Haz Debates Perspective Philosophy Round 2 Ft President Sunday as Moderator
2021-08-15
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we are joined once again by has from
infrared and lewis from prospective
philosophy to debate veganism
uh a quick reminder about format and
rules opening statements are eight
minutes long
um who goes first will be determined by
a coin toss i will warn you when you hit
five minutes so you can wrap up because
when you hit eight i will cut you dead
this will be followed by two sets of
alternating five minute responses
followed by 45 minutes of open
discussion and concluding with 20
minutes for question period hold on uh
do you think are you better if we just
do like a full open discussion
i think i think of uh open statements
and then
i i i do insist on opening statements
and at least one exchange of arguments
otherwise it just becomes a [Β __Β ] show
from go okay okay fine yeah but i'm i'm
happy to cut it short by one five
minutes
louis if it's any consideration i
haven't had a chance to prepare i got in
like
like about like well i thought that we
were starting at half ten so i thought i
was late
so i have had no chance to prepare so
like my streams watched me trying to
type [Β __Β ] down just to try my goodness
and for whatever reason i thought we
were early so
just uh
all right so we are actually oh so i was
actually late okay yeah you were
unfortunately that sounds about right
all right so this will be followed by
one set of alternating five-minute
responses uh followed by endless open
discussion and when we hit
let's say two and a half hours in we'll
end with audience questions for about 20
minutes if you have questions you need
to ask them in my chat i ask that you
mark them with an asterisk so i can find
them
uh rules of conduct are strict speaking
out of turn will result in 30 more
seconds of speaking time being a lot of
the other party
uh doesn't really matter because we're
going straight into a discussion the use
of slurs or personal abuse will be met
with an immediate ban and this applies
both to the audience and toward debaters
if either participant attempts to talk
over or challenge the moderator being
myself during this debate they will
first be muted and warned then removed i
trust all this has been made clear and
that by participating both guests have
castly agreed to the rules as just laid
out with that out of the way we will
flip a coin to see who goes first for
opening statements lewis your heads taz
your tails
tails has you go first you have eight
minutes sure yeah so i didn't actually
prepare an eight minute opening
statement but i think there's a few
things that i think
i want to cover here that i wasn't able
to cover last time because i was too
tired so the first thing in order is
that i made actually a big mistake
during the last debate because i made a
confusion i made a conflation and i was
overthinking it too much
so when i conceded that animals
thank you shin yi for the raid
appreciate it
um sorry about that
when i conceded that animals are in fact
conscious
for some reason i i was confused and i
was i thought that what he was trying to
say is that
for hegel
animals are attributed with a degree of
um
self uh it's not a sorry not a degree
they are attributed subjectivity and
selfhood and obviously that is the case
in hegel's philosophy of nature
um
he's
organism in general not just plants but
also the earth and plants
have subject uh some kind of subject
hood in relation to their own generality
that's a completely different thing than
subjectivity proper for you know
speaking subject so it's it's i confused
that for some reason with consciousness
and i thought he was trying to say that
um by the criterion that there's some
kind of similarity between um
the division between generality and
individuality that hegel establishes is
uniquely the case for animals as opposed
to plants
with
consciousness and that was a big mistake
on my part
as a matter of fact within the very
opening of hegel's philosophy of nature
it becomes very clear that hegel has a
working distinction between nature and
spirit and that animals actually fall
within
uh the category i guess it's a loaded
term philosophically of nature animals
do not participate
in spirit proper as far as hegel is
concerned now one of the reasons why
this was so confusing is because hegel
also makes it clear
that
the dialectical concept
um
which
uh
which um is interior and which emerges
only in spirit is the very thing that
legi leads the stages of the
philosophy of nature further so for
example beginning from
mathematics to inorganic physics to
organic physics the thing leading these
stages along is the very same
dialectical concept which emerges only
in spirit but that doesn't mean that
it's the same thing as the domain and
sphere of spirit proper and i think one
of the other reasons i had this
confusion because i was thinking more of
the question of the implications this
has in cosmological terms like what does
the implications of the emergence of
spirit have
or
the
fur cause like a cosmology of
spirit which i guess is the work of uh
ilienkov itself like how is it that
nature becomes the thinking
consciousness
um
so i i think i was being too generous
with perspective philosophy and
attributing him with a degree of depth
that wasn't there
um
on because he wasn't talking about that
as a matter of fact
the stage of consciousness um if you can
even call it a stage proper within
hegel's phenomenology of mind is only
meaningful from the perspective of being
an orientation a path to absolute
knowledge
consciousness
and moreover self-consciousness and
other stages
are
for hegel rather than um
necessarily existent stages
within which different kinds of beings
dwell
they are moments of the incomplete there
are moments of not only moments of
absolute knowledge
but they are also incomplete
perspectives on the question of absolute
knowledge within the history of
philosophy
and hegel makes that very clear
even the question of whether
consciousness or self-consciousness
exists as such
is by no means
by no means clear and hegel rather than
just being incomplete uh perspectives in
history philosophy so this idea that
lewis was forwarding like that oh yeah
humans belong to the middle term of
self-consciousness and animals belong to
the german it's a complete absurdity
hegel makes it very clear
also in the philosophy of nature
of the the sphere of humanity and the
sphere of spirit coincide it's one in
the same sphere like spirit begins with
humanity so
consciousness self-consciousness reason
spirit etc these are not things that you
can you know neatly box
these are not um this is not some kind
of like
cosmology within which humans only
occupy one's fear
humans are a part of every single sphere
every single one and the
the question like humans are not just
the middle term as lewis was putting it
that's a complete ridiculous
absurdity humans
uh
there
humans
all of this
phenomenology of mind is describing
humanity proper you can say that three
minutes left yeah you could say that the
different spheres represent like
different relationship
humanity has
um different relations but
to absolute knowledge i mean but
ultimately it's all humanity it's not
just the so-called middle term maybe
what he was trying to say is that
self-consciousness is the extent of
humanity s can be conceived of like as
an individual
uh and moreover not just an individual
but an unreflexive like
non-philosophical individual like the
kind of pre-moral individual of kant
even then that would be very wishy-washy
and very
ambiguous
so
um
let me think is there anything else i
wanted to get to
i have three minutes i can think about
it um
yeah in general i just think lewis
doesn't have any real grasp of hegelian
philosophy i think he's deeply confused
about what he's talking about i think
i'll just include it there
thank you very much
and uh louis you're gonna get eight
minutes
starting now
right that's great i hope you can all
hear us um so
yeah um i think it's quite funny in some
respects to kind of double back on
saying that animals are conscious
considering hegel himself actually says
animals are conscious um in the
phenomenology of spirit um he actually
says i'll find the quote if you like
he says um
what is it uh
where is it um
um
cindy and i am myself external spatial
and temporal as receptive of sensuous
intuitions i receive them from something
which is external to itself an animal
can intuit but the soul of an animal has
for its object not its soul itself but
something external it does he does not
say that animals are soulless without
consciousness who don't act into it the
world no they don't intuit themselves
that is the separation which is why they
never make it to the middle term within
the within the dialectical process which
i thought you know i was hoping you are
starting to understand and but you know
that's essentially the positive um const
the positive uh notion being represented
against nature and this is where we
start producing determinate objects and
identities from which then we can make
meaning and sense of nature and not take
it at its infinite form which seems to
prevent any knowledge of nature itself
but you know like that's that's
essentially the the hegelian dialectic
which reconciles absolute knowing in the
sense of the um well actually i mean
like let's pull up another quote like it
is fundamentally the truth of
consciousness which is being reconciled
within spirit spirit has shown itself as
the unity of soul and consciousness the
the former a simple immediate totality
and the
knowledge which is not limited by any
object and no longer stands in relation
to it but it's knowledge of the simple
neither subjective nor objective
totality spirit originates therefore not
only from its own being and for only
from its own being and relates itself to
its own determinations so spirit is
related only to itself which is the meat
which has annihilated the mediation of
self-consciousness in consciousness
consciousness as spirit no longer needs
self-consciousness it takes reality as
it is it no longer has to propose
determinate objects for example humanity
um
that's unbelievably clear i mean in the
science of logic he says um a beginning
is logical in that it is made to be the
element of a free self-contained thought
in pure knowledge it is mediated for
pure knowledge is the ultimate and
absolute truth of consciousness like i
mean i don't know how many times i have
to say this and he does say that animals
are conscious um he just says that
animals uh don't will themselves so
cannot own themselves he basically says
they are conscious but can't
you know uh contain the own their own
spirit that's just essentially that
they're not self-conscious they're
incapable of ethics so
you know they're not able to sign
contracts which i i don't think many of
us would disagree with but his inability
to reconcile consciousness and
self-consciousness because of his own
ideology is exactly what we need to talk
about
so
now that that's out the way let's move
on to really what we need to consider
within this conversation which is that
previously i outlined the ontological
commitments of hegel as consciousness
and that these commitments also have an
epistemological grounding in which
self-consciousness must reconcile as the
reconcile itself with consciousness as a
reflexive process intellective
purely reflexive on the sensuous data
that it receives from conscious
experience
without such data it would be
meaningless the experience in the world
is what grounds self-consciousness
knowledge
is not knowledge abstract but knowledge
of ourselves which
would without of without which when we
pose something like an abstract notion
of a rational man we reduce the notion
of god in hegelian philosophy to that of
a calculator or worse are still a
kantian the idealization of man has been
tested and it has been and it has
resoundly failed the hegelian position
stands to reconcile the unity of
consciousness and the self
this attempt to
um move us towards an abstract
one-sidedness is in and of itself a a um
a notion of either an unhappy
consciousness or an attempt to express
one's consumption out of fear of um of
meaninglessness so we're either trying
to consume meaninglessly rather or we
are trying to escape that
meaninglessness through an abstract
notion so you can either you can either
pick you're either someone who consumes
animals because you like the taste of
them and you can't then you're scared of
giving up your favorite foods or you do
it because you have some sort of supreme
anthropocentric motion you know you're a
christian you're a muslim or something
like that
this stands really
as a dominant ideology one which
we are supposed to see the world through
where his name could only be said to be
adam we will seek to disavow this
ideology of this uh abstract notion and
instead reconcile ourselves with
consciousness we need to confront the
monstrosity that we see in the eyes of
the animals and our own death drives as
recognizing ourselves as committing an
action of evil and injustice and
no and reconcile ourselves with our own
self-destruction so what must happen
well
so what must happen next is our act of
reconciliation with consciousness itself
the movement to consider the life and
liberty of all sentient beings and
reject abstract notions of right and
unjustified modes of consumption thank
you
thank you very much has you're going to
have five minutes to respond
yep
okay well we can hear you when we can
hear you on my i'm sorry i gotta fix my
stream though i gotta fix it okay no
worries take your time properties
default
hold on
okay i think i got it fixed i got it
fixed okay we're good perfect all right
okay let me just go we got five minutes
you got five minutes yeah okay sure
louis hegel does not say that animals
are conscious you literally just pulled
that out of your ass what you the
relevant passage you just described
proves that animals could not possibly
be conscious because consciousness takes
as its premise the very subject object
distinction which animals are not
capable of uh having
consciousness lewis is not simply um
it doesn't uh it's not simply like
the ability to intuit the ability to
have intuitions or whatever
consciousness specifically refers to
these um what an object is
for another for someone
for hegel it's very clear that animals
do not possess this which is it's
interesting and also that you keep
[Β __Β ] dodging
the point it's just like as clear as day
it is like so one-sidedly apparent
poor hegel within the very philosophy of
nature you can read the first part of
that philosophy of nature
animals belong to the domain of nature
humans belong to the domain of spirit
hegel like there's no ambiguity
whatsoever as far as that's concerned
now what you're trying to do is make it
seem like
consciousness is some kind of existence
for hegel right but in nowhere does
hegel say consciousness is an existent
consciousness for hegel represents an
incomplete perspective as far as the
quest for absolute knowledge is
concerned hegel for example talks about
the immediate consciousness
sorry of uh sense certainty right and
and the whole thing that is driving this
process along is the quest for absolute
knowledge okay
when hegel talks about consciousness
he's talking about something he's
talking about the inadequacy of
consciousness to exhaust
that's why for hegel there is actually a
moment in which consciousness
necessarily must become
self-consciousness
okay and this follows imminently hegel
doesn't say consciousness becomes
self-consciousness because of some
biological mutation
hegel says consciousness becomes
self-consciousness because the attempt
to arrive at um
the absolute knowledge
by means of uh the immediate
consciousness of objects in the world
ultimately fails and becomes inadequate
so
eventually consciousness itself as
selfhood must become such an object and
this is the stage for hegel of
self-consciousness it is so
fundamentally meaningless to say that
animals are conscious
because animals are not
like caught in this quest for absolute
knowledge whatsoever so no then the
second thing you said that it's very
clear for hegel that you said a lot of
word salad and a lot of mumbo jumbo
about self-consciousness
um hegel yeah it's very clear that
humans are the middle term no it's not
clear whatsoever hegel nowhere does
hegel state that humans are the
so-called middle term for hegel
again
the phenomenology of spirit exhausts
is is about is all humanity it's all
humanity that's participating in all of
these stages
it's all moments of human actually the
young hegelians precisely interpreted it
that way they got rid of the element of
god and we're basically just saying that
it's just a fundamentally human hegel
was secretly just saying that this was
all
man or as mark said
the conclusion of german philosophy is
that man is the highest essence for man
um i mean you could you can get rid of
you can reject that perspective and say
hegel was really talking about god and
so on and so on but animals don't figure
in it whatsoever
um
you're saying that
you're saying
yeah consciousness isn't some kind of
existent premise consciousness is a
stage of inadequacy for hegel and
nothing more now if you're talking about
consciousness as the elementary moment
of the subject object distinction
then yeah obviously consciousness has a
has great importance for hegel
but
what consciousness actually is so far as
its essence is concerned has to be taken
at the end of his philosophy not the
beginning he doesn't establish a
dogmatic premise that he remains
committed to to the very end what
consciousness actually must necessarily
be
is at the end of the phenomenology of
spirit not the beginning
you said that is clear um but nowhere is
i forgot i don't know what you said the
so-called ontological commitment you're
talking about consciousness is just
wrong you're talking out of your ass
um hegel describes the inadequacy of
consciousness and that's the whole point
i already said that now you may oppose
the so-called idealization of man as a
failed enterprise or whatever but hegel
recognizes humanity and man as the
exclusive domain of spirit it is
literally meaningless
incomprehensible and absurd
to think that the animals can belong to
this fear of spirit
all right that's a good one
you're not a hegelian okay that's it
yeah we're on time yeah sorry about that
um and louis five minutes
he just doesn't reconcile them as like
self-conscious which uh provided
evidence for because i actually quoted
herego um the the thing is is that
i think it's quite funny because you say
that hegel see it begins with the
subject object distinction no he begins
with the imminent consciousness which is
the point of self-certainty um which is
just existence itself it's infinite
which is why he starts with the
infinites and which i would like to ask
you if you could name them what are the
three infinites that exist in hegel um
if you could outline what are the
fundamental uh ontological uh
tenets of reality um
which exist within which
self-consciousness must reconcile um
because they are what we begin with
which is the whole movement like if we
already began with the subject object
distinction the movement would have
already pre would have already um
started the dialectic too soon which he
criticizes other philosophy with other
philosophers for doing he starts the
dialectic at the very beginning what
must be the case and where can we reason
from so when you say that he actually
presupposes like a dogmatic notion or
something as the first term that he's
not committed to that's ridiculous hegel
absolutely is committed to the movement
of the dialectic the terms prior were
necessary and we have imminently moved
from them to complete the dialectical
process which is the reconciliation of
