Perspective Philosophy CRUSHED by Sleep Deprived Haz
2021-08-08
Tags:
Perspective PhilosophyVeganismHegelHegelianismDGGDestinyZizekSlavoj ZizekSlavojJordan PetersonJoe RoganVaushVeganSocialism
today we have has from infrared
and lewis from perspective philosophy
debating whether veganism
is an ethical duty a quick word about
format and rules opening statements are
eight minutes long
who goes first will be determined by a
coin toss i will warn you when you hit
five minutes you can wrap
up because when you hit eight i cut you
dead this will be followed by two sets
of alternating five minute responses
followed by
45 minutes of open discussion and
concluding with 20 minutes for audience
questions
regarding audience questions super chats
will be prioritized and asked in the
order in which they appear
if we have time non-super chat questions
should be marked by an asterisk so i can
quickly find them in the chat
rules of conduct are strict speaking out
of turn will result in 30 more seconds
of speaking time being allotted to the
other party
so save it for the response period or
for the open discussion segment
the use of slurs or personal abuse will
be met with an immediate ban and this
applies both to the audience and to our
participants
if either participant attempts to talk
over or challenge the moderator being
myself during this debate
they will first be muted and warned and
then removed i trust all this has been
made clear and that by participating
both guests
i will take at least to have tacitly
agreed to the rules as just laid out
with that out of the way we will flip a
coin to see who goes first for opening
statements
has your heads louis your tails
tails louis you go first you are going
to have eight minutes
for your opening statement starting
now
[Music]
okay hi everyone all right
so animals are inherently valuable
consciousness is inherently valuable
and the inconsideration of sentient
beings
is inherently wrong that is essentially
what i'm going to be arguing when i say
that veganism is an ethical
obligation an obligation is
a duty or a responsibility now i'm
arguing from a hegelian
position something that i know that has
at least tacitly
um endorses at least from what i've seen
he endorses
so hopefully we can make some headway
there
so all conscious beings have interest
desires and the capacity to feel pain
and pleasure
when we are considerate when we are
considering conscious beings and
conscious interests
we are considering what is the
foundation of value and
ethics as a whole if we are to agree
with the hegelian position
then what we are understanding is that
there is a right and a wrong
entailed in the world itself it's
objective it's not determined by you
or me or any given party it is something
which is
right and that we can discover that it
is right and then make it a law make it
a rule
i would say that we have already done
such a thing we already have
laws numerous laws which protect the
rights the life and liberty
of individuals within the state and
usually
humans of course this wasn't always the
case
the law used to protect classes of
individuals particularly
and even still is inadequate in many
cases to protect the overall
interests of the general population even
humans
not just animals veganism
is this consideration veganism is the
consideration that animals are not being
respected and
treated equally in the eyes of the law
as in their interests their desires and
their preferences are not being met
with reasonable consideration we aren't
considering that the pain of an animal
having its throat slit
is not justified because we wish to eat
them
because we wish to overpower them we are
considering ourselves more valuable
simply based on an identity
which we have constructed rather than
something which is true by nature
if we are to be honest with ourselves
i'm going to be honest with the reality
that we are
spawned from the unnecessary suffering
of any conscious being
defies what we are trying to do in in
ethics
that is express consciousness and
subjectivity to the greatest overall
possible degree
to create principles which genuinely
reflect the interests and value
at one moment i'm sorry lewis um
infrared please no burgers in my window
thank you
keep going you have 30 more seconds so
when we consider when we consider
animals and we consider their interests
and their pain and their suffering
what we are doing is the same thing that
we've done for hundreds of years we are
considering
that the values that we hold today or
have held in the past
do not encompass the conscious interests
of individuals throughout society
that for example black people are not
lesser that women
are not lesser and now animals are not
lesser just because of the identities
that we have
perpetuated upon them and so when we
consider the conscious interests of
other sentient beings we are being
more ethical more rational and
essentially doing the right thing so i
hope
that explains my position
and are you wrapping up yeah all right
that was pretty fast okay so
uh has let me reset the clock here
and you have eight minutes for your
opening statement
starting now so
in this debate the main thesis i will
defend
is that lewis or prospective philosophy
plainly fails to grasp the principal
significance of the hegelian conception
of ethics
additionally not only is his conception
of ethics incompatible with hegelian
philosophy
so to art actual contents relevant to
this debate
namely veganism vegans like mr lewis
arrive
by means of conceptual abstraction at
the sweeping insight that mankind's
current
and past dietary habits are radically
immoral and unethical
however such a position of radical
skepticism
towards norms in the first place the
widespread popularity of which can be
traced to the counterculture
is completely at odds with hegel's view
it's a position which assumes that the
content of morality can be arrived at x
nihilo
on the basis of an individually
contrived standard of reason
hey gillian philosophy is rather one of
reconciliation one which endeavors to
arrive at the deeper rationality of the
world and its norms
whereupon the rational individual who in
hegel's case is the modern cartesian
subject
discovers itself to be radically at odds
with it the definitive case being the
newfound political anxiety
provoked by the french revolution for
the europe's ancient regime
the content of tradition taken generally
as the norms customs and culture of a
given society obviously
do change but they do not change as a
result of being imposed upon by what
hegel calls the law of the heart
or the frenzy of self-conceit veganism
taken both as an ethical obligation for
the individual
and a collective vision of
transformation rests upon the unhappy
consciousness
which affords recognition only of a
contradiction between reality and this
same individual self-conceit
traditions change as a result of a
radical process of mutual recognition
between thinking
beings which animals could not possibly
figure into
in the past lewis has contrasted the
individualistic morality of kant to
hegel's ethical life
of state and society while the
distinction is superficially true
louis's conception of the hegelian
ethical life merely consists in an
elevation of kantian morality to the
level of voluntary collective enterprise
his misreading of hegel has its roots in
a form of neocontianism
that has its origins in the late 19th
century and spans from thinkers like
frederick lang all the way to habermas
hans principal error doesn't suddenly
disappear when the same abstract and
indeterminate morality shifts from the
individual to collective level
the collective reality relevant to hegel
is not something voluntary but objective
it doesn't register some kind of common
sight of radical skepticism or
abstraction toward the world
but has us its content determinate
relations which manifest a greater or
super-individual rationality
which hegels call geist or spirit it is
only in the harmony between the
individual will
and the institutions of the state which
the individual forms a part that the
achievement of ethical life is possible
but the institutions of the state for
hegel are not determined voluntarily by
the product of the individual use of
reason
they are rather the form of civil
society's self-consciousness
the contents of which being not their
moral conscience but their very being
hegel's rejection of volunteerism and
individual rationalism concerning the
institutions of the state
is best epitomized by his defense of the
institution of monarchy
it is precisely on account of the pure
contingency of the monarch's position
being inherited by tradition and
completely outside the sphere of
voluntary tradition by rational will
individual rational will that hegel
defends constitutional monarchy as the
site of a truly actualized freedom
thus from the hegelian perspective the
answer to the question posed by the
debate topic can be
answered with a resounding no the
question is itself absurd
duty to whom and for what the hegelian
ethical life
is not the product of any abstract or
indeterminate duty
but the harmony between the determinate
private interests of civil society
with the determinate rights and duties
imparted upon it by the state
there can be no real ethical duty
according to hegel that does not fit
within this scheme
it is also peculiar that lewis believes
the hegelian view would be favorable
toward veganism given hegel's very clear
distinction between humans and animals
that renders any notion of animal rights
and absurdity
within hegel's philosophy of nature it
is precisely spirit or geist that
distinguishes mankind from the animal
kingdom
in that work hegel details that an
animal is defined by the pure immediacy
of external contingencies
its own inner nature being among them
for hegel the animal can only exist as
an immediate individuality
its existence does not contain quoting
the generality that defines it
rather comes at its expense in the form
of an unending and violent struggle for
survival
conversely human beings exist in
societies civilizations and states
the universality of their being does not
strictly stand opposed to its actuality
but is rather defi indefinitely realized
through it which hegel calls history
itself
while vegans claim that such views are
outdated according to natural science
hegel's distinction stands the test of
time at the more fundamental level
an animal cannot have rights and is
qualitatively different from a human
being
one could not be a consistent hegelian
without acknowledging as much
thank you very much all right so
perspective philosophy you're going to
have five minutes to reply
starting
now so that was actually really
interesting i was actually surprised uh
to be entirely honest with you
you actually know that much about hegel
that was pretty decent i mean you're
absolutely wrong about the idea of the
cartesian subject
being the hegelian subject that's not
entirely wrong
um and i think thinkers like zizek and
lacon
would exemplify why that would not be
the case
in fact the cartesian subject implies
some sort of inherent knowledge
um an inherent self understanding which
is absolutely absent within the hegelian
dialectic
in fact self-understanding is the middle
term whilst the first term is
consciousness
so no you're wrong about that but
otherwise that was actually pretty
decent
um i am not actually arguing for
veganism x nihilo
i'm not arguing it from an abstraction
that we are dismissing all of the ethics
that has come before us in fact i see it
as a rational development of the concept
of equality that we have
we have arrived to this place and that's
how i introduced um
my um opening argument i said that the
essentially we no longer consider other
ethnicities we no longer consider
other genders as being lesser or weaker
than us hegel did actually see animals
as
lesser hegel did but hegel was alive 300
mil 200 something years ago
and um really his ethics are under his
own system
outdated he understood that ethics was a
progressive system that was developing
and his understanding of animals was
also underdeveloped as his
as his position on women he thought
women were lesser and inferior
just as he thinks that animals are
lesser inferior and he also thought
animals couldn't kill themselves we know
better now so even in terms
of raw psychological terms we know that
hegel's philosophy did not capture the
essence of an animal which is
unsurprising because it was 300 years
out there
now when we consider that you know the
concept of mutual recognition
mutual recognition does not allow for
the establishment of
what is ethical ethically right but more
the investigation of what is ethically
right
mutual recognition allows for the
establishment of self-consciousness
which is the middle term
