Perspective Philosophy DESTROYED Again!

tails has you go first

you have eight minutes sure yeah so i

didn't actually prepare an eight minute

opening statement but i think there's a

few things that i think

i want to cover here that i wasn't able

to cover last time because i was too

tired

so the first thing in order is that i

made actually a big mistake during the

last debate because i made a confusion i

made a conflation and i was overthinking

it too much

so when i conceded that animals

thank you shin yi for the raid

appreciate it

um sorry about that

when i conceded that animals are in fact

conscious

for some reason i i was confused and i

was i thought that what he was trying to

say is that

for hegel

animals are attributed with a degree of

um

self uh it's not a sorry not a degree

they are attributed subjectivity and

selfhood and obviously that is the case

and hegel's philosophy of nature

these

organism in general not just plants but

also the earth and plants

have subject uh some kind of subject

hood in relation to their own generality

that's a completely different thing than

subjectivity proper for you know

speaking subject so it's it's i confused

that for some reason with consciousness

and i thought he was trying to say that

um by the criterion that there's some

kind of similarity between um

the division between generality and

individuality that hegel establishes is

uniquely the case for animals as opposed

to plants

with um consciousness and that was a big

mistake on my part

as a matter of fact within the very

opening of hegel's philosophy of nature

it becomes very clear that hegel has a

working distinction between nature and

spirit and that animals actually fall

within

uh the category i guess it's a loaded

term philosophically of nature animals

do not participate in spirit proper as

far as hegel is concerned now one of the

reasons why this was so confusing is

because hegel also makes it clear

that

the dialectical concept um

which

uh

which um is interior and which emerges

only in spirit is the very thing that

legi leads the stages of the

philosophy of nature further so for

example beginning from

mathematics to inorganic physics to

organic physics the thing leading these

stages along is the very same

dialectical concept which emerges only

in spirit but that doesn't mean that

it's the same thing as the domain and

sphere of spirit proper and i think one

of the other reasons i had this

confusion because i was thinking more of

the question of the implications this

has in cosmological terms like what does

the implications of the emergence of

spirit have

for

the

fur cause like a cosmology of

spirit which i guess is the work of uh

ilienkov itself like how is it that

nature becomes the thinking

consciousness

um so i i think i was being too generous

with perspective philosophy and

attributing him with a degree of depth

that wasn't there

um

on

because he wasn't talking about that as

a matter of fact the stage of

consciousness um if you can even call it

a stage proper within hegel's

phenomenology of mind is only meaningful

from the perspective of being an

orientation a path to absolute knowledge

consciousness

and moreover self-consciousness and

other stages

are

for hegel rather than um

necessarily existent stages within which

different kinds of beings dwell

they are moments of the incomplete there

are moments of not only moments of

absolute knowledge

but they are also incomplete

perspectives on the question of absolute

knowledge within the history of

philosophy

and hegel makes that very clear

even the question of whether

consciousness or self-consciousness

exists as such

is by no means

by no means clear and hegel rather than

just being incomplete uh perspectives in

history philosophy so this idea that

lewis was forwarding like that oh yeah

humans belong to the middle term of

self-consciousness and animals belong to

the german it's

absurdity hegel makes it very clear

also in the philosophy of nature

of the the sphere of humanity and the

sphere of spirit coincide it's one in

the same sphere like spirit begins with

humanity so

consciousness self-consciousness reason

spirit etc these are not things that you

can you know neatly box

these are not um this is not some kind

of like

cosmology within which humans only

occupy one's fear

humans are a part of every single sphere

every single one um

the question like humans are not just

the middle term as lewis was putting it

that's a complete ridiculous

absurdity

humans uh

they're

humans

all of this

phenomenology of mind is describing

humanity proper you can say that three

minutes left yeah you could say that the

different spheres represent like

different relationship

humanity has

um different relations but

to absolute knowledge i mean but

ultimately it's all humanity it's not

just the so-called middle term maybe

what he was trying to say is that

self-consciousness is the extent of

humanity s can be conceived of like as

an individual

uh and moreover not just an individual

but an unreflexive like

non-philosophical individual like the

kind of pre-moral individual of kant

even then that would be very wishy-washy

and very

ambiguous

so

um

let me think is there anything else i

wanted to get to

because i have three minutes i can think

about it um

[Music]

