developing logic
itself is developing
from epoch to epoch from individual to
individual in terms of a societal
development
for for hegel his was the end
his was the accomplishment of absolute
knowing it was the culmination for
this was the ambition and scope of
hegel's position i know it's a
contentious contended by many
hegelians but i think these hegelians
are kind of uh
chickening out as far as the actual
audacity of hegel's enterprise i don't
think that
i mean don't get me wrong i do think
that he's an audacious kind of guy i
don't think he's that audacious because
he does say that the child of the next
generation is superior to the gene
uh the genius uh the genius of this well
i think what's being mistaken here is
that for hegel
the enterprise of philosophy is
accomplished
this doesn't mean history itself is
ended
in in the strict sense of like there
will no longer be any development
after this obviously that's not hagel's
position but so far as it concerns the
ailment higgle considers there to be a
fundamental
ailment in the enterprise of philosophy
he considers this to be
resolved in his specifics i would agree
with that i would agree with that i
would say that hegel sees himself as
resolving the conflictions in society
and particularly the mediation between
the
external and the internal world which
had plagued philosophy for like
over a thousand years um i would say
okay guys
this this is interesting i'm going to
set a timer for this for 10 minutes and
i'm going to go into audience questions
is that all right
do you guys still want you guys to want
five minutes to
like whatever i'm just going to say one
more thing and then i'm happy to take
the break
go for it um so yeah i would say that
you mentioned like the community
bringing together to slaughter an animal
um as an act of uh unification uh within
consciousness
i would say that the slaughter of the
animal is the destruction of
consciousness
in which an individual associates with a
particular identity
over the universality of consciousness
and represents something like an in and
out group
that would be fundamental to what we see
in
underdeveloped notions of right which
hegel points towards various cultures
and his philosophy of history
as having um and i would say that
communities which engage in this um you
know communal
action are ignorant to the
self-destructive process
which ultimately destroys their own uh
self-consciousness
um in in in that why is it a destruction
of consciousness
because it's the inconsideration of
another of consciousness
in its of consciousness simplicity
why is that why can it not also be an
acknowledgement of consciousness
simplicity and its relation to us
i mean for example the animal kingdom is
itself
like i think there's a lot of confusion
here the animal kingdom itself
is a site of extreme violence
not violence proper i guess but it's a
site of
violence is an anthropomorphic term
animals are eating each other and
whatever dying for no reason and it's a
brutal whatever thing
so eating an animal is in a sense
acknowledging
the actual reality of consciousness
simplicity
actually rejecting eating an animal i
think would be this very same
annihilation of consciousness implicit
or you're talking about the annihilation
of consciousness simplicity
is the rejection of the fact that
there's a distinction between
self-consciousness and consciousness
it's almost like
there is really a imposition
of the of whims that could only possibly
result from self-consciousness
or whims or moral conscience upon
conscious beings like
you are super imposing the human
a product of a strictly human
perspective
um upon animals but animals themselves
don't really give a [Β __Β ] about any of
that
stuff they don't so when we eat an
animal we are in a sense
acknowledging this fact of both the
animal being and our
own being um i guess what i would say to
that is that
in the consciousness of the animal do we
still see the system of drives
which is why you say animals do like act
on their own
impulses and uh hegel recognizes that
they act on their own impulses and are
actually slaves to them
um i don't disagree with that but that
precisely is why
it must be mediated by us as
self-consciousness as being
expressed but as as forms of
self-consciousness
we ourselves possess drives we do we are
not elevated above our
drives to um determine them voluntarily
we are still bounded by
our own drives and hegel recognizes as
much it's why hegel
completely rejects the kantian moral
perspective because for hegel the
kantian moral perspective
is marked by what he calls the stamp of
particularity we are really given to our
drives whether we want to elevate
ourselves above them
voluntarily or not i do agree with that
actually
um but that's precisely why we share the
exact same
um primordial right as animals the
consciousness and the
the this is the right that was proven
this right was already proven in the
fact that we human beings have history
the right was not proven
so far as animals were concerned but the
proof is separate from
uh well actually the like the right the
right does not exist for
animals precisely because it has not
