🔴 RED NEWS | DEBATING LEFTIST! | AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY UPDATES

Get your fucking hands up Get on out of your seats All out of me All that on me

Get your fucking hands up Get on out of your seats All eyes on me, all eyes on me

Are you feeling nervous?

Are you having fun?

It's almost over, it's just begun.

Don't overthink this, look in my eye.

Don't be scared, don't be shy.

Come on in, the water's fine.

We're going to go where everybody knows.

Everybody knows everybody.

We're going to go where everybody knows.

No

Here draw four.

See all either.

It's almost over, it's just begun Don't overthink things, look in my eye Don't be scared, don't be shy Come on in, the water's fine You say the ocean's rising like I give a ship You say the whole world's ending Got eating already then You're not gonna slow if heaven knows you try

Could not get inside.

Nowhere to go.

Everybody knows everybody.

Knows everybody.

See all I'll take.

But see, all I told you, all I told me.

Pray for me, heads down now Pray for me, I'll sick get your forget hell

You know?

Talking to you, get the fuck out!

Get your fucking feel.

All eyes will be all eyes away.

Can't be the best time.

I'll be lost in your body alive.

All eyes will be all eyes of you.

Yo, shout out PJ for the five.

And PJ, thank you so much, brother.

I saw in the offline you gifted 30 when I wasn't even providing any content on the stream.

Thank you so much, brother.

Appreciate you.

Kras, what's going on?

What's up, y'all?

How you doing?

How you doing?

It's another stream of the infrared webcast, as you can see.

I'm back, and I have a lot, and I'm not even bluffing this time.

I actually have a lot to debrief and talk to you about.

From the Fresh and Fit stuff to the whole controversy, and Keith Woods being a fucking tether, and all these things happening.

And I talk, we got a lot to catch up on.

Definitely a lot.

But in the meantime, uh, I had agreed to a debate.

Um, Red Kahina, shout out Red Kahina, we're gonna bring her in soon.

She agreed to a debate, uh, p about China, I think.

Anyway, she's a le she's a critic.

Sleeper, what's going on?

She's a critic that's coming uh from the leftist perspective, usually the people who debate us.

Come from the right wing.

And I automatically respect it.

I respect the bravery.

I respect the willingness to engage.

And, you know, I'm looking forward to it.

And I want everyone to show Red Kahina respect.

Because if I respect her, you should respect her too, because she had the courage to agree to this debate.

Um, anyway.

Let me go ahead and drag her up and we're gonna start

We're gonna start today's stream, and today's stream starts now, by the way.

I'm not gonna stop it and stream later, it's gonna start now.

And uh the reason we're doing it now is because um the scheduling uh she lives in the UK, so we had to schedule in a way that works.

And then, so yeah, and I'm probably gonna stream tomorrow as well, but we'll see.

Anyway, let me uh

Let me bring her up.

Hello.

Mm-hmm.

Big Gorilla, thank you so much, brother.

Uh you have to unmute your mic.

Your mic is currently muted.

If you go on the I don't know what you're using, on the bottom, it's it's gonna say microphone, there's gonna be an icon.

Yeah, there's gonna be a okay, I had the but I'm on Discord.

Right.

There's a very strange lag now.

Maybe that's from my end.

Let me lower my volume.

Is everything good now?

Well, it's like there's a delay.

Ah, you probably have my stream up.

You need to turn the stream off.

I need to turn the stream off.

Okay.

Okay.

Everything good?

Yeah, everything's good.

I was just talking to people who can't decide whether they're in your party or not.

Oh, well, everyone who's a member of our party is has a objective verification that they're in.

So there's no confusion on my end.

So that's.

Okay.

Yeah.

Okay.

So these guys, I don't know who they are.

You're fans who can't decide whether they're in your party.

They like Heidegger, although some of them haven't read it.

And then they couldn't decide whether you so let's clear this up, whether you represent, you are, it was my understanding that you're the chief ideologist of the ACP, and they were saying, no, no, you speak only for yourself.

Oh, okay.

I see the confusion.

So I'm definitely the chief ideologist, the face of infrared, right?

I'm the host of the infrared show.

But and I'm the chairman of the ACP.

But in terms of the ACP's official ideology that it formally espouses as like the necessary prerequisite to agree with to join the party, that's just that's we would call it multipolar orthodox Marxism-Leninism.

So all that means is basically it's orthodox Marxism-Leninism.

We accept the synthesis of Marxism-Leninism up to Xi Jinping today.

And uh we reject the view it's on our questionnaire if you join the party that Russia is imperialist and China we reject that China's imperialist.

So that's the official it's just Marxism, Leninism, plus the pro-BRICS, pro-multipolarity.

Uh everything else is um is a matter of the individual conscience.

Okay, so basically it's like PR for those governments.

Yeah, it's a specific government any way you want.

It's not PR, but it's a position according to which we view China as a socialist country, and we also view Russia as an anti-imperialist country.

And we view BRICS as a progressive development.

Right.

But do you have a literature explaining?

I mean, I know there's been a debate.

I'm familiar with this from the Magma magazine, you know, the KKE's position about you.

I'm familiar with all of this.

But my understanding was to actually figure out what you guys are selling.

If you don't mind my I don't think you will mind that term.

Yeah.

To figure it out.

I went to the infrared website and I saw Heidegger and I saw Schmidt and I saw that the ACP is taking the position of the partisan in Schmidt's piece, which was very popular with ultra-lefts, you know, 20 years ago.

But, you know, I can't find then these guys are telling me, oh, that's not American Communist Party literature.

They can't be held responsible.

Yeah, so to be clear, the ACP the executive board is made up of people who have a range of different views and perspectives on things.

Carlos is currently the Secretary of Education, and we work closely to come to an agreement about what we consider, what kinds of publications we endorse, the reading lists.

So our reading list in our magazine hasn't been published yet.

Also, our manifesto isn't finished yet.

That's going to be finished before our first convention, which is going to be in October.

So.

The party's outlook can be roughly confined for now to the Declaration, what we write in the Declaration about Marxism-Leninism and its historical significance.

But more specifically, the views of the party in particular will be worked out in the manifesto and in our upcoming magazine.

Now, here's the thing.

Yeah, sorry.

Because that's ambiguous, you know, I want to give you the opportunity to fully scrutinize Haas of Infrared.

You don't have to worry about ACP.

Just me in terms of my views, in terms of Infrared's views.

I'm completely open to whatever criticism.

That's what I think I've done my homework on a little bit.

Yeah, yeah.

So we could just...

So that's you.

That's you.

And also, Carlos is Midwestern Marx, right?

Right, correct.

So I saw him do this Heider talk with your friend Daniel Tutt and Gabriel Rockhill.

So I sat through that.

That's probably kind of old, right?

A few years ago.

It's kind of old, but you know, I don't think how much could their views on Heidegger change unless the paymaster changes.

Unless the paymaster changes.

I don't think any paymaster would care about our views on Heidegger, but I think Carlos.

Rockhill is a professor.

They do care.

Rockhill's not in our party.

Carlos is.

And I've talked to Carlos in person a lot about Heidegger.

And if not anything else, I think he's very understanding of my perspective and he knows where I'm coming from.

Okay, so let's start.

You want to start we're going to talk about China.

That's what first of all, this this talk was proposed to me by someone representing themselves as belonging to your party, James Graham.

Okay, sure.

So okay, so now th these other guys representing that they're in your party, but then they're not sure because they don't know what they have to be responsible for, saying the party cannot yet be criticized because it actually hasn't produced any positions or and doesn't have any that are known.

No, I think our declaration is a pretty it's a relevant it's four pages long, and we do make some statements about our views about what actually Marxism-Leninism is and its significance.

And it's not much yet, but you know, we can be criticized for the paradigm of what we consider a party to be, a Communist Party to be, and how a Communist Party can begin and all these kinds of things.

There's also been some degree of scandal, I think, as far as our what we consider praxis to be.

And there's a lot of people trying to accuse us of being a multi-level marketing scheme and all this other kind of stuff.

So there's plenty to try and criticize us about that I'm open to responding to.

And as far as our positions are concerned as a party, you know, there's also the fact that we regard

we have specific views about America as a nation.

Carlos, I think, has written an article about the launch of the American Communist Party and the significance of our views on the national question in this country, which was which I think differ considerably from those of others.

I think there's a popular current

Among some radicals who identify as ML, that you know, America right now is not a nation at all, it's just a amalgamation of different nations.

You know, there's a white nation, a black nation, you know, Latino nation, yada yada.

So we disagree with that, and we have our own view.

So, but I agree, it's there isn't like a clear doctrine right now because all the party has done is declare itself.

It hasn't launched its journal yet, you know, it hasn't launched the manifesto yet.

But

It needs to be understood this is a years-long process that we've been building this party in private, and there's a lot of people that have been let's pretend it doesn't exist because so far it doesn't.

So let's just talk about the topic, the thing that does exist, which is your media presence and your operation.

Okay, so I, you know, and I, of course, I know you're familiar with the KKE's position on you, which is very influential among people, the last remnants of Communist parties in Europe, in the Middle East, and some of them, definitely.

Well, it's influential even among those who um reject the bourgeois party, is they because it's the last uh party with a lot of members in uh in E Europe.

It definitely has their attention, I agree.

Anyway, it's and also because they've uh they have made their they reiterate their pyramid theory um clearly and uh defend it.

So, anyway, and they have lockstep defense of it.

So, anyway, you're familiar with that.

What I think I'm looking at what you guys are doing, this is why James Graham proposed that I speak directly to you.

Is that what it seems to me you're doing, and I'm not I'm sure I'm not the first person who said it because I'm coming late to being aware of you guys, is that you are hanging up a Marxist shingle, that you're the main Marxist-Leninist thing you say is I'm a Marxist-Leninist, which is not something that a Marxist-Leninist typically has to say because everybody knows based on what they do and think about other things.

And that you identify as this and then you are delivering your ideological authorities on the infrared website, for example.

You start reading it, you get Heidegger, you get Schmidt, you get a parade of famous Nazis who are not only famous personal Nazis, because I'm not, you know, I don't like this cliché that, oh, just because someone a Nazi doesn't mean they're stupid.

Well, it doesn't mean they're smart either.

Like, just because someone is a Nazi and they say something that's incorrect, it doesn't make that thing more respectable, what they said are more valid.

Now, what Schmidt and Heidegger do is, you know, famously is take Marxism, celebrated critiques in the case of Schmidt, also critiques by other socialists like Maurice Jolier, but mainly the 18th premiere, and transform them into fascist mystifications.

And Heidegger did the same thing.

I mean, Heidegger read Lukac's book, which was one of the few Marxists that he could actually understand because it's in philosophical language.

Well, not really.

He tried to write more clearly, but he's writing about Hegel and he took his two ideas and he the you know, he took

Lukac's notion of history and totality and that things are either moving progressively or regressively.

How too Hegelian this is is a famous question in Marxism, but I mean too Kantian, right?

Not Hegelian.

No, too Hegelian.

I mean his the the he replied to the neo-Kantians who thought, well, you're one of us because you have a transcendental subject and but he he um he couldn't identify with them for political reasons, but that was his background as neocantians.

That was before even before before he started he adopted a, you know, some discipline, he he still said, I'm no, I'm not I'm trying not to be a Kantian.

There's elements of Kant in every philosopher including I would say as far as his metaphysical commitments are concerned, he his limit is Kant, definitely, because his rejection of dialectics of nature.

He he rejects dialectics of nature uh because he

He's a Kantian, that's why.

Because for him, he says it doesn't address subject-object.

That's his main thing.

Yeah, yeah, I know, but already with Hegel, that kind of distinction between the external nature and the kind of interior reality of the subject is sublated, right?

Hegel already puts that to work in a way that does have unity of subject and object, whereas like Marxism, Marxism is like, well, actually, what we have here is two subjects.

That's the top.

Well, we don't have to get too much into Lukaks, but basically, Hegel finish about Lukac.

So, Lukac, so you're familiar with the essay that we're talking about, History of Class Consciousness and Maine at Point.

That, you know, he has a totality that people, that totality, you know, each subject is completely embedded in and produced by the totality, but also producing the totality.

Yeah.

And that in general, history, so everything is historical.

There's no, there's no theory that Heidegger basically read this back and forth.

But no, Heidegger transforms it.

He makes a euphemist discourse.

I mean, this is partly Bourdieu.

I'm talking from, but other writers, that he takes totality and he turns it into being.

And he takes, you know, the subject and he transforms this.

And we're talking about the collective subject of all of humanity.

And he transforms it into the being there, which is just the only people who live authentically.

He transforms the categories into.

I don't think I would agree with that theory.

Authenticity or inauthenticity, which is now the thing, the objection to this is it's taking something intelligible and Marxist and making it into mystifying bullshit.

That is worthless.

It's worthless.

There is no authenticity.

There's no inauthenticity.

But wait, here's my punchline.

Okay.

I know why you like this because it will allow you to say that prostitution is an authentic way for Chinese people to live.

And that's why the thing is a good thing.

I'm not sure if I completely understand where you're coming from there, but I'd like to respond to a few things you said.

Go ahead.

So, firstly, from right out the door, I think there's a big misunderstanding.

You said that for me, Heidegger and Schmidt are authorities.

That is an extremely presumptuous claim, I think.

That's not justifiable.

The only authorities, and let's clarify what we mean here.

These are thinkers that have political authority.

They have a level of credibility and legitimacy that goes far beyond the merits of directly what they're trying to think about and say and whatever.

But this is what we call thinkers that are part of the synthesis of Marxism-Leninism, right?

The five heads.

So that is not a rank or a status.

I'm elevating Heidegger or Schmidt or any other one of these thinkers from the German conservative revolution.

I'm not elevating them to that status.

I'm not elevating them to the status of Marx and Lenin.

And the reason I'm not doing that, by the way, is because Marx and Lenin don't just have the status that they do because they had good thoughts or they had interesting thoughts or they were maybe coming from somewhere.

Because they accomplished a synthesis, a unity of thought and practice, which had an immortal historical contribution.

Regardless of whether you think Lenin or Marx were correct or not, it's immaterial.

The correctness of their thinking is reflected in something objective and indisputable contribution to history itself.

So I definitely curious because you talk about you talk at length about and you talk at length about Heidegger and Lacan is curiously for someone who has your gender ideas and Lacan was the first one to say You know that the woman doesn't exist and then you know and that I think we're going in too many directions and I'd kind of just like to these authorities and when we got to the question of authority you treat I should say you may declare that you consider Mao to be an authority and not Heidegger yet it's Heidegger's thoughts we hear from you and not Mao's who paid no attention to Heidegger right but think about why that is think about why that is because Mao's historical achievement and contribution is not discursively negotiable there's not much I can I can I can interpret Mao and I do this in for example small writings like the Brahmins of Democracy but ultimately I am not here to critique Mao I am definitely responding to Heidegger though because I don't think Heidegger accomplished directly any kind of synthesis and you pay you you you attach too much significance to the extent to which I name these figures and I name them and I engage with their ideas Marxism needs them and Marxism never needed them Mao never well let me let me ask you the question what what is my actual argument since you are so familiar with my views about how Marxism I'm not that familiar I'm not that familiar so you don't actually know what I say about any of these thinkers you just know that I mention them

Yeah, no, I know what you say about fascists that you talk about a lot.

Okay, what according to the question?

Why is it that I say that Marxism in the West you're you're kind of getting sloppy as far as the facts here, because I said in the West.

Thanks for grading you.

Send the bill to my office.

But why is it that I say that in the West, Marxism requires the aid of Heidegger's thinking?

Why do I say that?

What's the argument I use?

Your argument is that his resolution of the subject object I mean, I heard this with Tut, right?

Is that the line that you take all the time?

That his resolution of the subject and object allows people to love America effectively is what you said.

Not quite.

Well, that was it.

You said the problem is that people can't, people identify with America, the working class, the working class that you envision.

And believe I know these people too.

I mean, I have friends here.

I'm not sure.

Well, look, I think we're overcomplicating this.

So for me, don't dodge this.

This is what you said.

You can retract it if you want, but this is what I you know, the reason I'm please explain to me my thoughts.

No, I'm not going to tell.

I don't know what you think.

I only know what you said.

Explain to me what I've said.

Sure.

You said that the problem is there are these people.

What are we going to do with these?

How do you approach the proletarian that you're going to be able to do?

Right, but Kahina, this is kind of a separate.

America.

America.

Yeah, yeah.

I am totally open to going down the path of exploring.

Look, I'm totally open to going down the path of going down that topic of America and the American working class and whatever.

But right now, you know, it's kind of like crazy because you've said some crazy stuff about how I'm adopting Nazi thought and all these.

And I want to focus on that.

I want to focus on what the claims you're making about my relationship to Heidegger and Schmidt and so on.

But what are your claims?

Well, please don't interrupt me.

I've been really careful to try and not interrupt you.

So I'd like to not be interrupted as far as responding to your views.

So even let's begin with Heidegger and then we can go to Schmidt, right?

And we can go one by one.

For me, I think that in the West, the reason, part of the reason, at least, that the synthesis of Marxism-Leninism, and notice that I say the synthesis of Marxism-Leninism, because I consider that to be a qualitative change in Marxism.

I think that the West kind of grasped to some extent a view of Marxism, the so-called orthodox Marxism that was kind of canonized by the Second International.

And that was its limit.

And my critique of Lukox is that he never actually goes beyond this limit.

This limit could also be understood as precisely as another word for the Kantian sublime, which is totality.

And Lukox never goes beyond the kind of conceptual and institutional purport of Marxism into the real, right?