yeah in general i just think lewis

doesn't have any real grasp of hegelian

philosophy i think he's deeply confused

about what he's talking about i think

i'll just conclude it there

thank you very much

and uh louis you're gonna get eight

minutes

starting now

right that's great i hope you can all

hear us um so yeah

um i think it's quite funny in some

respects to kind of double back on

saying that animals are conscious

considering hegel himself actually says

animals are conscious um in the

phenomenology of spirit um he actually

says i'll find the quote if you like

he says um

what is it uh

where is it um

um

uh cindy and i am myself external

spatial and temporal as receptive of

sensuous intuitions i receive them from

something which is external to itself an

animal can intuit but the soul of an

animal has for its object not its soul

itself but something external it does he

does not say that animals are soulless

without consciousness who don't act

intuit the world nor they don't intuit

themselves that is the separation which

is why they never make it to the middle

term within the within the dialectical

process which i thought you know i was

hoping you were starting to understand

and but you know that's essentially the

positive um const the positive uh notion

being represented against nature and

this is where we start producing

determinate objects and identities from

which then we can make meaning and sense

of nature and not take it at its

infinite form which seems to prevent any

knowledge of nature itself but you know

like that's that's essentially the the

hegelian dialectic which reconciles

absolute annoying in the sense of the um

well actually i mean like let's follow

up another quote like it is

fundamentally the truth of consciousness

which has been reconciled within spirit

spirit has shown itself as the unity of

soul and consciousness the the former a

simple immediate totality and the ladder

knowledge which is not limited by any

object and no longer stands in relation

to it but it's knowledge of the simple

neither subjective nor objective

totality spirit originates therefore not

only from its own being and for only

from its own being and relates itself to

its own determinations so spirit is

related only to itself which is the meat

which has annihilated the mediation of

self-consciousness in consciousness

consciousness as spirit no longer needs

self-consciousness it takes reality as

it is it no longer has to propose

determinate objects for example humanity

um

that's unbelievably clear i mean in the

science of logic he says um a beginning

is logical in that it is made to be the

element of a free self-contained thought

in pure knowledge it is mediated for

pure knowledge is the ultimate and

absolute truth of consciousness like i

mean i don't know how many times i have

to say this and he does say that animals

are conscious um he just says that

animals

don't will themselves so cannot own

themselves he basically says they are

conscious but can't

you know uh contain the own their own

spirit that's just essentially that

they're not self-conscious they're

incapable of ethics

so

you know they're not able to sign

contracts which i i don't think many of

us would disagree with but his inability

to reconcile consciousness and

self-consciousness because of his own

ideology is exactly what we need to talk

about

so

now that that's out the way let's move

on to really what we need to consider

within this conversation which is that

previously i outlined the ontological

commitments of hegel as consciousness

and that these commitments also have an

epistemological grounding in which

self-consciousness must reconcile as the

reconcile itself with consciousness as a

reflexive process intellective purely

reflexive on the sensuous data that it

receives from conscious experience

without such data it would be

meaningless the experience in the world

is what grounds self-consciousness

knowledge

is not knowledge abstract but knowledge

of ourselves which

would without of without which when we

pose something like an abstract notion

of a rational man we reduce the notion

of god in hegelian philosophy to that of

a calculator or worse are still a

kantian the idealization of man has been

tested and it has been and it has

resoundly failed the hegelian position

stands to reconcile the unity of

consciousness and the self

this attempt to

um move us towards an abstract

one-sidedness is in and of itself a um

a notion of either an unhappy

consciousness or an attempt to express

one's consumption out of fear of um of

meaninglessness so we're either trying

to consume meaninglessly rather or we

are trying to escape that

meaninglessness through an abstract

notion so you can either you can either

pick you're either someone who consumes

animals because you like the taste of

them and you can't then you're scared of

giving up your favorite foods or you do

it because you have some sort of supreme

anthropocentric notion you know you're a

christian you're a muslim or something

like that

this stands really

which places the object of man as the

sublime object of ideology from which we

are supposed to see the world through

where his name could only be said to be

adam we will seek to disavow this

ideology of this uh abstract notion and

instead reconcile ourselves with

consciousness we need to confront the

monstrosity that we see in the eyes of

the animals and our own death drives as

recognizing ourselves as committing an

action of evil and injustice and

no and reconcile ourselves with our own

self-destruction so what must happen

well

so what must happen next is our act of

reconciliation with consciousness itself

the movement to consider the life and

liberty of all sentient beings and

reject abstract notions of right and

unjustified modes of consumption thank

you

thank you very much has you're going to

have five minutes to respond

yep

okay well we can hear you when we can

hear you on my i'm sorry i gotta fix my

stream though i gotta fix it okay no

worries take your time properties

default hold on

okay i think i got it fixed i got it

fixed okay we're good perfect all right

okay let me just go we got five minutes

you got five minutes yeah okay sure

louis hegel does not say that animals

are conscious you literally just pulled

that out of your ass what you the

relevant passage you just described

proves that animals could not possibly

be conscious because consciousness takes

as its premise the very subject object

distinction which animals are not

capable of uh having consciousness lewis

is not simply

um

it doesn't uh it's not simply like

the ability to intuit the ability to

have intuitions or whatever

consciousness specifically refers to

these um what an object is

for another for someone

for hegel it's very clear that animals

do not possess this which is it's

interesting and also that you keep

fucking dodging

the point which is like as clear as day

it is like so one-sidedly apparent

poor hegel within the very philosophy of

nature you can read the first part of

that philosophy of nature

animals belong to the domain of nature

humans belong to the domain of spirit

hegel like there's no ambiguity

whatsoever as far as that's concerned

now what you're trying to do is make it

seem like

consciousness is some kind of existence

for hegel right but in nowhere does

hegel say consciousness is an existent

consciousness for hegel represents an

incomplete perspective as far as the

quest for absolute knowledge is

concerned hegel for example talks about

the immediate consciousness

sorry of uh sense certainty right and

and the whole thing that is driving this

process along is the quest for absolute

knowledge okay when hegel talks about

consciousness he's talking about

something

he's talking about the inadequacy of

consciousness to exhaust this

that's why for hegel there is actually a

moment in which consciousness

necessarily must become

self-consciousness

okay and this follows imminently hegel

doesn't say consciousness becomes

self-consciousness because of some

biological mutation

hegel says consciousness becomes

self-consciousness because the attempt

to arrive at um

the absolute knowledge

by means of

uh the immediate

consciousness of objects in the world

ultimately fails and becomes inadequate

so

eventually consciousness itself as

selfhood must become such an object and

this is the stage for hegel of

self-consciousness it is so

fundamentally meaningless to say that

animals are conscious

because animals are not

like caught in this quest for absolute

knowledge whatsoever so no then the

second thing you said that it's very

clear for hegel that you said a lot of

word salad and a lot of mumbo jumbo

about self-consciousness

um hegel yeah it's very clear that

humans are the middle term no it's not

clear whatsoever hegel nowhere does

hegel state that humans are the

so-called middle term for hegel

again the phenomenology of spirit

exhausts

is is about is all humanity it's all

humanity that's participating in all of

these stages

it's all moments of human actually the

young hegelians precisely interpreted it

that way they got rid of the element of

god and we're basically just saying that

it's just a fundamentally human hegel

was secretly just saying that this was

all man or as mark said

the conclusion of german philosophy is

that man is the highest essence for man

um i mean you could you can get rid of

you can reject that perspective and say

hegel was really talking about god and

and so on and so on but animals don't

figure in it whatsoever

um

you're saying that

you're saying

yeah consciousness isn't some kind of

existent premise consciousness is a

stage of inadequacy for hegel and

nothing more now if you're talking about

consciousness as the elementary moment

of the subject object distinction

then yeah obviously consciousness has a

has great importance for hegel

but

what consciousness actually is so far as

its essence is concerned has to be taken

at the end of his philosophy not the

beginning he doesn't establish a

dogmatic premise that he remains

committed to to the very end what

consciousness actually must necessarily

be

is at the end of the phenomenology of

spirit not the beginning

you said that is clear um but nowhere is

i forgot i don't know what you said the

so-called ontological commitment you're

talking about consciousness is just

wrong you're talking out of your ass

um hegel describes the inadequacy of

consciousness and that's the whole point

i already said that now you may oppose

the so-called idealization of man as a

failed enterprise or whatever but hegel

recognizes humanity and man as the

exclusive domain of spirit it is

literally meaningless

incomprehensible and absurd

to think that the animals can belong to

this fear of spirit

all right that's a good one to end up if

you reject it you're not a hegelian okay

that's it yeah we're on time yeah sorry

about that um and lewis five minutes

he just doesn't reconcile them as like

self-conscious which uh provided

evidence for because i actually quoted

hegel um the the thing is is that

i think it's quite funny because you

said that hegel sees the begins with the

subject object distinction no he begins

with the imminent consciousness which is

the point of self-certainty um which is

just existence itself it's infinite

which is why he starts with the

infinites and which i would like to ask

you if you could name them what are the

three infinites that exist in hegel um

if you could outline what are the

fundamental uh ontological uh

tenets of reality um

which exist within which

self-consciousness must reconcile um

because they are what we begin with

which is the whole movement like if we

already began with the subject object

distinction the movement would have

already pre would have already um

started the dialectic too soon which he

criticizes other philosophy with other

philosophers for doing he starts the

dialectic at the very beginning what

must be the case and where can we reason

from so when you say that he actually

presupposes like a dogmatic notion or

something as the first term that he's

not committed to that's ridiculous hegel

absolutely is committed to the movement

of the dialectic the terms prior were

necessary and we have imminently moved

from them to complete the dialectical

process which is the reconciliation of

the first term and the sec and the

middle terms in spirit it's it's the way

reason works hegel's not like

obstructing a new rational schemata

where he's just totally revolutionizing

the way people think he's actually

taking something which was proposed in

many ways by plato and aristotle and

renewing it for a modern time and

showing how it actually develops over

time like the notion of consciousness as

as its imminency is stagnant the motion

of the middle terms is

self-consciousness and is infinite and

he says that as much the infinite middle

term which is self-consciousness and

that is on um i think on absolute in the

phenomenology of spirit and absolute

right

um the reality of the situation is like

to say that the ontological commitments

of hegel are not to self or not to

consciousness and purely

self-consciousness totally misses the

value of self-consciousness

self-consciousness is to remove the

negativity that exists that the purely

negative motion that exists in

consciousness in which we are subject to

all of the pains of nature and never

actually able to express our drives we

are we're existing in a way that's

purely impulsive in a way that is

damaging and so seek to free ourselves

it is

an imminent movement because we are in

pain and that pain drives us onwards

it's not that we have already started

with the intellectual like the

introspective necessary conditions to

work out what we must know because that

would be the kantian position that would

be like all right well we already have

what we need to know uh everything about

absolute knowledge and truth and so we

can just enter it into a calculator into

our boop boop categorical imperative

there we go no that's not how it works

the reality of the situation is that we

are analyzing the drives that are being

mediated through society these drives

are necessary for hegel and they exist

in consciousness and that's what society

is mediating in terms of absolute right

in at the point of absolute right there

is no confliction in the system of

drives now hegel says that as being

purely anthropocentric of course he does

he was writing 300 years ago it is

absolutely odd when people were even

non-racist 300 years ago and you said

you said yourself hegel is you know

fairly conservative as an individual

that that's not surprising but looking

at hegelian philosophy through the lens

of what did hegel think would be

dogmatism and historicism one minute

left it works you don't go hegel thought

um x y and z and then seek to prove his

conclusions you take the hegelian method

you take the ways in which he understood

the world and then you apply it to the

problems that we have and that is what

contemporary hergelians do which is why

we don't seem to be reckon uh trying to

promote some sort of monarchy for some

reason it's almost as if it had

everything to do with him living in

prussia like the the like oh my god like

anyway

the the whole point of this scenario is

to reconcile that consciousness must

reconcile itself with itself that is the

whole that is the mandate in spirit when

spirit has done that then spirit is free

now i've give you four quotes i think

was a four or three quotes explaining

that now

i ask you the question what are the

three infinite tenants which are the

ontological foundations for hegel the

three infinites

in hegel

all right thank you that's time yeah so

okay and uh by request we're gonna move

into open discussion um for the audience

if you want to ask questions um i cannot

see them unless they're in my chat

you're gonna have to come in here and

put them into my chat i ask that you put

an asterisk on both sides of it so i can

identify it quickly and we'll try and go

through as many as possible in the last

20 minutes we're gonna go for about an

hour if we're both okay with that

um so uh

yeah guys take it away so louis i'm

actually not gonna entertain your like

little attempt to quiz me or whatever

because you're not the teacher in this

scenario you're my student as proven by

your actual

cause you don't know you're avoiding the

question

okay so you're randomly to like quiz me

on random bullshit

is that established

established

sunday this guy he's about to interrupt

me like this because i can interrupt too

i could be way more unpleasant than you

louis we don't want to play this game do

you guys little boy don't play this game

with me louis don't play these gorilla

games with me little boy louis

lewis in seconds then lewis go lewis you

failed to actually i have a lot i have

to respond to a lot of this shit he said

i might only get 30 seconds

you get 10 seconds until he's allowed to

interrupt okay yeah lewis

you you haven't fucking demonstrated the

relevance of the three uh infinites

according to hegel as far as the actual

point under contention was concerned the

point under contention being you talked

about the imminent oh no higgle doesn't

begin with the division of subject of

object well you're just fucking putting

words in my mouth what i'm trying to say

is that consciousness beginning with

consciousness imminent or otherwise

implies some kind of fundamental

division between subject and object

there is no consciousness without that

division now i didn't say hegel my

fucking point was hegel doesn't

establish a dogmatic premise that he

maintains his commitment to um as far as

the ontological commitment to

consciousness is concerned which is what

we're beginning with

the actual content the being of

consciousness is something that hegel

develops through the course of the

phenomenology you do not first establish

the ontological significance of

consciousness and then begin from there

that's not the nature of hegel's uh

thinking and it's not his method and

it's not how his system worked

now your thing about um

nothing

hegel lived 300 years ago yeah but

here's the difference hegel had a very

rigorous distinction between nature and

spirit and therefore and he also had a

rigorous description of what he

considered animals and the way in which

animals were different from humans you

nothing has changed to justify a

difference as far as

how you can reconcile hegel's underlying

method in his system with the others you

talk a lot about j you talk a lot of

gibberish and word salad okay has i'm

going to stop you there yeah louis do

you want to respond

well i mean like to entirely honest with

you i'm a little bit sad that you're not

going to answer the question because i

think it is fundamentally important

since it is the ontology from which

hegel's building everything from i mean

i can answer it if you like but

what whatever and if you want to ask me

a question on hegel you you're very

welcome to to be entirely honest with

you you can quizzes

you're the one who needs education here

well i'm happy to i'm happy to answer

any question you like but the thing is

is that um

when we look at the determinate objects

at the production of the of determinate

objects in hegel um

and that you know in terms of the first

subject object distinction that's not

where he begins the

the phenomenology of spirit it begins at

the imminency of consciousness which is

essentially the end of the season you

know well yeah okay well then i'm just

making it clear

why is it a subject object distinction

let him finish this point 10 seconds

lewis then he can interrupt go um quite

the opposite it doesn't it doesn't um it

doesn't imply a subject object

distinction it actually implies the

infinite subject that that's the issue

it implies the infinite being until we

start to reconcile ourselves and destroy

nature and replace it with the notion um

or a concept and then the reconciliation

of that notion

and the and reality is the concept

itself when he says the concept or like

spirit um you're right in saying that

the truth of spirit um isn't is not like

in nature it's not like we don't like

you know we don't have ethical knowledge

like in like imbued within us um at

least it's not knowledge in us it's the

grounds for knowledge it's the grounds

for truth which is why hegel points

towards um um the the the law within me

um as well okay

but he doesn't say it but he doesn't say

that it's like it doesn't say

specifically that the

okay he doesn't say specifically that we

have knowledge in nature or something

inherently can we walk back what you

just said though you just said that

hegel believe begins with the imminent

consciousness which is infinite

subjectivity okay and then you said uh

it's before we have to destroy nature

wait a second we don't do anything uh

lewis it all follows imminently from the

nature of consciousness itself that the

division between subject and object so

yes consciousness does imply the

division of subject and object

but i will say it doesn't if we do

something like i think that you know we

don't do anything voluntarily that's

complete nonsense what are you even

talking about a determinist hegel is a

determination you're saying that we

begin with the infinite consciousness

and then we voluntarily uh destroy

nature and create the division of the

world

in the words of hegel the substance is

separated through action everything is a

moment of will like there is but that

doesn't make it voluntary you're here

hang on one of the times it is the will

it is sorry it is the will the will

figures in his ontology

the will isn't the second let him finish

the stock has

lewis

um i was just saying that we are the

will that when our when we are acting we

are manifestations of the will the will

is not separate from being

i completely agree which is why when we

are truly free it's in spirit itself

which is the reconciliation of will with

uh with itself but

spirit reveals the truth of

consciousness and if it reveals the

truth of consciousness the truth is that

being entails

uh the will the will is part of being

and that therefore the subject object

distinction is implied by consciousness

it's not that the will is part of being

it's that the will is being that all

there is is will like that like it's not

to say that like so when we talk about

what hegel's seeing as the foundation

it's he wouldn't see a consciousness as

something which is in it it's not

non-active okay how does objectivity

arise according to hagel

how does objectivity arise well we would

get it through the through the negative

process of um

well through self-conscious mediation

so the master slave dialect okay okay

where does that come from ontologically

ontologically speaking where does that

latent potentiality come from

um is it something outside of being or

is it something imminent to being itself

nothing nothing's outside okay so let's

shut the fuck up and stop saying that

hegel doesn't begin with an object

subject distinction implied by

consciousness all right

lewis respond yeah so nothing's outside

of being as becoming i mean that's like

that's obvious that's saying that

there's something outside of existence

the existence to be like what's outside

of existence

like non-existence like it doesn't make

sense like the the point of what hegel's

saying

is that the the

the there are a few things actually this

is why