developed through the court through a
animals do not have a history
so what how can they possibly have this
right if this right
was not imminently developed in history
itself it's a right that
we alone are affording a recognition
too that was that would be um a mistake
to say that the right as a development
of history the right
and development of ontology that exists
separate from us our
understanding of right its development
is through history
the ontological development of right
occurs through the course of history
itself
the middle term the self-consciousness
itself is the development of
of history the understanding of
consciousness
is the development of history
consciousness is the development
of nature itself and so is right
yes but so but
right right both right and nature for
hegel
um are reproduced in this development of
history
exactly which is why we constantly try
to
remove the separation between what we
consider to be right or what we want to
be right in terms of power dynamics yeah
relationship so this this right is
suspended in history itself
and whatever initial right
um human beings possessed the insight
into it is developed by history but this
insight is not some kind of individual
enterprise in which we look at animals
oh this fits somewhere within the scheme
it's something that
actually happens in history this is what
i'm trying to say
it actually does happen imminently it's
not because
individuals like sherlock holmes
discovered something
i don't disagree i think the the value
of genius in the hegelian
dialectic is nominal like it
they're just expressions of the spirit
of the day
i i don't disagree with that um what i'm
saying is that
the laws and fundamental um notions of
rape which we have developed
uh respective of the right which exists
within nature
is um constantly growing and is a
mediation between
um us or what we think to be right
and what is actually right and right
what is actually right
imposes its reality not because
it imposes its reality in an imminent
way is what i'm trying to say
it's not because i would completely
agree i would completely agree with it
it's not it's not because we say this is
right uh but because we i know you don't
you wouldn't like me using this word
abstract but because we arrive at it by
some kind of
abstract conceptual or even scientific
investigation
we discover what is right through an
imminent development of history itself
and i don't see veganism fitting within
the scheme of that
imminent development i don't see any
indications of it becoming
a phenomena that can subsist outside of
what hegel would call the unhappy
consciousness
okay we'll call that we'll call that an
ending statement because we're going to
move into audience questions if you want
to touch on this during the questions
you're welcome to
uh louis yeah but um yeah um and in fact
since
uh has had the last statement i'm going
to send the first question to you
um this is from uh g-nut does
prospective philosophy realize that
animals are savage beings that rape and
kill all the time
why should humans apply ethics to them
yeah i do realize that
animals are savage beings that rape and
kill all the time animals are horrible
man
like i don't know some of them are um
animals can be
vicious uh you know what we what many
would have considered natural
evils almost i mean evil being an
inappropriate term in a hegelian sense
but
you know the there's a lot of horrors in
nature i definitely understand that
but that doesn't mean that animals are
not moral subjects or moral patients
it means that they are in can they
cannot engage
in a dialectical process means that an
animal like a lion when it mauls a human
hasn't denied the value of our
experience for its own
it was unaware of our experience in a
way which is meaningful
and produces a notion of um conscious
conscience which is um developing
from you know this uh process of right
the instead an animal is um you know
subject to its impulses and its drives
it is moved by them it is a slave
to nature whilst we are not um in that
we can see that animals have drives and
are conscious
and they have value and wish to express
those drives they contain subjectivity
they simply do not own themselves and
cannot express that subjectivity
in a way that is um
capable of freedom in a hergelian sense
an animal can never be free
but an animal is valuable and for us to
be free
we must respect that value and try to
perpetuate their freedom
as much as possible to give the greatest
ontological foundation to our beliefs to
respect the middle term
just as much uh sorry the first term
just as much as the middle term
within the dialect process
and uh this is for has from herisenberg
um
this is a two-parter has how do you
respond to a characterization of your
argument as quote unquote evolutionary
colonialism
you recognize that ape slash humans got
there first by achieving
self-consciousness but you deny animals
their quote-unquote right to evolve
[Music]
no please don't let me don't let me deny
animals right to evolve please evolve um
whatever that even means um
[Music]
i i i don't see what you're saying uh
how are we denying the right of animals