Into some kind of actual understanding and comprehension of historical praxis.

And I consider that to be a big problem as far as the development of Marxism in the West is concerned.

So I'm not here to throw Heidegger in the face of successful Marxism-Leninism.

We have to engage with creepy guys like Heidegger in the West because our Marxism in the West has been a total failure since 1917, a complete and total failure.

Very, very few successes.

And those successes that we can attach to the history of Western Marxism and Western communism, we seem to not understand the essence of those successes, which is why they were always short-lived and they were almost immediately squashed.

They were transient, right?

So for me, where am I coming from with the Heidegger stuff?

I think there was a lot of baggage from the Second International of Social Democracy, according to which Marxism became a doctrine whose method could be reduced to the form of conceptual thinking, to concepts.

And that corresponded to institutions, right?

To institutions.

So the proletariat was one specific kind of subject that was interpolated by one specific kind of institution.

Now, the awkward thing is that this correlate, this conceptual correlate of the proletariat, eventually reveals itself to have opportunistic tendencies with the rise of the first imperialist war.

That no longer seems to be the proletariat, right?

At a certain point, at least the upper sections of it, the bribed so-called labor aristocracy.

So, social democracy had a problem precisely with the subject-object distinction.

What is the proletariat?

What is proletarian consciousness?

And what is the relationship between the two?

And I think that the strict distinction between subject and object, which was an undialectical distinction, contributed, at least if we render this in philosophical terms, to that problem.

Now, I think that Heidegger makes a good step in terms of his.

His way of problematizing that distinction of subject and object in the notion of Dasein, which situates it in a much broader historical context that's actually specific to the West.

And I think that's a useful step.

I think that's a useful beginning.

I think it's useful to regard the problems of Western Marxism as part and parcel of problems of the West in general.

And I'm open to alternative views, of course.

There's always going to be the third worldist view, according to which, well, the problem with the West is it's just too privileged and it's just too rich and they don't have enough to lose.

But I think we've come to a point where, strategically speaking, it's not very hard to conceive of a success of worldwide communism without the toppling of the U.S.

Empire.

And you could say that's going to happen inevitably because of contradictions, but we could have a third world war before that happens, right?

And even then.

Um I know I'm not really getting into the specifics of Heidegger yet, but

You know, it I'm not it's it's not that I'm not aware that the German conservative revolution thinkers, with the onset of the rise of the Nazis, did in large part regard the Nazis as the zeitgeist of their thinking, which of course I don't agree with.

But I think this is just reducing them to political agents and political ideologists.

When, okay, that's kind of ridiculous because, one, they were never officially canonized as official ideologists of the Nazi Party, so they've never had that significance.

Two, the actual official ideologists of the Nazi Party, there's not really much theory going on there if you actually look at it.

I know a lot of Western intellectuals are really trying hard to find the intellectual basis of Nazism.

But if you're honest about this inquiry, you'll find there is no such basis.

There is no intellectual foundation of Nazism.

Nazism was the opposite of anything that was mediated by the rational intellect, right?

Nazism was the pure brute force violence of the terroristic dictatorship of monopoly capital.

There's no need for any kind of intellectual legitimation and justification beyond the kind of barbaric Philistinism of imperialism in general.

So the Nazi views on race and all these eugenics, that was all shared already by the upper echelons of the British ruling classes and the American ruling classes.

It was just a completely unreflexive importation of their instincts and their assumptions and presumptions.

There wasn't any need for Heidegger's, you know, reading being in time or even Carl Schmidt's notion of the partisan.

Now, I'd like to get to Carl Schmidt for a second because I don't want to respond too long.

But when you.

I mentioned Carl Schmidt, so this is why you're mentioning this, because I mention him a lot in the rise of MAGA communism, right?

But what you don't pay attention to is that.

I precisely critique Schmidt for his commitment to the kind of um

The same Anglo-Saxon metaphysical foundations as Hobbesianism.

And Schmidt is just kind of.

Schmidt is kind of attempting to update Hobbes, right, in the 20th century.

Now, to me, the contradictions between Schmidt and Hobbes are contradictions Schmidt himself is unable to account for.

So, I actually want to move beyond Carl Schmidt.

And I do do that in that rise of modern communism.

How do I do it?

Because Schmidt reduces politics only to pure difference.

And never is there the moment of sublation which accounts for the difference.

So, when I speak of the kind of notion of the partisan empire or the proletarian dictatorship, which is the same thing, I'm drawing out conclusions from Schmidt that Schmidt's thinking itself would not permit.

And I'd like to leave this on a final note, and then I'll let you respond.

I am kind of baffled by how many of my critics try to associate me with fascism because of the extent to which I engage with thinkers like Heidegger and Schmidt, because of the superficial fact that those people, politically speaking, politically speaking, in Germany, you know, were conciliatory toward the Nazi regime, and some of them even joined the Nazi Party.

But if I took as much liberties with Marx or Lenin as I take with Heidegger and Schmidt in terms of how I critique them, in terms of how I interpret them in ways they would never have approved of, in terms of how I completely deviate from them, if I took those same liberties with Marx or Lenin or Stalin or Mao, I would be called a revisionist and oh, of course you're not a Marxist, of course you're not a Marxist-Leninist, you're totally butchering them.

This isn't what Marx meant.

This isn't what Lenin meant.

But how come when I engage with Heidegger, completely critiquing him and responding to him and going far beyond anything Heidegger himself would permit me, I am somehow an orthodox, dogmatic Heideggerian?

I think this should be thought about, you know?

But anyway, I'll let you go ahead and respond.

I'm taking notes here because it's a lot to respond to.

Okay, first of all, I don't see your critique of Heidegger as being that harsh because one of the things is you take it seriously, which it doesn't deserve.

And then the other thing is, like Heidegger, you say you find in Heidegger something that is like some small step on the way to a question, to the answer to a question that was settled by Marx, even in his very early writings.

Like it doesn't even, it's done.

We know it.

It's 100 years old.

You know, he's still wondering about subject-to-object, you know, in this philosophical idealist fashion that is a pseudo-materialism.

And this is all settled.

It was settled in German ideology.

It's even settled in the Communist Manifesto.

The point of Marxism is perspectival, multi-subject universe.

And what the notion of the object has, and Lukac tried to also had this problem of complicating it with his deciding that we should call this reification and that we should see more of it in capitalism than prior.

This is kind of stuff that Marx would have, that is obvious to Marx and to Marxism.

There are things that they bother to say that are just not explicitly said in Marx because they were too obvious.

And then, okay, another thing about Heidegger, you say, well, Heidegger is trying to bring something against Lukac, and there are problems with Lukacs.

But yeah, why is Heidegger trying to masperize, excuse me, to imitate and vitiate Lukac of all people?

It's not like Lukacs was the prime center of Marxist thought.

I mean, from his very first publications as a Marxist, he's being criticized by Marx Marxists as being too Hegelian.

He is one of many, but I'm sorry, I don't mean to say that.

Yeah, but all over, you know, even look, you know, even in the 1980s and high school, you know, when I you know, that uh Lukac's the problems with Lukac and the way he deviates, you know, or what that he tries to re-philosophize, re-idealize through the back door Marxism is, you know, a subject to debate, but it's like a well-known subject.

Why is Heidegger then decides he's going to imitate Lukacs?

Because Lukac was, you know, more well-known than I ever suspected.

Actually, I only learned this kind of recently in life.

But, you know, so he's imitating it and making it worse.

And you're saying, well, this is better because he has the subject, he wants to deal with the subject object in a completely Western context.

So there, you've lit up one of the motifs, one of the Nazi motifs that, you know, and it's true that Nazism is syncretic, that it doesn't have any philosophy, that it doesn't have really hardly any ideology, that even its racism has various, it had quite a lot of dissent from the biologism within the Nazi Party movement.

But nonetheless, this is one of the topics, the West as a subject, which is complete fiction.

That's a complete imperialist fiction, as you know, in its inauthenticity, in its bad state.

We have to get back to the authenticity.

These kinds of giant myths that Heidegger is trying to translate a much more compelling piece of work by Lukkac about historical developments, actually capitalism, modernity.

Heidegger is translating it into something that should be crawling up the screen in Star Wars, in bright green letters.

So then, not for adults.

Okay, Schmidt, Schmidt, yes, is Hobbesian, also Machiavelli, obviously, most important to him.

But more importantly, the thing that he translated into this seemingly respectable genre was the protocols of the elders of Zion.

It's practically plagiarized by Schmidt.

And he named his house after Machiavelli because the character after Machiavelli's house, because the character in the original book, Dialogue in Hell between Montesquieu and Machiavelli, that winds up in the protocols, is Machiavelli as the Satanist, the point of view that Schmidt takes up toward Montesquieu, the spirit of the laws, liberalism, etc., etc.

So your interest in these two thinkers, these two thinkers, take you back before Marxism.

Like, why not Marx?

Why not just have solved these problems with Marx?

And then when you're talking about that, the reason that Mao didn't need to read Heidegger and Schmidt or was not interested in them is because they're trivial.

So I think at the current format, we're just going to be both going on monologues for a long time.

I'll self-criticize and say I did this too.

So let's make it more of a dialogue and just kind of narrow it.

So I think we should begin there probably.

So I think what you're missing, though, is that Mao was deeply informed and entrenched in the literature of Chinese literature, classical Chinese literature.

That's a missing context.

Mao didn't just have only Marx.

No, he didn't have only Marx, but he had a, he was, he was devoted to the revelation that Marx brought him.

Right, but he was applying that to a specific against Confucianism.

Sure, but Mao was still engaging with classical Chinese literature and philosophy in ways that criticizing you for engaging with these things.

I'm criticizing you for what specifically you say about them.

Okay, you know, obviously I've read them too.

You know, I've had a lot of things.

Well, I think I'd like to start with Lukox, and we can kind of narrow it on that topic.

So I disagree with the view that Heidegger is just kind of ripping off Lukox and adding a mystique to Lukox.

Because firstly, I think that Lukox's notion of totality is a Kantian sublime.

You could maybe make this a similar argument for, I mean, I don't, first of all, we would probably have to begin there is that is Lukox's totality the same as being for Heidegger or is it is it a stand-in for Dasein?

I think it's ambiguous because totality is not just a passive one-sided object or pure stillness of being, right?

Totality is something that is supposedly imbued with the subject.

It's a kind of absolute of the unity of subject and object.

So is that more like Dasein?

Because Dasein is also kind of something that is neither just subject, neither just object, but a kind of concept, if you can call it that, which draws from both, right?

So it's precisely that.

rigidness of Lukak's, right, it's kind of a mechanical rigidity, I would say, undialectical mechanical rigidity, that I think leaves not as much room for um for development as the step that Heidegger makes.

Well, this is what I think.

I think that Heidegger Heidegger, this what you call this step, is a lot of jargon that actually at bottom doesn't really make any sense.

Whereas Kant is trying to be clear, he's trying to be clear that totality is grasped reality, you know, that it has some.

You can see this is clearly kind of in the bad sense, undialectical and metaphysical language, because what could we do with a totality?

What is a particular example of a totality?

What insight could we possibly yield from this notion of totality that is particular and is applicable?

Well, his idea of totality, I mean, it would be knowing all the particulars of reality that possible for a single individual to know all of the particulars of a given.

Lukant is not interested in single individuals.

The consciousness of totality is the whole of humanity, aren't it?

Yeah, but that's just as meaningless, though, because it could never be something particular.

Never does Lukaks develop a particular kind of, let's call it, I know it's a ridiculous contradiction in terms, a social subject, let's say.

For him, obviously, it's baked into the very notion of what a subject is.

Subject is an individual.

It's an individual thinking consciousness or a thinking being, right?

Lukaks tries to say Lukaks affords us the liberty of acquiring a social existence only at this, only beyond the threshold of a sublime limit where all of our individual subjectivities have meshed together, all of them simultaneously, but in such a way that renders that particular totality unintelligible in particular.

It never acquires a concrete and particular existence as a social being.

It's just this kind of impossibly infinite threshold of the total amalgamation of all individual subjectivities and possibilities.

Well, it's assumed that you're the product of it, the subject.

But how do we yield scientific insights from that, though?

I mean, how do we yield particular knowledge from that insight?

Well, he doesn't have, I mean, you know, he takes aim at empiricism for not for non-consciousness of the, you know, for not being critical enough.

Yeah, but it's just, it's just Kantianism.

He's just a neo-Kantian.

It's not, it's Marxism.

I mean, there are flaws in this Marxism.

So you're aware that in neo-Kantianism, specifically in Germany, drew from the context of the breakdown of social democracy, that all of these revisionist social democrats eventually openly start adopting neo-Kantianism because it was a better explanatory paradigm that fit the development of social democracy itself, this institutional mediation of reality without regard for the kind of what Lenin would call the lower and deeper material reality that's this kind of unnamable basis, material basis and premise of the party, the Social Democratic Party.

Which it tries to forget in premise in a purely rationalistic kind of way.

Well, there's a nice cohesion there, but obviously these thinkers are writing in the wake of major two major things of 1917.

Yeah, I agree.

But also relativity.

They're right.

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

You're right.

In a new scientific things, they're being asked, especially after with the growth of quantum physics, they're being asked if a new formal logic is necessary.

So, you know, they all reject this idea, as did Einstein.

But they're being asked if there is, you know, if all of what is sort of as metaphysics or theory or whatever has to be thrown out because of quantum mechanics and if

And and then they so they want to take refuge in uh a more um you know uh in an a uh uh safe uh Anglo-American empi empiricism that they think will be you know I think I think the neocontians in particular, you know, you have a kind of um

You have it's neo, it's neo-Kantian because there's an explicit understanding of the role of society, right?

In the uh the construction of the kind of um let's say politicize the transcendental subject, yeah, yeah, precisely.

In the construction of the transcendental subject, there's a mediation by the institutions of society that so rather than uh reliance upon the kind of uh time and space as a synthetic a priori, you can have as a synthetic a priori the kind of institutions that mediate our relationship to the world, which are social, right?

But regardless, without going down that rabbit hole, I think the reason to answer the question you asked earlier about why is it that Heidegger is reducing Marxism to Luke Cox, which I think it would be fair to say he was.

Well, here's why, in my view.

So, Orthodox Marxism breaks down and fully just turns into neocantism.

The Social Democrats lose their avowedly and specifically Marxist commitments such that they can no longer be called Marxists in

In particular, right?

They maybe are influenced by Marx, but they're not the epitome of Marx.

They're not the epitome of Marxism.

That is something that Zeitgeist is 1917, the October Revolution.

That's what gives Marxism new significance.

Now, correct me if I'm wrong, but in Germany, the only philosopher that is trying to draw out the significance of the October Revolution and therefore maintain at least a pretense to some kind of commitment to Marxism, that's Luke Ox.

Luke Ox, who in my view is just a spicy neo-Kantian, a neo-Kantian who's writing apologetics for the October Revolution, rather than a thinker of the October Revolution, you know, itself, he is the one that is trying to kind of rationalize and philosophically explain this event.

In the genre of philosophy, and the reason that Marxists, the reason that Marxists gave up on the genre of philosophy is they think that it's outmoded, especially after the scientific discoveries, the beginning of the 20th century.

Like, you can't talk about ontology.

You sound like a moron compared, you know, if you're going to be talking to Stevens.

Well, I think, I think, I think there's.

But to be fair, though, I mean, I roughly agree that philosophy is dead, you know, after Hegel.

I mean, I am actually a dogmatic, not dogmatic, sorry.

I am an actual orthodox Marxist-Leninist.

I think Hegel was the last philosopher.

I don't really necessarily think, at least the last Western philosopher, I don't necessarily think that Heidegger or Lukox are really philosophers.

I think that, but I think that the significance and necessity of their thinking.

Is emerging in this kind of new opening of reality that Marxism, as it was traditionally understood in Germany and the West at least, couldn't actually automatically make sense over a dress.

Now, you say, why not just Marx?

Well, we all know that Marx, Marx's thinking was clear.

It was in the books.

It was already written, right?

But why wasn't it self-evident to Western Marxists as far as, first of all,

Drawing out the implications of that thinking, and second of all, applying it in a Marxist way.

Why was that so impossible for them?

Because the exegesis, exegesis, I don't know how to say it, the interpretation was contentious because social democracy reduced and straitjacketed Marx's insights into the form of purely conceptual thinking.

It turned all of Marx's.

Sorry?

Yeah.

Sorry, but you're ignoring the class struggle within Marxism itself.

I don't think I am.

I think that in my writing, The Brahmins of Democracy, I kind of talk about.

How this the class struggle within Marxism, we could it it probably has an earlier uh basis, but at least within social democracy, we have an institutionalized dogmatic Marxism that roughly corresponds to the rise of a more skilled and technical, um, you know, um you're talking about the United States, no, no, no, all of your all of Western Europe, the kind of imperialist labor aristocracy, right?

The institutionalized and professional leaders of the social social democratic movement.

That is the kind of institutionalized Marxism of pure concepts, right, with pure correlates.

Then we have another kind of history of Marxism, which collapses the distinction between conceptual subject and object, in other words, by radically imperiling institutional conventions in popular and national reality.

So Lenin does this, for example, in his unique application of Marxism to the context of the Russian countryside.

And then the way Mao does this, of course, is self-evident, right?

The way Mao is sinicizing Marxism and applying Marxism in such a way that unleashes the energies and the kind of revolutionary potentials within the Chinese peasantry in ways that would not be considered acceptable from the Orthodox Marxist perspective.