the first term and the sec and the
middle terms in spirit it's it's the way
reason works hegel's not like
obstructing a new rational schemata
where he's just totally revolutionizing
the way people think he's actually
taking something which was proposed in
many ways by plato and aristotle and
and renewing it for a modern time and
showing how it actually develops over
time like the notion of consciousness as
as its imminency is stagnant the motion
of the middle terms is
self-consciousness and is infinite and
he says that as much the infinite middle
term which is self-consciousness and
that is on um
um i think on abs in the phenomenology
of spirit and absolute right
um the reality of the situation is like
to say that the ontological commitments
of hegel are not to self or not to
consciousness and purely
self-consciousness totally misses the
value of self-consciousness
self-consciousness is to remove the
negativity that exists that the purely
negative motion that exists in
consciousness in which we are subject to
all of the pains of nature and never
actually able to express our drives we
are we're existing in a way that's
purely impulsive in a way that is
damaging and so seek to free ourselves
it is a is an imminent movement because
we are in pain and that pain drives us
onwards
it's not that we have already started
with the intellectual like the uh
introspective necessary conditions to
work out what we must know because that
would be the kantian position that would
be like all right well we already have
what we need to know uh everything about
absolute knowledge and truth and so we
can just enter it into a calculator into
our boop boop categorical imperative
there we go no that's not how it works
the reality of the situation is that we
are analyzing the drives that are being
mediated through society these drives
are necessary for hegel and they exist
in consciousness and that's what society
is mediating in terms of absolute right
in at the point of absolute right there
is no confliction in the system of
drives now hegel says that as being
purely anthropocentric of course he does
he was writing 300 years ago it is
absolutely odd when people were even
non-racist 300 years ago and you said
you said yourself hegel is you know
fairly conservative as an individual
that that's not surprising but looking
at hegelian philosophy through the lens
of what did hegel think would be
dogmatism and historicism
works you don't go hegel thought um x y
and zed and then seek to prove his
conclusions you take the hegelian method
you take the ways in which he understood
the world and then you apply it to the
problems that we have and that is what
contemporary hergelians do which is why
we don't seem to be reckoning uh trying
to promote some sort of monarchy for
some reason it's almost as if it had
everything to do with him living in
prussia like the the like oh my god like
anyway the
the whole point of this scenario is to
reconcile that consciousness must
reconcile itself with itself that is the
whole that is the mandate in spirit when
spirit has done that then spirit is free
now i give you four quotes i think
there's a four or three quotes
explaining that now
i ask you the question what are the
three infinite tenants which are the
onlogical foundations for hegel the
three infinites
in hegel
all right thank you next time yeah so
okay and uh by request we're gonna move
into open discussion um for the audience
if you want to ask questions um i cannot
see them unless they're in my chat
you're gonna have to come in here and
put them into my chat i ask that you put
an asterisk on both sides of it so i can
identify it quickly and we'll try and go
through as many as possible in the last
20 minutes we're gonna go for about an
hour if we're both okay with that
um so uh
yeah guys take it away
so luis i'm actually not gonna entertain
your like little attempt to quiz me or
whatever because you're not the teacher
in this scenario you're my student as
proven by your actual like cause you
don't know you're avoiding the question
okay so you're randomly going to like
quiz me on random [Β __Β ]
is
he's allowed to interrupt me like this
because i can interrupt too
i could be way more unpleasant than you
louis we don't want to play this game do
you guys little boy don't play this game
with me louis don't play these gorilla
games with me little boy louis
lewis seconds then lewis go lewis you
failed to actually i have a lot to i
have to respond to a lot of this [Β __Β ] he
said i might only get 30 seconds
you got 10 seconds until he's allowed to
interrupt okay yeah louis
you you haven't [Β __Β ] demonstrated the
relevance of the three uh infinites
according to hegel as far as the actual
point under contention was concerned the
point under contention being you talked
about the imminent oh no higgle doesn't
begin with the division of subject of
object well you're just [Β __Β ] putting
words in my mouth what i'm trying to say
is that consciousness beginning with
consciousness imminent or otherwise
implies some kind of fundamental
division between subject and object
there is no consciousness without that
division now i didn't say hegel my
[Β __Β ] point was hegel doesn't
establish a dogmatic premise that he
maintains his commitment to
um as far as the ontological commitment
to consciousness is concerned which is
what we're beginning with
the actual content the being of
consciousness is something that hegel
develops through the course of the
phenomenology you do not first establish
the ontological significance of
consciousness and then begin from there
that's not the nature of hegel's uh
thinking and it's not his method and
it's not how his system worked
now your thing about um
nothing uh hegel lived 300 years ago
yeah but here's the difference hegel had
a very rigorous distinction between
nature and spirit and therefore and he
also had a rigorous description of what
he considered animals and the way in
which animals were different from humans
you nothing has changed to justify a
difference as far as
how you can reconcile hegel's underlying
method in his system with the others you
talk a lot about you talk a lot of
gibberish and word salad okay has i'm
going to stop you there louis do you
want to respond
well i mean like to be entirely honest
with you i'm a little bit sad that you
you're not going to answer the question
because i think it is fundamentally
important since it is the ontology from
which hegel's building everything from i
mean i can answer it if you like but
what whatever and if you want to ask me
a question on hegel you you're very
welcome to to be entirely honest with
you you can quizzes
you're the one who needs education here
well i'm happy i'm happy to answer any
question you like but the thing is is
that um
when we look at the determinate objects
at the production of the determinant
objects in hegel um
and that you know in terms of the first
subject object distinction that's not
where he begins the
the phenomenology of spirit it begins at
the imminency of consciousness which is
essentially the end of the season you
know well yeah okay well then i'm just
making it clear
but it implies a subject object
distinction
let him finish this point ten seconds
lewis then he can interrupt go um quite
the opposite it doesn't it doesn't um it
doesn't imply a subject object
distinction it actually implies the
infinite subject that that's the issue
it implies the infinite being until we
start to reconcile ourselves and destroy
nature and replace it with the notion um
or a concept and then the reconciliation
of that notion
and the and reality is the concept
itself when he says the concept or like
spirit um you're right in saying that
the truth of spirit um isn't is not like
in nature it's not like we we don't like
you know we don't have ethical knowledge
like like imbued within us um at least
it's not knowledge in us it's the
grounds for knowledge it's the grounds
for truth which is why hegel points
towards um
um the the the law within me
um as well okay
but he doesn't say it but he doesn't say
that it's like he doesn't say
specifically that the
okay he doesn't say specifically that we
have knowledge in nature or something
inherently can we walk back what you
just said though you just said that
hegel believe it begins with the
imminent consciousness which is infinite
subjectivity okay and then you said uh
it's before we have to destroy nature
wait a second we don't do anything uh
lewis it all follows imminently from the
nature of consciousness itself that the
division between subject and object
so yes consciousness does imply the
division of subject and objectives
but i will say it doesn't if we do
something like i think that you know we
don't do anything voluntarily it's
complete nonsense what are you even
talking about is not a determinist hegel
is not a determinant you're saying that
we begin with the infinite consciousness
and then we voluntarily uh destroy
nature and create the division of the
world
in the words of hegel the substance is
separated through action everything is a
moment of will
like there is but that doesn't make it
voluntary you're here hang on one of the
times
the will it is sorry it is the will the
will figures in his ontology
the will isn't
from whatever finishes
lewis go
um i was just saying that we are the
will that when our when we are acting we
are manifestations of the will the will
is not separate from being
i completely agree which is why when we
are truly free it's in spirit itself
which is the reconciliation of will with
uh with itself but spirit reveals the
truth of consciousness and if it reveals
the truth of consciousness the truth is
that being entails
uh the will the will is part of being
and that therefore the subject object
distinction is implied by consciousness
it's not that the will is part of being
it's that the will is being that all
there is is will like that like it's not
to say that like so when we talk about
what hegel is seeing as the foundation
it's he wouldn't see a consciousness as
something which is in it it's not
non-active okay how does objectivity
arise according to hegel
how does objectivity arise well we would
get it through the through the negative
process of um
well through self-conscious mediation
so uh the master slave dialect okay okay
where does that come from ontologically
ontologically speaking where does that
latent potentiality come from
um is it something outside of being or
is it something imminent to being itself
nothing nothing's outside okay so let's
let's shut the [Β __Β ] up and stop saying
that hagel doesn't begin with an object
subject distinction implied by
consciousness all right
lewis respond yeah so nothing's outside
of being as becoming i mean that's like
that's obvious that's saying that
there's something outside of existence
the existence it'll be like what's
outside of existence
like non-existence like it doesn't make
sense like the the point of what hegel's
saying
is that the the
the there are a few things actually this
is why
i said what are the three infinites
because it's the three onological
infinites that are the foundations for
this process okay
now you can respond okay oh okay unless
he wants his outline do you want to say
louis it's not relevant because me
saying consciousness implies a subject
object distinction
is 100 correct
it's as simple as that
wait sorry say that again
me saying that consciousness implies a
division between subject and object net
for a being to possess consciousness it
must be able to differentiate it must
participate in a subject object
distinction it must be able to be
cognizant of objects to be conscious of
some kind of content that is 100 percent
true you contested it by talking about a
lot of gibberish and word salad and i
had to reign you in and now it seems
like you're conceding on the point no um
i i would 100 percent say that the
the subject object distinction is
actually a product of language i mean
this isn't even just in hegel we could
go to heidi consciousness is presupposes
language for hegel
consciousness presupposes language
yes a conscious being is a being that
possesses language
yes it does yes
yes implies language and presupposes the
elementary subject object distinction uh
proper to language there is no conscious
being that does not possess language
according to hegel because the necessary
mediation
of um arriving at what an object is for
another for some kind of subject relies
upon and implies language and the
mediation of um their natural world or
whatever the real world by language so
yes consciousness implies language like
i said you don't seem to [Β __Β ]
understand
as you responded louis you got to
respond now so that's fundamentally
false i mean if you look at where he
says determinate objects come from
because he still he starts with the
infinites in two two respects i mean you
can look at the
um the three infinites which he poses as
um within spirit and then you can look
which you know maps very well onto
notions of them the trinity by the way
um so when you look at like in its
allegorical like another thing
about the three infinites name what's
relevant
wasn't it was relevant
the mediation between the self and the
other is how we understand matter and
and our understanding of the other is
mediated through manner and our
understanding of self is mediated
through both of them like it is a unity
which when separated becomes incapable
of producing knowledge so who was
separating anything why when when did i
separate this uni
this is
use what one because the inconsideration
of otherness within um consciousness
would be the separation there i would
argue what are you talking about i'm the
one you're the one who's trying to say
that consciousness is some kind of
infinite subjectivity and that's all it
is no i never said conscious i said that
consciousness at the at the very
beginning of the dialectic consciousness
is the infinite we begin with and then
we produce determinate objects for
anything how do you produce determinant
objects okay through negation and where
does the
so consciousness does not imply the
negation the negation comes from
something else yeah i know that's what
i'm saying so no there is no way we
could have had language because to have
language is to imply negation to go this
and not that yeah there's a very famous
quote by blonsho where he says for me to
be able to say this woman i must take
her flesh and blood reality away from
her destroy her the whole point of
giving a name to something you are
trying to hang on
finish then has respond go yeah so the
whole point in naming something is to
give a determinate existence to say that
it is not the infinite immediacy of
consciousness but a single entity in
itself and that is an act of language
which is not presupposed in the
imminency of consciousness
that language cannot actually name
particulars so you don't know what
you're talking about in that regard
secondly
like i said you're trying to make it
seem like hegel is trying to say
ontologically speaking consciousness as
the imminent consciousness and infinite
subjectivity that is not imminently
already entangled with the three uh two
other infinites that give rise to the
possibility of objectivity and therefore
subject objects distinction you're
trying to make it seem like hegel is
trying to say the infinite subjectivity
isn't existent and it's not it's just a
useful way
it's just something hegel is sets up
to uh to make it uh
it's something useful for hegel to
expound upon
the relationship between consciousness
and the world but insofar as
consciousness is taken as an existent as
something which beings possess
i think
as something that beings possess it
necessarily implies a distinction
between subject and object how could a
being possess consciousness
without
without that implying a division between
subject and consciousness no determinant
being whatsoever could possess
consciousness the infinite the imminence
i'm going to learn
now lewis the imminent consciousness
you're talking about is not a
determinate being it's not an it doesn't
it's not something that exists in
reality okay lewis respond
so the imminent consciousness is reality
and i think you misspoke then i'll give
you the benefit of the doubt i don't
think you meant um between consciousness
and the world you meant between uh
consciousness and itself because
consciousness is the world right you're
he's an absolute idealist like there is
no separation between consciousness it's
being in like we are design right um
like so like the world we are the world
this is the difference so we have the
world in its determinateness we have the
world in its otherness and we have the
world in itself which is the three
infinites
right okay
listen listen listen otherness
otherness means it's the relationship
between consciousness and it's uh
i don't know if i would say apparent or
it's opposite which is in fact yes for
hegel ultimately a moment of itself but
that's what i'm talking about yeah and
the consciousness of otherness exists in
what
the consciousness of otherness exists in
what
what does it exist in
what are you asking like what does it
present how does it present itself to
consciousness how does it determinate
way
but in
what does what are we presented with
as as the other
what is what is what is being presented
there
what can you get to your point what are
you trying to ask
we are being presented with a
manifestation of will
the the separation between self and self
other and and uh determinateness is that
a rock doesn't have a will but another
individual has the mediation between the
self and the other is what allows us to
construct determinate objects because
they're the only active participants
within within substance a conscious
being
implies a being
cognizant or
participating in a division between
subject and object consciousness implies
the division of subject and object no it
doesn't yes no it doesn't it doesn't it
doesn't do that for hegel and it doesn't
even do that why doesn't it explain
um because hegel doesn't start at the
point of he already starts prior to the
subject what does that have to do with
where he starts consciousness ultimately
implies a division
let him finish his thoughts
because if the chapter starts at
consciousness and then he outlines
consciousness and then outlines how
objects are then formed from
consciousness
later on
he's not saying that we start with a
subject object distinction you you
[Β __Β ] up the whole thing in hegel's
beginnings yes in the beginning chapter
of consciousness hegel
he does imply the existence of objects
it's just that objects are given they
are given to consciousness
have you even [Β __Β ] read the book dude
what are you saying you're saying
objects don't exist until the second
chapter let's take it down a bit no no
no i'm not saying that objects don't
exist until the second chapter i'm
saying objects
i'm saying the first movement in hegel
is not um is not the production of the
object subject division it's the
beginning of the immediate infinite okay
which doesn't he doesn't explain how the
division
let him finish his thoughts so we like
have a coherent conversation here keep
going
which is why in the phenomenology of
spirit he describes either being and
nothingness as either a room of bright
white light uh infinitely bright or
infinitely dark there's no difference
because there's no determination there
must be a combination between being and
nothingness which is being reconciled
within consciousness which allows us to
produce determinate objects we are the
production of objects and not we do not
find ourselves
okay okay lewis let has responded
babbling louis it's very simple
he may not arrive at in the first
chapter how precisely the division is
engendered but that is different from
saying the division isn't implied the
division is [Β __Β ] implied in the first
chapter because objects for hegel are