uh
here's what do you mean evolutionary
colonialism we're stopping the cows from
uh
uh having a monarchy because
we're eating them i don't see how one
follows i think i think achieving
absolute spirit
but yeah i mean i i to respond to that
um animal consumption does not first of
all animal consumption does not
necessarily
first of all here's why it's face value
wrong because
colonialism is not simply something that
was condemned by virtue of the guilty
conscience
of colonizers the colonial themselves
rose up and overthrew those
[Β __Β ]
so the day a cow and a goat can do that
be my guest cows and goats overthrow me
just like
you know people in africa were thrown
overthrowing the spanish and the french
and the british
please do it if if you can but i don't
think they're going to be doing that any
time soon that's my response
yeah i think you're going to eat those
words someday this is for perspective
philosophy
from angelo marney how important is
mutual recognition are animals capable
of engaging
in history um i don't think animals are
capable of engaging in history
um at least maybe not all of them it's i
guess it's possible that some would be
would be capable of um at least some
forms of um conceptual development some
animals have been taught
like some more primitive linguistic
concepts and able to
adhere to them that doesn't mean that
they wouldn't necessarily be
um attributable to a dialectical form i
don't think that's necessarily important
the development of history
isn't a development that is meant to
replace nature
but is meant to uh develop our
understanding of nature
our understanding of right it's not
meant to replace right the fundamental
right
that existed at the beginning of the
dialectic when man was pre-linguistic
or partially linguistic or becoming
linguistic
was is the same right that is being
expressed
um at the end of the dialectic the truth
doesn't change it is fundamental it is
um inherent
uh within the ontology of being itself
what changes
is uh our mediation with it
thank you also from angela marnie for
has um has how do you feel about
post-humanism
it depends on what you mean by that um
i think a lot of the conceptions of
humanism
have thus far been straw straw men
i think i kind of i did have many
disagreements with him but
i kind of sympathize with um
the neo-rationalists i don't know if
they still call themselves like
reza negarstani and others who say that
we have underestimated what human means
thus far
human does not mean
the subject of humanitarianism which is
something recent so
i think we have underestimated what is
the human
uh thus far and if we acquire an
appreciation of the human
we will once again be allowed to
recognize the significance of uh
humanism as a historical phenomena
which has been strawmanned in the modern
age and not the modern but the 21st
century
thank you very much uh for perspective
philosophy
from voidborn wouldn't it be a more
grounded position to concede that
animals are not equal to humans since
they cannot form societies
so then humans being higher should be
allowed to preserve animals
um well this is this is what it depends
on what you consider the notion of
equality the notion of equality
is not the power dynamic in terms of an
individual's
um of an individual's ability to let's
say overthrow another
and for example the colonials that were
overthrown in
and defeated by the natives what they
did was wrong
not because they were overthrown but
because of the reasons that they were
overthrown
and the development of that
consciousness in
but that's only proven when they're
overthrown
the reasons are only proven in the act
of overthrowing
i i would disagree i would say that it
develops within consciousness itself
the mediation between the individual and
the other can happen without let's say a
violent contestation
but the the point is finished and then
you're going to go okay
and yeah i would say i would say that is
necessarily the case i would say that we
know this in terms of
there are many cultures that have been
absolutely annihilated by
other cultures as in their consciousness
and their spirit has been
incapable of having the ethical growth
which would necessarily gain
uh which would necessarily give us the
resistance necessary to to develop it
the point of the point of the matter is
the ontological resistance
of the will is what we become
um uh conscious of that is what we
become conscious of in terms of right we
see the resistance
we see the harm we see the negativity in
terms of consciousness and that
contradiction and we seek to resolve it
within a new dynamic which is what the
overthrowing process
is the overthrowing process is not a
development
of a notion of this is now wrong nor the
slavery was wrong
and therefore we seek to cast off these
chains
thank you okay has go yeah well i wasn't
aware we're still debating he's like
answering questions and also trying to
respond and rebuke my previous points so
that's why
but if you want to if you want your
objective i'll give you i'll give you a
couple minutes
okay sure yeah yeah i'm sorry i didn't
mean to like cause a contestation now
yeah so in in the case of um