in the hegelian dialectic which is
infinite the development of
self-consciousness allows for the
development of absolute spirit which
allows the individual to reconcile
themselves
with themselves so you say who am i
considering when i'm considering the
animal
i'm considering myself because there is
only the self understanding the self
whether that includes objects which are
absent and nihilistic in themselves and
being determinant
are ultimately unified in what is the
self
so even if i was considering an animal
uh as in its consciousness even without
its self-consciousness i'm considering
me because we are all united in
spirit that's the entire point the
consideration of consciousness itself
does not need to recognize an
individual's self-consciousness for them
to have
uh value children do not have
self-consciousness babies like before
the mirror stage
and they are valuable and so are
disabled people they have experiences
which are inherently valuable
which we become conscious of the whole
point of self-consciousness
is to become aware of the value which
exists which pre-exists
self-consciousness
and construct an identity which allows
for authenticity and freedom which is
the entire point of the hegelian
dialectic
hegel's hegel's dialectic is 300 years
out of date we have now
reached a point in which the concept of
equality has developed past where hegel
was
at that time the cartesian subject in
this respect is
absolutely um non-existent the subject
is developing
and moving past the point of um uh
of of an inherent or innate knowledge
which is trying to reconcile itself with
we are trying to reconcile ourselves
with a logos with something which is
uh logically uh uh logically right
within being
we are reconciling ourselves with what
would be considered
natural or with abstract right within
reality you see i'm talking about some
sort of abstract terms no i'm not
i'm talking about the concrete
definitions of equality and its
application
within our society today what we are
considering in that concept
and why the development of the hegelian
dialectic has
has brought us here which is why
philosophers such as jeremy bentham
uh peter singer thomas regan they are
all developing
upon concepts of equality and applying
them to animals which is why when jeremy
bentham said
one minute jeremy bentham said um
the what is it um what is it that should
trace the insufferable line
is it the faculty of reason or perhaps
the faculty of discourse but the
full-grown horse or dog is by far a more
communicable
or rational animal than an infant a baby
an infant of a week
a month or a year old actually a day a
week or a month old
the question is but if it were not what
would it avail
the question is not can they reason nor
can they talk but can they suffer
that is the question that we are asking
ourselves today within the dialectic and
that is the question that leads us to a
resounding
yes upon the consideration of animals
and their value
they matter we should consider them and
we should protect them in law
thank you very much are you done i am
great okay so has you're going to get
five minutes let me reset the clock
and
right you are good to start now so right
unsurprisingly you clearly don't know
what you're talking about and fail to
address any substantive point i raised
when i raised the point about the
cartesian slash modern subject being
relevant for hegel
it is only in so far as this such
subject is relevant for the entire
enterprise of modern philosophy and
modernity
as a whole including things like the
french revolution and so on
you mentioned people like zizek and la
khan but they were among
the most ardent defenders of this very
same insight obviously hegel goes far
beyond the limits of cartesian
philosophy
and what descartes affords of the
cartesian subject
but it is still the same modern abstract
and self-relating negativity of the
cartesian subject that
modern philosophy as a whole must begin
with as well as the modern subject in
general
um moreover it's really interesting that
you ground your view
of animal rights in some notion of
equality which you disgustingly also
apply to
uh ethnic minorities in women which are
on the same level of animal we should
assume equal
well this radical concept of equality
comes and traces its origin in none
other than descartes himself
um we can spar about that point later
now you say that when dealing with
animals you are considering the self yes
precisely and that's why there's no
dialectic process
in which the other actually participates
in that uh
consideration this is exactly why hegel
would describe it
as an example of the law of the heart or
the frenzy of self-conceit
and all the perversions and narcissism
corresponding to it
now hegel being old doesn't actually
address
the meat and potatoes of the fundamental
ontological distinction he's drawing
between animals and humans just because
it's from 300 years ago it doesn't mean
it's not fundamental to his philosophy
without which it becomes entirely
meaningless
now you compared the extending
of equality toward animals toward the
extending of equality toward women and
minorities
but the crucial piece of the puzzle
you're missing there is the actual fact
that minorities and women not only
participated but were the decisive
factor
in acquiring their own equality they
participated in a process
uh a dialectic and historical process of
mutual
self-recognition again this is something
that animals are not capable of doing
the only thing animals have going for
them is people like lewis who go on the
internet and claim that we have to give
them rights
now you mentioned children and disabled
people there's two prongs of why that's
ridiculous
children may not have self-consciousness
but there's no such thing as a species
called children
children are precisely the site in which
self-consciousness develops
it's not a static object now granted
disabled people may never develop a form
of self-consciousness
but they represent in the way we treat
them the way we do
in a good way is because of the pure
contingencies to which any individual
may find themselves
as a result of accidents of birth and
other matters of chance
ultimately disabled people form a part
of a human community they come from
humans and they form a part of our human
society otherwise the question
of our obligations toward them wouldn't
even be possible
now when i accuse you of engaging in a
kind of uh abstraction it seems like you
don't know what i actually mean
i'm not doubting the fact that you uh
fantasize about some process in which we
all
work together in this dialectic process
to achieve veganism
what i'm actually talking about is that
you counter pose some kind of product of
the individual use of reason to arrive
at an ethical or moral insight
against the whole of the world and
against the whole of society in the
whole of tradition
while appealing to this alone would
never possibly suffice
um it completely betrays the hegelian
spirit according to which
evaluating a tradition in reality so
entrenched
as the consumption of meat should lead
the individual to the path of
reconciliation
and understanding why this uh
consumption of meat
is so widespread despite the fact that
not everyone is supposedly as smart or
intelligent as you
it completely betrays the spirit of
higgle finally there's just the final
thing
ethics is for hegel a site of statehood
now you interpret this to mean that we
merely need to pass legislation
to extend rights to animals but again
the institutions of statehood and the
laws therein are not a matter of
voluntary determination according to the
individual
or collective in the neocontinent way
moral conscience
the determinate content of society's
institutions according to hegel
is the product of a deeper dialectic
between the private interests of civil
society
and the f and the rights and obligations
sorry the rights and duties imposed upon
them
by the state the contents of which can
only fit
within this scheme and within this
harmony you failed to demonstrate how
veganism could possibly do that
thank you very much and that's time all
right lewis you're gonna get another
five minutes to respond
let me reset the clock starting
now okay so that was um
i appreciate like why you say that i do
think i did actually respond i
don't think you picked up on it and um
if you
if the cartesian subject was only
brought up to recognize you know the
development of
philosophy then why didn't you mention
let's say like i don't know the freudian
subject or something along those lines
and the ways in which we are balancing
ourselves in relation to our desires
which would be
more hergelian but whatever if you think
that it's philosophically relevant to
a you know exploit you know explicit is
that right
yeah your position that's fair enough
okay
so where was i
right okay you said that i am arguing
from what is a nihilistic abstract
position now and you're saying that i
am trying to propose some sort of
methodology is really just a
you know an affirmation of a subjective
consciousness trying to
impose upon a notion of right from its
own subjectivity which would be what
hegel considers the irony of this
objective
i am not doing such a thing i'm actually
building upon the norms and traditions
of our society
which has led us to this consideration
the concepts that i'm using
are widely available in fact many of our
society already engage in notions of
welfarism
and the consideration of animals and
animal rights we have laws in the uk
which protect animals already
some of which have already been extended
and the uk has just recognized
animals as sentient hegel also
recognizes animals as sentient hegel
also recognizes animals as conscious
he he simply says that they cannot own
themselves
so they are not capable of
self-consciousness that's unsurprising
they aren't rational ethical agents
but this does not give us the can this
does not give us the right to them
it does not give us the right to dismiss
the
fundamental rationality which is imbued
within what they are that is not
something that hegel necessarily
dictates he says they have no right to
life and so on like that
of course he does it's in his interest
he also says women who knows how to get
educated
and that's why i brought it up i'm
saying hegel is wrong on some things
and he himself admits that he can be
wrong in terms of animals yes he is
wrong he admits that conscious he admits
the sentient he admits that they have
interests
he just basically says that they're
incapable of knowing those interests
not that we are incapable of knowing
those interests he points towards
he points towards subjects which are
valuable but dismisses their value
since they cannot become aware of it
externally from their experiences
within reality he is dismissing an
aspect of consciousness
because it cannot become aware of itself
just because it cannot become aware of
itself does not mean
that it is not positioned within the
hegelian dialectic
the hegelian dialectic starts at
consciousness and then moves to
self-consciousness
as the middle term the infinite middle
term which is the conscious
re-evaluation of itself
has what is what has led us here the
vegan as an identity
the identity of the animal lover the
carer of animals those individuals who
see themselves
as guardians and not persecutors of
other conscious beings
are much have a much greater
consideration of consciousness
than an individual who is not
considering those interests
they are considering interests of an
animal who does communicate
their interests to us and and you know
actually the funny thing is
is it is the necessary communication
which would have had to have happened
to allow the hegelian dialect to even
form to
produce self-consciousness which is
something recognized by thinkers such as
emmanuel levanas when he talks about the
resistance in the face
the resistance of the face um
of the ethics of the face and the
resistance the primordial resistance
which is necessary for language which
establishes
the negation required for determinate
objectivity
and the production of words so without
this
non-linguistic communication which can
be seen within the animal
we would not be capable of producing the
middle terms necessary for the hegelian
dialectic to form
so no i am actually responding to quote
unquote the meat and potatoes of your
argument one minute
and it's fundamentally wrong the reality
of the situation is yes
hegel makes a metaphysical distinction
between animals and humans
but only so far as they are not
self-conscious
that does not mean they are not
conscious it does not mean that they are
not considered within the dialectical
process
in fact they are fundamental and
integral to it the understanding of
spirit
as being one and itself of consciousness