the
it is the immediate object of
consciousness is objects in the world
that relate to consciousness in an
immediate
uh in an immediate way according to
these uh philosophical perspectives he's
critiquing hegel says obviously that
such an immediate consciousness is not
even possible and he critiques the
possibility of a real immediate
consciousness like i said there's a
reason why chapter one leads to chapter
two because of the inadequacy of chapter
one and being able to actually arrive at
a at the point of real absolute
knowledge but the division between
subject and shut up the division between
object and subject in the first chapter
is [Β __Β ] implied okay that's if you if
you don't know this you haven't read the
book
okay i don't i don't like what i'll say
is that the first the whole point of the
first chapter is to show that the that
the wills engagement with reality is an
engagement with itself from which it
seeks to satisfy itself it is the
attempt to self-satisfaction which
produces the subject objective
we produce the subject object divide in
an attempt to satisfy ourselves and find
it inadequate so then move to
self-consciousness okay okay guys
hey guys both of you hey i will meet you
let's bring this back to the question at
hand how does this bear on the veganism
debate
okay
he's a fake hegelian i want to press him
on this because
so what that it that this is what
endangers the division between subject
and object for hegel consciousness
implies such a division
consciousness first does not imply such
a division the reason that it's relevant
for the veganism debate is because he's
trying to say that self-consciousness
would be necessary or like the subject
object distinction would be necessary
for the consideration of consciousness
uh simplicity i would have to i'd have
to imply you don't
understand about self-consciousness this
is how the is how heavily elaborate how
the distinction is endangered it doesn't
mean
let him finish his statement and then
you can go
so
the whole point in hegel is the
mediation of the will they attempt to
produce a world from which it can
satisfy itself if the subject object
distinction was already presupposed this
would already imply that they had the
world um in a way which is mediated but
they seek mediation it's the constant
drive for mediation that moves
consciousness to self-consciousness yeah
thank you
no yeah but here's the thing uh louis
it's not such a drive that leads it to
this for hegel the conclusion is already
implied at the premise it's just
developed at the end when you get to the
end of his [Β __Β ] book all of that is
already there in the beginning that's
what you don't [Β __Β ] understand that's
why you're not a hegelian and you don't
understand dialectics
yes it is there at the beginning it
develops at the end you learn the truth
of what's at the beginning at the end
that is so elementary to hegelian
dialectics how the [Β __Β ] do you call
yourself
doesn't begin
with a [Β __Β ] dogmatic premise and then
builds from the premise
reveals the truth of
the beginning i i completely agree that
it is the reconciliation of
consciousness with itself which i've
been arguing this entire time and that
doesn't imply the subject object
division in hegel and even in the even
in his um successors i mean let's take
someone who is very much inspired by
hegel like heidiger when we take you
know being in the world and the
production of language and determinate
objects is one of the existential
structures of design from which we must
analyze so when we find ourselves in
this throne-ness and find ourselves with
subject-object distinctions when we when
we
in every single sub-section of the first
chapter a subject object distinction is
operative and every single one
objects are given to the immediate
consciousness that is what hagel is
saying hegel is talking about why
consciousness is imminently inadequate
he is not saying consciousness is some
kind of discrete stage he's saying that
consciousness is almost a kind of
perspective philosophers have had which
is ultimately inadequate to satisfy
the um the need for absolute knowledge
which is the whole [Β __Β ] reason why he
wrote the book in the first place to
actually satisfy what it would mean to
have absolute knowledge and hegel is
saying consciousness
let them finish something you can
respond lewis keep going consciousness
as something um he hego if hegel begins
with consciousness he does it's he's not
saying that this is like the the
structure of creation like this is where
god first created the world and then it
developed like that okay that is not the
structure of his book you're not a real
gun you literally
have such a reason okay hang on okay
okay okay thank you has and lewis can
you reply like like fighting straw man
is really not doing you any any good
mate like i've rec i have outlined my
position time and time again if you
can't understand it then i suggest
either a reader's guide to the
phenomenology of spirit perspective okay
i'll break down your position
let him finish his response and then
i'll let you go but the argument that
i'm making isn't controversial and it's
not something that even struggles to
reconcile itself within spirit the will
is willing itself towards spirit now you
say that like the truth of spirit
already exists in consciousness i mean
yeah in the sense that it's unmediated
and um like without um
without determination but that precisely
is why it's inadequate which is why we
move through like so i don't see why
that's necessarily relevant except for
in relevance to my position which is the
consideration because it implies the
distinctions there from the beginning
try to be concise okay yeah so which is
the consideration of the ontology of
consciousness which exists within
animals as well as humans okay this
first of all first of all before we even
get to that stupid [Β __Β ] thing you
just said which directly contradicts
hegel's views that it exists in animals
louis i know your posit your position is
crystal clear and you haven't the the
issue here louis is you're not
responding to anything i'm saying in
response to your position like an npc
you just keep saying the same [Β __Β ] you
said before without addressing what i
the points i'm trying to raise hegel
begins with consciousness he doesn't
actually establish within the first
chapter how the subject object
distinction comes to be maybe but that
distinction is implied by consciousness
itself okay you don't understand the
difference between these two do two
different things there is a difference
between hegel elaborating how the
subject object distinction comes into
being and whether or not it is already
implied and already there from the
beginning hegel is a dialetician he
begins from a perspective of a radical
difference a radical discontinuity a
radical contradiction uh i know some
hegelians take issue with that but
whatever you get the [Β __Β ] point and
that is always implied from the
beginning
hegel you have a fundamentally
undialectical understanding of the
phenomenology of mind if hegel begins
the writing of the phenomenology of mind
somewhere that doesn't mean he's
actually
beginning ontologically the actual
ontological beginning is revealed at the
end the nature of the the essence of
what was at the beginning is only
revealed at the end okay the essence of
consciousness for example what
consciousness actually is
um as consciousness ontologically that's
something that's revealed at the end of
his book not at the beginning okay the
that is the thing that drives the
process along that you're talking about
is precisely something that was always
already there that's why for hegel
absolute consciousness follows
necessarily
um sorry absolute knowledge follows
necessarily
um
these are all moments in its being
yeah so i'm just going to say that the
subject object distinction is certainly
not implied i mean that's the whole
point of the hegelian schemata i mean
let's be honest like the whole point of
consciousness developing to terminate
objects is an attempt to satisfy you're
an npc npc
so the reason that we move to
self-consciousness is because the the
desire to satisfy ourselves within the
world has been frustrated by the um by
the existence of the other we see
something which is monstrous to us a
will which resists you treated and saw
satisfaction so the negative force which
moves the dialectic is the frustration
of the will itself which yes it is you
read the first chapter has has you had
time lewis finish your thought please
yeah so the negative force of the
dialectic which is moving us from
negation and negation is the frustration
of the will attempting to satisfy itself
in the world and that's why he moves
between hedonistic self-satisfaction and
abstract notions of lewis lewis let me
break it down for you very clearly very
concisely okay at this point if you
don't respond i'm gonna assume you're an
npc let's break it down like this
we're gonna go yes or no in the
beginning the first chapter does hegel
speak of objects for the immediate
consciousness
in the world
doesn't speak about objects
he speaks about objects not for the
immediate consciousness
he does not speak about the givenness of
objects for the immediate consciousness
no he talks about the determination of
con objects which are which are in the
first chapter
yeah we determine so he talks about
objects objects are in the first chapter
he does talk about objects yes in the
first chapter
it's the givenness of objects for the
immediate conscious hegel um
rebukes the view of the given obviously
he shares that with kant but that is
what he talks about in the first chapter
he doesn't actually believe they are
just given
but he's not describing how they
actually come to be and how they're
endangered but hegel speaks about the
fact that in he's talking about the
stages of philosophy in consciousness it
appears to us at the very least it
appears to us that there are objects
given already to consciousness now
the issue
that's what it appears that's what it
appears as it's not the case hegel
taught hegel is trying to explain why
philosophers before him were beginning
from that perspective empiricism and so
on and so on now
what the issue for hegel is not that
the issue is the will
satisfying itself
itself
okay
what it actually is rather than uh these
various objects in the world which hegel
will
obviously elaborate
um
instantiate the will's uh
self for itself
hegel is still saying that at the
beginning
there are objects now how are there
objects is a different question he
elaborates that later but in the
beginning consciousness does imply a
division between subject and object
division okay
we're going to let's respond now okay
louis go
okay that that's actually like look i
can understand why you would make that
mistake but no that the rejection of
send certainty comes precisely from the
lack of sense certainty we can have we
do not have determinants i know lewis
did you listen to what happens
he's wasting time did you listen to what
i [Β __Β ] said
i did listen to what you said which is
why i'm responding yeah obviously they
don't satisfy actually
right now
okay great so essentially like the way
that self-consciousness works like well
before we move to self-consciousness the
way the consciousness works is
self-satisfaction so the production of
determinate objects it comes as a given
in order to satisfy a one-sided will
it's dogmatic and inadequate but it's
still produced from an action of
consciousness because everything is in
motion remember that
it's not an i it's not like a stagnant
thing where we get presented an object
we produce objects to satisfy ourselves
that's the whole point and it's about
the production of the right objects to
satisfy ourselves how we objectify the
world is the question in hegel am i
unmuted now you are on muted now okay
louis
you just admitted just now that in the
beginning chapter
objects where you're saying they are
produced for consciousness in the
consciousness quest for
self-satisfaction
so consciousness does imply a division
between subject and object
no the consciousness implies a desire
for the division between subject and
object but no that division between
subject and object is established by
consciousness
consciousness establishes it
it's it's something that consciousness
seeks to establish not just it does
establish it it doesn't it's not
that's the whole point because the the
the me the reconciliation of the world
with itself like lewis can you respond i
want to go hang on hang on hang on
let him finish his sentence lewis
finisher thought then has
the reconciliation of the world with
itself is the destruction of the subject
object distinction we no longer need it
the will is purely in tune with the
world around it it understands itself as
the world okay louis thank you
okay perspective philosophy you're
trying to obfuscate the question i'm
gonna get to the meat and potatoes and
just see if you can respond to this okay
just see if you can respond to this
poor hegel hegel obviously says that the
perspective of consciousness is not
enough to actually exhaust how
the subject object distinction
is arrived at we cannot solely through
consciousness arrive at the distinction
between subject and object but despite
the inadequacy of consciousness alone in
being able to arrive at this
it is that distinction is still there
and operative and that is precisely why
consciousness is inadequate the
distinction is there even if
consciousness is inadequate
um to understand it
you have not uh made it clear you have
not proven you have not demonstrated you
actually are aware of this distinction
that i'm trying to [Β __Β ] point you to
can you please address this point i'm
raising there's a distinction between
the how and the is
okay okay
has no interruption when he responds
this time okay
the is
right which would be being itself and
that's something that happened way
before
hegel by the way this is this goes right
back to paramedics right although hegel
would see this as an as an infinite
negative and not infinite positive
is an infinite nonetheless
it does not have form
the positing of essence
is an action
within consciousness
that's the point
lewis
am i unmuted
you are admitted i'm not muting you
except when you talk over last time or
the last time lewis
consciousness
inadequately
attempts to seek knowledge
of a division already set before it
a fundamental distinction between
subject and object which is implied by
consciousness for hegel because for
hegel consciousness seeks to arrive and
explain
the objects given before it
or that it believes to be given before
it which are not in fact given but in
fact endangered by consciousness itself
yes
hegel makes that very clear
you outlining some one-sided um ontology
which in no way is could possibly be
hegelian because for hegel
there um
the implications of absolute knowledge
are implications for
being in other words for the nature of
being itself from the start hegel
doesn't say we begin from some kind of
um
we begin from some kind of one-sided
being and then voluntarily by means of
philosophy
add add more to it philosophy itself
participates in being for hegel so that
distinction you're drawing is completely
false
or hegel consciousness implies a
division of subject and object even if
consciousness like we're going in
circles do you
can you please demonstrate you even
understand what i'm trying to say
even if consciousness is inadequate the
stage of the so-called stage of
consciousness is inadequate to
comprehend how the division
that is the very object of consciousness
is uh
is possible to know
that division is still there and implied
by consciousness itself because
consciousness implies a radical
contradiction or discontinuity at the
heart of being itself otherwise there
would be no consciousness only a
one-sided being okay has it's on record
now that your charge is that he's a fake
alien i'm going to let lewis respond to
that and then we're going to drop that
charge going forward okay we're just
going to talk about the the subject
matter at hand
lewis please respond
okay so like colin is a fake agent i
think it's just ridiculous i mean like
one not not because i've actually
outlined hegel i would argue in a way
that was more complete than you and you
you won't actually answer my questions
on hegel and i will answer any questions
on hegel and when i do except the ones i
did hang on let them respond and when i
do and so you just find the answer not
your liking and so you did you you know
you get mad but the i mean like look
like even at the start of like um
at the start of uh consciousness like
the the like the beginning
of the of the dialectical process is a
pure here and now it is a universal unit
of experience it is
this
this absolute
presence
that's all it is to go
this and that
is the next movement
right which isn't the next chapter he
does quite a few movements in a chapter
it's and which is my self-consciousness
is a huge bit of the book like
the next movement is at this end of that
it's going you know this is a bottle
that is a microphone that is the object
yeah that's the next movement which is
the proposal of objects against the
subject but prior to that that
distinction does not exist and even
before and he even says yes it does
because of its concrete contents sense
certainty imminently appears as the
richest kind of knowledge indeed a no a
knowledge of infinite wealth for which
no bounds can be found either when we
reach out into space and time which is
dispersed or whether we take this bit of
wealth and the division enter into and
enter into it right okay now
i'm just gonna cut you off i'm just
gonna cut you off there louis because
we're we're running a bit long on that
response um i want to bring this back to
again for the sake of clarity for the
audience and for ourselves um what are
the actual stakes here we're debating
the a particular reading of hegel um ad
nauseam
what are the stakes why does this work
it's about whether animals could be
possibly be conscious according to hegel
which um i would argue i've already
established no you haven't you've quoted
all you do is quote [Β __Β ] without proving
how it supports your [Β __Β ] conclusions
i've actually give i'm not disputing no
you didn't your quotation about how
hegel says animals are conscious he
didn't say they're conscious though he
didn't louis respond but
one he does say that animals are
conscious he just show me the [Β __Β ]
quote show me what he says has let louis
respond okay wait a minute just wait
right there you want us to get some
quotes for for here you go on animals so
no no no i want a quote that proves
hegel thinks animals are conscious
despite what he said in the philosophy
of nature that there's a distinction
between spirit and nature
animals are in possession of themselves
their soul is in possession of their
body but they have no right to life
because they do not will it
hegel does not agree that animals have a
right to life how are they conscious by
that quote
animals are in possession of themselves
their soul is in a possession of their
body it doesn't go rocks are in a
possession of themselves okay but how
does it prove they're conscious all
vegetables of vegetables are in a sense
also
hang on the question hang on has so for
clarification the question originally
concerned whether or not hegel regarded
animals as consciousness but how does
this prove their conscious these are two
separate questions so you can pick one
to ask lewis no no i'm asking him how
does that prove hegel thinks they're
conscious is my question okay so that's
the one go lewis
okay because hegel proposes a soul or a
foundational spirit that exists in the
animal which has not itself as its
object but only its externality it is
only direct relationship with the world
where it seeks satisfaction it's at the