Well, first of all, okay, so Orthodox Marxist, you're saying Orthodox Marxism, most people when they say this, they're either talking about a very Hegelian Marxism that's like stageism and all that stuff, or they're talking about economism, a vulgar Marxism.

No, no, no, I'm talking specifically about the project of Orthodox Marxism within social democracy to iron out Marxism, to make it conceptually intelligible in a very simplistic kind of way, such that all of its ambiguities and the things that weren't exactly clear could just kind of acquire.

Acquire such a level of not just simplicity but concrete conceptual status that it was worthy of the actual institutions that the social democratic movement was able to produce.

So that these could be working concepts.

They could actually be integrated within a practical language of building movements and popularizing it and applying it and so on.

The surrender of bourgeois institutions to the hegemony.

First Imperialist War.

It had to split because of the class war within the communist.

Congrats on the ACP law.

So what is the theoretical element?

Sorry, there's a donkey.

Thank you, Grunvig.

I appreciate you.

Nordic Union 2036.

Okay, thank you, Grunvig.

Guys, sorry, I hate to say this.

Let's pause the donations until after.

After the uh debate.

Sorry, go ahead, Keyno.

So anyway, so when you're talking about, I mean, you know, I know these are cliché, these are well, you know, these are frequently used terms outside of Marxism for what's happening in Marxism.

But I think you're talking about in terms of the actual theoretical content, someone like Labriola or the very Hegelian Germans, you know, I don't know that literature very well.

I don't read German.

I think, you know, my problem is that Hegel is a thinker whose philosophy is a is totally inclusive in terms of its metaphysical commitments.

I mean, Hegel, when he's talking about nature, for example, when he's talking about being, he's really talking about it.

He's really talking about the thing.

He's really including the kind of Newman.

Hegel makes he makes statements about nature.

He makes statements about the cosmos, the nature of it, itself, and not just simply some kind of something that confines itself to the limits of a transcendental subject.

But I think with the rise of neo-Kantianism, there is an attempt to Kantianize Hegel, right?

To remove from Hegel all of these problematic speculative commitments.

and kind of confine the logic of Hegel to the um to to the narrow more narrow and more safe uh safe parameters of a transcendental subject that doesn't have to actually make any empirical uh commitments doesn't have to have any skin in the game as far as the nature of actual reality is concerned and um I sorry go ahead so I I think that Lukax is a good example of a of a of a Kantian who's trying to appropriate Hegel's logic within an ultimately Kantian outlook and view

But you're aware that Marx said the exact opposite about Hegel, that the problem with Hegel was that he turns every discussion on his head to make it the proof of his logic that he in the Critique of Philosophy of Mind he talks about.

By the end, the mind becomes the predicate of its predicate.

Right, but for Marx.

Yeah, but for Marx, the problem wasn't that Hegel wasn't making any commitments to actual reality or actual external being.

The problem was that, as you said, he's beginning from the universal and ending with the particular, meaning that he is trying to make false.

That's why Hegel makes many unscientific false claims about reality, because for him, the integrity of this kind of conceit of the mind

Um, as the metaphysical absolute comes first, reality be damned, more or less, right?

But but that's still, but in the process of damning reality, Hegel is still including it, he's still making claims about it, he's still involving it in the process by which the mind, you know, is realizing it's itself and reflecting itself back upon itself.

So I don't know that's such a big claim.

I mean, I think this you're except for pure logicians and mathematicians, I don't think there's anyone who doesn't.

Well, for example, Hegel, Hegel makes didn't Hegel say something along the lines of he confined the possibility of the number of heavenly bodies, the planets, and I think it was in such a way that excluded Pluto.

I don't remember.

I remember he said that lightning can't be electricity.

He's he yeah, he makes actual claims about reality.

That's what I'm trying to say.

And he makes these claims because they are necessary for the rational integrity of the mind.

They're necessary for hi for as far as he can think.

But he's only interested in proving this logic, which is not just the mind.

It's that it's there's a residue of 17th century rationalism of that it has to have this harmony, resonance with the reality.

Yeah, so but so here's the thing: that's an aspect of Hegel that you can at least respect.

I can at least respect it a little because.

And this is just the examples we're talking about of nature.

Hegel also makes these claims about history.

He makes also false claims about history sometimes.

But it shows his commitment to what the Kantians call a kind of speculative enthusiasm, a willingness to draw definite and concrete conclusions about something that goes far beyond the parameters of the individual thinking being.

Hegel's mind is not an individual mind.

Hegel's reason is not a reason that can confine itself to the mind or the thoughts of a single individual.

It's a sopra-individual kind of definitely the repository of an individual conceit, as Marx tells us and points out.

But in terms of its pretension, it's not something that can be reduced to any kind of procedure of thinking of the individual.

So, this is a very important thing to note, which is that this kind of willingness to include all of reality, the whole of reality, is not something that Marx and Engels abandon.

On the contrary, this is the foundation actually of the materialist method for them.

This is the square one of that we actually can know reality.

We can have a relationship with the actual world that involves knowledge.

So, Engels, in his dialectics of nature, is clear that nature itself is dialectical.

And the historical and materialist method, they're not referring to a purely social transcendental horizon that is unaffected or uninvolved with external being in the natural world.

On the contrary, there is a process of actual objective transformation of nature and of humanity itself, therefore, through the development of the productive forces and the rise of new relations of production, which are not just the Lukoxian totality.

These are specific thresholds of the actual objective existence of mankind that are particular.

The division of labor.

This is what Lukaks meant by totality.

But the Lukakian totality precisely cannot acquire particularity.

It precisely cannot acquire historicity as a kind of.

It's another word for history.

He just says, But it has no, but it has because it is included, like, you know, when you have a contract or you say, I'm going to pay you for every time this is on television, but also in all future media.

That's all it is.

It's including an all-future media and all future developments.

So we have this very generous, kind of all-inclusive, totally collective, totally historical concept called totality.

But wherever we're called upon to draw out tangible and concrete forms of conclusions and analysis from it, we are stuck with the methodological individualism of the subject.

The only time Lukaks allows us to regard humanity as social is precisely when it is beyond the threshold of the sublime.

So there's no way to draw any working conclusions.

There's no way to regard a given people, a given country, a given nation or civilization, or even stage of history as a particular social existence.

We are all individuals until we become amalgamated into the kind of Lukakian Borg, which is the totality.

Okay, I see where you're going.

You're rejecting the fundamental cosmopolitan.

Sorry, one second.

There's a problem with my camera.

I don't know what the hell.

Okay.

This is ridiculous.

If my camera broke that's another disaster on my hands.

Give me one second, I'm so sorry.

Okay.

All right.

Well, we're back for now, but that was a really spooky thing, guys.

Anyway, sorry, go ahead.

Okay.

So are you there?

Yeah, yeah, I'm back.

I'm back.

Sorry.

The camera

Okay.

So what was I gonna say?

Oh yeah, so I can see where you're going because this is really rhetorical.

I mean the the caricature that you're making of Lukach is to to isolate the cosmopolitanism and then say well we have in in Heidegger we have this improved thing which is good that we're going to have races basically.

We're going to have race.

No, precisely no actually.

I think I've I've heard the platypus I've heard I've heard the you know there's I don't know you know nobody is beyond the pale in my opinion, but you're gonna argue with them they're they're a Zionist organization that claims they're uh trying to destroy the left?

Um I have to so I want to I want to talk about uh the Heideggerian racism notion, but I've heard race, not racism.

I'm talking about yeah, yeah, the rate, the race, the yeah, the reality as media, okay, okay.

Speaking of American communism, have you read QE Newton?

Did you pay any attention to his critique of nationalism?

Well, I'd like to I actually like to talk about this because I think it's a big misconception.

I think a lot of people in attempting to find out exactly what was Nazi about Heidegger's thinking, they'll say, well, Dasein, it's implied by Dasein that this is a collective subject such as a race, or this is a kind of nation even, or a kind of super individual subject of some kind.

And I've heard the platypus people make the argument actually that this is, yes, this is the tribalistically mediated, you know, horizon of being and reality.

That's what Dasein is.

But actually, if you read Heidegger, the opposite is actually true.

Now, Dasein is neither an individual and neither a collective subject.

It's a rather intangible kind of thing, or whatever we can call it, right?

We can't call it a subject.

It's incompatible with Marxism.

Okay, hold on, hold on.

But you have to let me explain.

All right, go ahead.

So we just have a very vague presence, right?

We have a very vague thinking presence, a being that is at odds with the question of what it is, with what it itself is, right?

So wherever Heidegger.

writes about the ability for

The existential kind of challenge of Dasein.

If you read him carefully, he makes the assumption that this is a this is something.

This is uh something only the individual can accomplish.

Through their relationship toward death.

And even the way in which Heidegger attempts to justify the view, in his view, that Nazism was somehow the zeitgeist of a new possibility to reacquire meaning in the age of nihilism and for a new awakening of Dasein and so on and so on.

It's not that Heidegger regards the German nation or the German people as an actual collective subject or a social being.

He rather regards an individual, maybe Hitler or something, taking this initiative and inspiring others to take the initiative, right?

So it's always Heidegger actually is far too individualistic.

He never makes the step of actually regarding Dasein as anything more than something whose existential irrelevance can only be drawn out by the individual.

It's a very individual kind of framework he's straitjacketing and confining Dasein to.

And I would actually argue if, you know, since we can kind of take turns, because it's so cheap in terms of criticism, it's like, okay, this is the Nazi thing.

No, this is the Nazi thing.

And it's just a way of discrediting an idea without actually having to engage in it.

I never say that.

My interest in saying Heidegger is.

But if anything, but if anything, the problem.

Yeah, but if anything, the thing that probably leads Heidegger down the path, the false path, right, which is of regarding Nazism as the zeitgeist of his thought, his own thinking, the first step that he makes, is that kind of, I don't know if I'd call it a methodological individualism, but I would say the assumption that Dasein

corresponds to the individual.

I think that is more responsible for any kind of flirtation with Nazism than the view that he's talking about a a collective subject or s of some kind.

Right, because basically you're saying that he's a he was a bourgeois professor who was writing his own Meshagas, which there's no doubt of that.

But the question is, like, why why would any Marxist care about this guy Heidegger?

Like, I'm not related to him.

I don't give a shit what he thought about his own fantasies.

Dasein, all this stuff.

I mean, it's only interesting for its propaganda effects, which I'll tell you why.

Well, it's for the same reason Lacan finds Heidegger and Kojev regard Heidegger as such.

Because what Heidegger accomplishes, and this is his real achievement, is that he ontologizes and therefore makes it regards as a, opens the possibility of regarding as an actual material thing what we would otherwise assume as the distinction between the subject and the object.

Instead of meandering and dwelling in the problematic of the subject versus the object, we can finally regard the difference and through Heidegger's notion of the ontological difference, right?

The difference as an actual material thing itself.

And this is a dialectical step, in my view.

No, it's just it's it's already finished.

This is not a problem in Marxism.

I agree, but the problem put it this way.

We don't have to play the baby games with Heidegger, but also like Heidegger, this thing of, you know, is the German nation given?

Do we have to struggle for the Gemeinschaft?

He's not really consistent, but he's pretty consistent in that, you know, it's Gemeinschaft.

They picked this word because that's from Weber, right?

This is kind of a sociological.

No, it's actually, well, both of them, Bourdieu did this work, but it was the way that Burke's critique of Jacobinism, the way his word partnership, class partnership, was translated into German as Gemeinschaft.

And that's where they got that this is the opposite of liberal individualism, but also Jacobinism.

That is, Jacobinism, a petty bourgeois movement that for most of its achievements is actually being driven by the Paris popular movement.

So that it's the opposite of, you know, 1799.

But this is for all the critiques of liberalism, this is where Marxism belongs.

If you're going to abandon that, and you're going to be like, no, we need to.

All right, so here's the thing.

I want to make this simple.

I agree that all we need is Marxism too.

But guess what?

The interpretation of what Marx meant and how to read Marx and how to understand him is contentious.

It's contentious in a new age where phenomenology acquires a new significance because of the way reality is now not given to us anymore because of mass media.

It's increasingly artificial.

So how do we actually understand what Marx actually means?

Because we can't just read his words because his words are clearly being interpreted in ways that are contrary to the spirit of what he was trying to say.

In practice, the opportunism of social democracy, I should like to remind you, came from the dogmatic presumptions about the interpretation of what Marx meant.

Marx wrote that revolutionary England would be the first in the series of revolutions around the world.

Marx wrote, he had a very, he began with, he wrote, you can read in his words, this assumption of stages of development where Western Europe was more developed and so on and so on.

So just by reading Marx and not having any kind of way of reading more into it, right?

You can draw an assortment of conclusions which are in complete contradiction to Marxism.

So, not if you read, if you really read the whole text and the major work, and yes, of course, we're talking about the early 20th century, not everything was available, not everything was translated, people were working from the Communist Manifesto in Capital, mostly reading the first and second volume, etc.

etc.

That's fine, that's all understood.

But the politics of the social democratic parties is the petty bourgeois politics.

It was a different so here's here's here's here's what I'd like to say understanding of Marxism, and in this same period, you have Gramsci, you have a you know, having enormous influence later, you know, yeah, but I'm also I draw from Gramsci a lot as well, it's just that nobody pays attention to the Marxists I draw from, they only pay attention to the problematic people I read.

But anyway, look, here's what I'd like to say.

When we're talking about why we need Heidegger to understand Marx in the West, because that's what I say, I don't just say we need Marx and Heidegger.

It's that in order to understand Marxism, we need Heidegger, right?

Um, so it's a very important distinction that I make in terms of the claim.

Oh, so um.

Here's why.

With the development of history, with the rise of new ways of experiencing reality, aspects of being and aspects of reality.

Became were called into question in ways that they were not before.

There were a lot of things Marx and Engels were able to take for granted because, for example, mass media did not render fundamental aspects of reality as contentious as they became in the early 20th century.

Psychologism was something they didn't have to deal with because the psychological could be stoically kind of taken for granted in this impartial inquiry into the nature of reality and being and so on and so on.

They didn't need any kind of existential.

I mean, who of their contemporaries is initiating this process of this emo need to draw out the existential and emotional?

It's Schopenhauer, right?

Schopenhauer, and then from Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and then from Nietzsche, we get Kierkegaard, and then we can get from finally we get Freud and Heidegger, and so on and so on.

Now, we could do one of two things.

We could say, okay, Freud, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, it's all one big reactionary disaster, totally exterminated, and we can just optimistically, kind of naively adopt the optimistic, rationalistic outlook that is totally oblivious to the deeper and more unconscious realities.

Of mankind and so on, existential questions faced by them.

I think there was a response within Europe.

Which did, in fact, pose this alternative, and it's called positivism, right?

It's called what?

Positivism.

So, should Marxism be positivistic?

So, you see, there's a fork in the road.

There's a fork in the road as far as different ways of responding to new questions facing mankind, which Marx and Engels did not really have to write about or care about or give attention to, right?

Is it Petsy now?

You know, look, just because that these guys got famous, they got famous because they were convenient to the bourgeoisie who were able to reward and promote text in universities.

But you know, but you know something, but you know something how that's it.

It's empirically false.

It's empirically false.

For example, among the working class of Western Europe, now correct me if I'm wrong, I may be wrong in saying this.

I remember reading that Nietzsche was among the most popular authors among the German working class in the early 20th century.

That too, but I don't really know if it's true.

I'm sure their serial novels were more successful.

I think what people liked was The Count of Monte Cristo, which is the same as the Communist Manifesto, actually.

So they liked Dickens.

You know, people maybe read Nietzsche, but Nietzsche's been in conflict.

I think, well, look, I think the problem was not Marxism.

The problem was...

In what relationship to reality, how do we make sense of there?

There is a horizon of reality that needed to make, there was a need to make sense of it, right?

Before we could even begin with the square one of understanding Marxism's significance there, you could be a Marxist in Germany in the 20th century, a so-called Marxist, and yet, in terms of your relationship, let's say, to the totality of reality, to use the term Luke Hox likes, right?

You are actually positioned, this is true today as well, in such a way that's the opposite as Marx was to his own totality, right?

So, this is the problem with opportunism.

You have Marxists today that are using Marxist language and drawing out the implications of Marx's writings in such a way so as to support voting for Kamala Harris.

This is what the CPUSA does, even with Lenin.

So, clearly, we cannot just say all we need is the text.

I would love it for all, I would love it for us only to need the canonical texts of Marxism-Leninism in order to actually build, but you have a camera.

Right, but I would love it for that it's ignoring, like, for example, you went through your thinkers that you think are important: Schopenhauer.

You didn't mention Bergson, but Schopenhauer, Freud.

Who's missing here?

Like, Einstein?

I mean, aren't there things that were much more significant and also correct?

You know, you're talking about things that were enormously.

But Einstein isn't a bad way.

But Einstein isn't.

I agree with, I agree that we need some.

Einstein's talking about reality.

I fundamentally agree, but the problem is, if I say we need to read Einstein, it won't be contentious.

It's only when I mention these other thinkers that I'm somehow accused of being a proto-fascist, and that's the problem.

That's why this needs to be mitigated.

And then you think they're so important.

Not because they were fascists, like Freud was not a fascist.

He was pretty persecuted.

His work is erroneous, it's flawed, it's anti-Marxist, it is bourgeois and it's bad.

And we can talk about why, but we're going to wind up.

You're going to bring it back to, but don't you have a right to read him?

But just because he was a bourgeois, but just because he spent his life treating bourgeois neurotics.

No, but let me ask you the question.

I think we could go.

I want to ask you: how do you think the problem of subject and object is resolved in Marxism?

How would you resolve it?