as indiscernible from consciousness
which is the words he uses in the
science of logic
mean that we cannot dismiss any
consciousness
which exists in nature which means we
are bound
by the laws from which we by the laws of
right
which pre-exist our consciousness of
them hegel was unconscious of them
we have become conscious of them
thank you very much let me reset the
clock and has
you have one final five minute response
yeah it wasn't only the development of
philosophy lewis
the modern subject proper begins with
descartes this isn't a controversial
view it's the view of zizek and lacan
people you yourself mentioned
embarrassingly the freudian subject
doesn't enter the picture
until hundreds of years later so yes the
modern subject and the cartesian subject
are more or less interchangeable for
people who actually know what they're
talking about
and aren't uh grad students now you
claim to be building upon the norms and
traditions of our society but
you actually have to show for it there
is no imminent development of the
phenomena of veganism
among the broad strata of the people
it's only a tiny minority of overly
socialized and overly urbanized people
precisely the demographic that from as a
logical consequence of hegel's view
would be susceptible to the same frenzy
of self-conceit
and the unhappy consciousness that
propagate this cult of veganism it's not
actually gaining traction in the very
roots of our society
and there's a very clear reason for that
which you're not addressing animals
cannot
participate in a process of mutual
recognition
it doesn't now the fact that animals do
not possess self-consciousness
doesn't give us a right to them but
here's the thing
rights do not factor in this equation
whatsoever
because rights are determinate things
that are granted by the institutions of
the state
um uh not things that come out of thin
air rights simply don't factor into the
question of the treatment of animals
the custom moors and traditions of
society do which hegel doesn't believe
you can overturn or treat as completely
um
complete uh com treat in a way
completely from scratch from the
perspective of philosophy
hegel doesn't actually seek to
annihilate things like
tradition norms culture and religion by
means of philosophy hegel's philosophy
is meant
to be reconciled with those things the
question the deeper question of
the reality of those things is left
later for other thinkers
the fact that it cannot become aware of
itself means that it could not
possibly elevate itself to the status of
the subject
can you give me more time can you give
me more i'll give you 20 seconds
um okay now uh
it could not uh the fact that it can't
be aware of itself means it couldn't be
elevated to the status of a subject that
could be afforded rights or recognition
in the first place
for the ethical state or for the within
the scheme of the ethical life
that would be just as absurd as impoties
imposing duties upon animals as well
hegel is very clear that rights imposed
upon the rights given to the individual
are conditioned also by their duties and
vice versa
now obviously there's some kind of
connection between humans and animals
but and hegel makes that very clear but
actually
animals are not capable of language
proper in any meaningful sense
language for havel hegel does not simply
mean
the display of some kind of
communication this still fits within
hegel's description of animals are only
capable of
being acted upon by pure externalities
the communication by other members of
the species
being among those externalities it's
premised precisely by
language is precisely premised by
self-consciousness
and the radical alienation between a
being and its own essence the very
radical alienation that renders the
subjects relationship
to themselves the self-conscious subject
not only an immediate one impo
forced upon them by pure externalities
uh now you say that the laws of right
pre-exist our consciousness for hegel
that is true
but they don't exist in the either they
exist
in the form of the state which for hegel
is the realized form of humanity's
self-consciousness
the laws of right are not to be found
already existing
somewhere outside of the imminent
development of um
state and civil society they pre-exist
us
yes but not in a way that
but only insofar as they are already
mediated in the form of the institutions
of the state
oh you don't even need extra time are
you done yeah yeah that's it
okay fantastic so we're gonna move into
open discussion i'm just a heads up for
people in the audience if you want to
ask questions
um super chats of course will be
prioritized as i mentioned introduction
otherwise if you don't want to super
chat a question
put an asterisk at the beginning and the
end so i can find it in the chat
i can't promise we'll answer them all
but we'll we'll we'll do we can
um so i'm gonna set the timer for 45
minutes uh again just
to review the rules quickly um no
personal abuse no insults yada yada i
don't mind
insinuations of bad faith etc because
that can be part of a philosophical
discussion
but try to keep it civil and above all
do not
argue with me if i interject and give
someone time to finish their point
ready let's go yeah so would it be all
right if i respond and then you can
pick it apart and look and see yeah cool
so
you said um you said that uh
you know they're not subjects until they
become
and recognize themselves in terms of
self-consciousness
um i would absolutely disagree with that
i would make the distinction between an
agent and a subject in that respect
which is something which fits really
well in the hegelian dialectic because
of the
um the development from consciousness to
self-consciousness you say that um
language presupposes self-consciousness
quite the opposite i would say that
self-consciousness is the product of
language and i think that fits again in
the hegelian schemata
and levanas describes this as being able
to hover over our own existence
um and this is primarily from the
recognition
you know of each other as having a will
or having interests and actions within
the world which have
separated consciousness which is the
beginning of you know um
absolute spirit right the reality is
that uh the substance of spirit was
separated by action
the unifi the unit unified totality of
spirit has been separated into
individual
uh instances of consciousness because we
aren't aware of our universal nature
now the reason that we you know when we
do engage in recognition we do gain a
conception of rights we do actually
gain a conception of self um
understanding and we do
create civil society and the product of
laws which allow us to
emulate natural right but natural right
pre-exists even civil society
um the hegel actually states the laws of
right
are also simply there we have to become
acquainted with them
in this way the citizen has more for
firm or less hold of them
than they are given to them and our
jurist also abides the same point
but there is a distinction in the
connection with laws of right and spirit
investigation is stirred up and our
attention is turned to the fact of the
laws
because they are not different not
absolute laws of right are established
and handed down by men
the inner voice must necessarily collide
or agree with them
man cannot be limited to what is
presented to him but maintains that the
standard of right within himself
he is subject to the necessity and the
force of external authority
so he even says in that quote we do hand
down the laws of right
but we must collide or agree with them
to develop them
to correspond with the laws that are
simply
there the natural laws which pre-exist
us the same as the natural laws of
physics
yeah i mean other than the fact that i
would mention that obviously these
natural laws
are the laws of consciousness and not
self-consciousness which is the
awareness of those laws
oh has your silent your music okay yeah
i didn't say they aren't a subject
uh i said they are not a subject
relevant for rights in the states
obviously hegel makes it clear
in his philosophy of nature that animals
are some kind of subject but they are
not the subject
relevant for rights duties and ethical
obligations now you say that animals
hover over themselves and the world
but such a separation namely the
separation between
the animal and the world as mediated by
something like language
could never be proven hegel precisely
claims the opposite about
animals hegel claims that this very such
separation that allows a subject
to hover over the world over themselves
and the world
is not accomplished in the animal being
for the animal being there is
some kind of obvious separation but it
is not a separation that gives rise
to self-consciousness or language now
natural right may pre-exist civil
society
but you didn't actually hear what i said
with any degree of
precision these natural rights
are only mediated by the institutions
and the state
which rules over civil society for hegel
in other words
natural right does not first strike the
individual moral consciousness like
lightning and then come to determine
civil society in the state the laws of
natural
right develop in a manner that is not
premised by the insights of individual
reason
or the individual moral consciousness
they develop through a rational process
that is fundamentally
supra individual
now by super individual by the way i
don't just mean that individuals
collaborate or agree upon
certain rights and norms i mean that
it um comes as a kind of cunning of
reason
at their expense even in a way and their
expectations and so on and so on
so it's com it's a completely um
irrelevant point actually
the life two hours of sleep i forgot i
was gonna say the
grasp
the um okay i'll let you i forgot i was
gonna see
yeah um just to clear something up i
didn't see animals and hovered
over their own existence i was saying
that is how language allows for the
development of self-consciousness
and in so much i would agree that
animals do not have that same
self-consciousness
and that notion of identity they're not
in the middle term in the hegelian
dialectic
they're in the first term of the
dialectic they're in the consciousness
um and like there is something as well
to say
that the you're right in saying that the
you know the the the law the abstract
rights
are not you know essentially imbued
within us they don't strike us like
lightning as you said
they're essentially um developed and
uncovered
in relation to an examination of reality
itself of the self
understanding the self um but they are
premised by the immediacy of
consciousness
it is this investigation into ourselves
which is precisely what recognition is
an aspect of
and what i'm arguing in that is that
that primordial expression as eleven us
as levana says would be the foundation
of any and all
notions of resistance which would be
necessary for the negation of our will
is the foundation of self-consciousness
that animals themselves
um display and so without recognizing
this display of will within animals we
are negating the very same display
which has allowed us to develop the
self-conscious dialect
the self-consciousness which is the
dialectical middle term
within uh the hegelian dialectic
so in other words if we reject this
conscious display of interests and
value within animals then we reject the
same display
our ancestors and our traditions contain
epistemologically uh prior to their
um current mediation within civil
society
we reject the traditions and their
foundations which were produced
from these individuals who recognized
one another
and decided to form civil society and
create a notion of justice
and fairness and consideration of each
other within uh
abstract right which is an embodiment of
laws of fairness which exist within
reality itself
yeah but uh this examination you're
talking about isn't
actually an enterprise that occurs at
the level of the individual use of
reason
the uncovering you're referring to
precisely happens at a historical
and not individual level an individual
doesn't simply examine this like
sherlock holmes and then imposes their
insights upon the whole of society the
examination happens
in a way that is fundamentally supra
individual
and moreover the examination the results
of the examination in a sense are
already
predetermined i don't think you would
disagree with that but
so then the ques the burden rests upon
white explains the unhappy consciousness
of the vegan
in their kind of the manner by which
they seek to
um change the laws and impo
now impose their view and um
preach and so on and so on now it's
actually interesting because
even if we take into consideration
hegel's view of slavery which i would
have disagreed with at the time but for
reasons different
i would also grant the underlying