place we start quote the relevant quote
one more time i'm going to show you why
you're wrong
okay um so animals are in possession of
themselves their soul is in possession
of their body
their soul is in possession of their
body does hegel say that animals are in
possession of their soul
um they have no right to life because
they do not will it so they are not in
possession of themselves they are not
okay animals are not in possession of
their soul their soul is in possession
of their body right
yes you think what do you think now
since you know so much about hegel what
would hegel say about vegetables
in regards to the nature of their uh
soul
well actually i can quote that um
um but only because he's uh horribly
sexist
um
at one point um where he says men
correspond to animals while women while
women correspond to plants because their
development is more placid and their
principle and uh underlies a vague unity
of feeling so like the way that he takes
um and this is really a byproduct i
would say i'm not asking you for quotes
i'm asking you what does he how does he
how would hegel how would he because i
know he doesn't how would hegel what he
just described of animals or soul and
possession of their body
would this what would be the case for
plants and uh vegetables
um there would well i think i would
probably say that he would the may
probably make a distinction between
something like life in general and
describe it as vegetative and that would
be a byproduct of a metaphysical um
distinction which originated the
organism
okay
let him finish that sentence and then go
so so yeah so like this um like if you
look at um
hegel's philosophy like the way that
spirit is kind of
uh
you know separated in terms of soul
is very much built off um christian
metaphysical um analysis okay lewis i
might finish the sentence you're already
on the story all right okay i don't know
that's fine that's fine
or it has gone okay lewis you didn't
answer my question you're saying that
hegel thinks animals are consciousness
because the soul is in possession of
their body right
sorry i think that yeah i think animals
are consciousness because their soul is
in possession of their body yes okay
what about plants what about vegetables
um i would say that they don't have a
soil why they do have a soul that it's
why according to hegel would they not
possess a soul well they don't
necessarily not possess a soul they
would they there are distinctions in the
self because we all possess a notion of
self uh at least a notion of
consciousness
are you aware that when hegel is talking
about soul
he's not he's still within the realm of
as far as animals are concerned he's
still within the realm of in itself not
for itself in other words he's he's
giving a description of a thing so when
he's talking about the soul of the
animal it's not the same as the soul in
the human sense yeah there's a there's a
distinction from being in itself and
being for itself which i think is
absolutely the movement between to from
from consciousness to self-consciousness
it's not okay now let me ask you hang on
hang on
let him finish and then reply like i
mean you would have to presuppose that
being for itself exists in consciousness
in consciousness in the first chapter
when he specifically says in the second
chapter that being but the reason for
that is because consciousness is
inadequate so louis here's what you
don't seem to understand for hegel
consciousness does not exist as such it
is just something he refers to to prove
its inadequacy
but
there's there's no use in talking about
the consciousness of animals
no being can just be conscious
consciousness is a moment of spirit okay
no being is consciousness if
consciousness is taken divorced from
being a moment in spirit it is ta you
are precisely reifying
something that hegel is just
establishing to prove its inadequacy
specifically within the history of
philosophy empiricism sense and so on
and so on hegel is trying to say
so consciousness cannot exist outside of
being a moment of spirit or hegel
whatever consciousness is it's a moment
of spirit it's an it's an inadequate
unfinished explication of absolute
knowledge okay good lewis respond well
absolute knowledge contains everything
so everything is a part of spirit that's
the whole point but the ontological
commitment within within
um within uh you keep saying on logical
yeah so this would be like the
commitment to reality which we obtain
the abstract laws of right from like
that that's where before we get into
that wait a minute
has um trust me sunday i'm i'm i'm
saving us time i'm saving i'm trying to
i do not care lewis finish your thought
concisely please and then how's you can
respond yeah absolutely so it is a
hundred percent like consciousness
absolutely is a thing for hegel to say
that is absolutely ridiculous um we said
in the introduction of the phenomenology
of spirit
uh we said that in the introduction of
the phenomenal phenomenology of spirit
is the science of consciousness it's
exposition that consciousness has the
concept of science sure sure so two
things right two things because you just
you let him keep talking it piles up the
[Β __Β ] two things uh louis the first
thing
hegel begins with the science of
consciousness but the science of
consciousness is not the same thing as
consciousness taken one-sidedly
within the first chapter of the
phenomenology of the spirit of
consciousness consciousness only so for
example the science of consciousness
leads to the conclusion of absolute
knowledge yes
but consciousness
consciousness cannot be taken in a
vacuum one-sidedly within the con what
the essence of consciousness is
especially ontologically cannot be taken
within a vacuum within the first chapter
of the um phenomenology of spirit
because it necessarily follows from
consciousness that there is
self-consciousness and from
self-consciousness that there is spirit
and so on and so on so this is what you
don't seem to understand now you keep
talking about hegel's ontological
commitment to consciousness and i keep
trying to pin you down and you keep
avoiding my question
what is for hegel the being of
consciousness is the being of
consciousness fully exhausted in the
first chapter of the phenomenology or is
the being of consciousness inadequately
and uh
unfinished whatever inadequately uh
described in the first chapter
is the being of consciousness all there
in the first chapter without any further
elaboration
like purely is is what it is purely
there
like it's existence
so for hegel so hegel's ontological
commitment to consciousness what you
mean by that is that hago hegel is until
is committed to the ontological um
he he privileged he the ontological uh
exceptionality of the consciousness that
he describes in the first chapter of the
phenomenology is that what you're trying
to say
what i'm trying to say is that like i
can actually i'll outline this in a
really easy way everything that is
necessarily there to be understood in
hegel is within the immediacy of
consciousness but it is inadequate for
us to will ourselves
so we reconcile ourselves if the
movement of consciousness seeks to
reconcile itself with itself
because if it wasn't already there then
there would be nothing to reason and
there'd be nothing to actually it's a
possibility
let him finish the slide
it's the positing of existence which we
are reasoning out it is the
it is reality itself which is what hegel
is saying is already there that reality
is real that existence exists what is is
it's taught a logical which is why it's
infinite now i got you now i got you
sure i got you now so this reality
according to that is already there for
hegel this hegel fully exhausts already
in the beginning
he sets it up fully in the beginning
everything else is just kind of
ancillary right
well i mean like in the sense that like
he doesn't fully exhaust the like the
the foundations of reality he just says
that we move beyond the immediacy of
self-certainty and move okay now let me
ask you another question the same
question in a different way do we move
beyond this immediate reality or
was there something latent within this
reality that leads to it moving beyond
with regard to itself
quite the opposite actually if you look
at hegel we move back to immediacy but
i'm just quoting you
what do you want to [Β __Β ] say here i'm
just quoting you to help you guide you
and why you're a [Β __Β ] idiot yes let
him answer so if you look at hegel we
don't actually move away from the
immediacy of reality we mediate that's
what you said you said we moved away
from it why are you wasting my time
how's your muted lewis finish your
response we move back to the to the
immediacy so we do mediate we do mediate
in the second term but only to make and
reconcile ourselves with ourselves so
it's immediately available um to give
you a quote from this if if it would
maybe
help [Β __Β ] you [Β __Β ]
i'll get rag
all right is he still here
no okay let's finish your thought please
concisely and then we're gonna let uh
respond
so the essence so the positive in
essence is actually the movement in
self-consciousness but the the the
grounding of essence is the foundation
in the concrete existence which exists
in consciousness and he says that in
um i think that was the
uh the science of logic okay are you
done okay as you can respond
only languages that the host can
understand please you're literally just
quoting [Β __Β ] not you're not getting to
the [Β __Β ] point you're quoting
gibberish saying gibberish to dance
around the way i [Β __Β ] pinned you
you said you said louis not me that
everything is there in the beginning but
it's not enough so we have to move
beyond is this not enoughness itself a
feature of what is originally there or
not
well yeah but i mean the deficit is one
of knowledge not not of reality
that's where you're a fake [Β __Β ]
hegelian and a kantian yes it is a
deficit of being itself
it is definitely a deficit of being
itself not just knowledge lewis there is
no one-sided distinction between being
and knowledge that is not actively
suspended in hegel's philosophy hegel
does not simply set up being versus
knowledge and then it ends there being
and knowledge are for hegel thinking and
being for hegel are the same louis
they're the same thing ultimately so
you're a fake [Β __Β ] hegelian book
okay it would not be thinking just to
clarify or be willing actually says
thinking and being are the same he says
that yeah yeah
it's a will it's i'm talking i'm talking
about you louis you want to interpret it
as a will only lewis and has you're both
muted because you're not listening to me
so i will
i will suffer a lot but not that one of
my participants be accused of being
accompanied so we're gonna move into
audience questions again if anybody has
a question um you may uh
put it in my chat otherwise i won't see
it um i need you to put an asterisk on
either end so i can quickly cycle
through and find them thank you very
much
um let's find some questions here
uh i've got a question for both of you
actually um
we've been talking a lot about whether
or not animals are conscious i want to
know what the stakes are if indeed they
are why does it matter whether or not
animals are conscious
because it first of all a proves he
doesn't know anything about hegel
that b
the all of the even though i already
wrecked him as far as the supposed
necessary conclusions that would follow
from this and even if i were to concede
that animals are conscious which i don't
the conclusion obviously doesn't fall we
established that last time he didn't
even respond to any of my arguments but
first of all you're not even able
to arrive at the conclusions you did in
the first place because your [Β __Β ]
premise is wrong animals are not
conscious
louis do you want to play that yeah so i
i will say that i think it's quite funny
that he says that it doesn't matter if
uh if uh animals are conscious even
though the whole point of what he's
arguing here is to go i was way too
charitable i shouldn't have almost
conscious because this means that we are
considering animals here's the thing
lewis lewis
lewis lewis the way string yard works is
that if both of you speak at the same
time you both turn into a garbled mess
and nobody can hear so lewis finish your
thought then has you can address it yeah
i just think that he's i just think that
he's backpedaling i think that he's
attempting to undo the debate that he
had because it was that bad oh really
literally
again you always conflate [Β __Β ] louis
here's what i just said and sunday don't
don't let me say my piece sunday okay
here's what you're doing here's what you
said louis
you said
i said you said that oh you're you're
just trying to it's funny that you're
saying it doesn't matter because that's
the whole point of this debate the whole
point of this debate louis i don't get
it twisted louis i am 100
fully confident in the fact that i
[Β __Β ] wrecked you last time i just
didn't wreck you as thoroughly as i
wanted to and that's why i'm doing this
with even if i conceded to you that
animals are conscious as i proved last
time you'd still get [Β __Β ] wrecked but
for the sake of being philosophically
consistent and consistent with my own
beliefs and my own views i want to
clarify that i was wrong to even concede
that in the first place even though it
was it doesn't make a difference as far
as who wins this little encounter
between you and i that's why lewis i
wanted to have this [Β __Β ] debate and
clear this [Β __Β ] up because it this
debate not only proves
yet again another victory for me but
that you literally don't know [Β __Β ] about
hegel and that is something i don't
think i proved well enough last time i
proved it well enough this time
okay question for has from seeking a
independent of hegel if animals are
conscious would this change your view of
veganism
there's no independent of hegel animals
it did the notion of ana i uh understand
my concept of consciousness comes from
german idealism comes from uh this kind
of philosophy so no it's an absurdity to
call [Β __Β ] animals conscious i will
never accept animals as a so-called
conscious it's completely meaningless
completely stupid to call them that
okay and this is for both of you from
angela marnie i'm gonna let lewis go
first in this one how does consciousness
imply an object's subject distinction is
it baked into the meaning of
consciousness itself
um yeah so it doesn't um that's the
whole point where you start in hegel it
is the infinite experience consciousness
doesn't imply um an object subject
distinction that comes later like that
is the nes that is
the the subject like well not the
subject the consciousness produces the
object subjective distinction as a means
of self-satisfaction which is why if
you're going after hegel and you get to
heidegger and you start learning about
um existential analysis and and so on
you start saying that language is
actually a form of equipment in which we
use to engage with reality so this
production of self-consciousness and
objects uh and determinate objects
actually is a means to self-satisfaction
and not given in our experience which is
exactly why he's critiquing
self-certainty
all right how do you want to reply to
this yes consciousness does in fact
necessarily imply a subject object
distinction otherwise consciousness
could have no determinate content
whatsoever there's absolutely no meaning
to calling something conscious if you
don't have a subject object distinction
it's a pretty pla and i already proved
that through the course of this debate
like an npc he's repeating his original
argument that's fine
okay thank you and uh this is from ga
core above thank you for the five
dollars um prospective philosophy you
say quote unquote will a lot it seems
like you're focused on actualism more
than anything else
are we seeing the triumph of your will
i'm not entirely certain how that
is implying he follows giovantali's
actual idealism
um
what i'm arguing when i the whole point
of bringing up will and hegel is to show
that it's not a stagnant process that
being is not in uh that being is not um
there in itself it's it's actually his
reply to xeno's paradox which explains
that everything must be in motion like
if you if you were to shoot an arrow and
you were to stop time at any moment
zeno's paradox is supposed to say that
the arrow would have to both be there
and not there simultaneously the title
overcomes the distinction you don't know
what you're doing on the questions the
questions for lewis let him finish that
that is exactly what i'm saying um it's
it's a moment of becoming it's not a
moment of being there or not being there
it is both simultaneously
okay just to clarify the idea of pure
will is just as absurd for hegel as pure
being
okay
this is for both of you um from einsley
gonger i have a question why should i
care if animals feel pain or not i can
justify that we have a social contract
between us i take them to meet us humans
but what is the social contract between
me and an animal um
what morally prevents me from harming an
animal uh has would you like to take
that one first
yeah sure um
first of all i i completely doubt
animals have so-called pain as we know
it
i think pain is something we take for
granted there's a lot of things about
pain we take for granted it's not just a
sensation
okay um
like i said the fundamental distinction
you don't even have to talk about this
stuff about a social contract or
whatever
as someone else pointed out that i saw
on twitter which was actually such a
great way of summing up what i was
trying to say before the question of
harming animals or not harming animals
has nothing to do with morality has
nothing to do with ethics it's a
question of normativity okay it's it you
can't you can't um legislate you can't
it's no more relevant to ethics and
morality than aesthetic taste is
so yeah okay lewis
yeah so like the idea of a social
contract like being able to form a
social contract is in and of itself a
bad way to establish ethics hegel
actually points this out he basically
shows that everything that you're doing
in the social contract already must
pre-exist the contract for you to be
able to accept that an individual could
complete the contract that they're
capable of actually signing and
understanding and engaging in a contract
and having it as the end of their of
their will so the whole point is it
presupposes an ethical relationship in
which you already can have a trust
established in order to sign the
contract or even have the capacities
necessary or even the um the uh
fundamental tenants uh set that you
would require for um
to experience to even want to sign a
contract all of that is already
presupposed in social contract theory so
saying that signing a social contract
it's a bad way to do it so looking at an
animal animal's inability to sign a
contract is secondary why is a human
able to sign a contract and why do i
establish contracts with humans so if i
want to sign a contract with a human
it's so that we can facilitate a joint
end in order to satisfy a joint will now
if i already established that this joint
will exists prior to the contract the
foundations of that will exist in
ontology but they're also
epistemologically available to us by
analysis and that exists in an animal i
can see their pain and pleasure as
valuable prior to their ability to sign
a contract because that is exactly the
same pain and pleasure that i would see
as valuable prior to the humans capacity
to sign a contract which i must consider
for has from android 323 what does it
matter what an old man said if science
nowadays proves animals being conscious
because science proves no such [Β __Β ]
thing simple as that see how i get too
straight to the point and i don't babble
along like perspective philosophy to say
in so many words where you can sum up in
like two seconds
okay
uh for perspective philosophy from king