i said what are the three infinites

because it's the three onological

infinites that are the foundations for

this process okay

now you can respond okay okay unless you

want says outline them do you want to

say

louis it's not relevant because me

saying consciousness implies a subject

object distinction is 100 correct

it's as simple as that

wait sorry say that again

me saying that consciousness implies a

division between subject and object net

for a being to possess consciousness it

must be able to differentiate it must

participate in a subject object

distinction it must be able to be

cognizant of objects to be conscious of

some kind of content that is 100

true you contested it by talking about a

lot of gibberish and word salad and i

had to reign you in and now it seems

like you're conceding on the point no um

i i would 100 say that the the subject

object distinction is actually a product

of language i mean this isn't even just

in hegel we could go to heidi

consciousness is presupposes language

for hegel

consciousness presupposes language

yes a conscious being is a being that

possesses language

yes it does yes no it literally does

why doesn't for hegel consciousness is

an object

one at a time

has finisher thought then lewis respond

consciousness yes implies language and

presupposes the elementary subject

object distinction

proper to language there is no conscious

being that does not possess language

according to hegel because the necessary

mediation of arriving at what an object

is for another for some kind of subject

relies upon and implies language and the

mediation of um their natural world or

whatever the real world by language so

yes consciousness implies language like

i said you don't seem to fucking

understand

so that's fundamentally false i mean if

you look at where he says determinate

objects come from because he still he

starts with the infinites in two two

respects i mean you can look at the

um the three infinites which he poses as

um within spirit and then you can look

which you know maps very well onto

notions of the the trinity by the way um

so when you look at like it and it's

allegorical like and i don't think the

name was relevant by the

so the mediation between the self and

the other is how we understand matter

and and our understanding of the other

is mediated through mana and our

understanding of self is mediated

through both of them like it is a unity

which when separated becomes incapable

of producing knowledge so when we were

separating anything why when when did i

separate this unit

this is

use what one because the inconsideration

of otherness within um consciousness

would be the separation there i would

argue what are you talking about i'm the

one you're the one who's trying to say

that consciousness is some kind of

infinite subjectivity and that's all it

is no i never said conscious i said that

consciousness at the at the very

beginning of the dialectic consciousness

is the infinite we begin with and then

we produce determinate objects for

anything how do you produce determinant

objects okay through negation and where

does that

so consciousness does not imply the

negation the negation comes from

something else

yeah i know that's what i'm saying so no

there is no way we could have had

language because to have language is to

imply negation to go this and not that

yeah there's a very famous quote by

bloncho where he says for me to be able

to say this woman i must take her flesh

and blood reality away from her destroy

her the whole point of giving a name to

something you are trying to hang on has

has finished then has respond go yeah so

the whole point in naming something is

to give a determinate existence to say

that it is not the infinite immediacy of

consciousness but a single entity in

itself and that is an act of language

which is not presupposed in the

imminency of consciousness first of all

hegel says that language cannot actually

name particulars so you don't know what

you're talking about in that regard

secondly

like i said you're trying to make it

seem like hegel is trying to say

ontologically speaking consciousness as

the imminent consciousness and infinite

subjectivity that is not imminently

already entangled with the three uh two

other infinites that give rise to the

possibility of objectivity and therefore

subject objects distinction you're

trying to make it seem like hegel is

trying to say the infinite subjectivity

isn't existent and it's not it's just a

useful way

it's just something hegel sets up to uh

to make it uh

it's something useful for hegel to

expound upon

the relationship between consciousness

and the world but insofar as

consciousness is taken as an existent as

something which beings possess

let him finish sorry how's finisher

thought

as something that beings possess it

necessarily implies a distinction

between subject and object how could a

being possess consciousness without

without that implying a division between

subject and consciousness no determinant

being whatsoever could possess

consciousness the infinite the imminence

the imminent consciousness you're

talking about is not a determinant being

it's not an it doesn't it's not

something that exists in reality okay

lewis respond so the imminent

consciousness is reality and i think you

misspoke then i'll give you the benefit

of the doubt i don't think you meant um

between consciousness and the world you

meant between uh consciousness and

itself because consciousness is the

world right you're he's an absolute

idealist like there is no separation

between consciousness it's being in like

we are design right um

like so like the world we are the world

like that's that in its otherness it's

otherness yeah okay well well in its

determinateness this is the difference

so we have the world in its

determinateness we have the world in its

otherness and we have the world in

itself which is the three infinites

right okay listen listen listen

otherness me otherness means it's the

relationship between consciousness and

it's uh

i don't know if i would say apparent or

it's opposite which is in fact yes for

hegel ultimately a moment of itself but

that's what i'm talking about yeah and

the consciousness of otherness exists in

what

the consciousness of otherness exists in

what

what does it exist in

what are you asking does it present how

does it present itself to consciousness

how does it make a determinant way

but in what

what does what are we presented with

as as the other

what is what is what is being presented

there

what can you get to your point what are

you trying to ask

we are being presented with a

manifestation of will the the separation

between self and self other and and

determinateness is that a rock doesn't

have a will but another individual has

the mediation between the self and the

other is what allows us to construct

determinate objects because they're the

only active participants within within

substance a conscious being

implies a being

cognizant or

participating in a division between

subject and object consciousness implies

the division of subject and object no it

doesn't yes no it doesn't and it doesn't

it doesn't do that for hegel and it

doesn't even do that why doesn't it

explain

um because hegel doesn't start at the

point of uh he already starts prior to

the subject what does that have to do

with where he starts consciousness

ultimately implies a division

let him finish his thoughts

because if the chapter starts at

consciousness and then he outlines

consciousness and then outlines how

objects are then formed from

consciousness

later on

he's not saying that we start with a

subject object distinction you you

fucked up the whole thing in hegel's

beginning yes in the beginning chapter

of consciousness hegel

he does imply the existence of objects

it's just that objects are given they

are given to consciousness

have you even fucking read the book dude

what are you saying you're saying

objects don't exist until the second

chapter let's take it down a bit no no

no i'm not saying that objects don't

exist until the second chapter i'm

saying objects

i'm saying the first movement in hegel

is not um is not the production of the

object's subjective vision it's the

beginning of the immediate infinite okay

which doesn't he doesn't explain how the

division

let him finish this thought so we like

have a coherent conversation here keep

going

which is why in the phenomenology of

spirit he describes either being and

nothingness as either a room of bright

white light uh infinitely bright or um

infinitely dark there's no difference

because there's no determination there

must be a combination between being and

nothingness which is being reconciled

within consciousness which allows us to

produce determinate objects we are the

production of objects and not we do not

find ourselves

okay okay lewis let us respond babbling

louis it's very simple

he may not arrive at in the first

chapter how precisely the division is

engendered but that is different from

saying the division isn't implied the

division is fucking implied in the first

chapter because objects for hegel are

the the it is the immediate object of

consciousness is objects in the world

that relate to consciousness in an

immediate

uh in an immediate way according to

these uh philosophical perspectives he's

critiquing hegel says obviously that

such an immediate consciousness is not

even possible and he critiques the

possibility of a real immediate

consciousness like i said there's a

reason why chapter one leads to chapter

two because of the inadequacy of chapter

one and being able to actually arrive at

a at the point of real absolute

knowledge but the division between

subject and shut up the division between

object and subject in the first chapter

is fucking implied okay that's like you

if you don't know this you haven't read

the book

okay i don't i don't

like what i'll say is that the first the

whole point of the first chapter is to

show that the that the will's engagement

with reality is an engagement with

itself from which it seeks to satisfy

itself it is the attempt to

self-satisfaction which produces the

subject objective

we produce the subject object divide in

an attempt to satisfy ourselves and find

it inadequate so then move to

self-consciousness

okay guys

hey guys both of you hey i will meet you

let's bring this back to the question at

hand how does this bear on the veganism

debate

okay

he's a fake hegelian i want to press him

on this because

so what that it that this is what

endangers the division between subject

and object for hegel consciousness

implies such a division

consciousness first does not imply such

a division the reason that it's relevant

for the veganism debate is because he's

trying to say that self-consciousness

would be necessary or like the subject

object distinction would be necessary

for the consideration of consciousness

uh simplicita i would have to sub i

would have to imply you don't understand

what you're talking about

this is how the is how heavily elaborate

how the distinction is

it doesn't mean

let him finish his statement and then

you can go

so

the whole point in hegel is the

mediation of the will they attempt to

produce a world from which it can

satisfy itself if the subject object

distinction was already presupposed this

would already imply that they had the

world

um in a way which is mediated but they

seek mediation it's the constant drive

for mediation that moves consciousness

to self-consciousness thank you

no yeah but here's the thing uh lewis

it's not such a drive that leads it to

this for hegel the conclusion is already

implied at the premise it's just

developed at the end when you get to the

end of his fucking book all of that is

already there in the beginning that's

what you don't fucking understand that's

why you're not a hegelian and you don't

understand dialectics

yes it is there at the beginning it

develops at the end you learn the truth

of what's at the beginning at the end

that is so elementary to hegelian

dialectics how the fuck do you call

yourself

doesn't begin with a a fucking dogmatic

premise and then builds from the premise

reveals the truth of the beginning i i

completely agree that it is the

reconciliation of consciousness with

itself which i've been arguing this

entire time and that doesn't imply the

subject object division in hegel and

even in the even in his um successors i

mean let's take someone who is very much

inspired by hegel like heidegger when we

take you know being in the world and the

production of language and determinate

objects is one of the existential

structures of design from which we must

analyze so when we find ourselves in

this throneness and find ourselves with

subject object distinctions when we re

when we

in every single subsection of the first

chapter a subject object distinction is

operative in every single one

objects are given to the immediate

consciousness that is what hegel is

saying hegel is talking about why

consciousness is imminently inadequate

he is not saying consciousness is some

kind of discrete stage he's saying that

consciousness is almost a kind of

perspective philosophers have had which

is ultimately inadequate to satisfy

the um the need for absolute knowledge

which is the whole fucking reason why he

wrote the book in the first place to

actually satisfy what it would mean to

have absolute knowledge and hegel is

saying consciousness

hang on let alone finish this thought

then you can respond lewis keep going

consciousness as something um he hey go

if hegel begins with consciousness he

does it's he's not saying that this is

like the the structure of creation like

this is where god first created the

world and then it developed like that

okay that is not the structure of his

book you're not a real hegemon you

literally

have such a

like fighting straw men is really not

doing you any any good mate like i've

rec i have outlined my position time and

time again if you can't understand it

then i suggest either a reader's guide

to the phenomenology of spiritual

perspective okay i'll break down your

position

let him finish his response and then

i'll let you go but the argument that

i'm making isn't controversial and it's

not something that even struggles to

reconcile itself within spirit the will

is willing itself towards spirit now you

say that like the truth of spirit

already exists in consciousness

i mean yeah in the sense that it's

unmediated and um like without um

without determination but that precisely

is why it's inadequate which is why we

move through like so i don't see why

that's necessarily relevant except for

in relevance to my position which is the

consideration because it implies the

distinctions there from the beginning

hang on

try to be concise okay yeah so which is

the consideration of the ontology of

consciousness which exists within

animals as well as humans okay this is

first of all first of all before we even

get to that stupid fucking thing you

just said which directly contradicts

hegel's views that it exists in animals

louis i know you're posi your position

is crystal clear and you haven't fu the

issue here louis is you're not

responding to anything i'm saying in

response to your position like an npc

you just keep saying the same shit you

said before without addressing what i

the points i'm trying to raise hegel

begins with consciousness he doesn't

actually establish within the first

chapter how the subject object

distinction comes to be maybe but that

distinction is implied by consciousness

itself okay you don't understand the

difference between these two

two different things there is a

difference between hegel elaborating how

the subject object distinction comes

into being and whether or not it is

already implied and already there from

the beginning hegel is a dialetician he

begins from a perspective of a radical

difference a radical discontinuity a

radical contradiction uh i know some

hegelians take issue with that but

whatever you get the fucking point and

that is always implied from the

beginning

hegel you have a fundamentally

undialectical understanding of the

phenomenology of mind if hegel begins

the writing of the phenomenology of mind

somewhere that doesn't mean he's

actually

beginning ontologically the actual

ontological beginning is revealed at the

end the nature of the the essence of

what was at the beginning is only

revealed at the end okay the essence of

consciousness for example what

consciousness actually is

um

as consciousness ontologically that's

something that's revealed at the end of

his book not at the beginning okay the

that is the thing that drives the

process along that you're talking about

is precisely something that was always

already there that's why for hegel

absolute consciousness follows

necessarily

um sorry absolute knowledge follows

necessarily

um

these are all moments in its being

increased

yeah so i'm just going to say that the

subject object distinction is certainly

not implied i mean that's the whole

point of the hegelian schemata i mean

let's be honest like the whole point of

consciousness developing determinate

objects is an attempt to satisfy you're

an npc

within the world so the reason that we

move to self-consciousness is because

the the desire to satisfy ourselves

within the world has been frustrated by

the um by the existence of the other we

see something which is monstrous to us a

will which resists it prevents our

satisfaction so the negative force which

moves the dialectic is the frustration

of the will itself which yes is you read

the first chapter has has you had time

lewis finished your thought please yeah

so the negative force of the dialectic

which is moving us from negation and

negation is the frustration of the will

attempting to satisfy itself in the

world and that's why he moves between

hedonistic self-satisfaction and

abstract notions of lewis lewis let me

break it down for you very clearly very

concisely okay at this point if you

don't respond i'm going to assume you're

an npc let's break it down like this

we're going to go yes or no in the

beginning the first chapter does hegel

speak of objects for the immediate

consciousness

in the world

doesn't speak about objects

he speaks about objects not for the

media consciousness

he does not speak about the givenness of

objects for the immediate consciousness

no he talks about the determination of

con objects which are which are in the

first chapter

yeah

so he talks about objects objects are in

the first chapter he does talk about

objects yes in the first chapter

it's the givenness of objects or the

immediate consciousness hegel um rebukes

the view of the given obviously he

shares that with kant but that is what

he talks about in the first chapter he

doesn't actually believe they are just

given

but he's not describing how they

actually come to be and how they're

endangered but hegel speaks about the

fact that in he's talking about the

stages of philosophy in consciousness it

appears to us at the very least it

appears to us that there are objects

given already to consciousness now

the issue

that's what it appears that's what it

appears as it's not the case hegel

taught hegel is trying to explain why

philosophers before him were beginning

from that perspective empiricism and so

on and so on now

what the issue for hegel is not that

the issue is the will

satisfying itself

itself

okay

what it actually is rather than uh these

various objects in the world which hegel

will

obviously elaborate

um

instantiate the will's uh

self for itself

hegel is still saying that at the

beginning

there are objects now how are there

objects is a different question he

elaborates that later but in the

beginning consciousness does imply a

division between subject and object how

did that division is okay

we're gonna lose respond now okay louis

go

okay that that's actually like look i

can understand why you would make that

mistake but no that the rejection of sen

certainty comes precisely from the lack

of uncertainty we can have we do not

have determination i know lewis did you

listen to what happened

he's wasting time did you listen to what

i fucking said

i did listen to what you said which is

why i'm responding yeah obviously they

don't satisfy actually

right now

okay great so essentially like the way

that self-consciousness works like well

before we move to self-consciousness the

way the consciousness works is

self-satisfaction so the production of

determinate objects it comes as a given

in order to satisfy a one-sided will

it's dogmatic and inadequate but it's

still produced from an action of

consciousness because everything is in

motion remember that

it's not an it's not like a stagnant

thing where we get presented an object

we produce objects to satisfy ourselves

that's the whole point and it's about

the production of the right objects to

satisfy ourselves how we objectify the

world is the question in hegel

am i unmuted now you are unmuted now

okay lewis

you just admitted just now that in the

beginning chapter

objects where you're saying they are

produced for consciousness in the

consciousness quest for

self-satisfaction

so consciousness does imply a division

between subject and object

no the consciousness implies a desire

for the division between subject and

object but no that division between

subject and object is established by

consciousness

consciousness establishes it

it's it's something that consciousness

seeks to establish

it does establish it it doesn't it's not

that's the whole point because the the

the me the reconciliation of the world

with itself like hey louis can you

respond i want to go hang on hang on

hang on

let him finish his sentence lewis

finisher thought then has

the reconciliation of the world with

itself is the destruction of the subject

object distinction we no longer need it

the will is purely in tune with the

world around it it understands itself as

the world okay louis thank you

okay perspective philosophy you're

trying to obfuscate the question i'm

going to get to the meat and potatoes

and just see if you can respond to this

okay just see if you can respond to this

poor hegel hegel obviously says that the

perspective of consciousness is not

enough to actually exhaust how

the subject object distinction

is arrived at we cannot solely through

consciousness arrive at the distinction

between subject and object but despite

the inadequacy of consciousness alone in

being able to arrive at this

it is that distinction is still there

and operative and that is precisely why

consciousness is inadequate the

distinction is there even if

consciousness is inadequate

um to understand it

you have not

made it clear you have not proven you

have not demonstrated you actually are

aware of this distinction that i'm

trying to fucking point you to can you

please address this point i'm raising

there's a distinction between the how

and the is

okay okay

has no interruption when he responds

this time okay the is

right which would be being itself and

that's something that happened way

before

hegel by the way this is this goes right

back to paramedics right although hegel

would see this as an as an infinite

negative and not infinite positive is an

infinite nonetheless

it does not have form

the positing of essence

is an action

within consciousness

that's the

point lewis

am i unmuted

you are admitted i'm not muting you

except when you talk over last time or