rationality for his position
hegel even opposed some a lot of the
kind of abolitionist fervor in england
and throughout europe
which simply sought to abolish the
institution of slavery hegel actually
thought
that slavery would be dissolved through
some kind of gradual
historical whatever process which
reflects
hegel's radical uh conservatism
now you could say that this is because
hegel was an old guy and it was 300
years ago
but this is what is fundamental to
hegelian philosophy now from a marxist
perspective
you could at the same time recognize
that slavery dissolved by virtue of some
kind of material
development in the forces of production
and it would be kind of the similar
insight as hegel's but ultimately
whether you're coming from a marxist
materialist or hegelian perspective this
kind of t
again friend tyranny of frenzied
self-conceit which hegel also critiques
as uh
present throughout the french revolution
is not compatible with the hegelian
perspective now
you mentioned that uh yeah
like i forgot what you said it was
something about animals
um representing a prior state of being
that premises are very
self-consciousness itself
i agree with that but i find the view
that the conclusion
that the necessary conclusion this leads
to is that we cannot eat animals
this would assume that the cultures of
mankind
uh treat in the rituals of animal
slaughter and animal consumption
animals only from the perspective of
some kind of abstract
dominating kaguto which
does not recognize the determinate
particularity of animals
but actually if you investigate from the
perspective of culture the real rituals
of animal slaughter and animal
consumption
you can even explain them in that way
you can even explain them in terms of
the way in which mankind
or self-conscious beings relate to their
antecedent
premises themselves you could even go so
far as to say that this is even true for
things like factory farming which
may appear as the quintessential example
of this dominating
cogito which does not recognize
the particularity of animals and simply
treats it as a kind of uh
raw material but it does not actually
succeed
in doing that in actuality and it does
reflect
if there is uh something like that
in a factory farming i say i guess i
would say from the marxist perspective
this is only insofar as it represents a
deeper relation
in our world today between mankind and
itself some kind of more fundamental
estrangement between humanity and itself
uh but still
there is no reason to think that the
recognition that the state of animal
being
is a necessary state that premises are
premises the very possibility of
self-consciousness
must lead us to the conclusion that
animals cannot be eaten
according to some abstract duty
um well i guess like the point i was
making is that it's not necessarily an
abstract duty but really the first judy
um and the only judy that really
uh we are that we are really engaged in
it is the essence of the will you know
judy is the essence of the will
um that duty is seen in animals and
that's what i'm
trying to argue here that when we
consider animals
um being the fundament as in like animal
behavior as demonstrating
you know desires and interests which um
exist externally to our own we are re we
are
essentially recognizing their power to
their power to negate our own interests
the the difference is in terms of mutual
recognition they can't recognize our
uh power to uh negate their interests in
the same
way they don't have the necessary
faculties to form a language and a
linguistic structure which allows for
that
uh diorak um conceptions of themselves
that can't form the eye
you know um that doesn't mean that the
relationship between us and animals does
not
necessitate our consideration of their
will
it means that they are incapable of
returning that consideration
and forming civil society with us and
that civil society
and that absence from civil society does
not ob
which means they are they can't be um uh
given positive rights within our society
in terms of let's say
uh the right to vote or something like
that but it does not mean that we have
the right
to you know um undermine what we would
consider
necessary faculties and i think this is
why for example i would say i would
disagree with hegel
and say the consideration of slaves um
or people who even accept their slaves
and i think this is kind of hegel's
point
you know the slave enslaves themselves
for hegel the the slave has
adopted the mentality of being
slave-like and needs to almost
fight their way out develop to develop a
self-consciousness which is independent
from the identity imposed by the
lordsman the bondsmen must work upon
themselves
um and i can see why he's arguing from
that i guess my disagreement would be
there
that the power structure from which we
um gain this self-consciousness
it necessarily does not mean that we
should
impose um unfair power dynamics
upon individuals so that they can
develop freedom
our consideration of their will is
separate from their consideration of
our will so this is how mutual societies
or mutually distinct societies or
mutually distinct spirits in terms of
abstract right would engage with each
other until they form an
uh uh you know a um a coalescence
within absolute spirit and the laws of
one land versus the laws of another
um hegel recognizes that the laws of one
land are superior to the laws of another
and talks about the progress
necessary within society to you know
essentially reach a more free society
um you know referencing is like
historiography
in um this philosophy of history
um this would mean that individuals in
let's say germany at the time that he
was talking
were obligated to treat other
individuals from society
that are external to germany in a way
that was considered
uh ethical by their standard and not by
the standard of those in an alternative
society
so if um you know a british person
disagrees with slavery then they ought
to treat
individuals as being equal and not
enslave them
and this would be a matter of um
actualizing the self-consciousness which
exists within the state
this is exactly the same thing i would
say about animals
when we recognize the consideration of
animals
um as having this primordial will which
does not recognize
itself we still must consider its
interests
we still must consider its value and in
that consideration of its value
we must find that although it cannot
know
the consequences of uh
let's say ethical ignorance that its
ethical ignorance
does not permit our ethical ignorance
so but the issue is that animals are not
human if there is an aspect of ourselves
that uh is somehow common with the
animal
it is a moment of a greater being of
which we alone form a part
i think there's a confusion here between
the view
of the animal being being a moment in
the being of geist or spirit
or the human being and from a broader
kind of
natural historical perspective of like
for example a kind of
evolutionary view of the way in which
animals develop and become
human these are entirely two different
processes
moreover i think this perspective is
radically not
hegelian i don't think hegel is trying
hegel believes
that animals are uh
incapable of um self-consciousness on
account of some kind of
pure contingency like a person being
disabled would there's actually a reason
why
animals are not human there is an inner
kind of
there is an inner rationality of the
animal being
itself that makes sense so far from the
perspective of the animal
not from the perspective but taken at
the level of the animal being which
makes sense and which
reconciles some kind of some kind of uh
deeper unity of opposites now
insofar as animals actually do figure in
this moment
of um the premises of self-consciousness
for
the human being it is so far as they are
consumed so far as they allow us to
subsist
and satisfy our base our own base uh
animal necessities
um it's very strange that
the ways in which animals consume one
another does not somehow figure for you
and the fundamental being of
the animal world in general now hegel's
view regarding slavery is not actually
prescriptive
but descriptive he doesn't say this is
what should happen per se
taken by itself he says this is actually
what happens
so when hegel critique and this is
actually something that happens and has
actually happened across history
conquered peoples become enslaved and
then
this initiates some kind of dialectic
process that produces real
historical changes and outcomes hegel
merely critiqued abolitionism
because he thought it was a vain attempt
to hover over this type of imminent
uh development in this imminent uh
process
it wasn't prescriptively saying that it
it should happen
it was happening for eagle now
you say that uh hegel
requires individuals to treat others
from different societies and states
by their ethical standard but the
reasons for this contradict
the conclusion that animals themselves
should be treated in the same way
because
plainly put animals don't have any
ethical standard animals do not belong
to a state
or a civil society and do not obey any
kind of
abstract or alienated norms or
institutions whatsoever for hegel
different societies and enter into
moreover a process again of mutual
recognition and mutual
development where it's tit for tat they
both participate and develop
in it animals aren't capable of that now
you talk about the fact that humans
are obliged and have a duty to fulfill
animal interests but if
animal interests if they are
intelligible
would be radically incompatible with
vegan veganism there are some
animals which for physiological reasons
must consume
and lead to the death of other animals
even beyond then the conclusion doesn't
actually follow from the premise
animal interests are in no way
compatible with the obligations
hegel believes um a given citizen of a
state has toward another human being
which is part of another state and part
of another community
or even just a random stranger
who isn't part of any clear society or
state
the difference for hegel is that this
kind of benefit of the doubt that can be
afforded to the stranger
um this sorry emptiness and
lack of determination apart upon on the
part of the stranger
contains and conceals uh
an imminent potentiality to enter into
the course of
um mutual uh
recognition and um being a part of
some kind of bigger community
um well i guess this is where i would
say
that say that animals aren't human
um neither is the the first um term in
the hegelian dialectic because humanity
presupposes a form of identity which has
not yet developed
um would you know like for example like
notions of humanity even in like the
history of philosophy
um you know like seeing each other as
you know members of um
you know um like was it like homogenous
like
homogeneous they of the same species and
that didn't develop in terms of
self-consciousness even historically
until a certain until a certain point
and then in terms of individualism
which you know allows the individual to
interact with their state
in a way which is a particular subject
versus
um you know um institutional
um obligations which mediates the
subjective
freedom and the object of freedom of the
state uh that didn't even develop
as in until like hegel really come
around so like these
these notions in terms of the
development of the dialectic
um weren't even present um at the point
of the at the point of the inception
the point of the inception art um
of the first premise of the dialect is
consciousness itself
the imminency and the foundation from
which all reality is
derived which is the consciousness is is
all that's really being considered
and you said that you know i think was
towards the start you said that
um i wouldn't disagree that the
end of history as it would like the end
of the hegelian dialectic would be the
same
well as an empty formulation in a
kantian sense
yeah it wouldn't be the same it would be
absolute knowing or absolute spirit
but what that actually looks like hegel
kind of leaves blank deliberately
because it's
not something that we are actually
entitled to know because of our
history our historicity um
and i don't think i don't know if you
would agree i disagree with that um
in so much i would say that hegel would
not have predicted the rise of veganism
and the consideration of animals as the
growing dialectical process
i think that it is the consideration of
the conscious standard which pre-exists
the logic that was developed within the
dialectic
in the philosophy of uh sorry in the
science of right
he goes so far as to say that um
where is it see if i can find it
a uh
and one second there just lost it
it's on the genesis of logic i do
believe
uh actually i know where i know where it
is i just realized i think it's page 45.