The problem is that there are many subjects, and that's the issue.

And that objectivity is a belated fix that comes out of idealism.

That it's, you know, we know, we know what we are.

So you think objectivity is an idealistic notion?

Certainly.

I mean, we are we are a chemical process that consumes things outside uh we are uh we make pumpkins into carriages, right?

That's what we are.

That's what's subject to the let me let me simplify so it's less metaphysical.

Marxism says there's a proletarian class, okay?

Yeah, but simultaneously, and it makes claims about how the proletarian class through the class struggle is going to be resolved into the development of a new mode of production, at least politically speaking, and that you know, this is that this is going to be a process that reflects objective law, or at least we don't like to use the word objective, laws of history, right?

Laws of history that are not reducible.

Marx, you read the first line of the Communist Manifesto, you know, I mean, or the beginning.

I mean, he says, or the let me let me simplify the question for you.

Is Marxism a purely voluntary project of people coming together and saying we want to do this because it's the correct idea?

Or is it something that is impersonal, that is material and is going to happen regardless of anyone's ideas?

So which one is it?

Well, the Marxism as a commitment is that is a project of people together, yes.

But the Marxist view of history or the totality is that the conditions that we make our history in, that we inherit, really determine the odds.

How does this determination happen in a way that is independent from people's ideas, for example?

The determinations.

Well, things like um

Someone's idea might be interrupted by their death.

For example,

So assuming that thinking beings are living, you think that history is fully determined by thought?

No, it's not determined by thought.

It's a project of praxis.

Okay, so you're saying it's thought.

It's not happening conditions.

So what are the ingredients and the praxis?

Is it theory and practice?

Is that what you're referring to?

How is practice anything?

I know what praxis means, but I'm asking you because practice, let's be very careful about what we're the assumptions we're making here.

What independence in your view or difference is there between practice and theory?

Because isn't practice just the realization of a theory in your view?

Where's the to what extent is practice something that isn't directly a reflection of theory in your view?

Well, there's compelled kinds of practices.

Such as?

what the kind of work you do when you're a slave?

So, I don't want to I don't want to I don't want to make a huge leap, but what's ringing off in my brain right now when you say that is that if the only way we can understand material reality independent from ideas are relationships of power, it's kind of like we're getting into Foucault territory here, right?

Like certainly not certainly not, and um no, I'm not saying that's the only way.

So, you you're asking me a question about politics, and you bring it back to the market.

Let me ask you this question: to what extent is a given mode of production or a society material?

To what extent is it material?

Everything is material.

There's no supernatural realm at all.

Okay.

Everything is material.

So why do you need to be able to do that?

Okay, okay, sure.

So what's the point of.

I think you're talking about thoughts.

Now, thoughts are material, also.

These things are all made, and we know that's one of the beauties of the 20th century is that we start to understand that there isn't any spirit that's outside the material.

Yeah, but even, I mean.

But if we're talking, if you're talking basically about will, right, you're talking about, you know, kind of back to a Kantian idea of us being belonging to the kingdom of ends and have some project.

I mean, Marx talks about that.

What you have to, he talks about the world.

Lukac found this statement very important when he talks about how reality, he says the theory has to change reality, but reality also has to come and meet theory.

And then he says, you know, reality has a dream that can eventually be realized as reality.

That's what Marx says.

Well, and Marx uses romantic language, and he's being a little poetic there.

But I think then Lukac found that to be attempted to superimpose his idealist Kantian view on what Marx was trying to say there.

And that's why I think Heidegger is necessary, because without him, we kind of seem like we're regressing into idealism.

Seems like we're unable to comprehend precisely what materiality is in such a way that isn't the repository of a dogmatic conceptual view standpoint.

I was going to say that the reality that in order to match the dream of reality that reality has, you know, which is, it's a little bit of a wise crack, right?

About, but I don't think that means reality.

I don't think that's referring to a thought or an idea.

I think it's referring to a development reality is tending toward.

Well, it's referring to what human beings are already creating within the constraints that they're trying to.

But for Marx, the process by which mankind makes history is independent of their will.

No, it's not.

But he says it.

He says it.

Mankind creates history, but not according to their will, not as they wish it, not as they want it.

He says, Yeah, you make it not from scratch.

You don't world build.

No, no, no, he's very clear.

Men and women make history, but not as they please.

This is directly what he says.

The next line is they make it in conditions handed down from the past.

That's the constraints.

So, how is it that these conditions acquire such a status that it is irreducible to their will and their thoughts and their ideas?

Where is the room for the material?

What status does the material have?

Because it was too obvious for him to say.

He's writing to people who read Rousseau and stuff like that.

There's a human being in our environment.

We have certain capacities and certain needs.

Those are already the givens.

You have to have air in your lungs.

You have to have water.

So those are constraints.

It doesn't matter.

But you're ignoring a key insight of Marx.

You're ignoring a key insight.

Marx isn't simply saying that we're constrained by our physical existence.

No, I was using that as the most basic example.

We're constrained by everything.

We're constrained by relations of production that we enter into regardless of our will.

And I find it very difficult, for example, for that to make sense without us committing to a notion, for example, to an unconscious, that we are unconsciously.

Embedded in these relations, which still exert an influence upon us, but not according to the dictates, directly at least, of our consciousness.

And the idea of the unconscious, if you mean just things of which you are like functional.

No, no, because the unconscious, as Lacan puts, is structured like a language.

And that language.

The Lacanian idea of unconscious is not necessary for this.

I mean, I think it is better.

Because, look, just in as much as Lacan has this notion of the unconscious is structured like a language.

So the unconscious actually has determination.

Well, that's actually the same thing Marx is saying in different words, in terms of its logic, right?

He's saying material reality is not just a Kantian sublime beyond which nothing can be known or yada, just a totality.

He's saying it's structured in a very specific way.

It's structured in a determinate way.

It has determinations, despite that it's not reducible to any kind of concept or any kind of conceit of thought.

And that mirrors Lacan's notion of the unconscious as structured as a language.

There's a homology there, but I wouldn't say it's the same thing.

I mean, Lacan gets this idea.

Yeah, yeah, I'm saying the logic is the same, though.

Yeah, but Lacan gets this idea from his American friend who did the game theory, right?

That he decides that, you know, baby is involved in game theory and attributes hostile and gambling consciousness to infants.

Well, okay, look, look.

But let's say it's true.

Let's say it's true.

But that's not the, those are not the, that's not the totality of the constraints.

That's not, that's not, you know, the baby, the baby doesn't go out and, you know, I take issue with the notion that material reality is a, because you're describing it as a sublime purely as a constraint upon the activity of consciousness and thought.

And I take issue with that.

It produces the thought.

I mean, you're basically saying, you're saying material being cannot, you're saying material being cannot exert any significance upon thinking beings beyond the constraint imposes rather than recognizing material being as as determinations, as structured as determinations.

He's re-inscribing this medieval sort of mind-body division.

It's not Marxism.

You know, it's okay.

You want to play that game, that's fine.

But it's not for Marx, the human being, like he talks about this, that we are so for you, Marx, Marxism says, so Marxism, according to you, for Marx, thought is directly the same thing as reality.

No.

The content of thought and the so the the th thinking beings and the thinking consciousness, let's say.

Um the content of the determinations born out of that specific type of activity are directly the content of material reality.

No, I mean, he talks about it.

How is this not the same thing as a solip?

How does this not end with solipsism and a subjectivism, though?

Well, it doesn't for a lot of reasons.

But one, okay, I'll go through some of them.

So Marx talks about subjects and objects, the grasping of what thinking is, you know, as a grasping of reality, but forming it.

And he's in the very early stage of, you know, this is there isn't phenomenology yet.

There isn't that as a scientific I mean, he's phenomenological, of course, in that in the common sense of the word, but the in terms of the genre of phenomenology as an investigation, how how we assemble the reality is not he there's no bibliography of this except for like the Student Tracy and people the economists.

Now, what what he finds in Hegel that he finds so exciting is that there's an object that he's super concerned with that is a tricky one, which is capital, right?

He wants to and and in Hegel, he finds a way to explain why is Marx concerned with capital because he is thinks it's the enemy of humanity and he wants us to abolish it.

But why?

Where where is Marx beginning from to draw these conclusions about capital?

What is the fundamental beginning that marks what's his first step that leads him to inquire upon political economy, for example?

Well, I think he's concerned about property before he is interested in political sure but why?

Because human beings are in chains.

Again, I think there's an implicit idealistic liberalism.

No, no, no.

Yes, I think there's a almost a it's it's almost it's almost seems to me like a Gnosticism where for you, Marx is a liberal who wants the thinking consciousness to purely kind of overwhelm all of reality and it's an infinite reality and so on.

But but so we are we are liberal subjects, but we're constrained by capital.

We're constrained by property.

We're constrained.

And that we need to abolish these things that constrain our subjectivities so that we can be finally pure ethereal subjects that are, you know, I guess in the clouds or something.

Free of exploitation by ruling class.

That's what he's interested in.

But what okay, okay, let's let's let's begin because I think there's a lot of assumptions you're making here.

Why does Marx begin with a critique?

Why does okay, he doesn't begin there, but what leads Marx to engage in the critique of property?

What leads in there?

What leads him to engage?

You think it's some kind of something he read?

No, I think there's a line of development of Marxist thinking that leads him to the critique of private property.

You know, you read his letters.

He's like the only thing he thinks about.

He's if he's in he's because he wants justice.

Okay, hold on.

I'm sorry.

This camera is.

He wants justice.

All right.

Um fuck hold on give me a second.

Okay.

I'll let you think about that more while I get this camera working.

Oh, this is what I mean.

He wants justice.

Hold on.

All right, we're back.

All right.

So he wants to be pro-free.

About liberalism, h he begins to understand.

So hold on, you're saying it's because Marx wants justice, right?

He wants human freedom.

What is What is Freedom for Marx?

What is that?

Um self-determination.

Okay, so for Marx, human freedom is self-determination.

What what what what in the beginning?

Yeah.

Yeah.

So what does self-determination mean for Marx?

What does self-determination f mean for Marx?

Well, as a young man, it is the

the le sufficient leisure and access to your um need to this substance that satisfies your basic needs and your uh superfluous needs.

And how does Marx

Conclude, or how does he begin with this notion of self-determination from his Hegelian background?

No, he h he hated Hegel.

And then one day he writes to his father and says, Oh my god, I was so wrong.

I was running down the street full of joy.

I finally found the answer, and it's Hegel.

And this is quite the, you know, he's already in his twenties.

He found Hegel foolish.

I mean, he was more interested in.

You don't think Marx's notion of self-determination or species?

Are you referring to species being?

You don't think his notion of species being has any Hegelian import?

Later, but I mean, we're talking about Marx as a kid.

His initial interest, I mean, he read Aristotle.

He was interested in the and he had a big revelation about the very nature of the universe as you know, for his dissertation that everything is interconnected.

Um, Marx's let me find the exact date of his doctoral dissertation.

Eighteen forty one.

Yeah.

Okay.

So you're saying Marx did not engage with Hegel before eighteen forty one?

So no, what's about that?

Because listen, I'm going to risk myself sounding stupid, but I've read Marx's doctoral dissertation and his description of the atomists and the development of the what do you call it?

The repulsion of the atoms and the decline of the atoms and so on and so on.

It's one for one from Hegel's seems like it's from Hegel's logic.

Well, that could be because, you know, he hated Hegel.

He certainly had to be familiar.

But then there's a there's a letter that he wrote to his father that's it's actually quite funny where he's elated and he's like, I've converted to Hegelism.

Hegel has the answer.

And of course what he's what is sort of a matter of fact.

I think you're getting the order of things a little the chronology here is not exactly correct.

Well, that could be.

How when what was Marx's words?

Yeah, maybe it was a little earlier than the dissertation.

So, um, but yeah, no, probably, because yes, it has the it has this uh uh bent of the of uh of dialectics, right?

Um, so that's probably true.

But, um, so I think it's definitely clear that he wanted people to be free.

He wanted to free everyone, slaves.

But I think, I think what you're not understanding is Marx's Marx, no, Marx's notion of freedom is drawn from Hegel.

Initially, but then you know, of course, he uh he makes fun of him for uh quite a long time.

Well, Haeckel's notion of freedom is uh um reserved for uh

Um

Look, I'll just make it simple.

Marx shares in common the view with Hegel that freedom is not the arbitrary freedom to do what you want, like liberalism, just freedom to make as many choices as you can.

That's not his notion of freedom.

For Marx, freedom is not to be unconstrained by something in order to be unbounded and fly into the sky.

For Marx, freedom is the freedom to be something in particular.

Freedom is related to something already inscribed in one's being.

For that determination, you said it before.

Self-determination is, I guess.

It's getting there, at least, in terms of what Marx means by freedom.

And he shares that in common with Hegel: as freedom as insight into necessity, right?

So, Marx is not, Marx is drawing from Hegel a similar logic of what freedom is.

Now, the question I wanted to ask you, though, is that what, in your view, was decisive for Marx's step into materialism, right?

Sorry?

Hello?

Yeah, I think uh she might be lagging.

Yeah, hello.

We'll wait, we'll wait, it's uh it's a technical error on her end.

Yeah, maybe disconnect and reconnect.

Let me see.

Hello?

Yeah, I did the up and down.

Yeah, there's a user may have trouble connecting to the call.

Yeah.

Um if there's a way, maybe she's

If anyone is in contact with her, please just tell her to restart the Discord.

Hello?

Uh go ahead and unmute your mic if you can.

Hello?

Thank you, Dito.

Appreciate you, brother.

Anyone if anyone's in contact with her?

Hello?

Wow.

Okay, is yeah, yeah, I can hear you now.

Can hear you now?

I rebooted or whatever.

All right, so where were we?

We can just I guess we can take it back to higher.

I remember what you were saying.

You said the last thing I heard was freedom is not like having wings that you could fly into the sky.

Yeah, freedom is not the unconstraining one's will because one's will is constrained by some kind of antecedent material being that's what that one is thrusted into regardless of their uh of their preconceptions and regardless of their intentions.

This is um this is a little mystical.

I mean really is it is it mystical that man is thrusted into conditions independently of their will in the Hegelian sense that there's something prior to these conditions?

Yes, it's a fantasy.

There's nothing prior.

Marx makes a joke about it.

He's like you want to ask how you came into being and yet at the same time you still want to exist.

There's nothing prior to the existence of thinking beings before.

No, but the thinking being doesn't exist prior.

We're nothing to be thrown.

Yeah, you said, isn't it true that man is thrust into conditions and a reality independently of their thoughts?

No, where the thoughts are one of the many things that are the reality that this is not, there isn't, we're not a soul that gets sent down from heaven and then it's stuck in matter and all whatever.

I mean, maybe we are, but it's not, it's certainly not a Marxist way of thinking.

So before a subject before a subject acquires self-consciousness, they don't exist at all.

And self consciousness.

No, they exi but you know, there isn't a subject.

That's the whole thing about the subject object in Marxism is that that we're processes, we're also objects.

But why why are we arguing about this when Marx directly says that men and women are thrusted into condition conditions independently of their will?

Yeah, but this is not it's he's talking about men and women, whereas you're doing the Heideggering thing that there's a being that is in no conditions.

Are are men and women not beings?

Yeah, but they're um not new.

So men and women have always existed?

No, but to be men and women they had to first be children and before that they had to be another adult woman.

Is that the same as themselves or what?

Their parents are saying that.

Well, you know, the are those different beings or are those the same as themselves?

The separation of a mother from a fetus is a long process.

So there's a period when there is two people and one at the same time.

You know, liberalism.

Please don't give me the liberal answer of individualism that they're either two or one because you're not recognizing that.

I think there's a lot of confusion here.

So I think the reason you're taking issue with what I'm saying is because there seems to be a great deal of similarity between Heidegger's notion of thrownness and Marx's notion of the way.

Oh, nothing, but Heidegger is the joke idiot imitation of what Marx is saying.

He's trying to attract people to his fucked up and evil and selfish and bourgeois liberal shit.

But do you notice how you're just calling him names and you're not engaging with the content in any kind of way?

I'm open to a critique of Heidegger.

I'm open to a critique of Heidegger, but all you're doing is calling him names.

I don't think that's a critique.

You just skip that part of the decision tree, please, because it's a bore.

Because I want to defend my claim that Heidegger is necessary for Marxism to be understood correctly in the West.

So Mao didn't, oh, because he's not in the West.

Correct.

So Fidel didn't understand, so Huey Newton didn't understand.

Well, here's what I'll say.

I'll say that, first of all, whether Fidel is a Western...

Fidel is not a Western Marxist, let's be clear.

The West is referring to a specific civilizational problem with Western Europe and North America, right?

But anyway, look.

What language does the Fidel speak?

What what did he read?

Where did he go to university?

Cuba, Cuba's, the con the context of Cuba and Latin America differs from um differs from that of uh Europe, at least, in the sense that Fidel could take for granted, for example, a clear revolutionary tradition and uh civilizational sphere, I would argue, with Latin America, which was substantive and which could have been taken for granted.

Um Fidel did not have to litigate and create from scratch the very context in which his revolution was carried out.

Whereas Western Marxists seem to be faced with that precise problem.

And that's exactly why I think Heidegger is needed for Western thinking, or at least the same thing Heidegger was onto or trying to point at as and problematize.

I think Western Marxists need to take that seriously.

They need to take seriously the fact that we lack any kind of substantive civilizational context in which Marxism automatically has a given meaning.

And why is that?

Because think about it.

In China, in China, we have Marxism.

You know, we have this is not I don't know what you're talking about.