in the case of the overthrowing this is
what you say you want to be the case
in your head but in real history as far
as real history is concerned
it is true that might is right it is
actually true
this is also true within the hegelian
scheme itself how else does slave become
slave
and master become master the reason why
slave some kind of different result is
produced from the master slave dialectic
isn't because
um some kind of guilty conscience on
part of the master but because of an
imminent development that renders
this slave puts the slave in a position
superior ultimately to the master
now regarding his business of entire
cultures and peoples
being annihilated i would contest that
this happens in a way
that does not ultimately affect the
imminent reality of
uh of the uh annihilating uh
force in some kind of way i think that
the pretension of europe and america
to absolute power and colonial powers of
absolute power
is a bluff they can't do it because
doing so would fundamentally affect
their own societies in a way they cannot
afford it similar to the israel kind of
uh
gaza situation can the israeli merit
military go and
do horrible things eliminate
gaza yes they can but they can't
physically yes but they still
can't not because it was determined
ethically but because
the consequences would not be possible
both internally and
obviously for the international scene so
this is what i mean the act of
overthrowing is what effectively proves
because we don't know before the fact it
is effectively what proves
uh right and wrong um
thank you i i definitely disagree with
that i will say i think that
the the proof of right and wrong
um is essentially established in the
self-consciousness that is
uh come to the conclusion that this
action of um
control and domination was wrong
that that development that doesn't
account for the contingencies
of things like strategy and war and all
of those things for hegel are not
accidental contingencies they figure
within the deeper rationality of right
and
or the will so for hegel all of those
contingencies are not
accidents the reason why for example
napoleon defeats europe isn't simply
because of contingent whatever it's
actually because
this is in a sense right
from the perspective of history i i
disagree i think that what he would say
and i think this is i think an
understanding of hegel would lend itself
to an understanding of ideological power
and
um political power just as much as
authoritarian power
so the direct opposition of the of the
individual
uh to us but this distinction
not only does hegel overcome this
distinction in history this distinction
is overcome
in like maoist guerrilla war strategy or
people's war like
the ideology for example marxism
leninism
and its ability to strategically when
these are or
let's say win the class struggle these
are one and the same thing it's not like
oh first you're right then you win no
you winning is proof
that you're right if you can't win
you're not right so you have to win
basically well i would have i would have
said i would have said another thing i
would have said that i think it would be
embodied really in the philosophy of
someone like martin luther king
and the the developments that he managed
to produce
um non-violently but through an act of
resistance and the resistance itself and
its demonstration to the world
showed um civil society the injustice
that was going on and allowed for
the development within civil society
without actually i'm more of a malcolm x
guy so let's just leave it there and
that's like the difference between us
basically
one question in terms of mao they
in and mao's philosophy do you not think
that he's fundamentally wrong on his
rejection of the negation of negation
and um falling into i think
uh you know a form of
particularity and everything can be
fundamentally
and almost nominalism really he has a
one-sided dialectic of um
kind of almost uh pure either pure
negation or this kind of pure
reconciliation i think mao was both
correct and incorrect he was correct
because his rejection of the
prior conception of the negation of the
negation allowed him to introduce
the concept of infinity to the marxist
dialectic which is coming from chinese
tradition and the chinese philosophy
and this was an incredible achievement
in innovation ultimately
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negation of negation can be made
compatible with mao zedong thought
but it must first take note of the
achievements of mao zedong thought but
yes he doesn't he rejects the nation
negation of the negation but this is in
a sense
necessary for the time and it's
necessary uh
for that time for him to do that okay
thanks guys we're going to move on to
the next question
um i'm going to combine these two for
has because they're relevant to each
other so this is from voidburn and
noobslayer u
so question for has exceptions like
cephalopods and dolphins have been able
to express higher levels of
self-awareness and
thought why is it the fact that the
species is what matters
but not the universality of
consciousness itself that matters
because the universality of