the last time lewis

consciousness

inadequately

attempts to seek knowledge

of a division already set before it

a fundamental distinction between

subject and object which is implied by

consciousness for hegel because for

hegel consciousness seeks to arrive and

explain

the objects given before it

or that it believes to be given before

it which are not in fact given but in

fact endangered by consciousness itself

yes

hegel makes that very clear

you outlining some one-sided um ontology

which in no way is could possibly be

hegelian because for hegel

they're um the implications of absolute

knowledge are implications for

being in other words for the nature of

being itself from the start hegel

doesn't say we begin from some kind of

um

we begin from some kind of one-sided

being and then voluntarily by means of

philosophy add add more to it philosophy

itself participates in being for hegel

so that distinction you're drawing is

completely false

poor hegel consciousness implies a

division of subject and object even if

consciousness like we're going in

circles do you

can you please demonstrate you even

understand what i'm trying to say

even if consciousness is inadequate the

stage of the so-called stage of

consciousness is inadequate to

comprehend how the division

that is the very object of consciousness

is uh

is possible to know

that division is still there and implied

by consciousness itself because

consciousness implies a radical

contradiction or discontinuity at the

heart of being itself otherwise there

would be no consciousness only a

one-sided being okay has it's on record

now that your charge is that he's a fake

alien i'm going to let uh lewis respond

to that and then we're going to drop

that charge going forward okay we're

going to talk about the the subject

matter at hand

lewis please respond

okay so like colin is a fake agilian i

think it's just ridiculous i mean like

one not not because i've actually

outlined hegel i would argue in a way

that was more complete than you and you

you won't actually answer my questions

on hegel and i will answer any questions

on hegel and when i do except the ones i

did hang on let him respond and when i

do on so you just find the answer not

your liking and so you you know you get

mad but the i mean like look like even

at the start of like um

at the start of uh consciousness like

the the like the beginning of the of the

dialectical process is a pure here and

now it is a universal unit

of experience it is

this

this absolute

presence

that's all it is to go

this and that

is the next movement

right which isn't the next chapter he

does quite a few movements in a chapter

it's and which is my self-consciousness

is a huge bit of the book like

the next movement is at this end of that

it's going you know this is a bottle

that is a microphone that is the object

yeah that's the next movement which is

the proposal

of objects against the subject but prior

to that that distinction does not exist

and even bef and he even says yes it

does because of its concrete contents

sense certainty imminently appears as

the richest kind of knowledge indeed a

no a knowledge of infinite wealth for

which no bounds can be found either when

we reach out into space and time which

is dispersed or whether we take this bit

of wealth and the division enter into

and enter into it right okay now

i'm just going to cut you off i'm just

going to cut you off there louis because

we're we're running a bit long on that

response um i want to bring this back to

again for the sake of clarity for the

audience and for ourselves

um what are the actual stakes here we're

debating the particular reading of hegel

um ad nauseam

what are the stakes why does this it's

about whether animals could be possibly

be conscious according to hegel

which um i would argue i've already

established no you haven't you've quoted

all you do is quote shit without proving

how it supports your fucking conclusions

i've actually give i'm not disputing no

you didn't your quotation about how

hegel says animals are conscious he

didn't say they're conscious though he

didn't louis respond

but

one he does say that animals are

conscious he just show me the fucking

quote show me where he says has let

louis respond okay wait a minute just

wait right there you want us to get some

quotes for for here you go and animals

so

no no no i want a quote that proves

hegel thinks animals are conscious

despite what he said in the philosophy

of nature that there's a distinction

between spirit and nature

animals are in possession of themselves

their soul is in possession of their

body but they have no right to life

because they do not will it

hegel does not agree that animals have a

right to life how are they conscious by

that quote

animals are in possession of themselves

their soul is in a possession of their

body it doesn't go rocks are in a

possession of themselves okay but how

does it prove they're conscious all

vegetables of vegetables are in a sense

also

the question hang on has so for

clarification the question originally

concerned whether or not hegel regarded

animals as consciousness so how does

this prove their conscience these are

two separate questions you can pick one

to ask lewis no i'm asking him how does

that prove hegel thinks they're

conscious is my question okay so that's

the one go lewis

okay because hegel proposes a soul or a

foundational spirit that exists in the

animal which has not itself as its

object but only its externality it is

only direct relationship with the world

where it seeks satisfaction it's at the

place we start quote the relevant quote

one more time i'm gonna show you why

you're wrong

okay um so animals are in possession of

themselves their soul is in possession

of their body

their soul is in possession of their

body does hegel say that animals are in

possession of their soul

um they have no right to life because

they do not will it so they are not in

possession of themselves they are not

okay animals are not in possession of

their soul their soul is in possession

of their body right

yes you think what do you think now

since you know so much about hegel what

would hegel say about vegetables

in regards to the nature of their soul

well actually i can quote that and

but only because he's uh horribly sexist

um

at one point um where he says men

correspond to animals while women while

women correspond to plants because their

development is more placid and their

principle and underlies a vague unity of

feeling so like the way that he takes um

and this is really a byproduct i would

say i'm not asking you for quotes i'm

asking you what does he how does he how

would hegel how would he because i know

he doesn't how would hegel what he just

described of animals a soul and

possession of their body would this what

would be the case for plants and uh

vegetables

um there would well i think i would

probably say that he would the may

probably make a distinction between

something like life in general and

describe it as vegetative and that would

be a byproduct of a metaphysical um

distinction which originated the

organism

okay

let him finish that sentence then go

so so yeah so like this um like if you

look at um

hegel's philosophy like the way that

spirit is kind of

uh

you know separated in terms of soul

is very much built off um christian

metaphysical um analysis okay lewis i

meant i might finish the sentence you're

already on that story all right okay i

don't know that's fine that's fine

or it has gone okay lewis you didn't

answer my question you're saying that

hegel thinks animals are consciousness

because the soul is in possession of

their body right

sorry i think that yeah i think animals

are consciousness because their soul is

in possession of their body yes okay

what about plants what about vegetables

um i would say that they don't have a

soul why they do have a soul that it's

why according to higgle would they not

possess a soul well they don't

necessarily not possess a soul they

would they there are distinctions in the

self because we all possess a notion of

self uh at least a notion of

consciousness

are you aware that when hegel's talking

about soul

he's not he's still within the realm of

as far as animals are concerned he's

still within the realm of in itself not

for itself in other words

he's giving a description of a thing so

when he's talking about the soul of the

animal it's not the same as the soul in

the human sense yeah there's a dis

there's a distinction from being in

itself and being for itself which i

think is absolutely the movement between

to from from consciousness to

self-consciousness it's not okay now let

me ask you

hang on hang on

let him finish and then reply like i

mean you would have to presuppose that

being for itself exists in consciousness

in consciousness in the first chapter

when he specifically says in the second

chapter that being but the reason for

that is because consciousness is

inadequate so lewis here's what you

don't seem to understand for hegel

consciousness does not exist as such it

is just something he refers to to prove

its inadequacy

but

there's there's no use in talking about

the consciousness of animals right

because no no

no being can just be conscious

consciousness is a moment of spirit okay

no being is consciousness if

consciousness is taken divorced from

being a moment in spirit it is t you are

precisely reifying

something that hegel is just

establishing to prove its inadequacy

specifically within the history of

philosophy empiricism sense and so on

and so on hegel is trying to say

so consciousness cannot exist outside of

being a moment of spirit for hegel

whatever consciousness is it's a moment

of spirit it's an it's an inadequate

unfinished explication of absolute

knowledge okay good lewis respond well

absolute knowledge contains everything

so everything is a part of spirit that's

the whole point but the oncological

commitment within within

um within uh you keep saying logically

has you got time lewis so this would be

like the commitment to reality which we

obtain the abstract laws of right from

like that that's where before we get

into that wait a minute

as has um trust me sunday i'm i'm i'm

saving us time i'm saving

i'm trying to get to the meeting

i do not care lewis finish your thought

concisely please and then how's you can

respond yeah absolutely so it is a

hundred percent like consciousness

absolutely is a thing for hegel to say

that is absolutely ridiculous

and we said in the introduction of the

phenomenology of spirit

uh we said that in the introduction of

the phenomenal phenomenology of spirit

is the science of consciousness it's

exposition that consciousness has the

concept of science sure sure so two

things right two things because you just

you let him keep talking it piles up the

bullshit two things uh lewis the first

thing

hegel begins with the science of

consciousness but the science of

consciousness is not the same thing as

consciousness taken one-sidedly uh

within the first chapter of the

phenomenology of the spirit of

consciousness consciousness only so for

example the science of consciousness

leads to the conclusion of absolute

knowledge yes

but consciousness

um consciousness cannot be taken in a

vacuum one-sidedly within the conf what

the essence of consciousness is

especially ontologically cannot be taken

within a vacuum within the first chapter

of the um phenomenology of spirit

because it necessarily follows from

consciousness that there is

self-consciousness and from

self-consciousness that there is spirit

and so on and so on so this is what you

don't seem to understand now you keep

talking about hegel's ontological

commitment to consciousness and i keep

trying to pin you down and you keep

avoiding my question

what is for hegel the being of

consciousness is the being of

consciousness fully exhausted in the

first chapter of the phenomenology or is

the being of consciousness inadequately

and uh

unfinished or whatever inadequately uh

described in the first chapter

is the being of consciousness all there

in the first chapter without any further

elaborations being like purely is is

what it is purely there

like it's existence

so for hegel so hegel's ontological

commitment to consciousness what you

mean by that is that

hegel is until is committed to the

ontological um

he he privileged he the ontological uh

exceptionality of the consciousness that

he describes in the first chapter of the

phenomenology is that what you're trying

to say

what i'm trying to say is that like i

can actually i'll outline this in a

really easy way everything that is

necessarily there to be understood in

hegel is within the immediacy of

consciousness but it is inadequate for

us to will ourselves

so we reconcile ourselves if the

movement of consciousness seeks to

reconcile itself with itself

because if it wasn't already there then

there would be nothing to reason and

there'd be nothing to actually it's a

possibility

let it finish the slide

it's the positing of existence which we

are reasoning out it is the

it is reality itself which is what hegel

is saying is already there that reality

is real that existence exists what is is

it's taught a logical which is why it's

infinite it is now i got you now i got

you sure i got you now so this reality

according to that is already there for

hegel this hegel fully exhausts already

in the beginning

he sets it up fully in the beginning

everything else is just kind of

ancillary right

well i mean like in the sense that like

he doesn't fully exhaust the like the

the foundations of reality he just says

that we move beyond the immediacy of

self-certainty and move okay now let me

ask you another question the same

question in a different way do we move

beyond this immediate reality or

was there something latent within this

reality that leads to it moving beyond

with regard to itself

quite the opposite actually if you look

at hegel we move back to immediacy but

i'm just quoting you later

what do you want to fucking say here i'm

just quoting you to help you guide you

and why you're a fucking idiot

so if you look at hegel we don't

actually move away from the immediacy of

reality we mediate that's what you said

you said we moved away from it why are

you wasting my time as you're muted

lewis finish your response we move back

to the to the immediacy so we do mediate

we do mediate in the second term but

only to make and reconcile ourselves

with ourselves so it's immediately

available um to give you a quote from

this if if it would maybe help fuck what

the fuck

fucking quote fuck you bitch

i'll get rag all right is he still here

no okay lewis finish your thought please

concisely and then we're gonna let uh

respond

so the positioning of an essence is

actually the movement in

self-consciousness but the the

grounding of essence is the foundation

in the concrete existence which exists

in consciousness and he says that in

um i think that was the

uh the science of logic okay are you

done okay as you can respond

i don't know what that means but i'm not

allowing it

only languages that the host can

understand please

you're literally just quoting shit not

you're not getting to the fucking point

you're quoting gibberish saying

gibberish to dance around the way i

fucking pinned you

you said you said louis not me that

everything is there in the beginning but

it's not enough so we have to move

beyond is this not enoughness itself a

feature of what is originally there or

not

well yeah but i mean the deficit is one

of knowledge not not of reality

that's where you're a fake fucking

hegelian and a kantian yes it is a

deficit of being itself

it is definitely a deficit of being

itself not just knowledge lewis there is

no one-sided distinction between being

and knowledge that is not actively

suspended in hegel's philosophy hegel

does not simply set up being versus

knowledge and then it ends there being

and knowledge are for hegel

thinking and being for hegel are the

same lewis they're the same thing

ultimately so you're a fake fucking

hegelian look neat

okay

thinking and being are the same he says

that yeah yeah

it's a will it's i'm talking i'm talking

about you louis you want to interpret it

as a will only lewis and has you're both

muted because you're not listening to me

so i will

i will suffer a lot but not that one of

my participants be accused of being a

contingent so we're gonna move into

audience questions again if anybody has

a question um you may uh

put it in my chat otherwise i won't see

it i need you to put an asterisk on

either end so i can quickly cycle

through and find them thank you very

much

um let's find some questions here

uh i've got a question for both of you

actually um

we've been talking a lot about whether

or not animals are conscious i want to

know what the stakes are if indeed they

are why does it matter whether or not

animals are conscious

because it first of all a proves he

doesn't know anything about hegel

that be he all of the even though i

already wrecked him as far as the

supposed necessary conclusions that

would follow from this and even if i

were to concede that animals are

conscious which i don't the conclusion

obviously doesn't fall we established

that last time he didn't even respond to

any of my arguments but first of all

you're not even able

to arrive at the conclusions you did in

the first place because your fucking

premise is wrong animals are not

conscious

louis do you want to play that yeah so i

i will say that i think it's quite funny

that he says that it doesn't matter if

uh

if uh animals are conscious even though

the whole point of what he's arguing

here is to go i was way too charitable i

shouldn't have

conscious because this means that we are

considering animals here's the

the way string yard works is that if

both of you speak at the same time you

both turn into a garbled mess and nobody

can hear so lewis finish your thought

then has you can address it yeah i just

think that he's i just think that he's

back peddling i think that he's

attempting to undo the debate that he

had because it was not bad oh really

literally is that why louis again you

always conflate shit louis here's what i

just said and sunday don't don't let me

say my piece sunday okay here's your

turn here's what you said louis

you said

i said you said that oh you're you're

just trying to it's funny that you're

saying it doesn't matter because that's

the whole point of this debate the whole

point of this debate louis i don't get

it twisted louis i am 100

fully confident in the fact that i

fucking wrecked you last time i just

didn't wreck you as thoroughly as i

wanted to and that's why i'm doing this

even if i conceded to you that animals

are conscious as i proved last time

you'd still get fucking wrecked but for

the sake of being philosophically

consistent and consistent with my own

beliefs and my own views i want to

clarify that i was wrong to even concede

that in the first place even though it

was it doesn't make a difference as far

as who wins this little encounter

between you and i that's why lewis i

wanted to have this fucking debate and

clear this shit up because it this

debate not only proves

yet again another victory for me but

that you literally don't know shit about

hegel and that is something i don't

think

i proved well enough last time i proved

it well enough this time

okay question for has from seeking a

independent of hegel if animals are

conscious would this change your view of

veganism

there's no independent of hegel animals

it did the notion of ana i uh understand

my concept of consciousness comes from

german idealism comes from uh this kind

of philosophy so no it's an absurdity to

call fucking animals conscious i will

never accept animals as a so-called

conscious it's completely meaningless

completely stupid to call them that

okay and this is for both of you from

angela marnie i'm going to let louise go

first in this one how does consciousness

imply an object's subject distinction is

it baked into the meaning of

consciousness itself

um yeah so it doesn't um that's the

whole point where you start in hegel it

is the infinite experience consciousness

doesn't imply um an object's subject

distinction that comes later like that

is the that is

the the subject like well not the

subject the consciousness produces the

object subjective vis distinction as a

means of self-satisfaction which is why

if you're going after hegel and you get

to heidiger and you start learning about

um existential analysis and and so on

you start saying that language is

actually a form of equipment in which we

use to engage with reality so this

production of self-consciousness and

objects uh and determined objects

actually is a means to self-satisfaction

and not given in our experience which is

exactly why he's critiquing um

self-certainty

all right how is do you want to reply to

this yes consciousness does in fact

necessarily imply a subject object

distinction otherwise consciousness

could have no determinate content

whatsoever there's absolutely no meaning

to calling something conscious if you

don't have a subject object distinction

it's a pretty pla and i already proved

that through the course of this debate

like an npc he's repeating his original

argument that's fine

okay thank you and uh this is from ga

corabov thank you for the uh five

dollars um perspective philosophy you

say quote unquote will a lot it seems

like you're focused on actualism more

than anything else

are we seeing the triumph of your will

i'm not entirely certain how that

he's implying he follows giovantali's

actual idealism

no um

what i'm arguing when i the whole point

of bringing up will in hegel is to show

that it's not a stagnant process that

being is not in uh that being is not um

there in itself it's it's actually his

reply to zeno's paradox which explains

that everything must be in motion like

if you if you were to shoot an arrow and

you were to stop time at any moment

zeno's paradox is supposed to say that

the arrow would have to both be there

and not there simultaneously the bagel

overcomes the distinction you don't

understand the questions the questions

for lewis let me finish that that is

exactly what i'm saying um it's it's a

moment of becoming it's not a moment of

being there or not being there it is

both simultaneously

okay just to clarify the idea of pure

will is just as absurd for hegel as pure

being

okay

this is for both of you um from einsley

gonger i have a question why should i

care if animals feel pain or not i can

justify that we have a social contract

between us i take them to mean us humans

but what is the social contract between

me and an animal um

what

morally prevents me from harming an

animal uh has would you like to take

that one first

yeah sure um

first of all i i completely doubt

animals have so-called pain as we know

it

i think pain is something we take for

granted there's a lot of things about

pain we take for granted it's not just a

sensation okay um

like i said the fundamental distinction

you don't even have to talk about this

stuff about a social contract or

whatever

as someone else pointed out that i saw

on twitter which was actually such a

great way of summing up what i was

trying to say before the question of

harming animals or not harming animals

has nothing to do with morality has

nothing to do with ethics it's a

question of normativity okay it's it you