If not, to talk about Heidegger as this.

Perfect.

You know what?

You know what, Kehina?

We have Marxism.

The West is infamous for having a flourishing and very successful communist tradition.

So what are we even debating about?

Not America, but as you say, not the United States.

I think Britain definitely has a very successful up-and-coming communist movement, then, right?

Is that what you're saying?

No, but the Americas.

I mean, look, where?

I mean, the history in the Americas.

Okay, the Americas.

So you think you regard the global South portion of the Americas as part of the West?

Because it's in the Western Hemisphere?

Is that what you're saying?

I d I'm questioning this uh this um imperial idea fantasy that's the West, which became a a polite unif euphemism for is it is it an imperialist fantasy is it an imperialist fantasy to regard the West as the center of world imperialism today?

But you know, when you say the West, how you're you're trying to claim something.

I'm trying to claim the West lacks something that other civilizations have.

But what are you talking about, the West?

You're talking about the UK and the US, or are you talking about the US?

No, I'm talking about Europe and the I'm talking about Europe and the United States.

I mean, you know, the thing is, I know what you're talking about.

This term is used in bourgeois.

But you don't think there's any import to the term of the West, that there's nothing...

I mean, you're going to...

We're somehow supposed to ignore the fact that Western countries have completely failed to produce anything revolutionary, whereas the rest of the world seems to be able to do that.

I mean, we're going to ignore the peculiarities of Marxism in the West versus the rest of the world.

The revolutionary tradition has stopped talking about the West, which belongs to academics and usually talks about the global south.

So do you think do you think Germany's do you think Marxism in Germany is comparable to in Nicaragua?

You think Marxists in Germany are on the same page as Marxists in Nicaragua?

Are Marxists in Germany on the same page as Marxists in Lebanon?

Is it even close?

There's no question that Marxism in the imperial core and its immediate periphery has been completely defeated.

There's no question that there's any round.

Do you think that there's any implications from the development of Western modern Western history, colonialism and imperialism?

Do you think that there are any implications that development has as far as our more fundamental understanding of reality itself?

Is it just that the malign influence, is the malign influence of colonialism and imperialism confined just to the fact that we're misinterpreting Marxism?

Or do you think or do you suspect there might be a more fundamental problem of the way we relate to reality itself that is downstream from this status the West has, which you admit as the imperial core of the world?

I don't think there's any way to understand this except Marxism.

Not high degree.

Really?

Really?

Then why was Lenin necessary then?

Why was Lenin necessary?

If Marxism automatically was able to open our eyes to the problems of the imperial core, why was Lenin necessary to do the scandalous thing, which was to say that revolutions don't have to actually begin in the same imperial core, even though they're more developed and more advanced?

I think you're really ignoring that before Lenin, Marxism was extremely Eurocentric.

Social democracy was Eurocentric.

It was a European movement.

It was Lenin who opened the doors.

It was Lenin who opened the doors as far as Marxism's importation to non-Western countries.

Um well yes, there I think that I'm gonna say that um I I will kind of agree that anything that everything being written in the I think look with all with all due respect I think I'm trying I'm trying to I'm trying to talk about trying to not let me uh answer your question.

Okay, so your but your answer to the question seems to be that I'm trying to say that Mao could work with the classics of Chinese literature and civilian Wow, okay, so do you not do you not want me to say anything at all?

You've got to be kidding.

People are listening to this.

You're not going to fool anyone.

You're you're giving my answers and your questions.

I just want to clarify that we're on the same page going forward, so there's no ambiguity.

As far as my understanding of what you're saying, when I try to say that Mao was working with this deeper pattern of Chinese civilization and the classics of literature and so on and so on, which created a coherent context for the application of Marxism, where the social existence of a Chinese people and their underlying civilization did not have to be fundamentally created from scratch, but could be implicitly understood as something that exists, and that the West, because its history seems to be, according to Marx and Engels, the history of private property, which is a history of alienation and the destruction and severance of all social bonds, such that they constantly have to be re-litigated and called into question by thought, you think that my very notion of there existing a West characterized by the development of private property is an imperialist myth, right?

Oh, I think that the framing of the the catchphrase of the West is uh an imperialist myth.

And I would prefer if we talk about the empire and the class, because um this is a class project.

Also, in China you keep mentioning uh Mao's uh the important contributions of traditional Chinese literature to Mao's Marxism and uh you don't mention what those contributions are or what those texts were.

We know we he's extremely I mean he fought a a lifetime war against um the classics of he was extremely well read as far as the classics of Chinese literature.

Well read, but he was extremely hostile to well Confucianism above all and this was but he he opposed the extent to which he criticized Confucianism was from the perspective of classical Chinese literature.

For example, he drew from the legalistic traditions.

He framed the very nature of his criticism within the context and the terms of this tradition.

Well, I've read a lot of what Mao wrote, and I don't really know any, you know, I know Chinese 18th-century novels.

That's about all I know.

And maybe well, there's a very rich and ancient tradition of Chinese classical literature.

Of course, it's impossible to become knowledgeable in it, and the peasants weren't knowledgeable in it.

But Mao was, but Mao very much was.

Mao was, but you don't see him advancing this as a corrective to Marxism.

Marx is applying Mark, Mark, sorry, Mao is applying Marxism to that given context, though.

Well, give me an example.

Well, to the context, yes, of course.

But he was, you know, very, if anything, a bit.

Mm, you know, he was again he well, one of his big slogans is against book worship, right?

That was one of the projects.

It's a it's a demand that you're not allowed to uh argue from authority at all.

And you're not allowed or, you know, even the cadres couldn't.

Um couldn't.

Isn't that so?

Do you think that he was talking about classical Chinese literature or do you think he was talking about it?

Or do you think he was talking about people attempting to dogmatize, make render dogmatic Marxism?

What do you think he was talking about?

Marxism.

I mean, I think he was of course he wanted people to critique Marxism as well, but he was worried he was talking about, of course, the habits that a lot of the cadres who were not necessarily you think Mao was raining down on the cadres overenthusiasm for ancient Chinese literature when he talked about opposed book worship?

Um, part par the habits of argument that they had learned in school, yeah.

I think he was talking about dogmatic interpretations of Marxist texts because those were the source of legitimation and authority of the Communist Party.

He was trying to say don't worship the books just because they're sources of political authority for us.

Well, he's he was not saying don't take this attitude toward these toward any book.

Look, I'm mentioning books, but I need look, I'm mentioning books, but what we're really talking about is a cultural context within China.

Even for the Cultural Revolution, right, that they had.

They have this context which

They that could form the context for the application of Marxism.

That Western thinkers, because that's really where Marxism is for a long time, seem to not have.

And why is that?

We are, to an insufficient extent, probably engaging with the canon of Western literature, maybe.

I think that's true.

I think Heidegger forms a part of that canon.

I think Heidegger is raising questions and

Um

Calling into question and drawing attention to existential problems, which, if they're not unique to the West, maybe they're not, but they're definitely relevant to us, I think.

I think that the way in which Heidegger, for example, accomplishes the critique of metaphysics, he accomplishes the critique of this idealistic presumption, I would argue my interpretation is, in terms of how we relate to the world and reality.

We, for example, Heidegger critiques utilitarianism.

He critiques the notion of reducing all determinations within reality, all beings, to mere utilities and things that are used.

To accomplish some kind of fixed goal, for example.

The strict subject-object distinction itself is something Heidegger decides to problematize.

Heidegger critiques Descartes' reduction of being to the conceits and the purport of the thinking consciousness.

Heidegger goes all the way as far back as antiquity, right?

With Plato's step that he takes from Heraclitus, which totally renders impossible the more ambiguous reading into Logos and its identity with feces and so on and so on, as something purely estranged and detached.

From reality, from being, in other words, and the reduction of all being to the idea, right?

To the concept, beginning with Plato.

And so Heidegger identifies this as a spiral into oblivion.

Now, that's an idealistic reading, I agree.

But you see, Heidegger allows us to understand examples and expressions of what I would argue is the history of private property in terms of the history of philosophy itself and of Western thinking at large.

And it's very easy to read this through a materialistic paradigm.

Would Heidegger approve of that?

No, I take many liberties with Heidegger.

Yeah, but what do you eat it for?

Sorry?

If you already know better, and seriously, this is like if you may know better, but the problem is that Western Marxists don't know better.

So they need to read Heidegger to understand what Marx originally meant.

But listen, listen, with all due respect, Kahina, Kahina.

If all it took was for people to just read Marx, where is our communist movement?

No, it doesn't take for just people to just read.

So what else do they need to read?

Well, to be like to be a vanguard, I mean, you'd need What do we need?

Yeah.

What are we mi we clearly we've been doing something wrong for decades and decades and decades.

So what do we need to do that's new?

Marxists in America today need to read Huey Newton's critique of your multipolarity uh nationalism.

Perfect, perfect.

Long nation.

So according to you, Marxists in America are deficient.

Their chief defect is they're not reading Huey Newton enough.

Do you seriously believe that?

Yes.

Have you gone to have you have you ever visited an American college campus?

Do you think they read Huey Newton's um they don't read Huey Newton's?

I think all young Marxists in America do is read Huey Newton.

No, they read maybe Revolutionary Suicide, but they read the Expelled Panthers.

Okay, so we just need to read more of Huey Newton and then the K the Kingdom of the Keys.

Let me ask you a question.

Let me ask you a question then.

Why did Huey Newton fail?

Why did Huey Newton not usher in the communist movement that we lack today?

The reason that you're doing a podcast now.

This was the d he was because podcasts stopped him from accomplishing the revolution.

What are you t what are you saying?

He came up against um a hostile and more powerful force, which was the ruling class.

Um defeated.

Um they're not.

But you see how that has no explanatory value.

Was na was Mao not coming up against a powerful ruling class?

Was Lennon not coming up against a powerful ruling class?

Well, if you really want to know, like, why did Mao win and uh why was Lennon?

Why did Lennon win?

Why was Chavez assassinated?

Why was uh Chavez?

Hugo Chavez.

Hugo Chop.

Oh, you mean Shaguevara?

Chavez was assassinated with some kind of plutonium or something.

He was giving cancer with all these other guys at that at a conference.

They all got cancer, so did uh Kirshner and

Why were they killed?

Why were they killed?

Why were d revolutions defeated?

Why was the revolution?

Why was there a counter-revolution in Russia, etc.?

You know, yeah, each one has a specific thing.

You're talking about the global class war.

Huey Newton, you know, is one of the most important American communists.

I thought you were saying that.

Okay, sure, but you're saying that the problem with Western Marxism or American Marxism is that we're not reading Huey Newton enough.

But are you including Huey Newton?

Is he a Western Marxist too?

He's from America, right?

Okay, so it's everyone in America and not a tradition of not this what you call cultural Marxism that okay so clearly clearly it's not enough to read Huey even if I accepted that the Black Panthers contributed to the history of no no now I'm talking about a specific argument about what what the ruling class accomplished in the period of revisionism after the Soviet split the Sino-Soviet split what they accomplished in terms of the conditions that disable national independence and it's very what do we do what what do we do what's your what's your what do we do now you know I don't have to answer that that's not my that's not my fort I don't I don't really know what to do I think right now I mean we've had this whole conversation so you don't know what to do but it's just very important to establish that

We don't even think about anything I'm talking about.

Well, what because the alternative, which is doing nothing, is at least better.

What we have to think about now is what we can do to assist the resistance in Palestine.

Can I ask you a question?

Why is it that for you, there is no ability to rationally engage with anything I have to say about Heidegger?

Every time I try to say anything, you just an irrational response.

And I want to know where that's coming from.

Every time I bring up a salient point, every time I bring up a salient point that Heidegger might be raising, that we should engage with at least, you say, well, Marx already said that.

I mean, look, I don't even necessarily disagree, but clearly something is lost if this is an aspect of Marx's thinking we've all forgotten, people have forgotten to understand.

Wait, wait, okay, so don't interrupt me now.

Okay, that's why that's why I'm not answering that there aren't any answers in the transcript because at some point you interrupt me when I start to answer.

So, why?

So, the thing that you're saying, Heidegger, that we're missing from Heidegger is this subject-object thing, which you then elide into a romantic, a sort of mystical vision of what these determinations are that are going to define our will.

And it's very clear where you're going.

The thing that Heidegger could possibly be bringing to some basic idea, which is more like Marshall McLuhan than it is like Marx.

But I get what you're saying is the connection that there's a sort of Heidegger there.

You go, yeah, there.

Okay, so that what you're bringing into it, and you just cut me off because you know I'm about to say what you're trying to assert is a national destiny.

This is what Heidegger is famous for.

Yes, every paragraph doesn't reiterate it, but by the end of the page, you get to him saying, But and this is about national destiny.

You remember the discussion of Antijoni or Antiquity or however you want to say it?

This is what it's about: German destiny, Gemeinschaft, separate destinies.

And the reason you're saying this is because you want to make an argument that the policies of the Chinese Communist Party, the billionaires who run China and who employ people all over the world, including in the United States, and have now seized that run the Haifa port and also have seized Piraeus, etc.

That the reason that this is some kind of purer, better Marxism is something that Heidegger will help us understand because of this national destiny, which is a complete I think there's a staggering degree of imprecision as far as your analysis is concerned.

It has no explanatory meaning.

Ask the audience.

Well, look, okay.

Ask them.

Don't you want to know how you're doing?

I'm talking to you right now.

Okay.

You place a strong degree of emphasis on national destiny for Heidegger, but you're ignoring the inherent ambiguity within Heidegger's thinking, which doesn't allow the nation to acquire any real degree of tangibility as a being beyond an amalgamation and collection of individuals dealing with their own existential.

Existential problematic or whatever.

And I think that's I think you're I think you're ignoring that as much as as much as Heidegger

might allude to that, he's still operating within the framework of a kind of hierarchy of individual wills, hierarchy of individual beings.

Never is he giving us any kind of integral social being.

that pre exists the individual itself.

You can maybe interpret it that way, but you could also interpret it in the opposite way.

And this is an inherent ambiguity within Heidegger which I problematize, you know, which I uh critique him for.

his cake and eating it too.

He's he wants the nation, he defines it, he know y you read the black notebooks, you know who's out, and then you which is, you know, um which is said he defines the nation and he through the black notebooks, his anti-Semitic black notebooks, he's excluding the Jews from it.

So what does he define in the first place?

Is he as a as a historical being there?

Okay.

How does how does that how does that acquire the status of a social being, a collective being, for Heidegger?

Because it's a uh it's a g he talks about the German being there, that that this is a um Yeah, but for Heidegger the the the national for him, the the national acquires an existential status.

This is my interpretation, by the way, 'cause it's so ambiguous, only insofar as it's a shared individual horizon, right?

But for me, for me Okay, go ahead.

Shared among specific people and nobody's responsible.

It's like the SS.

Nobody's responsible for the break.

The opposite problem is true for Heidegger.

Heidegger never actually allows makes the fateful step of treating the ontological difference as a particular being itself.

So this is the step, logically speaking, from Kant to Hegel that Heidegger never makes.

And that's what I critique him for.

For him, the ontological difference is always confined to a specific, I would argue, individual horizon of Dasein, right?

Dasein, insofar as it's a question of being.

And the question, of course, is addressed existentially to the individual.

Now, insofar as there's a national destiny for Heidegger, a paradigm of national existence, it just seems to be one shared between individuals.

So we haven't escaped the methodological individualism yet.

Yet.

Because of Heidegger's Heidegger is the thinker of the individual dwelling within the stillness.

of uh of d of uh Dasein, dwelling within its ambiguity and its uh its terminal uh its existential terminality.

So so that so so for okay, go ahead.

Fuck what is the importance of that?

What is the importance of what?

Why does anybody need to know that, what you just said?

Because I think that if you understand where Heidegger goes wrong, you can actually open up this notion of Dasein to a working, I wouldn't say concept, to a working notion of particular social beings, particular patterns of social existence and logics of reproduction, which do preexist the individual subject, which do in fact preexist any specific dogmatic, or not even just dogmatic, any specific exclusive repository of being that defines our horizon as metaphysical.

And I think that is a much better place to start than the presumption of the subject-object distinction, which Lukox is working with.

So for me, Heidegger provides a trapdoor to escape some of the dogmatic assumptions of Western metaphysical idealism.

He's not the end point.

He just provides a way out of something that Marxists seem to be stuck in within the West.

Well, I don't know that Marxists are stuck in you know, Marxists in the West and everywhere else, um, except that their um search for uh explanations of social relations are um perspectival, m intersubjective.

Um they're two subject you know, subject object is uh is uh um

Largely illusory, or it it's not illusory.

That's the thing about Marx is that look, I want to translate all this into practical point of view.

And then you want to translate this.

I just want to say something.

Wait, James Graham was on the little side thing there, and he said this was supposed to be about China, and he doesn't realize that it is.

Don't worry about James.

We're just talking.

I'm just wanting to make that point that this is about China.

That the end point of all this discussion is going to be some kind of justification of what you call Xi Jinping thought, what I would call Kissingerism.

Okay.

And that it's all based on this idea of I can identify some problems with Western Marxism, which I think Heidegger can help us point a way out of.

You may not agree with Heidegger.

You may not agree with all of these impure, tainted thinkers.

And that's fine, but I think I want those problems to be recognized so that people have an idea of where I'm coming from.

And I'm saying they're wrong.

These are not the same things.

I'm challenging the claim, the claim that there is being thrown into matter, essentially.

This is like a Plotinus vision.

I'm challenging the validity of that.

That we're thrown into a context.

We ultimately don't have any antecedent control or.

There's nothing ability to define by thinking consciousness.