consciousness as you're putting it is a
kind of
it's not what hegel means it's a kind of
like new age spiritualism thing
so when it comes to all of the newly
observed things about dolphins and even
apes
these still do not go beyond the bounds
of what hegel described animals in the
philosophy of nature as being only acted
upon by immediate and pure externalities
so the fact that different animals
display different degrees of complexity
does not
still does not accomplish the necessary
um
step toward entering history entering
itself there's a qualitative difference
that we're talking about here
that's whatever i know you maybe saw
something about a dolphin
that impressed you or an orangutan but
this is still not enough
for uh them to be ethical subjects
proper
thank you last question for prospective
philosophy this is from angelo marney
how do you justify imposing moral
obligations on other people from a
hegelian perspective
um i don't i don't think that you can
impose a moral obligation
um or an ethical obligation really is
what we should say
in the sense that i don't think that we
can impose something that is outside of
outside of our society and the
development of the concepts from which
we share
everything that i'm saying is
conceptually um available
to you you not only speak the same
language but mostly we're part of
the same culture most people that you
know watch my streams that are engaging
in this
have some shared um ethical concepts or
the majority of the
majority of which share the same ethical
concepts uh we share
to the point in which we could develop
um laws which
govern human behavior relative to each
other
and also to animals as well i think that
there are some societies which have not
hit this point
um and there are some individuals you
know some uh
you know aspects of spur which have not
hit this point and you can't force this
um progression you know hegel says moral
progression is impossible
and i agree with that but you can
challenge it with rational argumentation
and allow for the development of spirit
to happen from external and internal
critique and this is a challenge to
dogmatism itself
rather than a challenge to um rather
than the imposition
of a moral law upon an individual who
would have no um
conceptual connection to it but doesn't
this kind of contradict the hegelian
perspective according to which
whereupon the insights of reason so far
as the individual is concerned
conflict with the deeper rationality of
society in the world
so much worse for the individual's
insights it just reflects a narrow
perspective
so how could arriving at some kind of
conceptual
uh insight on part of the individual or
rational insight on part of the
individual
possibly have consequences for
the society as a whole 100 must have
the whole point of the laws the laws
themselves
are are produced from the dialectical
um production the dialectical engagement
of subject and subject
uh there is no objectivity before that
and then the objectivity of the law
imposed upon those individuals is um the
freedom of the individual from their own
subjectivity
and the elevation of their subjectivity
or to the objective subject
um and and so that that is their freedom
so like to say that like um
like the the difference is is that this
has to be reconciled within the
consciousness of an individual
uh hegel would say the um the
uh abstract enactment of a law from
which individuals did not
have a conceptual understanding of as
inherently wrong he actually points out
that laws from which individuals cannot
understand
such as the he points out a historical
event in which they hammered the laws
higher than anyone could see as being
inherently
unjustified and it actually prevents an
individual from engaging with the law
the law and punishment itself is meant
to enact the subjectivity
and maturity of the individual and so
the punishment of the individual when
they breach the law
is actually a reckon a reconciliation of
that individual
with society and themselves we respect
that they knew the law they could
understand the law
and that they chose to act otherwise
define this or own subjectivity
yeah obviously that's true but that
still doesn't
address the point which is if the law is
the self-consciousness of the individual
then
laws are not established because
individuals come to insights in the way
that
you are coming to an insight here laws
are established because of a combination
of the
contradiction between state and civil
society where it's harmony
um the private interests the all sorts
of different kinds of factors
which are more fundamental particularity
passions which are more fundamental than
just the individual's conceptual use of
reason
but what they are is the individual
elevated to the point of universality
it's a relationship
and if philosophically yeah but this
comes from this
yes but hang on hang on hang on slow
down perspective philosophy finish your
thought then house
um okay yeah i'm just saying it's a
relationship it's a hermeneutic
relationship between the individual
themselves and the as an individual
instancing of the universal principle so
the individual themselves