can't you can't um legislate you can't

it's no more relevant to ethics and

morality than aesthetic taste

is yeah okay lewis

yeah so like the idea of a social

contract like being able to form a

social contract is in and of itself a

bad way to establish ethics hegel

actually points this out he basically

shows that everything that you're doing

in the social contract already must

pre-exist the contract for you to be

able to accept that an individual could

complete the contract that they're

capable of actually signing and

understanding and engaging in a contract

and having it as the end of their of

their will so the whole point is it

presupposes an ethical relationship in

which you already can have a trust

established in order to sign the

contract or even have the capacities

necessary or even the um the uh

fundamental tenants uh said that you

would require for um

to experience to even want to sign a

contract all of that is already

presupposed in social contract theory so

saying that signing a social contract

it's a bad way to do it so looking at an

animal animal's inability to sign a

contract is secondary why is a human

able to sign a contract and why do i

establish contracts with humans so if i

want to sign a contract with a human

it's so that we can facilitate a joint

end in order to satisfy a joint will now

if i already established that this joint

will

exists prior to the contract the

foundations of that will exist in

ontology but they're also

epistemologically available to us by

analysis and that exists in an animal i

can see their pain and pleasure as

valuable prior to their ability to sign

a contract because that is exactly the

same pain and pleasure that i would see

is valuable prior to the human's

capacity to sign a contract which i must

consider

for has from android 323 what does it

matter what an old man said of science

nowadays proves animals being conscious

because science proves no such fucking

thing simple as that see how i get too

straight to the point i don't babble

along like perspective philosophy to say

in so many words where you can sum up in

like two seconds

okay

uh for perspective philosophy from king

of based do you deny the labor

aristocracy

um

i i don't i don't really know um

i i can't like to be entirely honest

with you i don't think i could give like

a definite answer because i can't really

remember what

the i don't even know what the labor

aristocracy is off the top of my head to

be entirely honest with you i'm just

gonna like i'm willing to admit me

ignorance here

um

in terms of the terminology fair enough

from angelo mourney and i take this to

be for both of you is absolute knowing

the final and necessary development of

consciousness will animals ever achieve

quote unquote absolute knowing according

to lewis yes they will they're on their

way so the cow uprising is imminent

that's not actually what i think cows

don't uh establish absolute annoying

humans too it's it's true yeah but

for hegel consciousness implies the

inevitability of absolute knowing it's

because it's inadequate

no no it doesn't uh oh really but the

thing is it requires an intellect of

capacity which is what is which is

called animal consciousness has let him

finish his response but the the

reconciliation of spirit and

consciousness is the you know the

movement from being an immediate

consciousness to a reconciled

self-consciousness that's not to say

that animals are going to be um they can

be present in spirit in the sense that

it is consciousness is reconciliation

with itself but it is mediated not by

their actions but by our actions and our

consideration of their actions

so like they they engage with us and

communicate with us and we can recognize

what is valuable within them and that is

recognized this literally proves

veganism is fascist like you're

describing a volunteeristic actual

idealist reading of hegel according to

which everything is just some kind of

like subjective actual intervention in

reality rather than the fact that

absolute knowledge literally follows

imminently from consciousness it's

literally

consciousness is imminently inadequate

with regard to itself it can't exist by

itself

it's so ironic that you would accuse

veganism as being fascist when you are

hitler was a vegan from ocean which is

ideologically an abstract where you're

presupposing some idealized version of

man

and seeing it as a sublime object of

ideology from which we think the nazis

were humanistic

you're the one engaging in what is an

abstract moment of right that is being

justified by what the hegemony of man

when did i say that you don't even know

my fucking views i'm putting words in my

mouth talking out of your fucking ass

just like your pretend pretended

knowledge of hegel it's clear that the

nazis were vegetarian the nazis were

pro-vegetarian that's a fact of history

yes they fucking were yes they fucking

were vegetarian they used methods to

kill the jews that were ex were taken

from slaughterhouses

you know why then why did nazis demonize

cultures

why did nazis demonize coaster slaughter

because they hated the jews

what was the explanation they gave that

it was cruel toward animals that's why

they said the jews were being cruel

toward animals and nazis thought animals

have more rights than jewish people just

like vegans

it's not like we love animals it's like

we hate the jews the jews are worse than

us everything there was a vegetarian

himself hitler wasn't a vegetarian

that's a myth and it was a way to

propagandize himself in respect to being

comparable to gandhi who was popular at

the time but you know whatever you know

fuck history right

all right next question from thoughtbat

for has are you permissive of animal

abuse if not why not

no i'm not because i don't believe that

our relationship to the world comes from

thin air we it's established by

president custom moors and common sense

why would you want to be abusive toward

an animal if not the fact that you're

projecting upon that animal human

qualities and characteristics and you

want just like you want to use the

animal as a way to vent your own

misanthropy so no i don't believe in

intentionally abusing animals but if

animals like are not being treated up to

the standards of what vegans think as an

incidental fact of

our already existing fundamental

relationship to them then i don't give a

shit i obviously think sadism is fucked

up

but no i don't give a fucking shit about

animals

okay uh lewis this is from forehead who

has asked this question now four times

um are cars vegan

um yeah cars can be vegan anyway not all

cars like

um

like the reality is is that we can

engage in modes of consumption which

unfortunately will lead to states of

tragedy which we should reconcile um but

only ones that are

really

considering everyone but then attempting

to minimize harm so like the the for

example look at it like this um i have

an obligation to other humans but if i

drive a car i have a risk of running

them over it's not that i'm going to

kill some i want to kill someone but

that there is an aspect of our being

which necessitates our drive in the car

i have to drive a car to get a work i

need to satisfy my own uh needs and

drives so having a call is not an

inherently unethical okay this is from

ga coraba for five dollars per sec

perspective philosophy you sound more

like a neo hegelian how is this concept

of hegel anything but a precursor to the

worst ideas in human history

um well i am a hegelian um i don't think

it's a precursor to the

um ideas like the worst ideas in history

i i don't see how you could say that i

mean what are you considering the worst

ideas in history are you relating this

to perhaps like

um like i don't know like movements from

the like the moxie inside of things um

which i don't think were necessarily the

worst ideas in history but i'd say that

a lot of the negative uh within the

marxist leninist movement come from the

rejection of the negation of negation

within hegel which meant that they

started presupposing that like uh

essentially notions of right without um

that's not true so first of all the

rejection of the negation of the

negation has nothing to do with the

rejection of uh reconciliation it's

rather a point of i'm going to quickly

just sum this up

reconciliation re-emerges from the

dialectical materialist perspective in

the form of material being material

being is what reconciles um and leads to

a so it's not that they reject the

negation of the negation as as

reconciliation they do accept that the

negation is ultimately negated it's just

negated by positive material being it's

a very important distinction uh they do

not reject hegelian reconciliation they

reject the view that the negation of the

negation uh as a metaphysical view which

which leads to a kind of um

still negation of negation does not

arrive at positive being that's the

issue

i'm going to modify this question from

uh seeking a because it's kind of just

quickly odd just yeah

mao actually certainly does reject the

negation of negation yeah but

he says he says that there are basically

points towards particulars and that

everything can be infinitely divested

into um smaller and smaller units and uh

in society and he points to any points

that towards that so like it definitely

doesn't say that it can be reconciled he

says that there is the constant unity of

opposites yes

that's the point like the contradiction

must exist in in in a form of

contradiction that is never um

reconciled okay okay in the military

it is it is actually reconciled it's

just that you don't understand the

chinese tradition mao is coming from mao

is ontologizing contradiction itself as

a form of positive being so it is

reconciled in the form of this material

positive being which for hegel is the

very unity of opposites itself the

content of the material object for mao

is the unity of opposites which is he is

inheriting from the chinese philosophy

the chinese tradition and it's also

something this

orientation towards being

itself

a positive being as opposed to the

negativity of thought is something that

distinguishes eastern philosophy and

thinking from western in general so to

say that he doesn't accept a

reconciliation is wrong he accepts a

reconciliation it's just that this is a

reconciliation in reality itself in the

form of the very being of the unity of

opposites itself thank you i'm gonna i'm

gonna cut you off there uh lewis because

we're gonna get to the next question um

this is from nimrod's fall to has

um has how do you differentiate between

uh your view and the view that some

scientists used to have that non-whites

lacked consciousness and pain vis-a-vis

animals because

your comparison of non-whites to fucking

animals is precisely why veganism is a

white supremacist ideology that is the

enemy of mankind

okay just you call cube you just that's

just how you're going to respond to that

yeah because i get straight to the point

instead of wasting people's time like

you that's a point that's a too cool cue

that's that's a logical fallacy what do

you usually criticize criticism with a

criticism

what

you're like like someone's just went um

oh like how would like they've asked you

a question and then you went you're a

white supremacist yeah the reason it's

different lewis is because there's a

fundamental because non-white people are

still fucking human i don't know is that

is that enough for you i i didn't take

the question to be making that

implication i thought the point was that

um

it's it's not it's the equivocation goes

in the other direction whether or not

animals should be raised up to the

general status of having equal value to

human beings that's that's how i

interpreted that question it didn't have

the negative connotation at all that's

just me

what i'm saying is that the reason why

you can't compare it is because there's

a fundamental difference between

humans and animals and that non-white

people

uh the difference between non-whites and

whites is not the same as the difference

between humans and animals that's how i

would respond jesus christ that's what i

want you to establish what is the

difference

okay well that's a different question if

he wants to know what precisely a

different question your question is what

precisely is the difference between

humans and animals

uh ethical inconsistencies are you are

you asking me that question

what's the difference between humans and

animals yeah justifical in consideration

yeah sure you know what my answer to you

is

what reid hegel

ah that was terrible just read hegel he

talks about it he elaborates

pretty well okay okay

next question

all right uh there's a premise to this

one are either of you aware of

meta-modernism or post-post modernism

i'm aware of it i know very little about

it to be entirely honest with you um i i

i need to read into it somebody sent us

this on um one of me prior uh streams

but i can't say i know very much about

it to be entirely honest with you i

don't remember i remember encountering

it and my i remember what i thought when

i read up on it encounters that i wasn't

impressed by it and i thought it was a

bunch of bullshit but i don't remember

specifically why but that's my memory

yeah i have no knowledge of this

whatsoever um this is from seeking a i'm

going to modify this slightly if you

were pressed how would you salvage the

position of your opponent

um house do you want to go first or

lewis i'll let you choose once yourself

um

if i if lewis was an intelligent person

then they would come at this from the

perspective of a cosmology he wouldn't

try to collapse the distinction between

nature and spirit which is antithetical

to the hegelian enterprise he would try

to actually reconcile them from the

perspective of cosmology similar to uh

eval ilenkovs his cosmology of spirit

about but this is a necessarily

materialist enterprise though and he

would from this cosmology try to

establish how

animals figure into the ultimate

development of

spirit from the perspective of the

development of spirit as something that

arises out of nature and how spirit is

in fact part of nature and so on and so

on so if he was smart he would come at

it from that perspective it's just he's

not smart enough to do that so he has to

lie about hegel and pull shit out of his

ass

lewis

um it depends what you mean by salvage

do you mean like as in make a steel man

of the argument or do you mean to the

best of your ability perhaps you regard

the position as unsalvageable but if you

to the extent that you can

right so i would say that he's position

perhaps could argue if he was being like

justified about it would be to accept

that animals were conscious

um but then say that um and then tried

to do i think they were honestly his

argument in the first bit was stronger

than his argument in this one although

still terrible he um essentially tried

to argue an epistemological difference

in that one which um

meant that animals couldn't be

considered because we cannot demonstrate

the resistance in their will which would

lead us to a discussion of whether we

can they have no will

haven't uh haven't um like interests

which we can consider that would be the

um that would be the best argument that

he could make but i still think a very

poor one

all right this is from ga corabov again

for five dollars uh again to perspective

philosophy by nia hegelian i meant

gentilly prospective philosophy are you

aware of some of the abstractive

concepts you introduce uh are you aware

these seem a lot like actualism

um i'm not really i've never i've never

really encountered this so much to be

entirely honest with you um

but i'm not really introducing an

abstract concept i'm not saying that

there is um

anything that necessarily must be

accepted as pure abstract essence but

rather that we need to reconcile what is

a pure abstract essence um with the the

fundamental concrete reality which is

fundamentally what does that have to do

with actualism

i just said i've never encountered

actualism and i don't know so you don't

know what he's talking he's not taught

he's not saying you have an abstract

concept he's saying that your

interpretation of hegel is pretty much

the same as giovanni gentile's actual

idealism

well

giovanni's the um

he's the founder of intellectual founder

of italian fascism yeah italian fashion

yeah i never haven't read his work yet i

was going to read it in to respond to uh

fascists but i haven't met a fascist

hegelian yet because i think that's died

i think i've just met one today which is

i met one last week which is you

that's absolutely dumb like let's be

honest like what i'm arguing you're not

you're not a fascist i wouldn't call you

a fascist but like philosophically i

think you are

i don't think that's i don't think

that's the case at all considering that

i'm arguing for a mediation of the self

with the self in a way that reconciles

us from in and out groups to a unified

individual so like nothing to do with

fascism fascism fascism requires an us

versus them notion in which we can posit

a single identity against the against

the other not necessarily fascists for

example can have a view of like world

conquest like hitler where there's gonna

reconcile all beings with but it's gonna

be in like a determinate hierarchy with

germans at the top just like animals

would figure in the hierarchy but the

higher the races

i mean the hierarchy in and of itself i

think in a hegelian stance would be

absolutely unjustified why we have a

higher you admit we need a hierarchy

with animals or you don't admit that

no i don't think that we should hire

archives

at all so if you see like a baby and a

baby like chicken and which one would

you save because there's no hierarchy i

would do my judy

and do what which one would you save

well i'd probably do my judy to society

and my family and like whatever

so you're but your society is a

determinant society right it's not just

like a universal system

yeah but if at the point of absolute

spirit if you were to say like what

matters more a chicken or a baby they're

equal in value okay so so how can you

not why don't you transpose

hang on has let him finish his response

and then you can reply yeah so that's a

movement from hegel's um meta ethical

commitments or hegel's onological

commitments to eagle's normative

commitments

are our duties

and how we express that notion of right

let's bring it back to the point the

point was

there's clearly a hierarchy between

humans and animals

clearly yet you haven't established it

yeah no but you just establishment you

agree that animals cannot have the same

rights human beings can

what do you mean when did i say that

they can't have the same rights i

absolutely do think they can have the

same rights there's some rights

so like i wouldn't give a child for

example the right to vote and i wouldn't

give a dog the right to vote no i'm

sorry which one is it

is it the same rights or it's not the

same rights which one is it

is it the same rights or is it not the

same rights which one is it well it

would be the same right

no no the same right i didn't say right

and the abstract said right right this

the right it writes quote unquote can

you can you stop dancing around the

point would they have the same rights or

would they be unequal

well no you don't have to have the exact

same rights to be equal

okay collectively from the common sense

perspective would animals be equal to

humans

okay what you're arguing you can argue

also from the nazi perspective you don't

not everyone has to have the same rights

okay let him reply like look at it like

this like would hegel have said that

everyone has the same right to the money

that exists in my family if they don't

live in my family no like that's not how

it works that's fine those people's

rights are dependent upon the context

but we haven't you haven't established

how it's different from nazis okay hang

on hang on let him finish and then as

you can go how would you try to be quick

how is it different from nazism because

we're considering everyone equally and

the notion of rights is being delved out

from that position yeah the nazis are

saying we're treating everyone equally

uh just like how you're saying we would

treat all animals equally but if there's

differences in the content of the rights

that's not because there's no equality

it's just because of the differences in

determinate reality just like the family

example you mentioned so we're not

actually addressing that point the

opposite because

in reality the determinant reality from

which you're proposing is the subject

objective vision i'm saying is

necessarily inadequate to establish

right and that it needs to be reconciled

with consciousness

okay lewis

which is the whole point of this i know

you're trying to avoid this

louis i know you're trying to avoid the

point my question is very simple right

why

okay so clearly okay animals would be

concentrated differently than humans

right according to yes okay let's just

so why shouldn't different races be

treated differently from the nazi

perspective what's wrong with that

because the nazi perspective the lib

deliberately undermines the value that

exists in a race and it proposes an

abstract notion of value in let's say

like let's something like german-ness

right like where there is no value well

it's a pretty nationalist position

that's not necessarily true because um

germanness is just referring to the

actual determinant society in which

germans live whereas other and and also

both of you again the platform we're on

if you both speak over each other it

becomes a garbled mess that nobody can

hear you see the silence yourselves

one at a time has finisher thought then

lewis yeah yeah so basically and also

you could also say that

hitler might argue that german society

represents the fullest and most uh

developed i think nazis did argue this

um

developed expression of spirit the most

in the world and that it necessarily

does entail a hierarchy of races so why

does that not follow from your

perspective well

because the establishment of a hierarchy

in terms of of conscious beings is

exactly what is being undermined by the

hegelian position which is the

constitution the nazis are not as good

as

let them finish

the consideration of determinate being

is inadequate which is why we start at

consciousness which is what you've

missed this entire time you're the one

that's presupposing an abstract

determinate fucking uh notion of uh

of uh right

within okay you are putting forward an

anthropocentric position where there is

no justification for that in

consciousness itself

so what

so that is

there's fundamentally just so what that

there's no justification in conscious

itself and how am i establishing an

arbitrary abstract primacy of humanity

over everything else

because you're unwilling to consider

that animals are valuable that doesn't

mean i have an abstract perspective hang

on hang on hang on he doesn't logically

necessarily follow that

let him let him reply he has his

abstract

let him reply he derailed the topic i

was asking him why okay so but you can

you can point it out when you respond

but he needs to be able to finish the

sentence otherwise you don't like

something like five different things

we're arguing about now i need to derail

the topic you're trying to

trying to bring this back to a debate i

already want about consciousness

nobody talk over me that's the rule

lewiston has

[Music]