of based do you deny the labor
aristocracy
um
i don't i don't really know um
i i can't i like to be entirely honest
with you i don't think i could give like
a definite answer because i can't really
remember what the i don't even know what
the labor aristocracy is off the top we
had to be entirely honest with you i'm
just going to like i'm willing to admit
me ignorance here
um
in terms of the terminology fair enough
for angelo morney and i take this to be
for both of you is absolute knowing the
final and necessary development of
consciousness will animals ever achieve
quote unquote absolute knowing according
to lewis yes they will they're on their
way so the cow uprising is imminent
uh
that's not actually what i think cows
don't uh establish absolute annoying
humans
it's it's true yeah but
for hegel consciousness implies the
inevitability of absolute knowing it's
because it's inadequate
no no it doesn't uh really but the thing
is it requires an intellect of capacity
which is what is called animal
consciousness has let him finish his
response but the the reconciliation of
spirit and consciousness is the you know
the movement from being an immediate
consciousness to a reconciled
self-consciousness that's not to say
that animals are going to be um you that
can be present in spirit in the sense
that it is consciousness is
reconciliation with itself but it is
mediated not by their actions but by our
actions and our consideration of their
actions so like they they engage with us
and communicate with us and we can
recognize what is valuable within them
and that is recognizing this literally
proves veganism is fascist like you're
describing a volunteeristic actual
idealist reading of hegel according to
which everything is just some kind of
like subjective actual intervention in
reality rather than the fact that
absolute knowledge literally follows
imminently from consciousness it's
literally
consciousness
consciousness is imminently inadequate
with regard to itself it can't exist by
itself
it's so ironic that you would accuse
veganism as being fascist when you are
hitler was a vegan promotion which is
ideologically an abstract where you're
presupposing some idealized version of
man
and seeing it as a sublime object of
ideology from which we look i think the
nazis were humanistic
and then say and then um and then uh
satisfy our desires the nazis the nazis
venerated vegetarianism
you're the one engaging in what is an
abstract moment of right that is being
justified by what the hegemony of man
when did i say that
you don't even know my [Β __Β ] views
you're putting words in my mouth talking
out of your [Β __Β ] ass just like your
pretend pretended knowledge of hegel
it's clear that the nazis were
pro-vegetarian the nazis were
pro-vegetarian that's a fact of history
the used methods to kill the jews that
were ex were taken from slaughterhouses
why did nazis demonize
why did nazis demonize kosher slaughter
because they hated the jews
what was the explanation they gave that
it was cruel toward animals that's why
they said the jews were being cruel
toward animals and nazis thought animals
have more rights than jewish people just
like vegans
it's not like we love animals it's like
we hate the jews the jews are worse than
us everything there was a vegetarian
himself hitler wasn't a vegetarian
that's a myth and it was a way to
propagandize himself in respect to being
comparable to gandhi who was popular at
the time but you know whatever you know
[Β __Β ] history right
all right next question from thoughtbat
for has are you permissive of animal
abuse if not why not
no i'm not because i don't believe that
our relationship to the world comes from
thin air we we it's established by
president custom moors and common sense
why would you want to be abusive toward
an animal if not
the fact that you're projecting upon
that animal human qualities and
characteristics and you want just like
you want to use the animal as a way to
vent your own misanthropy so no i don't
believe in intentionally abusing animals
but if animals like are not being
treated up to the standards of what
vegans think as an incidental fact of
our already existing fundamental
relationship to them then i don't give a
[Β __Β ] i obviously think sadism is [Β __Β ]
up
but no i don't give a [Β __Β ] [Β __Β ] about
animals
okay uh louis this is from forehead who
has asked this question now four times
um are cars vegan
um yeah cars can't be vegan anyway not
all cars like
um
like the reality is is that we can
engage in modes of consumption which
unfortunately will lead to states of
tragedy which we should reconcile um but
only ones that are
really
considering everyone but then attempting
to minimize harm so like the the for
example look at it like this um i have
an obligation to other humans but if i
drive a car i have a risk of running
them over it's not that i'm going to
kill some i i want to kill someone but
that there is an aspect of our being
which necessitates our driving the car i
have to drive a car to get to work i
need to satisfy my own
needs and drives so having a call is not
an inherently unethical okay this is
from ga coraba for five dollars per
second perspective philosophy you sound
more like a neo hegelian how is this
concept of hegel anything but a
precursor to the worst ideas in human
history um well i am a hegelian um i
don't think it's a precursor to the
um ideas like the worst ideas in history
i i don't see how you could say that i
mean what are you considering the worst
ideas in history are you relating this
to perhaps like
um like i don't know like movements from
the like the moxie inside of things um
which i don't think were necessarily the
worst ideas in history but i'd say that
a lot of the negative uh within the
marxist leninist movement come from the
rejection of the negation of negation
within hegel which meant that they
started pre-supposing that like uh
essentially notions of right without um
that's not true so first of all the
rejection of the negation of the
negation has nothing to do with the
rejection of uh reconciliation it's
rather a point of i'm gonna quickly just
sum this up
reconciliation re-emerges from the
dialectical materialist perspective in
the form of material being material
being is what reconciles um and leads to
a so it's not that they reject the
negation of the negation as as
reconciliation they do accept that the
negation is ultimately negated it's just
negated by positive material being it's
a very important distinction uh they do
not reject hegelian reconciliation they
reject the view that the negation of the
negation uh as a metaphysical view which
which leads to a kind of um
still negation of negation does not
arrive at positive being that's the
issue
i'm going to modify this question from
uh seeking a because it's kind of
quickly odd just please
mao actually certainly does reject the
negation of negation
he says that there are basically points
towards particulars and that everything
can be infinitely divested into um
smaller and smaller units and
in society and he points to any points
that towards that so like he definitely
doesn't say that it can be reconciled he
says that there is the constant unity of
opposites yes
lenin finishes a lot and then you can
respond go but then they're never
reconciled that's the point like the
contradiction must exist in in a form of
contradiction that is never um
reconciled okay okay in the mouth
i'm very quickly i just want to clear no
please go for it
it is it is actually reconciled it's
just that you don't understand the
chinese tradition mao is coming from mao
is ontologizing contradiction itself as
a form of positive being so it is
reconciled in the form of this material
positive being which for hegel is the
very unity of opposites itself the
content of the material object for mao
is the unity of opposites which is he is
inheriting from the chinese philosophy
the chinese tradition and it's also
something this
orientation towards being
itself
a positive being as opposed to the
negativity of
thought is something that distinguishes
eastern philosophy and thinking from
western in general so to say that he
doesn't accept a reconciliation is wrong
he accepts a reconciliation it's just
that this is a reconciliation in reality
itself in the form of the very being of
the unity of opposites itself
thank you i'm gonna i'm gonna cut you
off there uh lewis because we're gonna
get to the next question um this is from
nimrod's fall to has
um has how do you differentiate between
uh your view and the view that some
scientists used to have that non-whites
lacked consciousness and pain vis-a-vis
animals because
your comparison of non-whites to [Β __Β ]
animals is this precisely why veganism
is a white supremacist ideology that is
the enemy of mankind
okay so just you call cube you just
that's just how you're gonna respond to
that
yeah because i get straight to the point
instead of wasting people's time like
you a point that's a too cool cue that's
that's a logical fallacy what do you
criticize criticism with a criticism
what
you're like like someone's just went um
oh like how would like they've asked you
a question and then you went you're a
white supremacist yeah the reason it's
different louis is because there's a
fundamental because non-white people are
still [Β __Β ] human i don't know is that
is that enough for you i i didn't take
the question to be making that
implication i thought the point was that
um it's it's not it's the equivocation
goes in the other direction whether or
not animals should be raised up to the
general status of having equal value to
human beings that's that's how i
interpret that question it didn't have
the negative connotation at all that's
just me
what i'm saying is that the reason why
you can't compare it is because there's
a fundamental difference between
humans and animals and that non-white
people
uh the difference between non-whites and
whites is not the same as the difference
between humans and animals that's how i
would respond jesus christ that's what
they want you to establish what is the
difference
okay well that's a different question if
he wants to know what precisely a
different question your question is what
precisely is the difference between
humans and animals
ethical inconsistencies are you are you
asking me that question what's the
difference between humans and animals
yeah justifical in consideration yeah
sure you know what my answer to you is
what reid hegel
ah that was terrible just read hegel he
talks about it he'll laugh
pretty well okay okay
next next question insecure
all right uh there's a premise to this
one are either of you aware of meta
modernism or post-post-modernism
i'm aware of it i know very little about
it to be entirely honest with you um i i
i need to read into it somebody sent us
this on um one of me prior uh streams
but i can't say i know very much about
it to be entirely honest with you i
don't remember i remember encountering
it and my i remember what i thought when
i read up on an encounters that i wasn't
impressed by it and i thought it was a
bunch of [Β __Β ] but i don't remember
specifically why but that's my memory
yeah i have no knowledge of this
whatsoever um this is from seeking a i'm
gonna modify this slightly if you were
pressed how would you salvage the
position of your opponent
um house do you want to go first or
lewis i'll let you choose amongst
yourselves um
if i if lewis was an intelligent person
then they would come at this from the
perspective of a cosmology he wouldn't
try to collapse the distinction between
nature and spirit which is antithetical
to the hegelian enterprise he would try
to actually reconcile them from the
perspective of cosmology similar to uh
evol ilenko's his cosmology of spirit
about but this is a necessarily
materialist enterprise though and he
would from this cosmology try to
establish how
animals figure into the ultimate
development of um spirit from the
perspective of
the development of spirit as something
that arises out of nature and how spirit
is in fact part of nature and so on and
so on so if he was smart he would come
at it from that perspective it's just
he's not smart enough to do that so he
has to lie about hegel and pull [Β __Β ] out
of his ass
lewis
um it depends what you mean by salvage
do you mean like as in make a steel man
of the argument or do you mean to the
best of your ability perhaps you regard
the position as unsalvageable but if you
to the extent that you can
right so i would say that he's position
perhaps could argue if he was being like
justified about it would be to accept
that animals were conscious
um but then say that um and then try to
do i think to be honest his argument in
the first bit was stronger than his
argument in this one although still
terrible he um essentially tried to
argue an epistemological difference in
that one which um
meant that animals couldn't be
considered because we cannot demonstrate
the resistance in their will which would
lead us to a discussion of whether we
can they have no will
haven't uh haven't um
like interests which we can consider
that would be the um that would be the
best argument that he could make but i
still think a very poor one
all right this is from ga korobov again
for five dollars uh again to prospective
philosophy by nia hegelian i meant
gentilly uh perspective philosophy are
you aware of some of the abstractive
concepts you introduce uh are you aware
these seem a lot like actualism
um i'm not really i've never i've never
really encountered this so much to be
entirely honest with you um
but i'm not really introducing an
abstract concept i'm not saying that
there is um
anything that necessarily must be
accepted as pure abstract essence but
rather that we need to reconcile what is
a pure abstract essence um with the the
fundamental concrete reality which is
fundamentally what does that have to do
with actualism
i just said i've never encountered
actualism and i don't know so you don't
know what he's talking he's not taught
he's not saying you have an abstract
concept he's saying that your
interpretation of hegel is pretty much
the same as giovanni gentile's actual
idealism
well
giovanni is the um
he's the founder of intellectual founder
of italian fascism yeah italian fashion
i never haven't read his work yet i was
going to read it in to respond to uh
fascists but i haven't met a fascist
again yet because i think that's died i
think i've just met one today which is i
met one last week which is you
that's absolutely dumb like like let's
be honest like what i'm arguing you're
not you're not a fascist i wouldn't call
you a fascist but like philosophically i
think you are
i don't think that's i don't think
that's the case at all considering that
i'm arguing for a mediation of the self
with the self in a way that reconciles
us from in and out groups to a unified
individual so like nothing to do with
fascism fascism fascism requires an us
versus them notion in which we can posit
a single identity against the against
the other not necessarily fascists for
example can have a view of like world
conquest like hitler where there's going
to reconcile all beings with but it's
going to be in like a determinate
hierarchy with germans at the top just
like animals would figure in the
hierarchy but the higher the races
i mean the hierarchy in and of itself i
think in a hegelian stance would be
absolutely unjustified why we have a
higher you admit we need a hierarchy
with animals or you don't admit that
no i don't think that we should hire
archives
at all so if you see like a baby and a
baby like chicken and which one would
you save because there's no hierarchy i
would do my judy
and do what which one would you save
well i'd probably do my duty to society
and my family and like whatever
so you're but your society is a
determinant society right it's not just
like a universal system you don't exist
and yeah but if at the point of absolute
spirit if you were to say like what
matters more a chicken or a baby they're
equal in value okay so so how can you
not why don't you transpose
has let him finish his response and then
you can reply yeah so that's a movement
from hegel's um meta ethical commitment
so hegel's on logical commitments to
diego's normative commitments
commitments are duties
and how we express that notion of right
lewis let's bring it back to the point
the point was
there's clearly a hierarchy between
humans and animals
clearly yet you haven't established it
yeah no but you just establishment you
agree that animals cannot have the same
rights human beings can
what do you mean when did i say that
they can't have the same rights i
absolutely do think they can have this
right so some rights
so like i wouldn't give a child for
example the right to vote and i wouldn't
give a dog the right to vote no
absolutely which one right
is it the same rights or it's not the
same rights which one is it
is it the same rights or is it not the
same rights which one is it well it
would be the same right
no the same right i didn't say right and
the abstract said right right this the
right it writes quote unquote can you
can you stop dancing around the point
would they have the same rights or would
they be unequal
well no you don't have to have the exact
same rights to be equal
okay collectively from the common sense
perspective would animals be equal to
humans
okay what you're arguing you can argue
also from the nazi perspective you don't
not everyone has to have the same rights
okay let them reply like look at it like
this like would hegel have said that
everyone has the same right to the money
that exists in my family if they don't
live in my family no like that's not how
it works that's fine people's people's
rights are dependent upon the context
but we have you haven't established how
it's different from nazis okay hang on
hang on let him finish and then as you
can go hollywood try to be quick how is
it different from nazism because we're
considering everyone equally and the
notion of rights is being delved out
from that position yeah the nazis are
saying we're treating everyone equally
uh just like how you're saying we would
treat all animals equally but if there's
differences in the content of the rights
that's not because there's no equality
it's just because of the differences in
determinate reality just like the family
example you mentioned so you're not
actually addressing my point the
opposite because in reality the
determinant reality from which you're
proposing is the subject objective
vision i'm saying is necessarily
inadequate to establish right and that
it needs to be reconciled with
consciousness
not which is the whole point of
recipient i know you're trying to avoid
this
louis i know you're trying to avoid the
point my question is very simple right
why
okay so clearly okay animals would be
concentrated differently than humans
right according to yes okay let's just
so why shouldn't different races be
treated differently from the nazi
perspective what's wrong with that
because the nazi perspective the
the deliberately undermines the value
that exists in a race and it proposes an
abstract notion of value in let's say
like let's something like germanness
right like where there is no value well
it's a pretty nationalist position
that's not necessarily true because um
germanness is just referring to the
actual determinate society in which
germans live whereas other and and both
of you again the platform we're on if
you both speak over each other it
becomes a garbled mess that nobody can
hear silence yourselves
one at a time has finished your thought
than lewis yeah yeah yeah so basically
and also you could also say that uh
hitler might argue that german society
represents the fullest and most uh
developed i think nazis did argue this
um
developed expression of spirit the most
in the world and that it necessarily