There's nothing before.

So the thinking consciousness determines the context into which we're thrusted into, even before we're born, because of metaphysical idealism, is correct, according to you.

The context creates the consciousness.

That's Marxism.

Right, but that's also kind of what Heidegger says.

That's also what Heidegger says.

That's what Heidegger says.

That's what Heidegger is mimicking and vitiating because he says, because we know the allusions that he makes when he's talking about.

Why don't we forget that you're clearly there's an irrational knee-jerk response going on?

You asked me, why is it not what Heidegger says?

And it's because Heidegger says being is thrown that is something that exists prior to you know world or reality or it creates world by being thrown into and everyone knows everyone reading this has read their medieval thinkers everyone knows what Gnosticism is they're not grappling in the dark these are university students in Germany can you finish your point though because you didn't finish it no I well I'll finish it if you don't interrupt me I'm waiting for you to finish it so Heidegger is talking about something that then has to, once thrown, it can be in it's got a zero and one choice.

It can be in an authentically embedded world or it can be inauthentic.

This is a paradigm.

Do you think Heidegger

himself, even according to his own conclusions.

Do you think he resolves the question of what an authentic existence is, or do you think he leaves it open even after he dies?

He it's already understood before he starts to write what it is.

Okay, what is it then?

It's uh it's the existence of um

A nationalist warrior toward death or a a you know like a totenkop type uh you know a hussar riding into the battle a uh an an SS officer so Heidegger was not saying that the West from the beginning of the Greeks was on a path toward uh uh the oblivion of being or did he say that he does he keeps saying the Greeks the Greeks like he's a fucking uneducated idiot there still are Greeks he talks about the Greeks meaning um some fantasy of the past people who didn't even can you please can you please try to make the effort to understand the point I'm trying to say Heidegger is saying that there's a long process of the West on the path to the oblivion of being.

You're trying to say that for Heidegger, it suffices to regard authentic existence as just a total state of war.

And yet Western history and the history of private property is characterized by endless wars and wars and wars.

So clearly Heidegger does not regard that as a sufficient condition for the acquisition of an authentic existence because he's writing within the context of several world wars going on, one before him and one that's coming up, several wars going on in the 19th century.

Clearly he doesn't regard war by itself as sufficient rerequisite for defining what an authentic existence actually is.

The truth which you're ignoring and you're refusing to get into here is that Heidegger doesn't answer the question of what constitutes an authentic existence.

He only begins by defining the parameters and opening the conversation as far as the inauthentic existence that has thus far defined the history and current trajectory of the West.

He never actually solves the question of what an authentic existence is.

So let's be clear about what we're talking about.

He gives examples and you have a brain.

Yeah, he tells you what's not authentic, which is the masses.

They can't live authentically.

No, he regards the era of the techni and modern technology and modernity as inauthentic.

He regards, and he traces the roots of this and the original.

Heidegger never it's curious that you're ignoring the fact that Heidegger never poses a point in which some kind of authentic relationship toward being by Dasein is lost.

The only place that he offers room for understanding the Edenic state before the dissent is the pre-Socratics, right?

So this is before what most thinkers traditionally regard as the beginning of Western, whether they're correct or not, Western civilization.

He goes to the pre-Socratics to search for answers as far as where we might begin to understand what constitutes an authentic relationship toward being as reflected in thought.

Dude, you're confusing his remarks on the bibliography of philosophy and his remarks on the existence in the social.

Sorry, but Heidegger regards every disclosure of being through the lens of the history of philosophy.

Almost to the point where he he redu in an idealist fashion fashion disclosure of being there you go right there this is a statement for Heidegger every disclo every disclosure you don't care about Heidegger but you're trying to cancel me for trying for drawing conclusions from Heidegger every time I try to rationally communicate to you every attempt I've made to rationally communicate to you the significance of Heidegger all you've done is talk about how much you don't care about him or how stupid you think he is without actually making a point no that's not true I've made plenty of points and I'm gonna make a point right now first of all you're um you're a little paranoid if you think I've tried to cancel you I'm here on your show talking to you but you're trying to imply that the extent to which I'm drawing from Heidegger is some kind of proximity to Nazism and fascism, something you feel.

No, what I'm trying to imply, what I'm not trying to imply, what I've stated very plainly is that your aim here is to use Heidegger.

I don't need Heidegger to support China.

I don't need Heidegger to support China.

I don't know.

You may not need it, but you're using it.

I don't know why.

I'm not saying that you're desperate, that you had no other choice, but here you are talking to me about this, right?

So this is what I'm reacting to, the reality, not some counterfactual.

So the reality is you are Heidegger.

You are doing something that I find very vulgar.

You're trying to reduce.

You're trying to reduce any expression of the intellect to the direct signaling of a political position.

You're trying to reduce it to that.

You're saying, all this will ever amount to is supporting Xi Jinping.

You're rushing too fast into the conclusions.

Let's be clear about what problems we have.

You're talking to a vulgar Marxist, okay?

Get used to it.

Instead of doing this thing where you're like, you're just trying to kind of crucify me on the cross of a direct, vulgar, political, outward, superficial position, why are you unable to engage with the deeper point about why it isn't maybe necessary for Western Marxists at least to recognize some of the same problems Heidegger raised for thought?

Well, I'll tell you.

Well, I'll tell you why.

Sure.

Why it's not necessary.

The points are wrong.

The points are here's the first one.

Disclosure of being.

It doesn't mean anything, but it implies.

Okay.

So this is all.

I think we've reached.

No, no, no, no, no.

We have reached a discursive limit because I'm trying to communicate something and you're saying that it is.

No, no, no, no, no.

Here's why it's a discursive limit.

And we should probably move to China then to the China topic directly.

Because you're just saying at this point that everything I'm saying and everything Heidegger's saying is devoid of meaning, meaning you're closing your ears and you're refusing in good faith to actually try and understand where I'm coming from.

You don't have to try and understand where I or Heidegger are coming from.

That's fine.

But just admit you refuse to engage.

You refuse to entertain it.

You won't even, you refuse to even read into the idea that there's any meaning to be gathered here at all.

What he's saying there, what he's communicating is literally the same thing as a toddler screaming noises.

So the conclusion we can draw from that is, according to you, Heidegger has never said anything at all.

He has never, there's nothing meaningful he has ever communicated.

All that's significant about him is that he was a Nazi and that's it.

And that's the extent to which you're willing to go to actually read anything or try to understand anything.

So that's fine.

Now wait, wait, wait.

Let's talk about a specific text.

Get it up on your screen.

The technology essay.

Now you said a few minutes ago that Heidegger was concerned.

First of all, that he gave you no idea.

You said there is no hint of what an authentic existence might be.

I didn't say hint.

I said he doesn't, he leaves it as an open question.

Yes, he doesn't give us.

It's an open question.

You don't know.

You have no idea what authenticity is.

I have an idea of it because I think it's the same thing Marx talked about with the species being.

But Heidegger will not go there.

So go ahead.

So you're saying you have an idea what you think so you have your own idea of authenticity, but you don't get it from Heidegger because Heidegger doesn't actually have one.

That's false advertising.

I d yeah, I d I I but I I do think it satisfies the criterion Heidegger suggests as far as what constitutes an authentic existence.

I just think Heidegger himself was unable to draw make the fateful step of drawing that conclusion.

So he just said the word authentic a lot with no intentions behind it.

No, he said the word authentic in relation to inauthenticity.

He was very clear about what constituted an inauthentic existence.

You're clear too on what's inauthentic, right, too.

And you said you tied it to what you called the technological era.

I think Heidegger's inauthentic existence is the same thing as what Marx describes as the alienated essence and estranged essence of man.

I'm not convinced that's what he's saying, but that is certainly what.

But I think it's easy to draw parallels and basically regard them as maybe talking about the same thing.

It's easy to misread, yeah.

So the thing is that you, you, there's no question that Heidegger was aware of Marx, that he was an anti-Marxist, that his aim was to.

I think Heidegger did not engage Marx really in good faith.

He didn't engage Marx beyond what the contemporary Western Marxists in Germany were saying about Marx.

And Heidegger took this at face value and didn't really attempt to engage Marx beyond that.

Heidegger engaged maybe with Lukaks, for example, and then he said, okay, this is Marx and this is Marxism.

I think that that see if you want to know my scandalous view, I think the historical tragedy is that there was a current within German intellectual thinking that was definitely reactionary.

There's historical reasons for that.

It was associated with the decaying Prussian junker class, whatever.

But that could have also maybe given rise to a new paradigm of thinking that could have been the official philosophy of the October Revolution.

It's just that the October Revolution never impressed its significance upon Germany's intellectual spheres because it was still chained by the precepts and the conceits of social democracy.

So instead of recognizing the zeitgeist of where they were trying to get at in Stalin socialism in one country and in Marxism Leninism, they immediately made the false step of seeing Nazism as the zeitgeist, which was a complete disaster.

It was a complete mistake.

And I'm not even saying that, okay, their thought has no, nothing about their thought can be indicted.

Their thought was pure and good.

It's just there is a misunderstanding where they saw Nazis.

No, I think there is an extent to which we can even trace in the thinking of Schmidt and Heidegger and Junger and all these other kinds of people where they go wrong even in terms of their thinking.

But at the same time, I think that the willingness to recognize the paradigm of social democracy and of institutional academic thinking at the time and of neo-Kantianism and so on and so on, there needed to be a radical departure from that.

Now, who does accomplish this?

The closest, I think, in the 1930s is Kojev, right?

And Kojev is someone who's directly understanding what I'm talking about.

That Stalin is the world spirit on horseback, so to speak.

Stalin is the zeitgeist.

And Kojev understands the role Heidegger had played, right, in allowing for an insight to this from the Western perspective.

And it's Kojev which says that Heidegger allows us only to understand death without struggle, right?

Whereas Marxism gives us the view of struggle without death.

And it's Kojev who's kind of synthesizing these perspectives and is really laying the real foundation of where I'm coming from with Heidegger in the first place.

It's Kojev, you know?

Why crucify me and not Kojev?

I don't understand it.

Nobody has to engage with that stuff.

But I think I think Kojev.

who was the foundation of the entire French school, including Lacan,

To the extent that Kojev is drawing from Heidegger is precisely the extent to which.

I think Heidegger's uh historical significance is objective and is uh valid and should be recognized.

But so then you're an anti-Marxist?

No, I think that Western Marxists I think I look look I'm gonna simplify it for you.

I think all your authorities are like the criminal.

No, but they're not authorities, but they're not authorities.

I don't have any authorities in the West.

Okay, they're not authorities.

They're not authorities.

Western Marxists are just all the people who are.

Tahina, I'm going to make a proposition and I'll let you work with that.

All of Western Marxism is just improvised social democracy.

And it never actually made the fateful step into Leninism.

That's my proposition to you.

Right.

And then you're going to draw a kind of genealogy to...

Today's uh so I want to find a way for us to import Leninism into America and into the West.

That's my goal.

We're not talking about Leninism, but the here's the thing.

And hold on, Kahina, do you not think that there were thinkers that tried to draw parallels between Schmidt's political theory and Leninism?

That Marxism was lacking a real political science and political theory and that and that in a lot of ways Schmidt could be read as the logic of class antagonism as applied to politics as unconditional enmity, unconditional political difference, irreducible political difference, and that's the form class struggle takes in politics as a struggle to the as an absolute isn't that exactly the essence of Leninist politics though the drawing of a distinction absolute distinction between class enemy and okay plagiarism from a very very popular book called The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion I don't understand why you're saying that why is it it is a plagiarism the the political um theology is a plagiarism of that book which nobody reads so they don't so everything is about hating jews so every everything is just about making jews the jews were added they it schmitted it's not about jews right it's about democrats and socialists right it's not about jews i mean he he was about jews he he was he thought jews were had a literal power satan so no no you know what i just don't like i don't like this view that many of my leftist critics are trying to do which was trying to say haas is replacing the five heads of marxism leninism with heidegger and schmidt and nick land and all these thinkers i regard as problematic and that's you and you yourself say these are your authorities and it's complete even if it was true that i bought this delusional view that schmitt was just the protocols of zion i mean i i don't even know where to begin with that well because you haven't read it you're right i haven't read the protocols it's popular for a reason you know but the protocols was just a nonsense forgery from from nonsense french literature scattered from the french literature that it took by maurice jolie who was an associate of blanqui uh is not nonsense it's very good and it's very influenced by the the 18th so you can say the protocols draws from good literature but i can't say that heidegger and schmidt might have raised a few interesting points that we should engage with who stopped you from saying that but i'm just saying it's kind of incredible the double standard it's like so you can say the protocols has brilliance in it and stuff but i can't say heidegger does well it it's um very vitiated and what the important point about the protocols is that is how it vitiates this important work and that's the same for heidegger

Um okay, so look.

There's a reason that you have a change.

What do you think is a good political science and political theory of the state that Marxists should have?

What is our political because there's already a bourgeois political theory.

What's our political theory?

Has that been developed at all?

The theory of the state?

Marxist political theory, in terms of how we understand.

You know are we Lockeans who just believe in the social contract of ind is it methodological individualism?

Of what no, but you can get your you can first of all, there Marx wrote in his philosophy of right his uh critique very right, it's a critique.

So, where's our positive political theory as Marxists?

Because we have the experience of actual proletarian dictatorships historically, and I argue still, you maybe disagree with that.

And we have no political theory that makes sense of it.

We have no political theory in the West or even anywhere.

We have no political science.

We have no political science that is befitting of Lenin's actual political achievements and accomplishment in world history of creating a new kind of state.

We have no political theory that corresponds to that.

Why is that?

What do you mean there's no political theory?

The logic of the Leninist party and the state dictatorship that begins with the October Revolution.

Yeah.

You haven't read Stalin?

Stalin is an orthodox Marxist-Leninist.

He's synthesizing Marxism-Leninism, but he is not providing us a particular because he's participating in its creation in the first place.

Now we're okay.

There is an extent to which the Leninist party dictatorship state is a new, objectively new paradigm of statehood, which even some non-Marxist countries in the third world, for example, are adopting aspects of.

We have no political theory to understand this.

Why is that?

What about Camillio Torres Restripo?

Who?

Camilla Torres, the uh

Colombian revolutionary priest.

Okay, what what is their political theory of the state?

Well, you could find it in his book, uh, Revolutionary Priests.

And he doesn't draw from Schmidt at all?

No.

They don't draw from Schmidt.

Schmidt.

He doesn't engage with Schmidt in any way.

Oh, I see where you're going.

You want to, like, trotify.

Okay, so, like, Schmidt, you're like this sort of...

No, no, no.

I disagree with Schmidt.

I'm just saying we don't have a post-liberal political theory, and we should probably...

All right, all right, listen, listen, listen.

Did Marx engage with the physiocrats and the classical political economists?

Critically.

Okay, why can't I critically engage with Schmidt then for political theory?

Oh, where's the critique?

I already told you what the critique was.

Schmidt.

Takes from Schmidt is still chained by the same metaphysical commitments as Hobbes, which is a methodological individualism, and despite his achievement in giving recognition to difference and antagonism as an objective feature of politics, he doesn't situate that in any kind he doesn't sublate it in any kind of positive determination of state.

For example, he doesn't have Zhang Weiwei's notion of a civilization state.

He doesn't have the notion of a polarity.

He just has a kind of state built upon pure antagonism and that's it.

But no determination which situates that antagonism in a more kind of rational development.

That's my critique of Schmidt.

I for me.

My notion uh my interpretation sorry, my uh elaboration of the concept of the partisan is that the partisan is a type of subject of a new state, of a new uh uh uh of a new um

Uh how should I say um

A new type of society, even, right?

The partisan is the subject of a polarity, which is different from the bourgeois state, and it's a state that commits itself to specific outcomes and goals and determinations, five-year plans, the supremacy of the proletarian class.

It's marked by the supremacy of a particular end goal, particular content.

Whereas the bourgeois state is universalistic and formalist, right?

It's indifferent to the content of differences and determinations within society.

So for me, this is how I interpret Schmidt.

It's a way that's extremely critical of Schmidt, actually.

And it's the application, Kahina, of the logic of class struggle to the realm of politics.

That's what you're missing.

Class struggle is something within civil society.

How does that directly bear out within the realm of the political?

That's not something we can take for granted.

Lenin develops that practically through the Leninist party.

And guess who identifies that?

Schmidt.

You know, Schmidt was involved in counter-partisan operations when he was a Nazi army guy or whatever.

Schmidt was writing within the context of partisan guerrillas during the Cold War.

So he's yes from the enemy's perspective, absolutely.

Right?

But he's identifying something that we should take advantage of recognizing, right?

Which is a new type of political subject and a new type of struggle within politics.

She said she was booted.

What?

Hold on.

Let me uh no, she's still in the hello?

I'm here.

Do you hear me?

Yeah, yeah.

That was my Discord that was uh Okay, sorry, I I stopped hearing it.

So anyway, my point about Schmidt, let's talk about Schmidt for a second.

Schmidt uh

Mark Sh Schmidt did not discover uh antagonism in par politics.

Mark most there's antagonism in all the nineteenth century theories.

Yeah, but when when when did it Marx is that we prefer is uh class struggle.

We understand the struggle of classes, but it's not limited to class struggle.

Hold on, class struggle is within civil society.

How does that directly transport?

But also in politics, how is it in politics, though?

What theory do we have to render directly transparent and clear to us in clear terms of how exactly class struggle plays out in politics?

Well, it plays out differently depending on circumstances.

Okay, for example for example do you think the logic of class struggle demands that we have a different concept of the political than in bourgeois political science?