be quick

okay right okay great so

the the reason i'm not derailing the

topic i'm defending myself against

claims of fascism and i'm showing that

that the hegelian critique of fascism

would be the inadequacy in spirit i

don't care what nazis think of

themselves of course they have delusions

of grandeur that's that's basically

entailed in that position but that's

because they're looking from a through a

sublime object of ideology which paints

germanic superiority as being justified

just as your position paints

anthropocentrism as being justified you

look through adam they look through

hitler as asco yeah two things and this

is why i'm saying this is taking so long

first thing um no no it doesn't

necessarily follow because from your

perspective which one of actual ideal is

the actual triumph of the will and the

actual uh

the actual uh triumph of the will if you

as far as the nazis are concerned it's a

decisive moment so these nazis are

merely saying well since it's not a

given in being just like how you said we

re it requires our will to establish

what was already true the nazis are not

saying for abstract reasons we elevate

ourselves above others they're saying

this is actually the case in reality

we've proven it by our military prowess

and superiority this is just the

manifestation of our actual will our

triumph of the will the second thing is

that your claim about that my humanity

is an abs you you have a completely you

just pulled something out of your

fucking ass i'm a fucking marxist

materialist dialectic you think i have

an abstract um humanism of some kind of

abstract bourgeois humanist no i have a

marxist humanism my marxist humanism has

nothing to do with arbitrarily elevating

some kind of uh form to the status of

supremacy against which all reality is

being related you haven't proven that's

my position nothing i've said implies or

demonstrate that's my position if you

want to know more about my humanistic

perspective just ask me you're clearly

uneducated so instead of talking out of

your ass why don't you just fucking ask

me um what the nature of my humanism i

completely have railed against abstract

humanistic universalism human rights and

all that kind of stuff i always fucking

critique that regularly my i don't have

some kind of fucking um

european modern european humanistic

perspective i don't think hegel

necessarily does either um what you're

saying is completely fucking wrong but

that doesn't mean i don't think a

distinction between humans and animals

is justified unless your argument is

that hegel is trying hegel's

elevation of humanity is abstract and uh

whatever but that just proves that

you're not a fucking hegelian because

hegel makes it clear it's not hegel

doesn't create some kind of abstract

criterion for humanity against which the

world is um being measured hegel

demonstrates why humans are different

from animals through the uh through an

imminent process of development not

through some kind of uh

top down thing

okay those would you like to reply

yeah so

um the nazis positing a power structure

as a justification of their position is

exactly what hegel argues against in the

um in the phenomenology and the

philosophy of right in the master slave

dialectic i mean that's the whole point

power doesn't justify itself what

justifies power is actually the the

expression of subjectivity or the

expression of the will yeah i mean

that's that's that's essentially the

whole point so saying like all right the

nazis say that they're superior and so

they have shown themselves to be you

know more considerable no that's that's

exactly exactly what hegel's arguing

against so like no i haven't got it

wrong like well you're and you know the

thing is i wouldn't be surprised if you

agreed with that no wait i'll let you

speak so do you let me speak i wouldn't

be surprised if you agreed with a power

structure where you say might makes

right and some sort of stupid notion in

which right can be justified through the

acquisition of material or power right

is not justified in relation to some

sort of um control or ideological

manipulation it's justified against

reality which is why reflection um which

is why the essence is reflection but the

concrete foundation is the existence

all right we're going to move to the

next question before this turns into a

wedding um this is from angela marney

again

oh please go for it

yeah okay the the imminent justif i'm

not saying they're justifying themselves

on the basis of power perspective maybe

the power proves something imminent but

i'm not saying it's coming just from the

fact they have power maybe what the

nazis would say is that our power

attests

uh to this fact not necessarily that it

is what proves it so it's a complete

straw man you still haven't

distinguished yourself

you know being logical they are saying

might makes right they're saying that no

they're not necessarily they're i am

more powerful and what we are

considering

they might say that might attest to

right but they're not saying it's

actually what makes right it's a very

very ah

saying that the power within nature is

what determines rightness so they're not

they're not saying that yes they are the

same would be a testament no they are

lewis lewis you're not able to hang on

hang on hang on has then lewis okay

louis i'm not they're not saying it's

what actually determines right it's just

that from our perspective of finite

knowledge this is what maybe this is

what um

demonstrates it for us but it's not

imminently what actually proves it it

merely attests to it there's a operative

distinction there you seem to be unaware

of the distinction i'm trying to make

i'm actually very aware of the

distinction you're trying to make but

the foundation from which they are

pointing to in which is this

justification i didn't speak of

justification i did not hang on

let him finish the reply it's a

testament as you call it towards reality

isn't a testament towards their power

they're saying that their actions within

the world are somehow justifying their

actions within the world no that is

exactly not against the hegelian

position no one mentioned justification

no one mentioned justification no one

mentioned justification please let us

finish

so the whole point of the hegelian the

hegelian system is to recognize that

what is valuable is is the will itself

it's not like some sort of like

uh or that predicate it is it is you

think okay do you think

hegel's philosophy is some kind of like

normative system

well i think there is a normativity in

hegel like of course yeah that's

extremely vague obviously there's a

normativity

yeah but like

you think it's a normative system not a

philosophy oh no of course i think that

it's more than normative that would be

ridiculous it's it's if the answer louis

is that it's not a normative system okay

so i said that it wasn't and then

but you're just you're treating it like

it is you're treating it like if i if i

say that the nazis

are coming from are understanding

themselves from a perspective of actual

idealism that's very different from

saying they're using hegel to justify

themselves normatively the point the

point what i was making is that the

ontology from which they are saying is

justifying their supremacy

superiority where does the justification

factor

is there supposed superiority sure

the whole point in the hegelian system

is that the master and the slave

regardless of any hierarchisation are

mutually dependent beings trying to

express subjectivity they that is all

that matters their interests that's fine

that's fine

okay first of all has nothing to do with

the point where does just where did i

mention justification and where could

justification possibly factor into the

point i'm trying to so

you weren't saying that a testament was

a notion of trying to prove something no

so you were just saying that it it might

might possibly indicate yes that's

exactly what i was saying louis if you

were listening so they were just so

they're just making unjustified

assumptions then and i can accuse them

of that wait wait wait what do you mean

because justification is important do

you what do you deny that i'm saying i'm

saying that they they are interpreting

their actions from the perspective of

actualizing the will

within this uh greater harmony of spirit

i'm talking this is not my view of hegel

this is your view of this accident my

view of anything this is your attempt to

try and make paint me as a fascist

because you're in no okay to be clear

for the audience to be clear for the

audience lewis is obviously not a

fascist i'm just saying that your

philosophical

views are uncannily close to actual

idealism

uh i i'm very much well i don't actually

you know actually saying that i'll read

giovanni and i'll make a distinction as

to why they're different but i will say

that my the logical end of my philosophy

does not attest or does not in any way

give credence to fascism

when we have a prospective fascist in

the next day no no i i perspective to be

clear i agree that you don't want it to

lead to fascism and you don't want it to

so i agree with that you don't want to

be a fascist obviously

but do you have a choice as a question

if you if you take it to the end there's

an apropos question here uh by angela

marney um i take it to be addressed to

prospective philosophy but i'll let you

both answer uh but lewis first um does

absolute knowledge mean no hierarchy

between human beings or between beings

um it depends on what you point towards

hierarchization it would mean equal

consideration of interests uniformity

like but in terms of like we were all

subject under right but if we were to

like create let's say it would be more

like a heterokey you would accept you

would still expect like some form of

normativity or maybe not actually

because he does say that subjects

reconcile themselves with the world so

probably not probably no hierarchy um

but it would but our actions would

attest to the greatest expression of

right so for example if

um the greatest expression of right was

the consideration of one interest over

another in a particular scenario we

would all agree with that would be

absolutely annoying we would all go

absolutely it is our duty to do x and

that judy is the one that we will follow

it logically follows very clearly from

hegel's um view of absolute knowledge

and his philosophy in general

that

hegel does explain why the hierarchies

in reality exist and hegel does believe

in my view that hierarchies are an

inevitability of the discontinuities

in reality

that exist objectively so for example

hegel doesn't believe in hierarchy in

the sense that he believes like

a person is ontologically superior to

another person or a person is uh

superior by virtue of some kind of

characteristic but for hegel there are

are necessary hierarchies in for example

a society

that represent the

different positions of human beings in

relation to um the spirit and in

relation to the state in particular so

in that sense yes hierarchies are

implied for hegel but they're not

there's no uh i don't think hegel

believes in an ontological hierarchy

between human beings i think hegel

imminentizes

hierarchies uh as the relationship

between the individual human

and um spirit in the form of the state

um if if by that you mean that hegel

like thinks that hierarchies are

necessary in order to express

absolute spirit to its greatest possible

degree i wouldn't disagree necessarily

although the top of the hierarchy is

absent of any subjectivity which is why

the king is just an empty

um an empty subject he fulfills the will

of the people it's not it's not just the

king

there's the civil servants and there's

all sorts of officials that stand above

society well yeah but the civil servants

well they're actually i mean there is

like uh

it's not that it stands above society

it's that they are they are society

mediating itself so you've got like

civil servants um who are bureaucrats

and then you've got um private society

and then you've got like these are three

years which are constantly interlocked

but in common sense terms that implies

some people have more power than other

people and ergo in the common sense

sense they're more they're higher on the

hierarchy

i mean i would probably push back on

that and say that power

is in and of itself an expression of the

of spirit and not an expression of

individuality okay sure

there's hierarchy okay just common sense

there's hierarchy okay

yeah but i think that that's that's

making hegel like essentially saying

nothing of what he's actually saying

that'll be like justifying like uh

individualism rather than well no

because you're not addressing the

person's question the person is asking

from a common sense perspective like

would there be hierarchy like as we know

it hierarchically yes

you know what you sound like you sound

like george orwell in the animal farm

and they go some are more equal than

like okay yeah in reality it's a

hierarchy okay like uh you can justify

it however you want but yeah that's a

hierarchy one person does not get more

than another

that's that's not that doesn't well

no yes i mean they do

no but that's not that's not what he's

justifying he's not saying that one

should get more than another that's no

he's not but he's saying that that's

exactly what he's doing because

his philosophy is right is not a

normative um prescriptive normative

document he's describing what the way in

which spirit is mediated

in the form of the states to individual

human beings and hierarchy is a

necessary part of that

we'll just sleep with that yeah we'll

move to the next question uh this is an

interesting one for uh has from noah

watson

um at what point in human evolution does

the slaughter and i'll extend this to

mean just the the use as we use animals

of proto-humans uh become unjustifiable

i actually

am very skeptical to this idea that like

proto like for example a lot of people

think neanderthals were like

proto-humans but that's there's actually

no scholarly consensus

as far as archaic humans are concerned

as actually being a different species

um

the second thing i would say though is

that

um there's a reason why we don't

slaughter

like chimpanzees and gorillas and shit i

mean i guess some tribes in africa might

or whatever but we generally don't

because they're too similar to us and

it's not necessarily because we're doing

it from an ethical or moral perspective

it's just a normative one um it's like

aesthetic taste it's like you know what

i mean like

this question of like how to absolutely

justify this or that is like if we don't

absolutely justify it then necessarily

it will follow that

our normative um

position to the world will be chaotic

and scary well that's not the hegelian

perspective for higgle

um our normative our nor our moors

customs norms and the things we consider

from a common sense perspective to be

like normal

that is actually not like completely

arbitrary and chaotic it is reconciled

with this fear of ethics and morality

and stuff so

it's not they're just not the same thing

is this important to point out they're

not the same thing but it's still

rational and meaningful and stuff it's

not like

people are just going to become

cannibals unless we create some

contrived some kind of like ethical

system

okay we're past the two hour marks i'm

going to limit us to two more questions

again if anybody has questions put an

asterisk on either end so i can catch

them in the chat and we'll be ending off

after those uh this is another one for

has from seeking a what would happen i

apologize if this is uh redundant i

vaguely remember seeing this question

earlier

what would have to be true that would

convince you that animals are conscious

and what about the argument from

marginal cases

yeah the only i would have to be the

thing that would um be necessary for

that to be proven to me is that animals

would actually have to demonstrate to me

by means of some kind of communication

that

they um

that they are conscious like they have

to actually like talk to me or something

i mean like maybe they would have to do

it in a language

that i don't i wouldn't immediately

understand but they would have to be

capable of language and they would have

to be able to recognize

um a difference between subject and

object

how would you respond just quickly how

would you respond then to levanas where

we talk about what comes before language

as the primordial expression so like

communication i mean eighty percent of

communication seventy eighty percent of

communication is non-linguistic like

most of it comes from you know body

language vocal tone or engagements with

each other uh that are not uh you know

actually contained within the words but

i just want to say like how you're

explaining this to has right now keep

going yeah

but but actually the the semantic

content of the words so when we talk

about some forms of like

communication

we

can have communication which is not

linguistic which animals display in

their resistance they scream they um try

to get away they display acts of fear

and terror and in many ways

are pleading to us um they they act and

call us to our own conscience

okay

that's like saying a tree makes you feel

a certain way they're calling it to your

conscience okay

um

obviously language is not the same as

like formal

verbalized um

words is not language is not the same as

words obviously there's forms of

communication that fall within the

criterion of language that are outside

of uh formal language so to speak right

as far as this primordial language stuff

is concerned i'm a lacanian so for me

this is the primordial basis of language

is death drive which animals do not

possess animals do not possess uh the

self-relating uh negativity

the death drive death drive that exists

in they do not have the death drive but

we have the death thrive and we can see

that in their faces which is why as

zizek actually points out that we see

the death drive and our own monstrosity

in the animals yeah yeah i i understand

i understand the idea like

uh language is something that emerged so

nature could speak its own pain whatever

but still animals don't possess it okay

they're not conscious they are not

themselves conscious maybe they

i am that's it what

so the the make it display which we

would say was fundamentally a

communication of no no no no no no

there's a there's a distinction between

the communication that is proper to

language and the elicitation of

the expression of some kind of uh

contingent and

external um

[Music]