does entail a hierarchy of races so why
does that not follow from your
perspective well
because the establishment of a hierarchy
in terms of of conscious beings is
exactly what is being undermined by the
hegelian position which is the concern
the nazis are not as
let them finish
the consideration of determinate being
is inadequate which is why we start at
consciousness which is what you've
missed this entire time you're the one
that's presupposing an abstract
determinate [Β __Β ] uh notion of uh
of uh right within
it
okay you are putting forward an
anthropocentric position where there is
no justification for that in
consciousness itself
so what
so that is fundamentally no no
there's no just so what that there's no
justification in conscious itself and
how am i establishing an arbitrary
abstract primacy of humanity over
everything else
because you're unwilling to consider
that animals are valuable that doesn't
mean i have an abstract perspective hang
on hang on hang on it doesn't logically
necessarily follow
his tales let him let him reply he has
his abstract
let him reply he he derailed the topic i
was asking him why okay so but you can
you can point it out when you respond
but he needs to be able to finish the
sentence otherwise you don't like
exactly five different things we're
arguing about now i need to derail the
topic you're trying to paint he's trying
to bring this back to a debate i already
want about consciousness
nobody talk over me that's the rule
lewiston has
[Music]
be quick
okay right okay great so
the the reason i'm not derailing the
topic i'm defending myself against
claims of fascism and i'm showing that
the that the hegelian critique of
fascism would be the inadequacy in
spirit i don't care what nazis think of
themselves of course they have delusions
of granger that's that's basically
entailed in that position but that's
because they're looking from a through a
sublime object of ideology which paints
germanic superiority as being justified
just as your position paints
anthropocentrism as being justified you
look through adam they look through
hitler has go yeah two things and this
is why i'm saying this is taking so long
first thing um no no it doesn't
necessarily follow because from your
perspective which one of actual ideal is
the actual triumph of the will and the
actual uh
uh the actual uh triumph of the will if
you
as far as the nazis are concerned it's a
decisive moment so these nazis are
merely saying well since it's not a
given in being just like how you said we
re it requires our will to establish
what was already true the nazis are not
saying for abstract reasons we elevate
ourselves above others they're saying
this is actually the case in reality
we've proven it by our military prowess
and superior this is just the
manifestation of our actual will our
triumph of the will the second thing is
that your claim about that my humanity
is an abs you you have a completely you
just pulled something out of your
[Β __Β ] ass i'm a [Β __Β ] marxist
materialist dialectic you think i have
an abstract um humanism of some kind of
abstract bourgeois humanism no i have a
marxist humanism my marxist humanism has
nothing to do with arbitrarily elevating
some kind of uh form to the status of
supremacy against which all reality is
being related you haven't proven that's
my position nothing i've said implies or
demonstrate that's my position if you
want to know more about my humanistic
perspective just ask me you're clearly
uneducated so instead of talking out of
your ass why don't you just [Β __Β ] ask
me um what the nature of my humanism i
completely have railed against abstract
humanistic universalism human rights and
all that kind of stuff i always [Β __Β ]
critique that regularly my i don't have
some kind of [Β __Β ] um
european modern european humanistic
perspective i don't think hegel
necessarily does either um what you're
saying is completely [Β __Β ] wrong but
that doesn't mean i don't think a
distinction between humans and animals
is justified unless your argument is
that hegel is trying hegel's uh
elevation of humanity is abstract and uh
whatever but that just proves you're not
a [Β __Β ] hegelian because hegel makes
it clear it's not hegel doesn't create
some kind of abstract criterion for
humanity against which the world is um
being measured hegel demonstrates why
humans are different from animals
through the uh through an imminent
process of development not through some
kind of uh
top down thing
okay those would you like to reply
yeah so
um the nazis positing a power structure
as a justification of their position is
exactly what hegel argues against in the
um in the phenomenology and the
philosophy of right in the master slave
dialectic i mean that's the whole point
power doesn't justify itself what
justifies power is actually the the
expression of subjectivity or the
expression of the will i mean that's
that's that's essentially the whole
point so saying like all right the nazis
say that they're superior and so they
have shown themselves to be you know
more considerable no that's that's
exactly exactly what hegel's arguing
against
so like no i haven't got it wrong like
what you're and you know the thing is i
wouldn't be surprised if you agreed with
that no way i'll let you speak so do you
let me speak i wouldn't be surprised if
you agreed with a power structure where
you say might makes right and some sort
of
stupid notion in which right can be
justified through the acquisition of
material or power right is not justified
in relation to some sort of um control
or ideological manipulation it's
justified against reality which is why
reflection um which is why the essence
is reflection but the concrete
foundation is the existence
all right we're gonna move to the next
question before this turns into a
wedding um this is from angela marnie
again
oh please go for it
yeah okay the the imminent justif i'm
not saying they're justifying themselves
on the basis of power perspective maybe
the power proves something imminent but
i'm not saying it's coming just from the
fact they have power maybe what the
nazis would say is that our power
attests
uh to this fact not necessarily that it
is what proves it so it's a complete
straw man you still haven't
distinguished yourself
they might say that might attest to
right but they're not saying it's
actually what makes right it's a very
very
the um within nature is what determines
rightness so they're not they're not
saying that yes they are the same would
be a testament no they are lewis lewis
you're not able to hang on hang on hang
on has then lewis
okay louis i'm not they're not saying
it's what actually determines right it's
just that from our perspective of finite
knowledge this is what maybe this is
what um
demonstrates it for us but it's not
imminently what actually proves it it
merely attests to it there's a operative
distinction there you seem to be unaware
of the distinction i'm trying to make
i'm actually very aware of the
distinction you're trying to make but
the foundation from which they are
pointing to in which is this
justification i didn't speak of
justification i did not
a testament as you call it towards
reality isn't a testament towards their
power they're saying that their actions
within the world are somehow justifying
their actions within the world no that
is exactly not against the hegelian
position no one mentioned justification
no one mentioned justification no one
mentioned justification
please let us finish
so the whole point of the hegelian the
hegelian system is to recognize that
what is valuable is is the will itself
it's not like some sort of like
uh or that predicate it is it is you
think okay do you think
hegel's philosophy is some kind of like
normative system
well i think there is a normativity in
hegel like of course yeah that's
extremely vague obviously there's a
normativity and of course yeah but like
you think it's a normative system not a
philosophy oh no of course i think that
it's more than normative that would be
ridiculous
the answer louis is that it's not a
normative system okay so i said that it
wasn't and then you know
you're treating it like this you're
treating it like if i if i say that the
nazis
are coming from are understanding
themselves from a perspective of actual
idealism that's very different from
saying they're using hegel to justify
themselves normatively the point the
point what i was making is that the
ontology from which they are saying is
justifying their supremacy superiority
where is the justification factor
is there supposed superiority sure at
all the whole point in the hegelian
system is that the master and the slave
regardless of any hierarchisation are
mutually dependent beings trying to
express subjectivity that is all that
matters their interests that's fine
that's fine
okay first of all has nothing to do with
the point where does just where did i
mention justification and where could
justification possibly factor into the
point i'm trying to say
you weren't saying that a testament was
a notion of trying to prove something no
so you were just saying that it might
might possibly indicate yes that's
exactly what i was saying louis if you
were listening so they were just so
they're just making unjustified
assumptions then and i can accuse them
of that wait wait wait what do you mean
because justification is important do
you what do you deny that i'm saying i'm
saying that they they are interpreting
their actions from the perspective of
actualizing the will
within this uh greater harmony of spirit
i'm i'm talking this is not my view of
hegel this is your view of this accident
my view of anything this is your attempt
to try and make paint me as a fascist
because you're no okay to be clear for
the audience to be clear for the
audience lewis is obviously not a
fascist i'm just saying that your
philosophical
views are uncannily close to actual
idealism
i i very much i don't actually you know
actually saying that i'll read giovanni
and i'll make a distinction as to why
they're different but i will say that my
the logical end of my philosophy does
not attest or does not in any way give
credence to fascism
when we have a prospective fascist and
the next day no no i i perspective to be
clear i agree that you don't want it to
lead to fascism and you don't want it to
so i agree with that you don't want to
be a fascist obviously
but do you have a choice as a question
if you if you take it to the end there's
an apropos question here uh by angela
marnie um i take it to be addressed to
prospective philosophy but i'll let you
both answer uh but louis first um does
absolute knowledge mean no hierarchy
between human beings or between beings
um
it depends on what you point towards
hierarchization it would mean equal
consideration of interests uniformity
like but in terms of like we were all
subject under right but if we were to
like create let's say it would be more
like a hierarchy you would accept you
would still expect like some form of
normativity or maybe not actually
because he does say that subjects
reconcile themselves with the world so
probably not probably no hierarchy um
but it would but our actions would
attest to the greatest expression of
right so for example if
um the greatest expression of right was
the consideration of one interest over
another in a particular scenario we
would all agree that would be absolute
annoying we would all go absolutely it
is our duty to do x and that judy is the
one that we will follow
um it logically follows very clearly
from hegel's um view of absolute
knowledge and his philosophy in general
that
hegel does explain why the hierarchies
in reality exist and hegel does believe
in my view that hierarchies are an
inevitability of the discontinuities
in reality
that exist objectively so for example
hegel doesn't believe in hierarchy in
the sense that he believes like
a person is ontologically superior to
another person or a person is uh
superior by virtue of some kind of
characteristic but for hegel there are
are necessary hierarchies in for example
a society that represent the
different positions of human beings in
relation to
the spirit and in relation to the state
in particular so in that sense yes
hierarchies are implied for hegel but
they're not there's no uh i don't think
hegel believes in an ontological
hierarchy between human beings i think
hegel imminentizes
hierarchies uh as the relationship
between the individual human
and um spirit in the form of the state
um if if by that you mean that hegel
like thinks that hierarchy is
unnecessary in order to express
absolute spirit to its greatest possible
degree i wouldn't disagree necessarily
although the top of the hierarchy is
absent of any subjectivity which is why
the king is just an empty um an empty
subject he fulfills the will of the
people it's not it's not just the king
there's the civil servants and there's
all sorts of officials that stand above
society well yeah but the civil servants
well they're actually i mean there is
like uh
it's not that it stands above society
it's that they are they are society
mediating itself so you've got like
civil servants um who are bureaucrats
and then you've got um private society
and then you've got like these are three
years which are instantly interlocked
but in common sense terms that implies
some people have more power than other
people and ergo in the common sense
sense they're more they're higher on the
hierarchy
i mean i would probably push back on
that and say that power is in and of
itself an expression of the of spirit
and not an expression of individuality
okay sure
there's hierarchy okay just common sense
there's hierarchy okay
yeah but i think that that's that's
making hegel like essentially saying
nothing of what he's actually saying
that'll be like justifying like uh
individualism rather than well no
because you're not addressing the
person's question the person is asking
from a common sense perspective like
would there be hierarchy like as we know
it hierarchically yes
consideration versus hierarchy of you
know what you sound like you sound like
george orwell in the animal farm and
they go some are more equal than like
okay yeah in reality it's a hierarchy
okay like uh you can justify it however
you want but yeah that's a hierarchy one
person does not get more than another
that's that's not that doesn't well no
yes i mean they do
no but that's not that's not what he's
justifying he's not saying that one
should get more than another that's no
he's not but he's saying that that's
exactly what he's doing because
his philosophy is right is not a
normative um prescriptive normative uh
document he's describing what the way in
which spirit is mediated uh in the form
of the states to individual human beings
and hierarchy is a necessary part of
that
we'll just sleep with that yeah we'll
move to the next question uh this is an
interesting one for uh has from noah
watson um at what point in human
evolution does the slaughter and i'll
extend this to mean just the the use as
we use animals of proto-humans uh become
unjustifiable
i actually
am very skeptical to this idea that like
proto like for example a lot of people
think neanderthals were like
proto-humans but that's there's actually
no scholarly consensus as far as archaic
humans are concerned as actually being a
different species
um
the second thing i would say though is
that
um there's a reason why we don't
slaughter
like chimpanzees and gorillas and [Β __Β ] i
mean i guess some tribes in africa might
or whatever but we generally don't
because they're too similar to us and
it's not necessarily because we're doing
it from an ethical or moral perspective
it's just a normative one um it's like
aesthetic taste it's like you know what
i mean like
this question of like how to absolutely
justify this or that is like if we don't
absolutely justify it then necessarily
it will follow that
our normative um
position to the world will be chaotic
and scary well that's not the hegelian
perspective for higgle
um our normative our nor our moors
customs norms and the things we consider
from a common sense perspective to be
like normal
that is actually not like completely
arbitrary and chaotic it is reconciled
with this fear of ethics and morality
and stuff so
it's not they're just not the same thing
is this important to point out they're
not the same thing but it's still
rational and meaningful and stuff it's
not like
people are just going to become
cannibals unless we create some
contrived some kind of like ethical
system
okay we're past the two hour marks i'm
going to limit us to two more questions
um again if anybody has questions put an
asterisk on either end so i can catch
them in the chat and we'll be ending off
after those uh this is another one for
has from seeking a what would happen i
apologize if this is uh redundant i
vaguely remember seeing this question
earlier
what would have to be true that would
convince you that animals are conscious
and what about the argument from
marginal cases
yeah the only i would have to be the
thing that would um be necessary for
that to be proven to me is that animals
would actually have to demonstrate to me
by means of some kind of communication
that
they um
that they are conscious like they have
to actually like talk to me or something
i mean like maybe they would have to do
it in a language
that i don't i wouldn't immediately
understand but they would have to be
capable of language and they would have
to be able to recognize
um a difference between subject and
object
how would you respond just quickly how
would you respond then to levanas where
we talk about what comes before language
as the primordial expression so like
communication i mean 80 of communication
78 of communication is non-linguistic
like most of it comes from you know body
language vocal tone or engagement with
each other that are not uh you know
actually contained within the words but
i just want to say look how you're
explaining this to has right now keep
going yeah
but but actually the the semantic
content of the words
so when we talk about some forms of like
um
communication
we
can't have communication which is not
linguistic which animals display in
their resistance they scream they um try
to get away they display acts of fear
and terror and in many ways uh are
pleading to us um they they act and call
us to our own conscience
okay
that's like saying a tree makes you feel
a certain way they're calling it to your
conscience okay um
obviously language is not the same as
like formal
verbalized um
words it's not language is not the same
as words obviously there's forms of
communication that fall within the
criterion of language that are outside
of uh formal language so to speak right
as far as this primordial language stuff
is concerned i'm a lacanian so for me
this is the primordial basis of language
is death drive which animals do not
possess animals do not possess uh the
self-relating
negativity the death drive death drive
that exists in they do not have the
death drive but we have the death drive
and we can see that in their faces which
is why as jack actually points out that
we see the death drive and our own
monstrosity and the animals yeah i
understand i understand the the idea
like
uh language is something that emerged so
nature could speak its own pain whatever
but still animals don't possess it okay
they're not conscious they are not
themselves conscious maybe
display which we would say was
fundamentally a communication no no
no no no there's a there's a distinction
between the communication that is proper
to language and the elicitation of um
the expression of some kind of uh
contingent and uh external um
[Music]
expression a part of the animal that
evokes a certain stimuli to other
animals that is different from
communication communication implies a
withdrawness