okay okay while he's doing that um for
people in the audience who have
questions put an asterisk on the
beginning and the end we'll be doing
audience questions in 20 minutes
thank you um
right okay he says that um here we may
quote it from like this is from the
philosophical sciences encyclopedia of
philosophical sciences
and he quotes himself um saying there is
nothing in heaven or nature or spirit or
anywhere else
that does not contain just as much
immediacy as mediation
so that both these determinations prove
to be unseparate
unseparated and inseparable and the
opposition between them
nothing real so in spirit there is no
actual opposition the negation of
negation leads to the unity of being
which is the unity of self-consciousness
and consciousness
animals are an aspect of consciousness
which we must become united with
and so with the development of the
dialectical process an inconsideration
of a conscious being
would be a lesser um
media mediated and a poor um
contradictory uh position within spirit
it would not be spirit as it is or
should be
it would be spirit as uh seen how we
would like it to be
and hegel actually mentions this in the
philosophy of right
where individuals come into conflict
with the law itself
um seeking to express what they think
ought to be the case
rather than what is the case and he says
that we need to essentially bend
to the to the existence of um value in
nature or the or value in consciousness
rather than the other way around
yeah but regarding the first thing you
said about the reason
for uh the fact that the end of history
or whatever
is not our philosophy of right and so on
and so on
was not realized until very recently
such changes whatever we want to make of
them is
assuming we're operating from this
strict to yelling perspective we're not
physiological or natural changes which
they would have to be in the case of
animals
i think again this is a kind of false
almost caricature of the hegelian view
according to which
there is this kind of linear progression
between
lower and higher forms of being but for
hegel makes it quite clear that there is
a reason why
animals exist as animals and it makes
sense animals are not moments
in animals themselves are not moments in
uh humanity's being human
humanity possesses an aspect within
itself
that is comparable to the animal being
but
animals themselves it's not
so the fact that for most of humanity's
history it did not achieve
the kind of uh whatever you want to call
it i forgot
what you were trying to say it's all con
controversial stuff
absolute knowing the end of history um
and so on and so on
this is not actually uh
this is not actually something
that um animals this is something that
was always
already possible for human beings given
their physiological and natural
presuppositions given where they already
stand within
the philosophy of nature this is not
true for animals
and regarding this as an aside regarding
the question of absolute knowing
yes it's true that its contents are not
transparently pre-established but i
think you're confusing
uh what absolute knowing actually is
absolute knowing will not consist in a
position that's going to possess
some kind of uh prescriptive stance
toward what is truly uh what
one really ought to do and like for
example
in terms of one's dietary habits and
ones participates
all of these things for hegel uh possess
objectivity they
possess objectivity in the form of moors
customs traditions and so on and so on
the position of absolute knowing ends
from the perspective of philosophy
itself
namely the philosopher hegel himself
um the one who is cogniza cognizant
of some kind of deeper harmony of um
history and being and so on and so on uh
regarding the thing you said about the
unity of opposites
and the implication of the relation to
animals i don't really think it's
important to point out that for hegel
there are no true
contradiction it's only a matter of
reconciliation the negation of it
yeah it's not without it's not relevant
to what i was saying obviously yeah
but regarding this kind of end state of
the relation between humans and animals
again the practice of the consumption of
meat
itself is just as compatible with this
such a um such a consumption affirms
on the one hand uh the premises of
self-consciousness namely the need to
to satisfy physiological base animal
instincts and so on and so on
and on the other hand affirms the
self-consciousness
as a higher moment of being above uh the
animal kind
so the conclusion plainly doesn't follow
that we can't consume
meat just because so i think you're
making
uh an error here you're making uh you're
not taking note of a necessary
distinction
of course animals within the greater
uh within the greater
fucking scheme
form a part and premise a possibility
of self-consciousness this does not mean
that we have an obligation
to protect animals
because the manner by which this
develops
has already occurred it already has
occurred it's something
that has occurred imminently and is not
the result
of um
like you so you talk about the
distinction between that the individual
must make
must bend to what is rather than what
ought right
but bending to what is in this case the
actual and um let's say
uh real relationship between mankind and
the animal world within hegel's scheme
acting in such a way that is cognizant
of what this
is in no way implies that animals
somehow
have rights and cannot be eaten and so
on and so on um
[Music]
if and again uh my argument is that the
the the best argument for what this
would look like is the very consumption
of animals
it's the very consumption of animals
that
uh that represents this
uh acting in regards to what
is so
um and that's why the consumption of
meat across the cultures and history of
mankind is laden with so much
tradition called careful tradition
culture and so on and so on
it can be even explained within this
hegelian scheme
um so yeah like animals
uh not being self-conscious is
not what i'm saying like i do agree
animals are not self-conscious
um animals are animals are not the
middle term
where the middle term um where the
self-consciousness which is
coming to know itself to develop into
absolute spirit that is
that is the dialectical process and it's
been developing since the inception
which was from consciousness itself
all the way through to the development
of absolute knowing which is the unity
of this middle term with the first term
in the conclusion
which is absolute knowing that's our
absolute spirit
which contains absolute knowledge that
absolute knowledge is as we say like
indeterminate and uh is
non-contradictory in
uh in relationship to nature like no
contradictions exist in nature
but the contradictions that exist within
us are what are driving us forward in
terms of the negation of negation
which is leading us to this absolute
spirit and so these contradictions
are contradictions are our our awareness
of the contradiction of the mediating
term ourselves
and nature we are realizing that we
ourselves have created
our identities which are inadequately
describing the system of drives
which pre-exists that identity we are
wrongly sublimating
and engaging in our desires within
society
as to not allow for the greatest
expression of subjectivity within this
hegelian dialect
dialectic which is why uh the conception
of a better and better society
is the greater and greater expression of
the system of drives
animals are within the system of drives
they are simply not
conscious of the system of drives we are
the mediating force
they are what we are they are part of
what we are mediating
they are subject to our um ethics
in our attempts to make sure that they
live good lives so for example
um you know our consideration of animals
an animal might want to get like
jabbed up or like you know some sort of
vaccine but we would do that to them
regardless of their
you know of their um resistance because
they are not aware
of the positives that would be affecting
them in terms of the system of drives
itself
because we are the self-consciousness we
are what determines
um the abstract notions of right from
which are
which you know determine our treatment
to them but what
is well we are what determine the
contingent laws which are reflective of
the imminent right
which is universal and necessary within
consciousness
the consciousness itself is immediate
consciousness itself contains immediate
notions of right which we are not aware
of
so the animals animals themselves and
all conscious beings contain this
logical necessity from which
ontological's necessity
predating logic actually in terms of the
hegelian dialectic
spirit is the necessary foundation for
the production of logic
and in such the resistance that exists
within animals
is the necessary negation from which
logic
requires we would have no notion of
negation and the law of
non-contradiction
at all um or the notion of identity at
all
without uh the negative force of an
external will
which is essentially what hegel is
pointing to so when we see an external
will embodied in an animal form
if it cannot recognize us it cannot form
a dialectical relationship
and form rules of abstract right that is
absolutely true
but being a conscious being it is
governed by those rules
just as we are the we do not produce
these notions of right
and therefore determine and govern uh as
we see fit based off
uh our mutual power relationship with
the other
the power relationship is actually an
obscurity really which is prevent
preventing us from seeing reality in a
way which is
un um corrupted by our attempts to
put our subjectivity over the
objectivity
of what we both share which is the will
so when we look at the fact that an
animal cannot engage in this power
relationship
or in a state of mutual recognition it's
not that the animal is not what we are
recognizing we actually must imminently
recognize the animal
to even have began the dialectic which
is i think you agreed to the animals are
conscious and we do recognize that they
are conscious and feel pain and pleasure
and so on
um animals simply do not recognize it
themselves
we do recognize that consciousness and
we do recognize it in the other but we
recognize as well
that are the rules that we have the
embodied traditions are expressions of
right
that are embodied in consciousness
itself within
ourselves and the other animals do
fulfill the mandate of being the other
they simply cannot fulfill that mandate
within a dialectical
process they cannot um continue
um the um they cannot continue
and form a relationship which you know
constitutes either a master slave
relationship
or a um constant conceptual development
they can't hold notions and concepts
uh we can and we hold notions and
concepts which embody them
and give them meaning just as much uh
well
sorry um highlight or explanate
the meaning that already exists within
them their pain and pleasure is valuable
in and of itself
we can't know that and meaning and has
to be this way for hegel
the and and i think you know thinkers
such as robert brandon
um even talk about how the
some the the foundations of semantics
have to be within reality itself
if we do not allow our words and our
meanings to be given
objective reality separate from this
self-conscious mediation within the
dialectic they
uh would be would lose grounding it
wouldn't actually make sense there would
be no unity
between what is the mediating force of
the middle term
unconsciousness itself which again is
why hegel
sorry about that which is why hegel says
that consciousness
or that um that in spirit there is
nothing unseparated
unseparated unseparated and inseparable
they are um okay lewis just try and wrap
it up in the next 30 seconds because
we're running up your time and i want to
get
lost keep going yeah that's absolutely
fine they are inseparable
and the notions between consciousness
and um
self-consciousness are unified in
absolute knowing and absolute right and
this would give
us the foundations for a perfect will
it would actually destroy um
subjectivity
in terms of um and united with
objectivity
the subject would be inherently
objective
if they were a um member
of the community which engaged in a law
which was
absolutely perfect and absolutely
correspondent
to the law of right within nature
okay um so it seemed like you said a lot
of
extremely irrelevant things um
as to the actual debate and point at
hand um
i don't even know if we're gonna have
time to cover all of it but i think i'm
just gonna try and simplify it
to put it simply you are confusing
philosophy of right with philosophy of
nature you're assuming
that the philosophy of right
is tasked with uh reproducing
voluntarily the philosophy of nature but
this isn't true
obviously philosophy of nature is a
premise
of the possibility of philosophy of
right
but it put differently obviously nature
is a premise of
humanity and uh spirit and so on and so
on
but this does not impose a duty or an
ethical obligation on part of
individuals
to um to uh
preserve this process in a manner
outside of the self-preservation and
self-realization of spirit itself in
other words
like i said animals are not somehow on
the ladder to becoming human agents and
we just have to cultivate
uh them as an aspect of our being and
uh because they represent or sorry they