expression a part of the animal that

evokes a certain stimuli to other

animals that is different from

communication communication implies a

withdrawness

of the subject with regard to themselves

so that things become for themselves to

another not just you need something like

for example a big other it's not just a

one-way relation between uh me and then

another person it's that it's me another

person and a fundamental third point of

reference that is the presupposition but

the only way that the only way that that

occurs is in the acknowledgement of the

other and that acknowledgement of the

other happens between us and animals in

in two ways i mean animals do

acknowledge us

engage with us so the acknowledgement

yeah the hang on lewis quickly and then

has so one animals do acknowledge and

engage with us animals do and i mean

like shit this is like unbelievably

obvious in terms of training in terms of

like your ability to manifest a

relationship with an animal animals

definitely do and they'll act even

defensively even with each other animals

form social pacts um they're not in like

a society or or something like that but

they do have relationships with one

another it's not purely from like an

internal standpoint and then also they

uh they do communicate pain in that

respect they try and communicate their

pain in the sense to make you stop they

try to communicate pain within a sense

to um cower from you and act defensively

in order to make it end like cats will

lie on their belly and sure submission

okay okay okay concise like two examples

not ten go okay so yeah that's right but

like animals submit to each other even

there is an act there is an active power

relationship with the without with an

animal within another melody okay okay

the first thing you like you you know

you what you do is that you go like 5

000 different points when i have one

point i want to stick to one point so

let's go one by one there's three i

could identify the first point with

regarding to the fact that a big other

the third term is created only by a

relationship with another person

actually that's not true this third term

is necessary both for the acknowledgment

of another and ourselves so that

dialectic relationship is always there

just by having a relationship to another

you do not establish that third term

that is the third point of reference

between you both it's very important to

understand i will say that okay well i'm

addressing your points one by one

because you fucking shit out so many

stupid fucking points okay the second

thing is you said that animals do in

fact communicate to us and do relate to

us they they don't do this any more

than a fucking plant does okay you

haven't established how it's different

from a plant okay

um

you haven't just you haven't gotten from

in itself to for itself as far as that's

concerned

this the third thing is that you said

that animals communicate pain and all

these kinds of things well that's just

anthropomorphization it's like a cat

lady who tries to intuit the feelings of

her cat ultimately there's a complete

unbridgeable difference there where you

could not possibly have communication

with a with an animal because the third

term that is the reference point of

communication could not exist between

you so

uh and as far as animal training and

stuff is concerned even though i don't

myself take this view from a hegelian

perspective and classically modern

european perspective you still don't

establish the difference between in

itself and for itself for example what

separates a robot from an animal in this

regard a complete just robot a machine

that can be trained and so on and so on

i mean like uh you don't actually arrive

at the point at which

animals are conscious

or have languages

if uh all right okay so um

the third term in the hegelian on

laconian kind of especially in the

laconian sense like the the you know the

the big other that's produced that's not

produced that's not imminent within our

being that's produced from the

relationship with the other which then

produces a notion of self and that is

self-consciousness which is what happens

at the mirror stage and the production

of language so that's not that that's

the production of language not the

necessary tenets of language which

animals have you know so they're

recognizing recognition so hang on the

recognition of consciousness is what

produces language and allows us to

formulate the third term it's not what

gives us consciousness it's not what

it's not already okay

thank you lewis and now has new

connections yeah you make the same

mistake in regards to lacan that you did

with hegel so when hegel's talking about

the mirror stage you're again confusing

this with uh lakon's ontological claims

and the implications which are again

being developed from the end yes from

the

yes the truth of the beginning is again

same with lacan at the revealed at the

end so yes and the very beginning the

distinction of the big other

is there the the the the reason why

lacan moves to the big other is because

of the inadequacy of um the relation

between one and another to possibly

explain

uh

what gives rise to identity and

subjectivity lacan moves to the big

other in order because the initial thing

is inadequate it's literally the same as

hegel but you make the same mistake and

misunderstanding okay the big oh that

could not possibly be there because if

it was there then we would start with

the bard subject and not the subject

which is exactly why lecon starts with

the subject which is not barred by

language and that the production of

language becomes bod so that that's

that's the relationship with the big

other right you're making the same with

this okay lewis can you please respond

to my point though i did respond to you

you did it right there

is not saying this is ontologically the

case he's saying this to the ex or

purposes of his investigation for

purposes of his development of what is

already there so yes the big other in a

sense is already there

it's just that we don't know this

so to speak at the beginning this has to

develop in a certain way in order to

arrive at it but yes the big other is

there okay lewis oh that isn't a thing

it's a relationship

yeah okay listen the big other is the

relationship but the symbolic it's the

relationship of the symbolic order

through the subject mediated by the

imaginary that's just what the big other

means that's all it means

and the symbolic order is something that

la khan believes as ontologically

antecedent in the form of death drive

i would agree that the death drive is

there we could agree on that

but that's that's separate that's like

that's like saying like the will seeks

to destroy

that's the wills and frustration with

itself you know why it's especially true

that the symbolic order is already there

louis

well because when you're because when

you're an infant it's literally there

like you you're you're born into a

society into a symbolic order and you're

just confused about your relationship to

it it's already there exactly against

what he argues because he even talks

about how

erogenous zones don't even develop until

past the mirror stage so even our um

experience of pleasure hasn't even been

sublimated in a way that makes sense but

this is the presence of the symbols

let them finish the response lewis try

to be concise go yeah so sublimation and

the um symbolic um the symbolization of

our drives is past the mirror stage

which allows us to feel things in

different locations and understand them

in that way yeah

but lacan is not a stageist he doesn't

believe like there's these are just

different stages lacon's own mirror

stage that was almost an epistemic

development on his part to arrive at

where he would eventually become he

doesn't actually ontologize these stages

and say that this is actually imminently

an ontological stage in being

he

like look like i don't know if i can

kind of say this in another way

um like the whole point of the mirror

stage

is to

recognize

something that you did not see before

like prior to that consciousness was not

a way

of

aware of itself we know

what is leading the process along is the

symbolic order

desire and the frustration of desire

well but desire again what is leading

desire alone

nothing

no yeah there is something

what

drive

that is desire no it's not desire's not

the same as drive dude i've studied

lacan for like five years you don't know

what you're talking about desire is not

the same as drive desire is the

imaginary form drive takes drive belongs

to the domain of the real desire belongs

to you if you want to imagine yeah okay

if you want to know what you're talking

about dude i'm wasting my time

hang on let him respond

if you want to say that what you mean by

desire is the symbolized drive fair

enough it's not symbolized drive

yes it is no it's it belongs to the

imaginary it belongs it's sublimated

drive symbolize drive is signifier okay

it's the sublimated drive man

it's not it's that simple it's the drive

which is given content so that it can be

expressed in the in the imaginary form

well yes but in so much that it gives

the the the capacity for the will to

actually express itself otherwise this

is not philosophy so he's not talking

about will or any of this other stuff

he's talking about psychoanalysis okay

you have to know what you're talking

about you just don't you don't you're

not well read on mcconnell definitely

definitely is philosophical since the

con was heavily inspired by hegel

la khan was inspired by hegel's

dialectic but hey la khan even would say

this is just dialectical materialism

like it's not even hegel per se it's all

right

it's not a materialistic really where

let me ask you a question

when lachan was confronted with the

possibility of a certain theoretical

position he said no this can't be true

because it would violate dialectical

materialism so yes he was but lacan

explicitly okay even if you reject

history and the facts which you are la

khan actually explicitly rejected the

entire enterprise of philosophy he

contrasted psychoanalysis with

philosophy as a completely separate

enterprise so no luck on does not think

this is all philosophy it's not

philosophy philosophical reasons of

lacan are separate from the khan himself

anyway okay that's that's

even

better have to critique la khan's view

of philosophy because they disagree with

it

that's that's fair enough that's that's

not the point i'm making i just what the

point i'm making is that i don't think

that lacan is a materialist

no you don't think you would like says

he is i would argue i would certainly

argue that the whole point of

sublimation is to reconcile an

individual's relationship with their

drives to actually understand material

in the world without yeah

you would be assuming that they would

have those drives and uh and just

sequences where does luck a lot of

marxists

materialism i'm not going to not mention

them because i'm just okay let's just

take it is a materialist yes or no

that's the topic i would say

okay well well

the way you've justified that is because

you've said that lacan is making a

philosophical claim about knowledge

that's incompatible with materialism but

lacan is making no such claim in the

first place and la khan himself believes

that he is engaging in a materialist

enterprise he himself does okay i would

say that lacan begins from a position

which unifies the real the signified and

the imaginary and one such notion in

that is immaterial and without such

lacan wouldn't make sense well what no

material is not the same as substantial

it's clearly material in the sense of

him it's possessing a material content

do you think that the imagination is

material

when did i say that

the relationship lacan establishes

between the imaginary symbolic and the

real precisely gives uh is precisely

materialist it's like saying oh so like

let me finish that's like saying so like

oh if marx acknowledges ideas does that

mean he thinks ideas are material well

no ideas are not themselves material you

can be a materialist while acknowledging

the reality of ideas you can be a

materialist while we're acknowledging

the reality of the imaginary

well one you would have to either

explain mate you'd either have to

explain the ideas in material terms or

the material in ideal terms that would

be what would separate what does this

material mean for you

hang on let him finish this point and

then you can respond so in other words i

would say like i would say that marx is

very much very well aware of the uh of

ideology and how it impacts our

relationship with material but it's all

explained with by moving through

material as in the material explains the

ideas well in hegel the ideas explain

the material okay what is material what

do you what do you mean by material

do you mean as in like what do i mean by

material like person yeah what are you

trying to say when you say lacan

he's not he's not a materialist what is

material then

what is the material thing

i would say that material would be the

um determin would be a uh i'd probably

say like

uh determinate matter in terms of um our

experience what is matter

um i would say the external reality

okay sure uh matter for you is just

external reality do i have you clear

um

i would say that it's i mean like not

for me personally i would say that what

matters is actually a relationship but i

mean like in terms of like uh

so like

i would say that like mata in terms of

how we understand it i'd say that mata

is actually an emptiness

which is kind of what like hegel would

kind of point out what's

homeless right of course of course

that matter is negative okay yeah so

let's let's be clear

so lacan is a materialist because for la

con the imaginary cannot possibly be

self-referential what defines the

imaginary just like what defines

etiology for marx

is in the form of

symptoms in the real

symptoms in the reel for lacon which is

a fundamental structure it's a

fundamental formation that subsists in

the real which accounts for the range of

our imaginary

forms

so for la con la con is clearly a

materialist

symptom

does not have an undialectical view of

materialism according to which there's

like an underlying substance that

determines the the the um form and

content of like the superstructure the

imaginary or ideas obviously that's an

undialectical materialism that's a straw

man no no dialectical materials believes

that dialectical materialists understand

that matter is a dialectic

uh is dialectical matter is itself the

unity of opposites it's compatible like

with mao's view of

the drawing from chinese philosophy of

the unity of opposites as being matter

itself

so matter has no form outside of the

actual form given to it in the form of

the imaginary and so on and so on but it

is still primary it is the primary

content of that form lacan explains this

one last thing lacan actually explains

this logic in the form of his uh

concept of the non-all it is all yes but

there's the non-all

makes it so that um it is internally

incomplete and contradictory and there

lies the primary primacy of matter he

doesn't say like matter is a ready-made

form that determines everything matter

is itself

something that

exists in relation and disturbs in the

form of symptoms the imaginary forms and

it's primary because it is its real

being

well i think that like the important

thing to recognize i think that i would

i would i would not accuse the khan of

being anything but a phenomenologist to

be entirely honest with you i don't

think that we live in unmediated matter

that is like that is exactly like so

like otherwise like one i think the way

that you described materialism there

i'll ask you to define matter as well um

because you describe materialism in such

a way that it almost included can't not

hegel which is so strange like the idea

of like a prime minister a prime a

primary see of reality that we are

subject to hegel agrees with that but

he's not a materialist he doesn't see

that like reality as a through material

notion or physical notion he sees it

through um he sees the material as being

posited as an understanding of something

this is this is exactly the same as the

laconian point of the real which is

infinitely negative and resists meaning

no but here's what you don't understand

the real for lacon is not only negative

the real actually has determinate form

in the form of symptoms symptoms

the real is not simply negativity for

lacan and that's actually the the

primary form of that's the primary

distinction as far as dialectical

materialism with hegel's idealist

philosophy is concerned it obviously

there's an agreement with hegel as far

as the fact of there being a dialectic

relation between

form and content that much is very clear

but from the materialist perspective

it is precisely content material essence

and being

which reconciles

the form in other words the truth of the

form is in the material it subsists in

material being itself already this

explains for example marx says elevation

of the proletariat as the class i don't

want to get into that but um i would

well okay

i can i can finish and then you can go

we don't have time i want to diverge

into other topics that's why

um

so for lacon uh

matter is so if you want to ask me the

question of how i would define matter i

would define matter in a very similar

way that uh three modern philosophers in

the past would define like essence and

content matter does not self-subsist

uh in an undialectical way in an

unmediated way as you're trying to say

that's undialectical that's actually not

materialist it's substantial and

ultimately leads to the conclusion of

idealism which was marx and engels

criticism of french materialism in the

first place matter is definitely

mediated but that doesn't change that

matter is

uh primary and that matter is antecedent

matter is

incontained in the word itself it is the

matter the real content the real content

of any given totality

um

necessarily comes at the expense of both

our knowledge and

the form

given to this

content

that's the point of dialectical

materialism it is the is describing a

relationship between form and content

that's correct

form arises from content but not in a

way

that is all uh contained in the form

itself the content is latent with the

birth regeneration and destruction of

existing forms

okay i'm gonna allow one more response

from both of you no interruptions please

lewiston has

um i don't necessarily even disagree

with pretty much anything you've said

it's just whether you would give mata

the premise of that it's like whether

you would say that the real is matter i

don't think that the con well at least

in my understanding of the khan

i suppose i could be wrong i wouldn't

have said that lacon would give that

primacy to mata he would have gave the

re like it's not that he would say that

what is real is this external physical

existence which we are being tested

against um instead actually this

internal existence that we are

experiencing is already

the symbolic we experience the symbolic

the symbolic reality we don't experience

the the uh the real the real manifest

itself and the inadequacy of this

symbolic realm and in our internal

understanding of self

the real is existence itself in our

place within it and how we are

symbolizing it which is why he's

phenomenological at least from my

interpretations of things if you want to

say that it's mata um i mean i would

have to do more reading to just go

fundamentally hundred percent mcconnell

is saying that the real is mata but i do

not think that i've ever come across

anyone saying that the real is matter

and and that rather anything else that

what the real is is anything but what is

which is what makes it infinitely

negative you can't predicate anything of

it you can't say that there is an

essence of it other than because essence

is actually in the symbol it is in the

production of essence that we get the