of the subject with regard to themselves
so that things become for themselves to
another not just you need something like
for example a big other it's not just a
one-way relation between
me and then another person it's that
it's me another person and a fundamental
third point of reference that is the
presupposition but the only way that the
only way that that occurs is in the
acknowledgement of the other and that
acknowledgement of the other happens
between us and animals in in two ways i
mean animals do acknowledge those yeah
do you engage with us so the
acknowledgement yeah the hang on lewis
quickly and then has so one animals do
acknowledge and engage with us animals
do and i mean like [Β __Β ] this is like
unbelievably obvious in terms of
training in terms of like your ability
to manifest a relationship with an
animal animals definitely do and they'll
act even defensively even with each
other animals form social pacts um
they're not in like a society or or
something like that but they do have
relationships with one another it's not
purely from like an internal standpoint
and then also they uh they do
communicate pain in that respect they
try and communicate their pain in the
sense to make you stop they try to
communicate pain within a sense to um
cower from you and act defensively in
order to make it end like cats will lie
on their belly and sure submissive okay
okay okay concise like two examples not
ten go okay so yeah that's right but
like animals submit to each other even
there is an act there is an act of power
relationship with the without within
animal within another melody okay okay
the first thing you like you you know
you what you do is that you go like 5
000 different points when i have one
point i want to stick to one point so
let's go one by one there's three i
could identify the first point with
regarding to the fact that a big other
the third term is created only by a
relationship with another person
actually that's not true this third term
is necessary both for the acknowledgment
of another and ourselves so that
dialectic relationship is always there
just by having a relationship to another
you do not establish that third term
that is the third point of reference
between you both it's very important to
understand i will say that
okay the second thing is you said that
animals do in fact communicate to us and
do relate to us they they don't do this
any more
than a [Β __Β ] plant does okay you
haven't established how it's different
from a plant okay
um
you haven't just you haven't gotten from
in itself to for itself as far as that's
concerned uh this the third thing is
that you said that animals communicate
pain and all these kinds of things well
that's just anthropomorphization it's
like a cat lady who tries to intuit the
feelings of her cat ultimately there's a
complete
unbridgeable difference there where you
could not possibly have communication
with a with an animal because the third
term that is the reference point of
communication could not exist between
you so
uh and as far as animal training and
stuff is concerned even though i don't
myself take this view from a hegelian
perspective and classically modern
european perspective you still don't
establish the difference between in
itself and for itself for example what
separates a robot from an animal in this
regard a complete just robot a machine
that can be trained and so on and so on
i mean like uh you don't actually arrive
at the point at which
animals are conscious
or have language
if uh all right okay so um
the third term in the hegelian and
laconian kind of especially in the
laconian sense like the the like you
know the the big other that's produced
that's not produced that's not imminent
within our being that's produced from
the relationship with the other which
then produces a notion of self and that
is self-consciousness which is what
happens at the mirror stage and the
production of language so that's not
that that that's the production of
language not the necessary tenets of
language which animals have i don't know
recognition so
the recognition of consciousness is what
produces language and allows us to
formulate the third term it's not what
gives us consciousness it's not what
it's not already okay no thank you thank
you lewis and now has new connections
yeah you make the same mistake in
regards to lacan that you did with hegel
so when hegel's talking about the mirror
stage you're again confusing this with
lacon's ontological claims and the
implications which are again being
developed from the end yes from the
yes the truth of the beginning is again
same with lacan at the revealed at the
end so yes and the very beginning the
distinction of the big other
is there the the the the reason why
lacan moves to the big other is because
of the inadequacy
of um the relation between one and
another to possibly explain
uh
what gives rise to identity and
subjectivity la khan moves fr to the big
other in order because the initial thing
is inadequate it's literally the same as
hegel but you make the same mistake and
misunderstanding okay the big oh that
could not possibly be there because if
it was there then we would start with
the bard subject and not the subject
which is exactly why le con starts with
the subject which is not barred by
language and that the production of
language becomes bod so that that's
that's the relationship with the big
other right yeah i'm making the same
with this okay lewis can you please
respond to my point though i did respond
to you you did it right there
has restated the point i'll do a second
point sure louis there's a difference
between lacan is not saying this is
ontologically the case he's saying this
to the ex for purposes of his
investigation for purposes of his
development of what is already there so
yes the big other in a sense is already
there it's just that we don't know this
uh so to speak at the beginning this has
to develop in a certain way in order to
arrive at it but yes the big other is
there okay lewis oh that isn't a thing
it's a relationship
yeah okay
listen the big other is the relationship
but the symbolic it's the relationship
of the symbolic order through the
subject mediated by the imaginary that's
just what the big other means that's all
it means
and the symbolic order is something that
lachan believes as ontologically
antecedent in the form of death drive
i would agree that the death drive is
there we could agree on that
but that's that's separate that's like
that's like saying like the will seeks
to destroy that's the wills
and frustration with itself you know why
it's especially true that the symbolic
order is already there louis
well because when you're in because when
you're an infant it's literally there
like you you're you're born into a
society into a symbolic order and you're
just confused about your relationship to
it it's already there exactly against
what he argues because he even talks
about how erogen erogenous zones don't
even develop until past the mirror stage
so even our um experience of pleasure
hasn't even been sublimated in a way
that makes sense but this is the
presence of the symbols
let him finish his response lewis try to
be concise
yeah so sublimation and the um symbolic
um the symbolization of our drives is
past the mirror stage which allows us to
feel things in different locations and
understand them in that way yeah
but lacan is not a stageist he doesn't
believe like there's these are just
different stages la khan's own mirror
stage that was almost an epistemic
development on his part to arrive at
where he would eventually become he
doesn't actually ontologize these stages
and say that this is actually imminently
an ontological stage in being
he
like look like i don't know if i can
kind of say this in another way
um like the whole point of the mirror
stage
is to
recognize
something that you did not see before
like prior to that consciousness was not
a way
of
aware of itself we know
what is leading the process along is the
symbolic order
desire and the frustration of desire
well but desire again what is leading
desire alone
nothing no yeah there is something
what
drive
that is desire no it's not desire's not
the same as drive dude i've studied
lacan for like five years you don't know
what you're talking about desire is not
the same as drive desire is the
imaginary form drive takes drive belongs
to the domain of the real desire belongs
to you if you want to imagine yeah okay
if you want to know what you're talking
about dude i'm wasting my time hang on
let him respond
if you want to say that what you mean by
desire is the symbolized drive fair
enough it's not symbolized drive
yes it is no it's the it belongs to the
imaginary it belongs it's a sublimated
drive symbolized drive is signifier okay
it's the sublimated drive man
it's not it's that simple it's the drive
which is given content so that it can be
expressed in the in the imaginary form
well yes but in so much that it gives
the the the capacity for the will to
actually express itself otherwise this
is not philosophy so he's not talking
about will or any of this other stuff
he's talking about psychoanalysis okay
you have to know what you're talking
about you just don't you don't you're
not well read on the content definitely
definitely is philosophical since the
con was heavily inspired by hegel
lacon was inspired by hegel's dialectic
but hey lakon even would say this is
just dialectical materialism like it's
not even hegel per se oh no khan is not
a materialist really let me ask you a
question when lachan was confronted with
the possibility of a certain theoretical
position he said no this can't be true
because it would violate dialectical
materialism so yes he was but lacan
explicitly okay even if you reject
history and the facts which you are la
khan actually explicitly rejected the
entire enterprise of philosophy he
contrasted psychoanalysis with
philosophy as a completely separate
enterprise so no la khan does not think
this is all philosophy it's not
philosophy philosophical reasons of
lacon are separate from the khan himself
anyway like that's that's separate even
you have to critique la khan's view of
philosophy because they disagree with it
that's that's fair enough that's that's
not the point i'm making i just what the
point i'm making is that i don't think
that lacan is a materialist
but you don't think you would like says
he is i would argue i would certainly
argue that the whole point of
sublimation is to reconcile an
individual's relationship with their
drives to actually understand material
in the world without yeah
you would be assuming that they would
have those drives and uh and just
sequence where does luck on a lot of
marxists do hang on let them finish
marxism now though can we stick with
your problem
on materialism i'm not going to not
mention them because i'm just okay let's
just take it is a materialist yes or no
that's the topic i would say
okay well well
the way you've justified that is because
you've said that lacan is making a
philosophical claim about knowledge
that's incompatible with materialism but
lacan is making no such claim in the
first place and la khan himself believes
that he is engaging in a materialist
enterprise he himself does
okay i would say that le khan begins
from a position which unifies the real
the signified and the imaginary and one
such notion in that is immaterial and
without such lacon wouldn't make sense
well what no material is not the same as
substantial it's clearly material in the
sense of him it's possessing uh material
content do you think that the
imagination is material
when did i say that
the relationship lacan establishes
between the imaginary symbolic and the
real precisely gives uh is precisely
materialist it's like saying oh
so like let me finish that's like saying
so like oh if marx acknowledges ideas
does that mean he thinks ideas are
material well no ideas are not
themselves material you can be a
materialist while acknowledging the
reality of ideas you can be a
materialist while we're acknowledging
the reality of the imaginary
well one you would have to either
explain
you'd either have to explain the ideas
in material terms or the material in
ideal terms that would be what would
separate what does this material mean
for you
hang on let them finish this point and
then you can respond so in other words i
would say like i would say that marx is
very much very well aware of the uh of
ideology and how it impacts our
relationship with material but it's all
explained with by moving through
material as in the material explains the
ideas well in hegel the ideas explain
the material okay what is material what
do you what do you mean by material
do you mean as in like what do i mean by
material like person yeah what are you
trying to say when you say lacan uh he's
not he's not a materialist what is
material then
what is the material thing
i would say that material would be the
um determin would be a uh i'd probably
say like
uh determinate matter in terms of um our
experience what does matter
um i would say the external reality
okay sure uh matter for you is just
external reality do i have you clear
um
i would say that it's i mean like not
for me personally i would say that what
matters is actually a relationship but i
mean like in terms of like uh
so like
i would say that like mata in terms of
how we understand it i'd say that mata
is actually an emptiness
which is kind of what like hegel would
kind of point out what's
homeless right of course of course
matter is negative okay yeah so let's
let's be clear
so la con is a materialist because for
la con the imaginary cannot possibly be
self-referential what defines the
imaginary just like what defines
etiology for marx
is in the form of
symptoms in the real
symptoms in the real for lacan which is
a fundamental structure it's a
fundamental formation that subsists in
the real which accounts for the range of
our imaginary
forms
so for la con la con is clearly a
materialist
symptom
does not have an undialectical view of
materialism according to which there's
like an underlying substance that
determines the the the um form and
content
of like the superstructure the imaginary
or ideas obviously that's an
undialectical materialism that's a straw
man no no dialectical materials believes
that dialectical materialists understand
that matter is a dialectic
uh is dialectical matter is itself the
unity of opposites it's compatible like
with mao's view of
the drawing from chinese philosophy of
the unity of opposites as being matter
itself
so matter has no form outside of the
actual form given to it in the form of
the imaginary and so on and so on but it
is still primary it is the primary
content of that form lacan explains this
one last thing lakhan actually explains
this logic in the form of his uh
concept of the non-all it is all yes but
there's the non-all
makes it so that um
it is internally incomplete and
contradictory and there lies the primary
primacy of matter he doesn't say like
matter is a ready-made form that
determines everything matter is itself
something that
exists in relation and disturbs in the
form of symptoms the imaginary forms and
its primary because it is its real being
well i think that like the important
thing to recognize i think that i would
i would i would not accuse the khan of
being anything but a phenomenologist to
be entirely honest with you i don't
think that we live in unmediated matter
that is like that is exactly like so
like otherwise like one i think the way
that you described materialism there
i'll ask you to define matter as well um
because you describe materialism in such
a way that it almost included kant and
not hegel which is so strange like the
idea of like a prime minister a prime a
primary see of reality that we are
subject to hegel agrees with that but
he's not a materialist he doesn't see
that like reality as a through material
notion or physical notion he sees it
through
um he sees the material as being posited
as an understanding of something this is
this is exactly the same as the laconian
point of the real which is infinitely
negative and resists meaning no but
here's what you don't understand the
real for lacan is not only negative the
real actually has determinate form in
the form of symptoms symptoms the real
is not simply negativity for lacan and
that's actually the the primary form of
that's the primary distinction as far as
dialectical materialism with hegel's
idealist philosophy is concerned it
obviously there's an agreement with
hegel as far as the fact of there being
a dialectic relation between
form and content that much is very clear
but from the materialist perspective
it is precisely content material essence
and being
which reconciles
the form in other words the truth of the
form is in the material it subsists in
material being itself already this
explains for example marx says elevation
of the proletariat as the cloud i don't
want to get into that but
um
i would
well okay we
we don't have time i want to diverge
into other topics that's why um
so for lacon uh
matter is so if you want to ask me the
question of how i would define matter i
would define matter in a very similar
way that uh three modern philosophers in
the past would define like essence and
content
matter does not self-subsist
uh in an undialectical way in an
unmediated way as you're trying to say
that's undialectical that's actually not
materialist it's substantial and
ultimately leads to the conclusion of
idealism which was marx and engels
criticism of french materialism in the
first place matter is definitely
mediated but that doesn't change that
matter is
uh primary and that matter is antecedent
matter is
incontained in the word itself it is the
matter the real content the real content
of any given totality
um
necessarily comes at the expense of both
our knowledge and
the form given to this uh content that's
the point of dialectical materialism it
is the is describing a relationship
between form and content that's correct
form arises from content but not in a
way
that is all uh contained in the form
itself the content is latent with the
birth regeneration and destruction of
existing forms
okay i'm gonna allow one more response
from both of you no interruptions please
lewiston has
um i don't necessarily even disagree
with pretty much anything you've said
it's just whether you would give mata
the premise of that it's like whether
you would say that the real is matter i
don't think that the con well at least
in my understanding of the khan
i suppose i could be wrong i wouldn't
have said that lacan would give that
primacy to mata he would have gave the
re like it's not that he would say that
what is real is this external physical
existence which we are being tested
against um instead actually this
internal existence that we are
experiencing is already
the symbolic we experience the symbolic
the symbolic reality we don't experience
the
the uh the real the real manifest itself
and the inadequacy of this symbolic
realm and in our internal understanding
of self and they the real is existence
itself and our place within it and how
we are symbolizing it which is why he's
phenomenological at least from my
interpretations of things if you want to
say that it's mata um i mean i would
have to do more reading to just go
fundamentally hundred percent mcconnell
is saying that the real is mata but i do
not think that i've ever come across
anyone saying that the real is matter
and and that rather anything else that
what the real is is anything but what is
which is what makes it infinitely
negative you can't predicate anything of
it you can't say that there is an
essence of it other than because essence
is actually in the symbol it is in the
production of essence that we get the
symbolized reality the the imagination
produces an essence from which is
applied to reality in the form of a