um occupy this fear of drives that
whatever but animals will always be
animals this is what you're not
understanding this is why you're
confusing the two
things you're making a really crude kind
of
is ought to distinction which is foreign
to
hegel's position you're effectively
trying to say that
because hegel descriptively outlines
some kind of place humanity has within
the whole of nature
humanity then has an ethical obligation
to fulfill this um same
same premises but as a matter of fact
these premises are fulfilled in a manner
that is antecedent
to right and men are antecedent to
obligations
uh so it could not be possibly be the
case that
this could it would it would be constant
right moreover
even if in some sense this is what
happens
namely humanity must account for its
premises
obviously outside of the sphere of
ethics
and right since such a thing would not
be possible
hegel makes it very clear like if
for example if animals cannot
form within the scheme of ethics and
ethical life proper we can just condense
it that way
that is not our problem that's the
problem of nature itself
this is what is the result of nature
itself
superimposing some kind of duty
to account for our natural premises
beyond accounting for
our determinate natural premises
for example our need to survive and our
need to satisfy our animal-based wants
and so on and so on
is completely foreign to the hegelian
scheme we
ourselves are
we so far as we are concerned this is a
very important distinction
we ourselves so far as we
are concerned are the only
subject of um ethics and rights and so
on and so on
uh in regard sorry not ethics and rights
uh are only relevant in regard i got two
hours of sleep
in regards to our material premises now
uh you talk about
the fact that we both agree that animals
uh
are conscious i agree but only in the
very restricted hegelian
sense hegel remember is an idealist what
most people mean collectively by
consciousness
is in fact self-consciousness so i just
want to point that out for the audience
now you say that attending to the wants
or needs of animals it has to be this
way
on account of the very fact that animals
comprise the kind of premises
of thinking beings
but the manner by which animals comprise
the premises of thinking beings
happens in a way that is outside of the
sphere
of ethical uh duties of these same
thinking beings
for example hegel does not actually
speak of a right
to food or things like that
uh even even in so far as it concerns
our subsistence
so it's a kind of ought is distinction
we do
reproduce our physiological premises
that condition the necessity of
self-consciousness
but we do so only in so far as it is a
moment in
the realization of spirit we don't do so
as a
matter of imposing some kind of um
abstract duty upon
the world and upon culture and society
now
the crux i wrote notes separately to
remember what you were saying the manner
by which this unity of consciousness and
self-consciousness you're talking about
um expresses itself
imminently not voluntarily it doesn't
express
itself in a way that
it doesn't express itself according to
the voluntary will of the individual
it expresses itself
in the form of the very determinate
development
of history itself so this unity between
self-consciousness
and consciousness that you're talking
about
is something effectively already
reconciled
for hegel it's not that it's not the
fact that uh
we are not vegans means it's not
reconciled no it
is precisely reconciled moreover i find
it interesting that you neglect
the wider point that why can't our
cultural dietary practices of animal
slaughter and consumption and so on and
so on which have many
cultural meaning and laden with
depth and so on and so on why does this
not
according to your view accomplish this
very same
such unity why is it that the
consumption of animals necessarily means
that self-consciousness
denies the premises
its own premises in the form of
consciousness why could it not also
mean that it affirms its premises and
consciousness
after all isn't that why especially upon
eating meat and people being brought
together in a community to slaughter a
cow or something or a goat
that they basically express their
gratefulness
uh they're some kind of deep
gratefulness that
in a sense not much separates us from
animals uh but at the same time
something manages to and this is of both
a very humbling and uh
both are very humbling and empower sorry
uh
what's the fucking word dignified
experience
both very humbling and uh very dignified
so far as our humanity is concerned
um all right so we're running up to time
um yeah yeah
yeah um if you guys want to take five
minutes for going to questions to grab
water or something you've been here for
a long time
so for anybody in the audience if you
want to ask questions
put them in asterisks we'll go for about
15 or so minutes i think we're not going
to go too long our participants are
extremely tired
and um well thank you very much so we'll
come back in five minutes if you're both
cool with that you can go grab a drink
or something and then we'll
get started on audience questions sound
good would house be okay with this just
like
um just making a few points just just
essentially just off what he said there
only if you let me interrupt you
um yeah yeah that seems fair enough uh
within reason i'm
like going like just interrupt like
every two seconds or something just so i
don't actually say something
to say um yeah so um
um hegel doesn't outline humanity's
place
um like as in the beginning of the
dialectic in his philosophy of nature
it does that in uh in the phenomenology
of spirit
and this is the pre-philosophical work
really in the sense that this outlines
the onological commitments
necessary in philosophy for the
development in the science of logic
so and the beginning of this is
consciousness it's not
it's not the notion of humanity so
humanity's place in nature
is secondary to the its place in uh the
dialectic
which is yeah but the philosophy of
nature
outlines the process by which such a
being
whose development is expressed in the
philosophy
philosophy of mind is possible
um somewhat i think that hegel's notions
and i think kegels notions of nature
are tentative and i think that will
i think poor hegel at least you may not
agree with it before hegel himself this
is true
oh well for hegel it's it's certainly um
well i would say that it was it's a good
work i don't think that he's necessary i
would not i don't agree with everything
it says but
that's separate um i don't think there
is a confliction in nature in the sense
that we are consuming them
i do think that we can satisfy our uh
system of drives within a vegan society
uh we can sublimate
uh our base drives and needs uh with a
vegan diet
and we can live happy healthy lives and
yeah i'm not i'm not denying that that's
possible although i think i would argue
that point my point was that
this is not the only manner by which
this would be possible in the most
consistent and all manner in a way that
is in harmony with uh our
with the realization of spirit
um i guess that's the point of
contention because i would say that the
unity of dialectic is an
ever developing not reconciled process
between consciousness and
self-consciousness
that's precisely why it's reconciled
well it's reconciled in formal terms in
but not in um but not in um concrete
um real terms no it is it is precisely
reconciled
um no i think that there is the the
confliction between the individual and
themselves
which is why the development of spirit
the whole point for hegel is that
development
is itself a concrete something that is
concretely reconciled
in in becoming but it only is um
it is only truly reconciled when it
becomes unified
absolutely with himself which is the
point of absolute spirit
um which hegel claims was is
accomplished in his own
work yes but he also claims to say that
the
like it's almost it's reconciled its
absolute spirit
is an ever developing infinite isn't it
the infiniti yeah of course it's ever
developing but
for hegel that is precisely why it is
reconciled at the same time this
development
fits within the scheme of absolute
knowledge itself
yeah but absolutely no but it's the
contents of absolute knowledge are
obviously not
pre-written somewhere but um
the development hegel talks about is
already is already
uh reconciled in its form right whatever
form it so happens to be which hegel is
open about
yeah i would say that the absolute
knowing is a development from the
logic which is also developing so it's
like yes
hegel reckons recognizes that absolute
knowing is dependent upon the
philosophical forms that are available
to us
but they themselves are developing logic
itself is developing
from epoch to epoch from individual to
individual in terms of a societal
development
for for hegel his was the end
his was the accomplishment of absolute
knowing it was the culmination for him
this was the
ambition and scope of hegel's position i
know it's a contentious contended by
many
aliens but i think these hegelians are
kind of uh
chickening out as far as the actual
audacity of hegel's enterprise i don't
think that
i mean don't get me wrong i do think
that he's an audacious kind of guy i
don't think he's that audacious because
he does say that the child of the next
generation is superior to the gene
uh the genus uh the genius of this well
i think what's being mistaken here is
that
for hegel the enterprise of philosophy
is accomplished this doesn't mean
history itself is
ended in the strict sense of like there
will no longer be any development
after this obviously that's not hagel's
position but so far as it concerns the
ailment higgle considers there to be a
fundamental ailment in the enterprise of
philosophy
he considers this to be resolved in his
specifics i would agree with that i
would agree with that i would say that
hegel sees himself as
resolving the conflictions in society
and particularly the mediation between
the external and the internal world
which had plagued philosophy for like
over a thousand years
um i would say that okay guys this this
is interesting
i'm going to set a timer for this for 10
minutes then i'm going to go into
audience questions is that all right
you guys still want you guys don't want
five minutes to
like whatever i'm just gonna say one
more thing and then i'm happy to take
the break okay cool go for it
um so yeah i would say that you
mentioned like the community
bringing together to slaughter an animal
um as an act of
unification within consciousness i would
say that the slaughter of the animal is
the destruction of consciousness
in which an individual associates with a
particular identity
over the universality of consciousness
and represents something like an in and
out group
that would be fundamental to what we see
in
underdeveloped notions of right which
hegel points towards various cultures
and his philosophy of history
as having um and i would say that
communities which engage in this um you
know communal
action are ignorant to the
self-destructive process
which ultimately destroys their own uh
self-consciousness
um in in in in that why is it a
destruction of consciousness
because it's the inconsideration of
another of consciousness
in its of consciousness simplicity
why is that why can it not also be an
acknowledgement of consciousness
simplicity
and its relation to us i mean for
example
the animal kingdom is itself like i
think there's a lot of confusion here
the animal kingdom itself
is a site of extreme violence
or not violence proper i guess but it's
a site of
violence is an anthropomorphic term
animals are eating each other and
whatever dying for no reason and it's a
brutal whatever thing
so eating an animal is in a sense
acknowledging
the actual reality of consciousness
simplicity
actually rejecting eating an animal i
think would be this very same
annihilation of consciousness implicit
you're talking about the annihilation of
consciousness simplicity
is the rejection of the fact that
there's a distinction between
self-consciousness
and consciousness almost like there is
really a
imposition of the of whims that could
only possibly result from
self-consciousness
or whims or moral conscience upon
conscious beings like
you are superimposing the human
a product of a strictly human
perspective
um upon animals but animals themselves
don't really give a shit about any of
that
stuff they don't so when we eat an
animal we are in a sense
acknowledging this fact of both the
animal being and
our own being um i guess what i would
say to that
is that in the consciousness of the
animal do we still see the system of
drives
which is why you say animals do like act
on their own
impulses and uh hegel recognizes that
they act on their own impulses and are
actually slaves to them um
i don't disagree with that but that
precisely is why
it must be mediated by us as
self-consciousness as being
expressed as as forms of
self-consciousness
we ourselves possess drives we do we are
not elevated above our
drives to um determine them voluntarily
we are still
bounded by our own drives and hegel
recognizes as much it's why hegel
completely rejects the kantian moral
perspective because for hegel the
kantian moral perspective
is marked by what he calls the stamp of