symbolized reality the the imagination

produces an essence from which is

applied to reality in the form of a

symbol which is mediated through the

self and like the other

okay two things the real is not matter i

didn't say that it's just that the real

occupies a similar relation to both the

symbolic and the imaginary that matter

does to ideas as relevant to philosophy

that's why lacan is a materialist

and obviously materialism for marx

implies the destruction of philosophy

which lacan is committed to

insight in the form of psychoanalysis

itself so in in that sense the real and

matter are related the real and matter

are related because the real is the

precise way in which matter relates to

us psychologically but it's not

identical with matter itself obviously

um

i don't think that but

as if if i may i will say i don't think

that the con

like

the primary like the importance of yeah

i'll get to it i'll get to it

yeah i'll get to it la con obviously

doesn't draw like a kantian distinction

between psychology and reality but what

i'm i was just trying to simplify

um that the real is matter insofar as it

relates to our like psychological

reality river because there is clearly a

discontinuity but that discontinuity is

ontologically accounted for for example

in g x work the discontinuity between

for example symptoms

uh in the unconscious in the symbolic

order and i'm gonna get to that's gonna

be my second point and symptoms in

nature there are symptoms in nature that

you can understand ontologically and

then there are symptoms

relevant for the unconscious there is no

hard kantian distinction between these

two but there's still a discontinuity

and that discontinuity is the very

object of gg's ontological enterprise

which i disagree with a lot but i'm just

saying acknowledging that the

discontinuity

exists is not a kantian

thing then the second thing you said is

that the real is always already uh takes

the form of the symbolic but it seems

like you're very confused about the

actual content of this symbolic i didn't

say that

hang on lewis it's a hazard's turn okay

whatever you said whatever you said

about the relationship between the real

and the symbolic okay this this is what

you need to understand the symbolic is

precisely i would argue material

actually the symbolic is precisely

material in regards to the imaginary

signifiers are symptoms for lacan this

is the conclusion of lacon's work

signifiers are not produced as uh

they're not philosophical concepts it's

very easy to mistaken signifiers for

concepts they are not the same thing

signifiers are symptoms of the

unconscious and they are formed in a way

that comes at the expense of our

conscious conceptual uh imaginary form

so for the khan the concept belongs to

the realm of the imaginary

for example it is not something that

premises the imaginary itself

um

well i guess this is what i would have

said i i one i wasn't saying

that um

that the

the

we we get the we already exist in the

symbolize i mean in a throne-ness and

maybe like a hedgerian sense perhaps but

not like in a like in a already the

world is simply given to or symbolized

um quite the opposite i was saying that

we gain symbolization through an active

process of imagination which is mediated

between two parties that's

not the case

well i think it is the case like for

lacon the imaginary has a very passive

role in relationship to the symbolic and

the real

but we can get into that and and you

know i'm happy to i do need to go and

research for carmo but

uh from my understanding of a con this

is where i've taken it

the under the real isn't seen as

material it's seen as the absence of any

given thing the symbolic would contain

material but it wouldn't be limited to

material it would be anything which

would be given determinate existence

though i'd which for the con is material

the terminate existence is material for

lacan well that that's like a point of

contention of whether it is or not like

i don't know i'll have to i'll

definitely check okay you don't know

that's fine but like no i'll definitely

check from my understanding it's

phenomenological because it contains uh

the mediation of what is um

it is a mediated reality through

thought it is the production not thought

all right i i think i think we're gonna

move on to the next question now um and

we're going to make this the final

question and this is from uh einsteiner

and i'm going to address this to both of

you leaving aside the previous argument

about the consciousness of animals

uh please comment upon the argument that

veganism is necessary for the sake of

the environment insofar as it is able to

sustain human beings into perpetuity uh

who wants to go first

um i have to can i go and then i can i

go pee because i gotta be really bad if

you guys want to take two seconds to do

that right now you can i'm gonna go pee

i'm very bad yeah you do that hang on

lewis we'll wait till he gets back

no problem no problem

i'm uh

my bladder is stoically shut

yeah i'm just gonna as soon as this is

over i'm running to the bathroom to be

entirely honest with you hey you've got

time why don't you do that now

uh no i'm happy to wait i'd rather just

like

i'd rather be able to take my time

and feel like this is like

you wanna you wanna like you wanna

really savor that release i gotcha

that's the thing it's almost it's almost

like it's gonna be cathartic it's gonna

be like it is that will be um that will

be symbolic hey by the way i've been

meaning to ask where did you get that um

that jellyfish lamp behind you i want

one uh my girlfriend got it so i'll ask

her all right i'll ask you

but uh yeah i'm a big fan of the

jellyfish lamp i've had loads of people

ask if they're real jellyfish now which

i don't know half of them i think are

taking the piss and then the other half

like i think are serious because there's

even people

like um well how do they work

so right so like this is the thing right

so that's water

right yeah you get this like fill like

empty and you get those little like

jellyfish like plastic things and then

you put the water in like you fill it up

yourself put a couple of drops of like

um dishwashing like this dish like what

dish soap um

and then like once you pour it on like

there's a light at the bottom and like a

mortar or whatever or pump rather so

like it's pumping water up that's making

it like circulate

okay with the light at the bottom so

like and then you've got a remote that

can like

so like

so the jellyfish themselves they they

have there's nothing moving in them

they're just being pushed around all

right yes back we're gonna get back to

this so i'm just gonna restate the

question

um

has i don't know if you can hear me yet

uh i can hear you you're good brilliant

okay so again uh please comment upon the

argument that veganism is required to

sustain the environment for humanity um

who would like to go first

i i will if uh please there's no

objection okay sure yeah i don't think

it is um there's two two things right

first um to say it's necessary means

it's necessary from the perspective of

some kind of subjective agent well the

first problem with that is that you're

including in your necessity something

that may not necessarily be possible

um for example the commitment human

beings have in this world to eating meat

is not simply a result of a deficient

ethical or moral system on their part

but could itself be somehow part of our

objective reality changing our very

notion of necessity the necessity

implies that we can actually force

people or convince people to stop eating

meat but that is not necessarily true

it's not necessarily true you can

convince everyone to stop eating meat so

you have to change

um

the object uh sorry you have to change

the content of what your necessity is

uh based on the necessities of sorry

based on uh being based on reality now

the second thing is that i actually

don't believe it's true

i'm gonna do three things the second

thing is that i don't believe it's uh

necessarily true that meat consumption

has to end

in order to um stop climate change maybe

there's a level of wasteful wasteful

meat production that's harmful to the

environment that has to be curbed down

but i don't think this

implies anything about stopping climate

change the third thing is that there's

an assumption that

climate change

can even be stopped and i'd actually

don't think

that much is very clear i don't know if

we can stop climate change

i don't i don't i'm not really inclined

to believe we can stop it i think we're

entering a new era in which humanity

will have to adjust to this new reality

and reconcile itself with the way it

which has

in a way that

it did not choose to or will to changed

the world

um so i believe in a deeper

reconciliation

of this uh fact of having changed the

world in a way we didn't expect or know

as something actually which will turn

out to be rational so that's my three

points

okay lewis

yeah so i could you just do this a favor

just restate the question so i'll make

sure that i can

answer it concisely i do my best to

anyway yeah no worries sure comment upon

the argument that uh leaving aside the

issue of the consciousness of animals

and all that ethical stuff veganism is

required to um preserve the environment

for human beings

okay

so obviously i do think animal lives

matter and so on and i do think that all

behavior is malleable from an

existentialist position in theory

everything can change about the way we

act we can radically reinvent ourselves

and change the way we act in our

relationship with nature specifically

energy production and food production

um with animal agriculture there is a

real big issue in terms of deforestation

primarily and also the production of

methane so what we have is a

relationship in which we need to

radically reduce meat consumption uh

meat dairy and egg consumption in order

to save our planet i mean that means

that would mean taking away the number

one cause of deforestation for example

which is animal agriculture it would

also mean taking away the number one

cause of ocean dead zones which is

animal agriculture it would mean taking

away the number one cause of um ocean

plastics the number one cause of um

of um

river pollution

so

and and then also 28

of greenhouse gas emissions and that was

a study done by oxford and also 70 of

our land use um is coming from animal

agriculture so in terms of animal

agriculture's environmental impacts even

towards the human um habitat it is

profound we need to we need to reimagine

our relationship with our food supply

and move towards a plant-based diet even

for a matter of self-preservation and

then to add to that we haven't even

considered the risk of zoonotic diseases

which are a massive existential threat

covert 19 being only a tiny shitty

little like really flu compared to what

can happen when we look at things like

ebola or when we look at things like um

even h1n1 and h5n1 um these flus would

have been absolutely devastating had

they had the virulency

there would have been a massive

existential threat for our own survival

and then even in terms of how we treat

others

if we look at something like the

slaughterhouse um the slaughterhouse is

indicative of an environment which is

unsuitable for human engagement it is a

house of horrors and individuals come

out with uh what is called pits disorder

perpetration induced traumatic stress

this is a mask this is a manifestation

of trauma people uh have feelings of

disintegration feelings of um paranoia

um you know um drug addiction alcohol

abuse and are much more likely to engage

in domestic violence and violence

against other humans as well um which is

documented uh pretty clearly in the size

that in the point that we can actually

show

that arrest rates and sorry arrests

isn't this beyond the question

well it's just it's

anthropomorphic value isn't it in

relation to animal agriculture

so it was about the environment okay

hang on try try to wrap it up louis and

then we'll move on

in terms of the size of a slaughterhouse

facility we can actually map on domestic

violence and um

and violence as a whole to the size of

the facility so if you care about humans

and you want to protect us against uh

habitat destruction and uh even protect

us against ourselves from the production

of zoonotic disease and even manifesting

violence then yeah go plant-based

good argument

i've got evidence of you let me know you

said a lot of things but like the idea

that

you want to stop domestic violence more

yeah like dude the reason why we have

domestic violence the reason why the

harm toward animals evokes feelings of

domestic violence is because of a more

underlying problem in the first place it

doesn't necessarily follow that you know

it's

factory farms and slaughterhouses will

lead to domestic violence it's just that

they do do that given the current

circumstances of the relationship

between men and women in our society

like what you're saying is like really

stupid well actually the the authors

posit the fact that women and children

are usually seen as vulnerable as are

animals so the relationship between

vulnerability is what is producing the

domestic violence yeah well it's a cycle

well that

state of vulnerability that women and

children are in is also societal it's

also resulting from the fact that women

and children are not given adequate uh

protection in our society but also and

also

the fact that um

women and children are

children i'm sorry women in particular

are objects of male violence and it's a

more deeper problem than just animals

you know i agree it's a much deeper

problem overall societally but i think

that it's certainly feeding into a

problem and also the vulnerability that

is manifest in children is probably not

something that we could just

miraculously change um like i'm not even

saying you can change

well no women are weaker than men i'm

not even saying you can change it for

women i'm just saying that

the

the violence against women in particular

is not doesn't simply follow from seeing

animals being killed it follows from

seeing animals being killed plus a

society with a specific relationship

between men and women but that's only

the manifestation of that aggression

that's why that's the way it's

sublimating so it would sublimate in a

self-destructive way regardless which is

why the ones who don't come out how can

you prove that you can't prove because

because many of them report feelings of

disintegration insomnia uh alcoholism

drug abuse um much higher conviction

rates so it manifests itself and solomon

it's in in various different ways

depends

i can't check the studies and data so

i'm going to assume it's correct that's

what i usually do when i uh can't verify

a source but even if we assume that's

correct

it doesn't actually follow

uh that that is the true cause

well i mean you can go and i've got a

video on it it's uh called working in

hell you can go and have a look

okay well i think you should read hegel

before you recommend me videos

all right we're gonna call it now we're

at two hours and 41 minutes and i

believe the taliban are about to take

kabul so um i'll let you guys take three

minutes each to make your final

statement and then we'll uh call tonight

sound good

yeah yeah all right uh

has would you like to go first

no he can go first all right lewis

yeah sure so what has has demonstrated

in this

argument is his

like ignorance to be entirely honest

with you he actually gave a better

position in his first debate which was

uh essentially that the separation

between animals and humans was one of of

um

of epistemological difference not

ontological difference um in this debate

he's trying to make the ontological

difference which hegel outright denies

he hasn't answered any of the questions

i raised about um ideology and why we

are abstracting man to the form of

consciousness which is definitely

against the hegelian notion

at least from the perspective of someone

who understands the system and not

reading through the lens of what hegel

himself thought so yeah i've answered

all of these questions and i think now

we just have to ask ourselves what is

the foundation of value in reality is it

the notion of humanity is it the self is

it a form of self-righteous um

consideration of of something that is

the form of adam that is being bestowed

upon us by man or some sort of

abstracted rational agent in a kantian

sense or is it

something which is sensitive is it that

the intellectual the intellective

capacities of a rational agent are based

upon reflecting upon the sensitive

nature of experience we gain information

which is good or bad imminently from

reality that information is what

consciousness is and that information

exists in animals and so when we do not

consider that information we are correct

we are committing a philosophical

failure we are not considering what is

actually right and what is actually

valuable we are considering what we want

to be right and what we want to be

valuable

all right thank you house

yeah well i didn't catch all that

because i was ordering chicken shawarma

sandwiches um i'm really hungry but

anyway um

i'll conclude with this uh

so i i

left the last debate last debate i was

really tired and uh i didn't quite

know for certain whether perspective

philosophy actually understood hegel

or not

so

um in this debate i actually wanted to

take the opportunity to grill him and

see if he actually could prove he knows

what he's talking about i am i have 100

confidence beyond any reasonable doubt

whatsoever that prospective philosophy

derives his understanding of hegel

entirely from his ass

and not only does he know nothing about

hegel he doesn't he also proves he

doesn't know anything about la con and

things like materialism and marxism and

a host of other subjects um lewis says

he's responded to all of my questions

and i haven't responded to any of his

but the exact opposite is literally true

and i think anyone who reviews this

debate in good faith will see that i did

make a good effort to try and actually

pin louis down and ask him concrete

simple questions which he just dilly

dallied and danced around without ever

directly addressing anything

i raised none of the points i raised

were addressed by him or even

acknowledged he has a proclivity to go

into tangents about completely

irrelevant things that are meant to

confuse the audience as well as me i

wasn't impressed by it i can clearly map

and trace but

through the course of receiving his

arguments that a does not follow b and

that what the tangency goes on are in no

way connected to the actual underlying

points that were under contention

um

so in conclusion i think it's a pretty

one-sided um

debate i got what i was looking for i've

exposed perspective philosophy as a fake

hegelian especially when he actually

admitted that he doesn't actually think

that hegel believes in the unity of

being and thought

um

and i think i've gotten more than i

wanted to do because all i wanted to do

here was prove that perspective

philosophy was a fake hegelian who

doesn't know shit about hegel but i also

proved that he also doesn't know shit

about lacan either so that was

a freebie you know

um

yeah i think you know i'm pretty

satisfied with the result i was pretty

well rested pretty alert today unlike

last time so you know i'm i'm i'm

satisfied

i got what i wanted

just to quickly say i definitely didn't

say that hagel didn't that said that

being well we had the chance to sorry

it says all that you're closing you

already had your closing statement so

oh no there is the thinking thing you

already gave your closing statement

and uh also you never answered the

infinite is correct unfortunately the

these were closing statements fair

enough i don't know we can we can if you

guys want to do a rematch

uh give me give me a week or two so i

cannot die of blood clots but we'll

we'll arrange that but for now for now

we're done so thanks everybody for

participating um and