symbol which is mediated through the
self and like the other
okay two things the real is not matter i
didn't say that it's just that the real
occupies a similar relation
to both um the symbolic and the
imaginary that matter does to ideas as
relevant to philosophy that's why lacan
is a materialist
and obviously materialism for marx
implies the destruction of philosophy
which lachan is committed to
insight in the form of psychoanalysis
itself so in in that sense the real and
matter are related the real and matter
are related because
the real is the precise way in which
matter relates to us psychologically but
it's not identical with matter itself
obviously um i don't think that the
as if if i may i will say i don't think
that the con
like
the primary like the importance of yeah
i'll get to it i'll get to it
yeah i'll get to it la con obviously
doesn't draw like a kantian distinction
between psychology and reality but what
i'm i was just trying to simplify
um that the real is matter in so far as
it relates to our like psychological
reality river because there is clearly a
discontinuity but that discontinuity is
ontologically accounted for for example
in gjx work the discontinuity between
for example symptoms
uh in the unconscious in the symbolic
order and i'm gonna get to that's gonna
be my second point and symptoms in
nature there are symptoms in nature that
you can understand ontologically and
then there are symptoms
relevant for the unconscious there is no
hard kantian distinction between these
two but there's still a discontinuity
and that discontinuity is the very
object of jesus ontological enterprise
which i disagree with a lot but i'm just
saying acknowledging that the
discontinuity
exists is not a kantian
thing then the second thing you said is
that the real is always already uh takes
the form of this symbolic but it seems
like you're very confused about the
actual content of this symbolic i didn't
say that
hang on lewis it's a hazard's turn okay
whatever you said whatever you said
about the relationship between the real
and the symbolic okay this is this is
what you need to understand the symbolic
is precisely i would argue material
actually the symbolic is precisely
material in regards to the imaginary
signifiers are symptoms for lacan this
is the conclusion of la khan's
signifiers are not produced as feel
they're not philosophical concepts it's
very easy to mistaken signifiers for
concepts they are not the same thing
signifiers are symptoms of the
unconscious and they are formed in a way
that comes at the expense of our
conscious conceptual uh imaginary form
so for the khan the concept belongs to
the realm of the imaginary
uh for example it is not something that
premises the imaginary itself
um
well i guess this is what i would have
said i i one i wasn't saying
that um
that the
the
we we get the we already exist in the
symbolize i mean in a throneness and
maybe like a hedigerian sense perhaps
but not like in a like in a already the
world is simply given to or symbolized
um quite the opposite i was saying that
we gain
symbolization through an active process
of imagination which is mediated between
two parties that's
not the case
well i think it is the case like for the
imaginary has a very passive role in
relationship to the symbolic and the
real
but we can get into that and and you
know i'm happy to i do need to go and
research the carmo but
uh from my understanding of khan this is
where i've taken it
the under the reel isn't seen as
material it's seen as the absence of any
given thing the symbolic would contain
material but it wouldn't be limited to
material it would be anything which
would be given determinate existence
which for lacan is material determinate
existence is material for lacon well
that that's like a point of contention
of whether it is or not like i don't
know i'll have to i'll definitely check
okay you don't have that's fine but like
no i'll definitely check from my
understanding it's phenomenological
because it contains uh the mediation of
what is
um
it is immediate at reality through
thought it is the production
not thought all right i i think i think
we're gonna move on to the next question
now um and we're gonna make this the
final question and this is from uh
einsteiner and i'm going to address this
to both of you leaving aside the
previous argument about the
consciousness of animals
uh please comment upon
the argument that veganism is necessary
for the sake of the environment insofar
as it is able to sustain human beings
into perpetuity uh who wants to go first
um i have to can i go and then i can i
go pee because i gotta be really bad if
you guys want to take two seconds to do
that right now you can
i'm gonna go pee i'm very bad yeah you
do that hang on lewis we'll wait till he
gets back
no problem no problem
i'm uh
my bladder is stoically shut
yeah i'm just gonna as soon as this is
over i'm running into the bathroom to be
entirely honest with you you've got time
why don't you do that now
uh no i'm happy to wait i'd rather just
like
i'd rather be able to take my time
and feel like this is like
you wanna you wanna like you wanna
really savor that release i got you
that's the thing it's almost it's almost
like it's gonna be cathartic it's gonna
be like it is that will be um that will
be symbolic hey by the way i've been
meaning to ask where did you get that um
that jellyfish lamp behind you i want
one uh my girlfriend got it so i'll ask
her all right i'll ask you
but uh yeah
i'm a big fan of the jellyfish lamp i've
had loads of people ask if they're real
jellyfish now which i don't know half of
them i think are taking the piss and
then the other half like i think are
serious because there's even people like
um well how do they work
so right so like this is the thing right
so that's water
right yeah you get this like fill like
empty and you get those little like
jellyfish like plastic things and then
you put the water in like you fill it up
yourself put a couple of drops of like
um dishwashing like this dish like what
dish soap um
and then like once you pour it on like
there's a light at the bottom and like a
mortar or whatever or pump rather so
like it's pumping water up that's making
it like circulate
okay with the light at the bottom so
like and then you've got a remote that
can like
so like
so the jellyfish themselves they they
have there's nothing moving in them
they're just being pushed around all
right yeah is back we're gonna get back
to this so i'm just gonna restate the
question
um
as i don't know if you can hear me yet
uh i can hear you you're good brilliant
okay so again uh please comment upon the
argument that veganism is required to
sustain the environment for humanity who
would like to go first
i i will if uh please there's no
objection okay sure yeah i don't think
it is um there's two two things right
first um to say it's necessary means
it's necessary from the perspective of
some kind of subjective agent well the
first problem with that is that you're
including in your necessity something
that may not necessarily be possible um
for example the commitment human beings
have in this world to eating meat
is not simply a result of a deficient
ethical or moral system on their part
but could itself be somehow part of our
objective reality changing our very
notion of necessity the necessity
implies that we can actually force
people or convince people to stop eating
meat but that is not necessarily true
it's not necessarily true you can
convince everyone to stop eating meat so
you have to change
the object sorry you have to change the
content of what your necessity is
uh based on the necessities of sorry
based on uh being based on reality now
the second thing is that i actually
don't believe it's true
uh i'm gonna do three things the second
thing is that i don't believe it's
necessarily true that meat consumption
has to end
in order to stop climate change maybe
there's a level of wasteful wasteful
meat production that's harmful to the
environment that has to be curbed down
but uh i don't think this it implies
anything about stopping climate change
the third thing is that there's an
assumption that
uh climate change can even be stopped
and i'd actually don't think
that much is uh very clear i don't know
if we can stop climate change
i don't i don't i'm not really inclined
to believe we can stop it i think we're
entering a new era in which humanity
will have to adjust to this new reality
and reconcile itself with the way it
which has
in a way that
it did not choose to or will to change
to the world um so i believe in a deeper
reconciliation
of this fact of having changed the world
in a way we didn't expect or know as
something actually which will turn out
to be rational so that's my three points
okay lewis
yeah so i could you just do do a favor
just restate the question so i'll make
sure that i can
answer it concisely i do my best to
anyway yeah no worries sure comment upon
the argument that uh leaving aside the
issue of the consciousness of animals
and all that ethical stuff veganism is
required to um preserve the environment
for human beings
okay
so obviously i do think animal lives
matter and so on and i do think that all
behavior is malleable from an
existentialist position in theory
everything can change about the way we
act we can't radically reinvent
ourselves and change the way we act in
our relationship with nature
specifically energy production and food
production um with animal agriculture
there is a real big issue in terms of
deforestation primarily and also the
production of methane so what we have is
a relationship in which we need to
radically reduce meat consumption uh
meat dairy and egg consumption in order
to save our planet and i mean that means
that would mean taking away the number
one cause of deforestation for example
which is animal agriculture it would
also mean taking away the number one
cause of ocean dead zones which is
animal agriculture it would mean taking
away the number one cause of um ocean
plastics the number one cause of um
of um
river pollution
so
and and then also 28
of greenhouse gas emissions and that was
a study done by oxford and also 70 of
our land use um is coming from animal
agriculture so in terms of animal
agriculture's environmental impacts even
towards the human um habitat it is
profound we need to we need to reimagine
our relationship with our food supply
and move towards a plant-based diet even
for a matter of self-preservation and
then to add to that we haven't even
considered the risk of zoonotic diseases
which are a massive existential threat
covert 19 being only a tiny shitty
little like really flu compared to what
can happen when we look at things like
ebola or when we look at things like um
even h1n1 and h5n1 um these flus would
have been absolutely devastating had
they had the virulency there would have
been a massive existential threat for
our own survival and then even in terms
of how we treat others
if we look at something like the
slaughterhouse um the slaughterhouse is
indicative of an environment which is
unsuitable for human engagement it is a
house of horrors and individuals come
out with what is called pitts disorder
perpetration-induced traumatic stress
this is a mask this is a manifestation
of trauma people have feelings of
disintegration feelings of um paranoia
um you know um drug addiction alcohol
abuse and are much more likely to engage
in domestic violence and violence
against other humans as well um which is
documented uh pretty clearly in the size
that in the point that we can actually
show
that arrest rates and sorry arrests
isn't this beyond the question
well it's just it's
anthropomorphic value isn't it in
relation to animal agriculture
so it was about the environment okay
hang on try try to wrap it up louis and
then we'll move on
in terms of the size of a slaughterhouse
facility we can actually map on domestic
violence and um
and violence as a whole to the size of
the facility so if you care about humans
and you want to protect us against uh
habitat destruction and uh even protect
us against ourselves from the production
of zoonotic disease and even
manifesting violence then yeah go
plant-based
good argument
i've got evidence of you let me know you
said a lot of things but like the idea
that
you want to stop domestic violence more
yeah like dude the reason why we have
domestic violence the reason why the
harm toward animals evokes feelings of
domestic violence is because of a more
underlying problem in the first place it
doesn't necessarily follow that
you know
factory farms and slaughterhouses will
lead to domestic violence it's just that
they do do that given the current
circumstances of the relationship
between men and women in our society
like what you're saying is like really
stupid well actually the the authors
posit the fact that women and children
are usually seen as vulnerable as are
animals so the relationship between
vulnerability is what is producing the
domestic violence yeah well it's it's a
cycle well that
state of vulnerability that women and
children are in is also societal it's
also resulting from the fact that women
and children are not given adequate uh
protection in our society
also and also um the fact that um
women and children are
children i sorry women in particular
objects of male violence and it's a more
deeper problem than just animals you
know i agree it's a much deeper problem
overall society but i think that it's
certainly feeding into a problem and
also the vulnerability that is manifest
in children is probably not something
that we could just miraculously change
um like i'm not even saying you can
change the women well no women are
weaker than men i'm not even saying you
can change it for women i'm just saying
that
the
violence against women in particular is
not doesn't simply follow from seeing
animals being killed it follows from
seeing animals being killed plus a
society with a specific relationship
between men and women but that's only
the manifestation of that aggression
that's why that's the way it's
sublimating so it would sublimate in a
self-destructive way regardless which is
why the ones who don't commit how can
you prove that you can't prove because
because many of them report feelings of
disintegration insomnia uh alcoholism
drug abuse um much higher conviction
rates so it manifests itself and solid
mates in in various different ways
depending
i can't check the studies and data so
i'm going to assume it's correct that's
what i usually do when i
can't verify a source but even if we
assume that's correct it doesn't
actually follow
uh that that is the true cause
well i mean you can go and i've got a
video on it it's uh called working in
hell you can go and have a look
okay well i think you should read hegel
before you recommend me videos
all right we're going to call it now
we're at 2 hours and 41 minutes and i
believe the taliban are about to take
kabul so um i'll let you guys take three
minutes each to make your final
statement and then we'll uh call tonight
sound good
yeah yeah all right uh
has would you like to go first
no he can go first all right lewis
yeah sure
so what has has demonstrated in this
argument is his
ignorance to be entirely honest with you
he actually gave a better position in
his first debate which was uh
essentially that the separation between
animals and humans was one of of um
of epistemological difference not
ontological difference um in this debate
he's trying to make the ontological
difference which hegel outright denies
he hasn't answered any of the questions
i raised about um ideology and why we
are abstracting man to the form of
consciousness which is definitely
against the hegelian notion um at least
from the perspective of someone who
understands the system and not reading
through the lens of what hegel himself
thought so yeah i've answered all of
these questions and i think now we just
have to ask ourselves what is the
foundation of value in reality is it
the notion of humanity is it the self is
it a form of self righteous um
consideration of of something that is
the form of adam that is being bestowed
upon us by man or some sort of
abstracted rational agent in a kantian
sense or is it
something which is sensitive is it that
the intellectual the intellective
capacities of a rational agent are based
upon reflecting upon the sensitive
nature of experience we gain information
which is good or bad imminently from
reality that information is what
consciousness is and that information
exists in animals and so when we do not
consider that information we are correct
we are committing a philosophical
failure we are not considering what is
actually right and what is actually
valuable we are considering what we want
to be right and what we want to be
valuable
all right thank you house
yeah well i didn't catch all that
because i was ordering chicken shawarma
sandwiches um i'm really hungry but
anyway um
i'll conclude with this uh
so i i
left the last debate last debate i was
really tired
and i didn't quite
know for certain whether perspective
philosophy actually understood hegel
or not
so
um in this debate i actually wanted to
take the opportunity to grill him and
see if he actually could prove he knows
what he's talking about i am i have 100
percent confidence beyond any reasonable
doubt
whatsoever that prospective philosophy
derives his understanding of hegel
entirely from his ass
and not only does he know nothing about
hegel he doesn't he also proves he
doesn't know anything about lachon and
things like materialism and marxism and
a host of other subjects
um lewis says he's responded to all of
my questions and i haven't responded to
any of his but the exact opposite is
literally true and i think anyone who
reviews this debate in good faith will
see that i did make a good effort to try
and actually pin louis down and ask him
concrete
simple questions which he just
dilly-dallied and danced around without
ever directly addressing anything i
raised none of the points i raised were
addressed by him or even acknowledged he
has a proclivity to go into tangents
about completely irrelevant things that
are meant to confuse the audience as
well as me i wasn't impressed by it i
can clearly map and trace but
through the course of receiving his uh
arguments that a does not follow b and
that what the tangency goes on are in no
way connected to the actual underlying
points that were under contention
um
so in conclusion i think it's a pretty
one-sided um
debate i got what i was looking for i've
exposed perspective philosophy as a fake
hegelian especially when he actually
admitted
that he doesn't actually think that
hegel believes in the unity of being and
thought
um
and i think i've gotten more than i
wanted to do because all i wanted to do
here was prove that prospective
philosophy was a fake hegelian who
doesn't know [Β __Β ] about hegel but i also
proved that he also doesn't know [Β __Β ]
about la con either so that was
a freebie you know
um
yeah i think you know i'm pretty
satisfied with the result i was pretty
well rested pretty alert today unlike
last time so you know i'm i'm i'm
satisfied
i got what i wanted
just to quickly say i definitely didn't
say that hegel didn't that said that
being well we had the chance to argue
that
says all that you're closing you already
had your closing statement so oh no
there is the thinking thing you already
gave your closing statement
and uh also you never answered the
infinite is correct unfortunately the
these were closing statements fair
enough i don't know we can uh we can if
you guys want to do a rematch
uh give me give me a week or two so i
cannot die of blood clots but we'll
we'll arrange that but for now for now
we're done so thanks everybody for
participating um and take care thank you
again to audience uh questioners as well
uh thank you guys thank you lewis have a
good night bye bye