particularity we are really given to our
drives whether we want to
elevate ourselves above them voluntarily
or not
i do agree with that actually um but
that's precisely why we share the exact
same
um primordial right as animals the
consciousness and the
system but this is the right that was
proven this right was already proven in
the fact that we human beings have
history
the right was not proven so far as
animals were concerned
but the proof is separate from uh well
actually the
like the right the right does not exist
for animals precisely because it has not
developed through the court through a
animals do not have a history
so what how can they possibly have this
right if this right
was not imminently developed in history
itself it's a right that
we alone are affording a recognition
to that that would be um a mistake to
say that the right as a development of
history the right as a
development of ontology that exists
separate from us our
understanding of right its development
is through history
the ontological development of right
occurs through the course of history
itself
the middle term the self-consciousness
itself is the development of
of history the understanding of
consciousness
is the development of history
consciousness is the development
of nature itself and so is right
yes but so but
right right both right and nature for
hegel
um are reproduced in this development of
history
exactly which is why we constantly try
to uh
remove the separation between what we
consider to be right or what we want to
be right in terms of power dynamics yeah
relationship so this this right is
suspended in history
itself and whatever initial right
um human beings possessed the insight
into it is developed by history but this
insight
is not some kind of individual
enterprise in which we look at animals
oh this fits somewhere within the scheme
it's something that
actually happens in history this is what
i'm trying to say
it actually does happen imminently it's
not because individuals
like sherlock holmes discovered
something i don't disagree i think the
the value of genius in
the hegelian dialectic is nominal like
it they're just expressions of the
spirit of the day
i i don't disagree with that um what i'm
saying is that
the laws and fundamental um notions of
rape which we have developed
uh respective of the right which exists
within nature
is um constantly growing and is a
mediation between um
us or what we think to be right and what
is actually right
and right but what is actually right
imposes
its reality not because
it imposes its reality in an imminent
way is what i'm trying to say
it's not because i would completely
agree i would completely agree with it
it's not it's not because we say this
is right uh but because we i know you
don't
you wouldn't like me using this word
abstract but because we arrive at it by
some kind of
abstract conceptual or even scientific
investigation
we discover what is right through an
imminent development of history itself
and i don't see veganism fitting within
the scheme of that
imminent development i don't see any
indications of it becoming
a phenomena that can subsist outside of
what hagel would call the unhappy
consciousness okay we'll call that we'll
call that an ending statement because
we're going to move into audience
questions if you want to touch on this
during the questions you're welcome to
uh louis yeah but um yeah um and in fact
since
uh has uh had the last statement i'm
gonna send the first question to you
um this is from uh g-nut does
prospective philosophy
realize that animals are savage beings
that rape and kill all the time
why should humans apply ethics to them
yeah i do realize that
animals are savage beings that rape and
kill all the time animals are horrible
man
like i don't know some of them are um
animals can be
vicious uh you know what we what many
would have considered natural
evils almost i mean evil being an
inappropriate term in a hegelian sense
but
you know the there's a lot of horrors in
nature i definitely understand that but
that doesn't mean that animals are not
moral subjects
or moral patients it means that they are
in
they cannot engage in a dialectical
process means that an animal like a lion
when it mauls a human
hasn't denied the value of our
experience for its own
it was unaware of our experience in a
way which is meaningful
and produces a notion of um conscious
conscience which is um uh developing
from you know this uh process of right
the instead an animal is um you know
subject to its impulses and its drives
it is moved by them it is a slave
to nature whilst we are not um in that
we can see that animals have drives and
are conscious
and they have value and wish to express
those drives they contain subjectivity
they simply do not own themselves and
cannot express that subjectivity
in a way that is um
uh capable of freedom in a hergelian
sense an animal can never be free
but an animal is valuable and for us to
be free
we must respect that value and try to
perpetuate their freedom
as much as possible to give the greatest
ontological foundation to our beliefs to
respect the middle term
just as much uh sorry the first term
just as much as the middle term
within the dialect process
and uh this is for has from eisenberg um
this is a two-parter uh has how do you
respond to a characterization of your
argument as quote-unquote evolutionary
colonialism
you recognize that ape humans got there
first by achieving self-consciousness
but you deny
animals their quote-unquote right to
evolve
[Music]
no please don't let me don't let me deny
animals right to evolve please evolve um
whatever that even means um
i i i don't see what you're saying uh
how are we denying the right of animals
here's what do you mean evolutionary
colonialism we're stopping the cows from
uh
uh having a uh monarchy because
we're eating them i don't see how one
follows i think i think achieving
absolute spirit
but yeah i mean i i to respond to that
um animal consumption does not first of
all animal consumption does not
necessarily
first of all here's why it's face value
wrong because
colonialism is not simply something that
was condemned by virtue of the guilty
conscience
of colonizers the colonial themselves
rose up and overthrew those
motherfuckers
so the day a cow and a goat can do that
be my guest cows and goats overthrow me
just like
you know people in africa were thrown
overthrowing the spanish and the french
and the british
please do it if if you can but i don't
think they're going to be doing that any
time soon that's my response
yeah i think you're going to eat those
words someday this is for perspective
philosophy
from angelo marney how important is
mutual recognition are
animals capable of engaging in history
um i don't think animals are capable of
engaging in history
um at least maybe not all of them it's i
guess it's possible that
some would be would be capable of um at
least
some forms of um conceptual development
some animals have been taught like some
more primitive linguistic concepts and
able to adhere
to them that doesn't mean that they
wouldn't necessarily be um
attributable to a dialectical form i
don't think that's necessarily important
the development of history
isn't a development that is meant to
replace nature
but is meant to develop our
understanding of nature
our understanding of right it's not
meant to replace right the fundamental
right
that existed at the beginning of the
dialectic when man was pre-linguistic
or partially linguistic or becoming
linguistic
was is the same right that is being
expressed
um at the end of the dialectic the truth
doesn't change it is fundamental it is
um inherent
uh within the ontology of being itself
what changes
is uh our mediation with it
thank you also from angela marnie for
has um has how do you feel about
posthumanism
it depends on what you mean by that um
i think a lot of the conceptions of
humanism
have thus far been straw straw men i
think uh i kind of
i did have many disagreements with him
but i kind of sympathize with um
the neo-rationalists i don't know if
they still call themselves like
reza negarstani and others who say that
we have underestimated what human means
thus far
human does not mean um
the subject of humanitarianism which is
something recent so
i think um we have underestimated what
is the human
uh thus far and if we acquire an
appreciation of the human
we will once again be allowed to
recognize the significance of uh
humanism as a historical phenomena which
has been strawmanned
in the modern age and not the modern but
the 21st century
thank you very much uh for perspective
philosophy
from voidborn wouldn't it be a more
grounded position to concede that
animals are not equal to humans since
they cannot form societies
so then humans being higher should be
allowed to preserve animals
um well this is this is what it depends
on what you consider the notion of
equality the notion of equality
is not the power dynamic in terms of an
individual's
um of an individual's ability to let's
say overthrow
another and for example the colonials
that were overthrown and
um defeated by the natives what they did
was wrong
not because they were overthrown but
because of the reasons that they were
overthrown
and the development of that
consciousness in
but that's only proven when they're
overthrown
the reasons are only proven in the act
of overthrowing
i would disagree i would say that it
develops within consciousness itself
the immediation between the individual
and the other can happen without let's
say a violent contestation
but the the point is finished and then
you're going to go okay
and yeah i would say the i would say
that is necessarily the case i would say
that we know this in terms of
there are many cultures that have been
absolutely annihilated by
other cultures as in their consciousness
and their spirit has been
incapable of having the ethical growth
which would necessarily gain
uh which would necessarily give us the
resistance necessary to
to develop it the point of the the point
of the matter is the ontological
resistance
of the will is what we become
um uh conscious of that is what we
become conscious of in terms of right we
see the resistance we see the harm
we see the negativity in terms of
consciousness and that
contradiction and we seek to resolve it
within a new dynamic which is what the
overthrowing process is
the overthrowing process is not a
development
of a notion of this is now wrong nor the
slavery was wrong
and therefore we seek to cast off these
chains
thank you okay has go yeah well i wasn't
aware we're still debating he's like
answering questions and also trying to
respond and rebuke my previous points so
that's why i
just want to do that but if you want to
if you want to object i'll give you i'll
give you a couple of minutes
okay sure yeah yeah i'm sorry i didn't
mean to like cause a contestation now i
was just yeah
so in in the case of um
in the case of the overthrowing this is
what you say you want to be the case in
your head but in real history as far as
real history is concerned
it is true that might is right it is
actually true
this is also true within the hegelian
scheme itself
how else does slave become slave and
master
become master the reason why slave
some kind of different result is
produced from the master slave dialectic
isn't because
some kind of guilty conscience on part
of the master but because of an imminent
development that renders this slave
puts the slave in a position superior
ultimately to the master
now regarding this business of entire
cultures and peoples
being annihilated i would contest that
this happens in a way
that does not ultimately affect the
imminent reality of uh
of the uh annihilating uh force in some
kind of way
i think that the pretension of europe
and america
to absolute power colonial powers of
absolute power
is a bluff they can't do it because
doing so would fundamentally affect
their own societies in a way they cannot
afford it similar to the israel kind of
uh
gaza situation can the israeli military
go and
do horrible things eliminate
gaza yes they can but they can't
physically yes but they still
can't not because it was determined
ethically but because
the consequences would not be uh
possible both internally and obviously
for the international scene
so this is what i mean the act of
overthrowing
is what effectively proves because we
don't know before the fact it is
effectively
what proves uh right and wrong
and thank you i i definitely disagree
with that i will say
i think that the the proof of right and
wrong
um is essentially established in the
self-consciousness that is
uh come to the conclusion that this
action of
um control and domination was wrong
that development that doesn't account
for the contingencies
of things like strategy and war and all
of those things for hegel are not
accidental contingencies they figure
within the deeper rationality
of right and or the will
so for hegel all of those contingencies
are not accidents the reason why for
example napoleon
defeats europe isn't simply because of
contingent whatever it's actually
because
this is in a sense right
from the perspective of history i
disagree i think that what he would say
and i think this is i think an
understanding of hegel would lend itself