Or is the same notion of the political within which we are understanding class struggle?

As an academic abstraction and to the majority of the Soviet state was the Soviet state does the Soviet state satisfy the criterion of a

of a of the classical bourgeois social contract.

Uh it uh sublates.

I agree.

Does that require us to have maybe a new understanding of what the political is and what political dictatorship means in relation to democracy and so on and so on?

Or should we just should we just continue should we just continue to pretend like proletarian dictatorships aren't unconditional dictatorships of the party, which, if necessary, will suspend and circumvent all democratic formal procedures?

For example, in times of war or emergency circumstances.

Is it not important that we establish and make clear that we're not somehow compromising?

So when the Bolsheviks dissolved the Constituent Assembly, what was the response by the liberal socialists in the West?

Oh, this is the downfall of the revolution.

It's no longer legitimate because they're operating within a bourgeois notion of the political.

Is it not?

I agree.

I fundamentally agree.

But it was only possible for Stalin to actually further and deepen real responsive democracy within the Soviet Union.

And Stalin himself would agree to this insofar as he consolidated a very strong dictatorship, which was an unconditional dictatorship, which was a dictatorship that didn't need to be directly legitimated by elections in order to exist.

The Soviet dictatorship pre-existed the 1936 Constitution.

Let's remember that.

The the uh revolutionary period yeah but the it's it was very democratic, the organization of the even of the Bolsheviks, even in the worst times.

Now obviously the Bolshevik party was internally democratic, sure.

But was the Bolshevik dictatorship form would it does it satisfy the criterion of formal democracy in the bourgeois view?

Why would it what does that have to do with anything?

Formal democracy because we because because bourgeois because listen because there are clear because there are clear contradictions in liberal political science and liberal political theory, contradictions which Schmidt inadvertently at least gives expression to.

Let's even say he's a fascist thinker, right?

I don't know.

He was a Hegelian Catholic.

Schmidt, even if we disagree with his thinking, his thinking is evidence that there are contradictions within bourgeois political theory because he's trying to grapple with those very same contradictions, even if he does it in a false or incomplete way.

So Schmidt is testament to the insatisfactory nature of classical political theory.

And to that extent, it's worth engaging him to understand exactly what those contradictions are.

For example, they can't assail.

For example, I'll give you an example.

Classical bourgeois political theory can't explain or recognize the reality of polarization within society.

Why is it that society has become polarized?

Why is it that politics itself increasingly revolves around polarization?

And that's where the concept of the partisan acquires relevancy too, right?

Because the partisan is not simply a position or a determination founded upon a difference of individual opinion.

It's founded upon an unconditional fidelity to a difference, a struggle, or a conflict, right?

And Schmidt, in his notion of the partisan, his writing, The Partisan, he details this, right?

He details how the partisan is this kind of sore thumb in the midst of the universalism, the smooth space of the bourgeois state, so to speak.

It's this telluric force.

And he said, oh, this is Nazism, but what does he use as an example to describe partisanship?

Communist guerrillas and Soviet partisans that he himself was involved in fighting in World War II.

He starts with the model as the um the uh San Fedisti, the um uh this the Spanish guerrillas who were actually f fighting under the reactionary Spanish guerrillas, but then he extends it where?

They were they were uh defending their homeland but under he elides the fact that they were fighting under the British commander.

But don't you find it find it interesting that he then extends this to the Leninist party itself?

He's not a Leninist, he's not a communist, right?

So why is he doing that?

Of course he's doing that because he's uh he is uh a a master propagandist.

You think so you think Schmidt's uh writing The P uh The Partisan was just written for propagandistic purposes to demonize communists?

Not to demonize communists.

He's trying to, you know, the chapos were to call it steal their valor.

No, I think it's clear that what he was trying to do was that he was trying to come up with a political paradigm or a political theory that could sufficiently extain from his own perspective and position the new phenomena, this new phenomena within modern politics that classical political theory couldn't seem to account for, right?

So he makes it more modern by eliding the resistance to the British invasion of Ireland and other such movements.

He doesn't, he erases the whole early modern period in order to make the Spanish resistance.

So, how can I ask you a question?

How can we be Marxist-Leninists?

How can we be Marxist-Leninists trying to develop our own better Marx or Schmidt?

I'll tell you the difference here is because Schmidt will attribute liberalism to a ruse of the ruling class.

He literally says it's Satan in his glossary.

He believes it's a literal Satan that's creating a trap for everyone.

And Marx can explain liberalism very satisfyingly.

All right.

So I get it.

I get it.

I get it.

Unless we completely agree with everything Schmidt ever said, we need to totally discard him.

That's where you're coming from.

You have to at least agree with one thing he said in order to not totally discard him.

So but you don't see how that's undialectical?

That's that what about the critical perspective?

What about criticism?

Do you think Marx okay, name one thing Marx agreed with Adam Smith about completely without any qualification?

Go ahead.

Did did Marx agree he didn't agree with Adam Smith completely?

So let's discard Adam Smith from the genealogy of tracing the development of Marx's critique of political economy.

Adam Smith provided no value, no historical significance.

We don't need to engage with him.

Marx didn't even need to engage with him or mention him.

He just did it for no reason.

All we need is Marx.

That's it, right?

No, but you don't ha you don't have Adam Smith without Marx anymore.

It's too late for that.

Okay, so Marx did not need to draw from any thinkers at all, even critically.

Maybe he should have been.

So only Marx exclusively had the liberty of being able to do this.

Now we can't, right?

We can't do the same thing Marx did to thinkers that came after Marx because those thinkers committed the sin of not being Marxist when they could have been.

And because they weren't Marxists, their thinking is tainted by the intention of completely repudiating Marxism in every possible way.

And therefore, we should completely discard them and ignore them entirely.

Is that what you're saying?

Yeah.

Well, I thank you for the honesty.

But here's why I disagree.

Here's why I disagree.

Because just get it.

It's worthless.

Okay, but just because thinkers that came after Marx might have had the opportunity of reading Marx or did read Marx and did not end up with the conclusion of being Marxist doesn't mean that the entirety of their thought is tainted by a fundamental intention to reject Marxism.

You can critique them and because Kahina, you can critique them and trace precisely how their criticism of Marx was wrong, how they got it wrong, right?

You can be good faith.

You can say, well, it's not that they had this pathological, irrational fixation on rejecting Marxism.

It's that they were unable to interpret Marx correctly.

And even in the manner by which they reject Marx, you can see traces of where they go wrong.

And you can interpret the correctness of Marx himself in a new light.

That's what it means to be a non-dogmatic thinker.

Is there a single thinker?

Is there a single non-Marxist thinker after Marx's death that you regard as providing any valuable insights at all within the political

Uh politically speaking.

Absolutely.

Name one.

They're all Marx Marx Cesant, though.

They're all somehow influenced by Marx.

I mean, well, Schmidt was Junger and Schmidt were influenced by Marx as well.

So which ones were not Marxists that you regard as valuable?

I would say Mir Maria Maesse's work is pretty important.

She wrote something called Patriarchy on a World Scale.

Okay, so only when it comes to feminism do you provide some relief as far as feminists?

It's taking off from Samir Amin.

I don't know how Marxists you would.

I mean, Tebalite is basically.

So are there no non-Marxist thinkers that you believe Marxists should read and think about?

I believe Marxism is true.

I do as well.

But I'm confident.

I am so the difference between us, I am so confident in the truth of Marxism that I can even derive the truth of Marxism from non-Marxist thinkers themselves and show how actually the only grain of truth that they were coming from actually reflects.

uh actually reflects something that we can conclude is the truth of Marxism itself.

So even in the way that they reject Marxism reflects the correctness of Marxism itself.

But besides that it's your hobby, what's the point of it?

What's that?

Besides that, this is your hobby to read um because Mar because we are because as Marxists, we have a responsibility to be absolutely and ruthlessly critical toward every conceit and every position we claim to stand on from the perspective of theory, and we have a responsibility and an obligation to check our blind spots, to check, you're actually quite naive in front of these authors.

What what extra Marxist intention do you think I fucking have when it comes to reading or even thinking about Heidegger?

Why the fuck should I ever care about Heidegger beyond wanting to strengthen Marxism?

What what do you think Heidegger is like my grandfather or something?

Like I care about him beyond strengthening Marxism-Leninism in the West?

Why should I care about anyone?

What pathological attack?

You think I'm just a because this is what you think you think I'm a secret fascist and I'm a secret Nazi and Heidegger is the truth of my actual intention and where I'm coming from and that actually it's Marx that I'm trying to appropriate because I'm trying to what hijack the flourishing Western Marxist movement in the fascist direction.

Is that what you're saying?

No, what I'm saying is you're working for the Chinese Communist Party.

That's what I'm saying.

It's that simple.

Uh um but why why does the Chinese Communist Party need Heidegger through me?

Why do they need me?

Why do I need to be crucified?

Why do they need it?

Oh, that you're crucified?

You know, you look okay.

But in the West in the West, leftists are a lot of Marxists in the West, they're crucifying me on the cross of Heidegger.

Why do I why does the Chinese Communist Party need that?

I think they think it'll appeal to your audience, you know, and they're not wrong.

But I've been engaging with Heidegger's thinking at least since twenty seventeen.

Well, there you go, they've found you for that reason.

The the Communist Party of China found me.

You work in marketing.

Well, some underling recruited you.

That's my f hunch.

There you go.

If that's true, why wouldn't I just be like Hakeem and these other people that's just like a social democrat who like praises China because of, you know, whatever?

Like, why why am I taking such a specific position?

You know what shelf space is?

Huh?

Shelf space?

Like, why is there a Diet Coke and a Coke Zero and

You know, to get more shelves.

So I just want to draw before we get into China, because I think we should get into China.

It's too late.

It's now 12 o'clock for me.

We've been doing this for three hours.

But and I'm happy to talk about China.

I've been trying to talk about China.

But we can.

Yeah, I get it.

It's late for you.

We might have to reschedule.

Yeah.

We can continue tomorrow.

It's too late for because the workers are coming to my house tomorrow to fix things.

Yeah, that's fine.

Well, look, I appreciate you coming on and making the attempt to dialogue.

But again, you know, I don't think you've really shown a willingness to engage with where I'm coming from when it comes to these problematic thinkers that you're emphasizing.

You know what?

I think we should leave this to the audience.

I'm not going to even respond.

Okay.

Maybe you're right.

We'll see.

We'll see what they say.

Okay.

Okay.

All right.

Well, I will talk to you again.

We'll do this again when you have time.

Okay.

Bye.

Okay, great.

Bye-bye.

Good night.

Good night.

Alright, one last thing on the whole um Heidegger Schmidt stuff, it's like people think I'm stupid and I don't somehow know that these people were roped in and associated in their personal lives with Nazism, but you're forgetting that the German Communists did not succeed in Germany, and the onus is on us to be ruthlessly self-critical about how Communists failure allowed for the rise of Nazism.

And that means understanding where we got things wrong potentially, right?

Every strength of the enemy

Should be seized from them.

You know, and by the way, Heidegger and Schmidt were not decisive for the rise of Nazism.

But maybe if German communists in the 1920s, for example, would have adopted a new paradigm of thinking similar, not identical, but similar to the overall orientation of the German conservative revolution in the 20s before Nazism, which was a newfound appreciation and recognition, right, of the particularity of modern thinking, drawing from Leninism, anticipating socialism in one country.

Maybe the victory of Nazism could have been completely avoided.

Maybe German communists would have had more success finding a basis, a popular basis for communism in Germany among the farmers and peasants who were still a sizable force within Germany.

And by the way, who the Nazis did not even really succeed in mobilizing, they got the tacit support.

Sorry, the passive support the Nazis did.

But they could have been mobilized as a revolutionary subject, and fascism itself could have been avoided, right?

So

You know, it's lost on people.

It's like in Russia today.

They engage with all of these thinkers.

It's not because they're pro-Nazi, it's the opposite.

It's like.

You're trying to find when an enemy beats you.

You should study what the enemy was doing, first of all.

But even this wouldn't be completely accurate.

Because again, the German conservative revolution thinkers, though they cowardly and in a craven way went over to Nazism, did not provide the politi official political ideology or theory of Nazism.

But I have no uh I'm not trying to say that, you know, they're personal, they had personal honor.

They were uh far from it, okay?

I'm also, you know, Schmidt was an enemy.

He was part of the German army during World War II.

I mean, any Nazi party member who had gotten shot in the face would have deserved it, including Heidegger.

It's like, why are people why is this why is this basic

Why is this like a clear dialectical outlook lost on people?

It's like just because I think thinkers are worth engaging and responding to.

and distilling not just the rational kernel, but like

Integrating their the Marxism failed in this specific niche of thought.

So how can we as Marxists correctly respond to Heidegger?

How can we do that?

Well, the way they respond is closing their ears, not saying her in particular, but others, Nazi, Nazi, Nazi, and that's it.

That his false and problematic political commitments are somehow enough to completely discredit anything he's ever tried to say within the sphere of the intellect.

Well, sorry, this completely betrays the spirit of Marxist thinking.

Marx said dare to know, regardless of how bad these thinkers were.

They say, well, why don't you apply that to Hitler?

Because Hitler didn't, Hitler wasn't an intellectual, neither was Mussolini.

Why don't you apply that to Gentila?

Well, because Gentila didn't contribute any new insight, right?

Giovanni Gentila was just a...

Uh he was just bastardizing Hegel.

And reducing him to the kind of um

Hegel to the uh to the voluntarism of the ind uh individual, the anarchistic individual.

I don't see anything worthwhile to draw from there, right?

But for example,

Heidegger's ability to broaden the the horizon of thought beyond metaphysics.

to understand correctly the

The beginning of of Marxism.

Not only phenomenalizing it in the age of mass media and stuff, but opening up the ontological as a new way of.

regarding the whole of reality.

as the relevant kind of

I wouldn't say object, but the relevant kind of um aim of Marxism to understand rather than just the kind of Lukoxian totality, which is an unworking sublime we can do nothing with,

You know, I think it's uh a little ridiculous.

I think it's a little ridiculous.

There's a specific way in which I regard Heidegger's thinking as relevant and significant.

Um and it's precisely in opposition to Lukox.

Yeah.

Definitely the phenomenological and ontological orientation of Heidegger's thinking.

Definitely that.

Definitely that.

Definitely a rejection of the implicit metaphysical assumptions of Western Marxism.

For example, substantialism, the identification of material being with sensuous empirical tangibility.

The reduction

of objects to one sided um concepts, right?

Static concepts.

I think there's a lot of in terms of critiquing w Western metaphysical thinking, there's a lot of room there.

Anyway, um, there's a lot of other things I need to talk about, which I'll get into now.

So, guys, now we're gonna get into the start part of the stream that

Ah, I don't know how much I can devote to the whole controversy regarding Keith Woods being a fucking retard.

But I made a tweet which nuked the JQ.

I made a tweet that nuked the JQ.

It was a nuclear fucking bomb.

Okay?

The nuclear bomb I launched against the JQ, which was the obvious question.

Why is it that only the West has ever had a JQ?

Why is it that only the West has ever had the Jewish question?

There were Jews in Islamic civilizations.

There were Jews in other civilizations.

And yet the fixation and obsession on Jews was lacking.

So I I just asked that question and I provided my own explanation and they they trust me when I say from the very top of the far right uh hierarchy, influencer hierarchies, they put a fucking hit out on me because of that.

Keith Woods had to do an emergency ratio on me.

They were fucking nuked out of orbit from that fucking tweet, right?

Now uh let me let me just briefly let me just briefly respond to some fucking retards who didn't understand when I say that only the West had a Jewish question.

They said, well there's instances of anti-Jewish violence in the Islamic world too.

Do you think I'm saying that Jews were never persecuted anywhere else?

But Christians were persecuted.

Muslims were persecuted.

There's nothing exceptional in the nature of the persecution.

That's what I was trying to fucking say.

Some fucking retard was like, well, there is this Egyptian Mamluk sultan who is going to burn all of the Jews in Cairo.

And then you look it up, what he's talking about.

And he was going to burn all the Christians too.

And if you look at an Islamic history, the persecution of Jews was qualitatively the same as the persecution of Christians and other minorities, religious minorities.

So no one is saying Jews were never persecuted as a religious minority, but they were never elevated to this metaphysical status of being the fundamental problem with all of society, all of the world.

That's an exclusively Western thing.

Now, Keith Woods' retarded fucking dumbass was like, What about the Romanov Russian Empire?

Because he's historically illiterate and he doesn't know that the Romanov dynasty began at the outset with a historical period of Westernization.

And then under Catherine, they conquered the Pale.

They created the Pale settlement when they conquered the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

And they adopted the practices of Western civilization economically.

They the same role of Jews.

Given the exclu uh the exclusive almost position of usury within civil society because they were barred from land ownership, both within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and beyond and so on and so on.

And also

Adopting the western patterns of thinking.

Keith Woods is such a fucking retard.

He's like, Oh, I'm sure those peasants were just too influenced by Teutonic consciousness.

Like, you fucking Irish retard, we're not talking about consciousness, we're talking about the relationships of production that were imported from the Prussian aristocracy, which came from the West.

We're not talking simply about consciousness, we're talking about serfdom, we're talking about the role Western civilization allocated Jews almost exclusively, by the way, in terms of usury, using them as a reservoir for loans.

When kings and aristocrats and nobles couldn't get it in legitimate ways, they had it so that they got it from Jews, right?

These are all idiosyncrasies of Western civilization, though.

There's nothing fundamental.

This is my problem with JQers.

There's nothing fundamental about Jews.