is um a necessary component in this so a
society which does not allow for the
freedom of an individual
and rejects the freedom of an individual
would be inherently
uh dogmatic and tyrannical and negative
for hegel
yes i understand that laws
elevates the self-conscious but here's
the thing
there's a reason why they have to exist
in the estranged form of the law
it's not just a matter of kind of
worldly convenience it's the fact
that this self-consciousness is greater
than what can be afforded by the
insights of individual reason alone now
the individual can be cognizant
of the law but even
in being cognizant of the law this will
not fully satisfy
the demands of the rational subject
insofar as they do not recognize uh
the reality of a supra supra individual
irrationality that can often
come at the expense of their
expectations prejudices and beliefs
like a thief in the night so to speak
like uh it's an expression of a higher
cunning i would agree
i would agree with that i guess the only
thing i would say is that
just just finish up really quickly
because it has two more questions needs
to answer and then we're going to wrap
up yeah that's fine
i just said that essentially um that's
true the universality of reason
is you know essentially the driving
force of what we must give ourselves
into
we must we are subject to the laws we
cannot override them in the irony of the
subjective
but that the laws are constitutive of
subjects
coming together reasoning together and
putting forward their rational
um their rational um conclusions
to produce the laws the laws should be
rationally attainable by everyone
and so um follow what is
um a testable and reliable understand
testable and reliable
to the understanding of an individual
and be produced from
all of the individuals and the
consideration of those individuals and
not produced by
a class of individuals like a master
slave dialectic would
give itself into but hegel precisely
disagrees
when is precisely produced by a kind of
class of individuals not democratically
it's the class of
civil society sorry it's the class of
civil servants
the well if you look at if you look at
how um
how hegel's society works it's almost
like trifecta
isn't it with the king sitting on the
top so you've got um
like you've got essentially civil
society um uh was it civil society
um individual interests or private
interests
and um and then is it the king or
there's it's like another
there's another um institution i think
that also mediates
but they're also all contradictory uh
drives within society
that are being mediated by the king it's
not yeah it's not democratic
and yeah but the king himself is and
people
argue about whether he was just
essentially tipping his heart
essentially to the the king at the time
because
uh and for his own political interest
which i think he was
because the king himself has no um
subjective formulation
they are entirely objective the king is
the form
is the king is purely the expression of
the will of the people
the king would be replaceable with an ai
like
not neces i mean the king is inherited
by tradition and custom and there's
there's there's a
argument to be made for why hegel was
not necessarily
just trying to circumvent censors and so
on and so on
obviously the king doesn't have a lot of
power
basically to some of what you're saying
but for hegel
it's not like this kind of neil kantian
which is how i think you're describing
it this kind of neo-kantian
social democratic kind of we all get
together and rationally decide an
outcome in some kind of way for hagel no
it's it's not it's hegel rejects this
volunteerism i think almost explicitly
in his form of the rejection of his
critique of the english reform bill and
his
uh critique of the french revolution and
so on and so on
well okay lewis final word and then
we're gonna move on to the next question
that's that's fair enough i think that
hegel being
um hegel it wouldn't agree with
something like a marxist lenin estate i
don't believe or any sort of
um top-down sort of um dictatorship he
may agree with the
dictate of the proletariat dependent
let's not get into this let's just
yeah yeah that's fair um but i will say
that hegel does lend himself
to um i would say democracy um in many
ways which is why a lot of
you know hegelians are pro-democracy and
myself included i think that democracy
analytically aliens like brandon and
pippin like the hardcore hegelians
not so much you know oh absolutely i
mean you can go and read um
the beginner's guide to the philosophy
of write written by david ross
who is more continental than [Β __Β ] than i
don't know swiss cheese his name
sounds at anglo like what about kojev
and people like that like
real i'm not i'm not denying that there
are people that do interpret hegel and
like hardcore
i think real hegelians continental
hegelians um
can be liberals even um i just think
that i think that is a bad stance to
take i'm not a liberal
um but you know what i would say is that
something like
um socialism and uh you know i would
even say something like
something close that even anarchism
lends itself to hegel in a way let's
debate about that another day jesus
christ