It's a problem of West, the Western civilization.

Even if they say, oh, well, Jews were usurers.

By the way, this is a huge simplification.

Why?

Because the Roman church was a usurer, okay?

The various military aristocratic orders, the Knights of Malta, the Templars, whatever they were just as usurious, if not more.

The reason they expelled the Jews from England, for example, is because they were offering lower rates.

Lower rates of interest than the Roman church was.

It wasn't because everyone was engaging in usury.

The Jews were just doing it in a way that was competitive.

You see

So they mi they uh they miss that.

But even if we say, okay, Jews, their primary significance was usury, even if even if we agree with that wrong conclusion,

Only in Western civilization were they put in that position.

Why is it in the Western civilization during the Middle Ages, all other Christians banned, all other Christians genocided like the Cathars, Muslims not even allowed to fucking breathe, but only for some reason Jews are tolerated.

Why?

Because kings

needed loans to wage the wars they were doing after the Crusades and during.

They usually got it from the Roman church, but sometimes they'd keep Jews around for another reason.

So they had a relationship of hypocrisy.

And that's just as much an indictment on so-called Western civilization.

Simply blaming the Jews neglects the question of why Jews did not acquire this same role and position in non-Western civilizations, right?

So uh that really made the far right angry.

And I got some messages.

They're like, They're really out for you now.

They put a fucking hit on uh out you because of that.

'Cause I just said something that totally fucking nuked their whole shit from orbit.

By the way, what I said was the same as what Marx wrote in the Jewish question.

It's hypocrisy that's the source of the J Q.

Because basically the material realm, the economic realm, was regarded as a dirty, material, worldly realm, which has no spiritual significance.

Only the hereafter and uh the you know, heaven and whatever, the afterlife.

By the way, my fucking camera is broken.

That's another great, great thing that I have to deal with.

I don't know if my battery is fucked or what, 'cause I had a power outage yesterday.

But fuck.

Anyway, I'm going to have to deal with that.

This is total hypocrisy.

Total hypocrisy.

You know.

Anyway, um so that's the Keith Woods thing.

But anyway, let me talk about Fresh and Fit.

Let me talk about fresh and fit.

Um

And uh my debate

The camera again fucked up.

This is uh this is this is unbelievable.

You know, this is really unbelievable.

We're gonna have to.

Very uh

Yes.

So this goes into here.

Okay, so that's not the problem.

Here's the battery.

Got it.

Let me see if I could take this battery out and just blow on it or something.

I don't know.

Put it back in.

How do I fucking take this battery out?

I think it's like right here.

What a disaster, honestly.

What a fucking disaster What the fuck did I do to deserve this?

Fuck it, let's just put it back.

All right.

Um

Anyway

So, Fresh and Fit.

So, the debate I had on Fresh and Fit.

That was a fun debate, I guess.

Interesting debate.

Dump.

But uh without talking about that too much, I want to actually talk about

I want to talk about uh the the my my fun appearance with the after hours.

So that was me with all the girls.

So if uh a lot of you were confused of why I agreed to do that.

So I'll explain myself.

I would have never even imagined doing it months ago because I'm like, I want to be more professional.

I have to be more like Xi Jinping.

But then I thought to myself when I was invited, and I was like, I'm not Xi Jinping.

I'm 28 years old.

And I need some kind of way to talk to the youth of this country.

And this is what they watch.

And I need to prove that I can communicate my message in a way that's relatable and that, you know, that can be tested in this kind of very, very, very,

Vulgar environment.

I'm not better than average Americans.

We're a trashy country.

We're a vulgar, trashy country.

And if we want to be a communist party, we can't be like having our nose in the sky like Caleb Maupin or whatever and be like, I'm a no, we have to fucking we have to be Christ-like.

You know, we have to lower ourselves and not have any arrogance, not lower ourselves in terms of our dignity, but in terms of our ability to communicate and talk to people, you know?

Um, because guess what?

People watch that show, people watch this kind of content, and I thought to myself, as long as I don't demean myself in a vulgar, you know, trashy way, this can actually be good.

I can actually talk about some real issues.

So that was fun, but people were wondering why I was so uncomfortable.

Um, people were wondering why I was so uncomfortable, huh?

Well, first of all, um, it's not that I was uncomfortable, the chairs were extremely uncomfortable, so I didn't like that.

But the elephant in the room is very clear, all right?

All right, I'm still Haza, I'm still, I'm still Hazal Ghul.

I'm the same guy, I'm the same guy, and I'm human, all right.

And guess what?

A lot of discipline, it took a lot of discipline to be there and be fucking professional.

A lot of discipline.

Like, I'm sorry to tell you, a lot of those women were fine as hell.

Like, I was like, wow.

A few in particular, right?

And I'm just like, all right, sweating.

I'm like.

I got I'm the chairman of a Communist Party.

I can't be si and Zinpink can't be doing Y'all gotta understand the position I'm put in.

I literally sacrificed s being chairman of the party fucking sucks, by the way.

If this was me in my Twitch days, you would get the old Haas.

You would get a crazy Haas saying crazy things.

Um.

Running crazy.

I don't know, man.

That would be like the Zerka Royale type of Haas.

And you know what kills me?

Is it like if I was on that same energy, just being myself, I would go so fucking viral.

I would be so beloved and go so fucking viral.

But I can't do it because I'm responsible to the party.

That just goes to show how fucking selfless I am.

I could grow my personal career so fucking easily just being my damn self.

But I decided to be your chairman.

And be professional.

And be like Xi Jinping.

But uh, no, lot of temptation.

Lot of temptation, man.

I'm gonna be real.

Lot of temptation.

And I reined it in, I had the discipline.

You know, I had the discipline.

You know, I because here's the thing: it's like, in the interest of content, in the interest of being charismatic and being funny and whatever, like, I was about, I could have said some outrageous shit, just like on the Zerka Royales, when I was talking to the women on those panels back in the day, and it's like.

You know

I didn't do it because I was like, I'm chairman of this party and I got to be disciplined and professional.

I can't be looking trashy.

Uh pull a fidel.

Well that's like a private thing.

You can't do that in public.

You can't do that in public.

You know?

Uh, Myron made them all leave at the end.

Um, listen.

You know, I was being politically correct straight up.

And that's why I was uncomfortable in a way.

Not uncomfortable, but tense.

When I have to be professional and politically correct in that environment, a lot of tens.

Lot of tension.

Because it's not naturally how I am.

You're like, well, that's fake, Kaz.

That's fake.

Well, it's called being an adult and being professional, straight up.

But it's like, you guys need to understand, I'm still a human being.

Like, I'm still a damn human being.

All right?

I'm still a human being.

I mean, I still got that dog in me, basically, you know?

But I got to rein it in and be disciplined because I have a responsibility now that I didn't have before.

I have a responsibility now that I didn't have before.

So it's like

I'm just saying, that's an example, guys.

It's not that I'm trying to be boring for you.

It's just like this is a new era.

You know, I'm going to Russia and China and shit.

They can't see me being a crazy wild animal like how I used to be.

Um

But uh

Yeah.

Can we get old Haw?

You will never get old Haas back.

I'm sorry.

You're never getting old Haas back.

Because, uh,.

Yeah, I mean you're never gonna get the old Haas back, straight up.

Because what would have happened?

What would have happened?

They would have clipped me and they would have canceled me and, you know, people are like, this is a chairman of a Communist Party.

And you know, they would have been right.

I'm going to be real.

Like, a chairman of a Communist Party should not be on some wild shit.

You should be prof you should you should keep it professional and keep it disciplined, you know?

But I'm still 28.

I'm still young.

I'm still a young man.

Am I?

No, I'm.

I'm still a.

Am I middle-aged?

I don't even know anymore.

28.

What's that?

I'm still a.

Still in my prime as a young man, basically.

I'm still, I'm still human.

I'm still human, you know?

I'm still human.

I'm straight up still human.

I'm still a grown-ass man.

Straight up still human.

I'm not going to sit here and lie to y'all that I'm a Gnostic, you know, monk.

And female temptation is lost on me.

It's not.

I'm still human.

I'm still human.

All right.

Um

But I also have responsibilities and discipline.

I also

It's all about discipline, straight up.

Straight up.

All about discipline, man.

Uh

You know?

But it's like it's interesting to think about.

It's like as chairman, I can't have that dog in me.

You know, I can't there's things you can do that I can't do, you know?

I can't be chasing females left and right.

Because then what happens?

Because then, I mean, I don't know.

Because it just looks unprofessional.

It looks trashy, you know?

Um

Yeah, definitely, by the way, it's not even a question.

Within the party, within the party, I consider female comrades like my sisters.

All right.

So it's not even thinkable that within the party, you know, I'm old Haas.

Definitely not.

That's where the professionalism is absolute.

Within the party, like within the party, it's like.

Y'all are my sisters, so that's gross to even think about, you know?

I'm talking about outside the party, obviously.

But even outside the party, I have to be.

I have to live my values.

I guess I have to be a trad LARPer or some shit and get married.

But um

Keena left you brain dead.

No, I'm just talking about why I appeared on the after hours, because I haven't streamed in a week.

I'm just trying to tell y'all an example of my professionalism.

Why am I telling you this?

Because I want you to emulate my good example when you're put in similar situations.

Y'all may not be on my level, but you gotta be professional.

You gotta be professional, you know?

You gotta rein in the craziness.

Remember when I was telling y'all not to be weird?

I just gave you an example of not being weird.

I gave you an example of just look how I was engaging and talking to people.

You don't have to be condescending in the sense of like.

Overly intellectual, but you should also just like not be weird.

You shouldn't cross boundaries and, you know.

start getting weird and shit, you know?

So yeah.

That's what I'm trying to say.

That's what I'm trying to get at, you know?

But like, I thought about it, I was like, oh, isn't it look so trashy that I'm like in Fresh and Fitz after hours as chairman?

I'm like, well, no, because I'm 28.

And this is a young party, in the sense that, not that it's just young people, but it's like.

We're not above anybody.

I'm not Xi Jinping.

I'm not Xi Jinping.

And you know, we need to engage with the youth of this country as trashy and vulgar and whatever as they are.

That doesn't mean we adopt that ourselves, it means we communicate.

You know, we don't close the barrier of communication.

And by the way, I was impressed.

You know, a lot of people are like, oh, Huzz, they're all trashy whores.

And it's like, well, you know what?

I remember that girl diagonal somewhere.

She was Haitian or something.

And

She was straight up woke in a good way.

She was like, Yeah, the U.S., I know what it's done to Haiti.

Kamala and Trump are the same thing.

And look what they're doing around the world.

And it's like, that's a normal person.

And it's like, you know what?

I'm sorry to tell you, but that's the American people straight up.

They're not going to, they're not perfect trad LARPers.

They're just down-to-earth normal people.

And it's like, I was impressed by how many people, how many of those women were, they had good instincts and good common sense.

Some of them were on that more PMC type of thing with pro-Ukraine and like saying that abortion matters more than foreign wars or whatever.

But it's like.

A lot of them had good common sense, and it's like, you know, I was.

My goal is like, let's bring down the hatred, let's bring down the gender wars, let's come together.

You know, as the young people of this country end these culture wars, 'cause I'm not sitting in judgment of nobody.

I'm not a I'm not gonna sit in judgment of anybody.

I'm not better than anyone, you know.

And it's like, well

Well, I mean, that's our country today, you know, straight up.

We we have nowhere to sit in judgment from.

That's the problem.

We have no seat of judgment to s cast look down on anybody.

We need to be Christ-like and we need to you know, we need to forgive.

We need to forgive.

We need to forgive.

The misguided youth

He said women shouldn't vote.

What did you think?

I don't think I really had um

There was room for input from me there because uh

I was so fucking exhausted and like we'd been going for hours and you know it was already set.

But if you want to know my view on um

Should women vote?

Um, I don't think it's impossible.

Sorry, I don't think it's possible.

For women to be excluded from modern politics.

And for that policy to ever be proposed and gain traction, this is just my opinion.

It wouldn't succeed.

It would polarize the genders even more.

And all it would do is give ammunition to Democrats.

It's unthinkable.

It's an impossible, right?

Secondly, here's another thing I think.

It's like, look, on the one hand, it's pretty outrageous that you had young women there that were straight up being like, yeah, I think that reproductive rights is a more pressing issue than World War III, than foreign wars.

So, the idea is like, oh, so they should be allowed to vote and send young men to die in battle, even how stupid and vapid they are.

But then, on the other hand, I think I'm like, well, look, Americans are fucking stupid in general.

And that's how most voters are in general.

Most voters are fucking stupid.

Women are more stupid about some things, but men are also dumb about other shit too.

This is the sham nature of American democracy in general.

We all just fucking vote on shit we don't even fucking understand based on our feelings.

Women are just more, like, it's just more explicit when it comes to them.

So like my actual solution to this problem is that we need to get rid of liberal democracy altogether.

Not strip women of the vote specifically, but strip everyone of the fucking vote.

We should not be choosing our leaders directly in votes in general.

We shouldn't be choosing what parties in power through a vote in general.

We should have a one-party dictatorship that has internal procedures of democracy that are separated from the democracy of civil society, which by the way should be stacked birthday cake style.

So locally, at a village level, should people have a say in electing their representatives at the most local possible level?

Of course they should.

And should women have a say in that?

Of course they should.

Women are involved in the village life.

Women are involved and they know what's going on.

Women have a unique perspective that is politically valuable.

Of course they do.

And it's like they should elect a representative that they feel best represents them locally.

Everyone should.

And that person should elect repr and it's birthday cake.

That's the that's proletarian democracy.

It's birthday cake stacked.

That's how the democracy in our party works too, by the way.

It's like you have the lowest level, elect the representatives, these representatives elect other representatives, and on and on it goes until it's, you know.

Less and less people.

And it's like, should women be involved in that propos process?

Sure.

The problem is that liberal democracy polarizes voters on retarded lines, such as gender war shit, where people are allowed to make the decision to prioritize abortion over fucking nuclear war.

I mean, that's to me, that's a defect of liberal democracy itself.

China doesn't have, China doesn't need to strip women of the vote because China doesn't have a political system that polarizes people along gender lines in the first place.

Women that are voting in China are voting on real issues because the way their political system is structured is that it prioritizes the most important issues being and immediate issues being rendered contentious at the most local level.

You know?

Like at a village level.

You know, women who are involved in raising children, who are living like anyone else is living in the same environments, who want clean streets and pretty much want the same thing everyone else has, why is their input not important?

Like, people, when they say strip women of the vote, the only good faith I can afford to that view is like you're thinking of like a stupid woman, a stupid woman thinking emotionally about World War III.

Like, I get that.

But.

You know, that's a problem of liberal democracy.

That's not a problem of

women being in any way participating in the process.

John Jackman.

Yeah, it's pushed on them since birth, so it's like a brainwash thing.

Like, I totally get it.

But it's like.

Like for example in a marriage

Even if men have the final say in a forward-facing way, um the decision-making process, as every man will understand, involves women big time.

It's a it's compromise in its balance.

That's how a marriage works.

It's compromise in its balance.

You know?

So there's a way to be responsive to women's perspective politically without the craziness of liberal democracy, which just empo seems to empower everyone with the ability to make retarded decisions.

Um, but that that that would have been what I would have said if I was asked my view, right?

But it's outrageous how, like, some of them were saying, like, yeah, foreign wars are less important.

It's like, well, like, you're not going to go die in those wars, you know?

So it's like.

I just think that liberal democracy is itself the problem, not

not necessarily women's participation in politics in general.

Um

But I I also think it's kind of it's a it's a it's a class distinction.

It's like, wow, you're really gonna prioritize.

She was like one of them I remember she was like, Well, I live in America.

I don't care about all these other people we're bombing.

I care about Americans' human rights.

And I'm like,

That is your Kamala voter.

Straight up like uh Chauvinism, you know, like okay, you don't fucking care about bombing other children, women and children.

That's literal Hitlerite Chauvinism right there.

And for some reason, it's given a pass because she's a liberal young woman, and I guess though that couldn't possibly be a fascist perspective, but it's like, well, it is.

It is a fascist perspective to say, you know, you don't care about other people's rights, and therefore your country can bomb them and kill them with impunity.

And it's not as much as your problem as if your abortion rights are slightly restricted from being able to abort a baby at nine months to having to do it in like the first three months or something.

See, this is why my perspective I think is valuable on a show like that.

Because I think it would really reveal it's not a man versus woman issue, it's a class issue.

It's like, yeah, the women that are like, oh yeah, all that matters are my brunch and mimosa.

Like, that's class struggle.

That's not necessarily a problem with women.

Common sense working class women don't have that fucking crazy perspective.

You know, women that are actually working class.

You know, they're just trying to get by.

Why should they be crucified on the same cross as these retarded, as Rosa Luxemburg would put it, like bourgeois women?

Why should they be treated the same?

It's not fair.

Yo, minister, what's up?

Anyway.

Anyway guys, um I think that's all for today's stream.

But good stream and I hopefully I'll be back tomorrow.

I hope you uh enjoyed the debate.

Chicago event.

We're in the final stage of locking the date down, but it's looking like the second week of October.

It's looking like the second week of October.

And.

I'm going to

I'm traveling soon this month.

So I'll keep you updated.

But uh hopefully we'll be live tomorrow as well.

Alright guys, I know it's Labor Day and I should probably stream all day.

'Cause nobody's doing anything, but guess what?

I gotta eat.

I gotta eat.

I gotta eat.

You know, I gotta eat.

I'm hungry, you know?

And uh there we go.

There we go.

See y'all later, bye bye.