thank you very much guys all right uh
has there's
two final questions for you and then
we're going to wrap up so the first is
from uh horizonburg
uh could factory farming be a morally
acceptable practice under socialism if
so what conditions would need to be met
for to be acceptable
obviously it could be morally acceptable
i don't see where morality
is has relevance here um
morality i if i'm a socialist i'm a
marxist right so
remarks this kind of um
estrangement of morality and ethics and
religion
from the actual uh material reproduction
of society as a result of the division
of labor so for marx
um
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the new society kind of reconciles
all of these things into determinate
forms of labor
and things like that it's not like these
are all we
approach things from is this morally
correct is this religiously correct for
marx all of these things
become reconciled
so is factory farming morally accepted
well
it doing away with factory farming would
not be because
of moral considerations that's your
question
i think there are health considerations
and things like that to be investigated
but
from a moral perspective i don't see why
it's the problem
thank you and final question for has um
this is from josh henniosa
i take this to be a accusation of
two fallacies so i'll let you just
respond to them uh the first
is name the trait also you are appealing
to nature and tradition fallacy
i don't know what this uh name the trait
stuff is from ask yourself
i think i've already debated i had i
debated someone from their server and i
talked about
why this is not i watched that debate i
don't know i'll put it on
louis is familiar with it does he want
to give a quick explication well
just let me answer the second question
please i know what no
name the trade is i know what name the
trade is i reject name the trait because
it's undialectical that's my
summarization
uh the real difference between mankind
and animals
is not because of some kind of formally
and
arbitrarily formally intelligible trait
it's because of something suspended in
actual area it's proven in a dialectic
way not because of some kind of
axiom or dogma the second thing was a
question about
appeal to nature and tradition
um i didn't i didn't actually
appeal to nature and tradition if this
is what you're saying
um but that doesn't mean that
traditions attest to a deeper
rationality
um that requires one to possess an
attitude of caution and more
consideration like oftentimes when
people critique
traditions they're taking a one-sided
and very narrow perspective
in relation to those same traditions
they're not
actually understanding why those
traditions have
stood the test of time and the reason is
not because
people are simply less intelligent than
you are
that would assume that tradition the
reason i have problems with this as a
logical fallacy is because it assumes
that the products of in the individual
use of logic
premise real human traditions but what
premises real human traditions is not
the individual
use of logic um what premises are
traditions is ontological it is our
fundamental
relationship to both our own being and
nature and so on and so on so i reject
this kind of
uh [Β __Β ]
thank you all right um so that's it for
questions so thank you gentlemen for
participating
um if uh anyone and thank you to the
audience as well for your questions and
for
being extraordinarily civil i greatly
appreciate that if
you are a small content creator and you
are interested in taking part in a
future sunday showdown dm me on twitter
or in the discord server
um if both of you would like to i
realize that i'm the smallest channel of
three of us here but if you'd like to
shout out your
channels and say what you're about um
please feel free
uh house would you like to go first
yup i'm on uh youtube it's the infrared
just search infrared you'll find me i'm
big enough for that now
twitch.tv slash infrared show um
where marx is lending his channel but
we're not
just about politics you know i'm also
a really entertaining person and really
funny
um and i'm also uh doing debates a lot
and it's entertaining especially when i
can get uh
more than two hours of sleep um
so yeah come watch me i think for two
hours of sleep you did pretty damn well
uh lewis please yeah so hello and
perspective philosophy
you can find me respect philosophy on
youtube uh i do debates
like this one on thoughts on philosophy
veganism um
politics ethics and uh loads of loads of
other stuff really
um i do and longer phone videos as well
even
outlining ontological uh positions and
ethics
and other you know philosophical
positions so yeah just check us out and
my audience check out president sunday
and you know what actually check out
check out uh
um infrared like that this was actually
pretty productive i wasn't expecting
that so
yeah yeah i agree this is easily the
most interesting discussion i've hosted
so far granted only
only the fourth but um i hope this
pretends uh
the quality we'll be looking at in the
future anyways we're going to call off
now so
thank you very much everybody and take
care
okay bye all right thanks guys bye