to an understanding of ideological power
and
um political power just as much as
authoritarian power
so the direct opposition of the of the
individual
uh to us but this distinction
not only does hegel overcome this
distinction in history this distinction
is overcome in like
maoist guerilla war strategy or people's
war like
the etiology for example marxism
leninism
and its ability to strategically win
these are or
let's say win the class struggle these
are one and the same thing it's not like
oh first you're right then you win no
you winning
is proof that you're right if you can't
win you're not right so you have to win
basically well i would have i would have
said i would have said another thing i
would have said that i think it would be
embodied really in the philosophy of
someone like martin luther king
and the the developments that he managed
to produce uh non-violently but through
an act of resistance
and the resistance itself and its
demonstration to the world
showed um civil society the injustice
that was going on and allowed for
the development within civil society
without i'm more of a malcolm x guy so
let's just leave it there and that's
like the difference between us basically
one one question in terms of mao
they in and mao's philosophy do you not
think that he's fundamentally wrong on
his rejection of the negation of
negation
and um falling into i think uh
you know a a a form of uh particularity
and everything can be fundamentally and
almost nominalism really he has a
one-sided dialectic of um
kind of almost uh pure either pure
negation or this kind of pure
reconciliation i think mao was both
correct and incorrect he was correct
because his rejection of the
prior conception of the negation of the
negation allowed him to introduce the
concept of
infinity to the marxist dialectic which
is coming from chinese tradition
and the chinese philosophy and this was
an incredible achievement in innovation
ultimately negation of negation can
be made compatible with mao zedong
thought
but it must first take note of the
achievements of mao
tong thought but yes he doesn't he
rejects the nation negation of the
negation but
this is in a sense necessary for the
time and it's necessary
uh for that time for him to do that
okay thanks guys we're going to move on
to the next question um i'm going to
combine these two for has because
they're relevant to each other this is
from voidburn and noobslayer u
so question for has exceptions like
cephalopods and dolphins have been able
to express higher levels of
self-awareness and thought
why is it the fact that the species is
what matters but not the universality of
consciousness itself that matters
because the universality of
consciousness as you're putting it is a
kind of
it's not what hegel means it's a kind of
like new age spiritualism thing
so when it comes to all of the newly
observed things about dolphins and
even apes these still do not go beyond
the bounds of what hegel described
animals in the philosophy of nature as
being only acted upon
by immediate and pure externalities
so the fact that different animals
display different degrees of complexity
does not still does not accomplish the
necessary
um step toward
entering history entering itself there's
a qualitative difference that we're
talking about here
that's whatever i know you maybe saw
something about a dolphin
that impressed you or an orangutan but
this is still not enough
for them to be ethical subjects proper
thank you last question for perspective
philosophy this is from angelo marnie
how do you justify imposing moral
obligations on other people from a
hegelian perspective
um i don't i don't think that you can
impose a moral obligation
um or an ethical obligation really is
what we should say
in the sense that i don't think that we
can impose something that is outside of
outside of our society and the
development of the concepts from which
we share
everything that i'm saying is
conceptually um available
to you you not only speak the same
language but mostly were part of
uh the same culture most people that you
know watch my streams that are engaging
in this
have some shared um ethical concepts or
the majority of the
majority of which share the same ethical
concepts uh we share
to the point in which we could develop
um laws which
govern human behavior relative to each
other
and also to animals as well i think that
there are some societies which have not
hit this point
um and there are some individuals you
know some uh
you know aspects of spur which have not
hit this point and you can't force this
um progression you know hegel says moral
progression is impossible
uh and i agree with that but you can
challenge it with rational argumentation
and allow for the development of spirit
to happen from external
and internal critique and this is a
challenge to dogmatism itself
rather than a challenge to um rather
than the imposition
of a moral law upon an individual who
would have no
um conceptual connection to it but
doesn't
this kind of contradict the hegelian
perspective according to which
where upon the insights of reason so far
as the individual
is concerned conflict with the deeper
rationality of society in the world
so much worse for the individual's
insights it just reflects a narrow
perspective
so how could arriving at some kind of
conceptual
uh insight on part of the individual or
rational insight on part of the
individual
possibly have consequences for
uh the society as a whole
oh 100 must have the whole point of the
laws
the laws themselves are are produced
from the dialectical
um production the dialectical engagement
of subject and subject
uh there is no objectivity before that
and then the objectivity of the law
imposed upon those individuals is um the
freedom of the individual from their own
subjectivity and the
elevation of their subjectivity or to
the objective subject
um and and so that that is their freedom
so like to say that like um
like the difference is is that this has
to be reconciled within the
consciousness of an individual
uh hegel would see the um the
uh abstract enactment of a law from
which individuals did not
have a conceptual understanding of uh as
inherently wrong he actually points out
that laws from which individuals cannot
understand
such as the he points out a historical
event in which they hammered the laws
higher than anyone could see as being
inherently
unjustified and it actually prevents an
individual from engaging with the law
the law and punishment itself is meant
to enact the subjectivity
and maturity of the individual and so
the punishment of the individual when
they breach the law
is actually a a reconciliation of that
individual
with society and themselves we respect
that they knew the law
they could understand the law and that
they chose to act otherwise
define their so own subjectivity yeah
obviously that's true but
that still doesn't address the point
which is
if the law is the self-consciousness of
the individual then
laws are not established because
individuals come to insights in the way
that
you are coming to an insight here laws
are established because of a combination
of the
contradiction between state and civil
society where it's harmony
um the private interests the all sorts
of different kinds of factors
which are more fundamental particularity
passions
which are more fundamental than just the
individual's conceptual use of
reason but what they are is the
individual elevated to the point of
universality it's a relationship
and if philosophically yeah but this
comes on this yeah
yes hang on hang on hang on slow down
perspective philosophy finish your
thought then how's
um okay yeah i'm just saying it's a
relationship it's a hermeneutic
relationship between the individual
themselves
and the as an individual instancing of
the universal principle
so the individual themselves is um a
necessary
component in this so a society which
does not allow for the freedom of an
individual
and rejects the freedom of an individual
would be inherently
uh dogmatic and tyrannical and negative
for hegel
yes i understand that laws
elevates the self-conscious but here's
the thing
there's a reason why they have to exist
in the estranged form
of the law it's not just a matter of
kind of a
worldly convenience it's the fact that
this self-consciousness
is greater than what can be afforded by
the insights of individual
reason alone now the individual can be
cognizant
of the law but even
in being cognizant of the law this will
not fully satisfy
the demands of uh the rational subject
insofar as they do not recognize uh
the reality of a supra supra individual
irrationality that can often
uh come at the expense of their
expectations prejudices and beliefs
like a thief in the night so to speak
like uh as an expression of a higher
cunning i would agree i would agree with
that i guess the only thing i would say
is that we're supposed to
just just finish up really quickly
because it has two more questions needs
to answer and then we're going to wrap
up
yeah that's fine i just said that
essentially um that's true the
universality of reason is
you know essentially the driving force
of what we must give ourselves into
we must we are subject to the laws we
cannot override them in the irony of the
subjective
but that the laws are constitutive of
subjects
coming together reasoning together and
putting forward their rational
um their rational um conclusions
to produce the laws the laws should be
rationally attainable by
everyone and so um follow
what is um a testable and reliable
understand
testable and reliable to the
understanding of an individual
and be produced from all of the
individuals and the consideration of
those individuals
and not produced by a class of
individuals like a master slave
dialectic would
give itself into but hegel precisely
disagrees
when is precisely produced by a kind of
class of individuals uh not
democratically it's the class of uh
civil society
sorry it's the class of civil servants
the
well if you look at if you look at how
um how
hegel's society works it's almost like
trifecta isn't it
with the king sitting on the top so
you've got um
like you've got essentially civil
society um
was it civil society um individual
interests uh or private interests
and um and then is it the king or
there's
like another there's another um
institution i think that also mediates
but they're also all contradictory uh
drives within society
that are being mediated by the king it's
not yeah it's not democratic
and yeah but the king himself is and and
people
argue about whether he was just
essentially tipping his heart
essentially to the king at the time
because
uh and for his own political interest
which i think he was
because the king himself has no um
subjective formulation
they are entirely objective the king is
the form
is the king is purely the expression of
the will of the people
the king would be replaceable with an ai
like
not necessary i mean the king is
inherited by tradition and custom and
there's there's there's a
argument to be made for why hegel was
not necessarily
just trying to circumvent censors and so
on and so on
um obviously the king doesn't have a lot
of power
basically to some of what you were
saying but for hegel
it's not like this kind of neo-kantian
which is how i think you're describing
it this kind of neocontian
social democratic kind of we all get
together and rationally decide an
outcome in some kind of way for hegel no
it's
it's not it's hegel rejects this
volunteerism i think almost explicitly
in his form of the rejection of his
critique of the english reform bill
and his uh critique of the french
revolution and so on and so on
okay lewis final word and then we're
gonna move on to the next question
that's that's fair enough i think that
hegel
being um hegel it wouldn't agree with
something like a marxist london estate i
don't believe or any sort of um top-down
sort of
um dictatorship he may agree with the
dictate of the proletariat
dependent let's not get into this let's
just yeah yeah
that's fair um but i will say that hegel
does lend himself
to um i would say democracy um in many
ways which is why a lot of
you know hegelians are pro-democracy and
myself included i think that democracy
is analytic aliens like brandon and
pippin like the hardcore hegelians
not so much you know oh absolutely i
mean you can go and read um
the beginner's guide to the philosophy
of right written by david ross
who is more continental than fuck than i
don't know swiss cheese his name
sounds like anglo like what about kojev
and people like that like
real people i'm not denying that there
are people that do interpret hagel and
like hardcore
i think real hegelians continental
hegelians um
can be liberals even um i just think
that i think that is a bad stance to
take
i'm not a liberal um but you know what i
would say is that something like
um socialism and uh you know i would
even say something like
something close that even anarchism
lends itself to hegel in a way
let's debate about that another day
jesus christ
thank you very much guys all right uh
has there's
two final questions for you and then
we're going to wrap up so the first is
from uh horizonburg
uh could factory farming be a morally
acceptable practice under socialism if
so what conditions would need to be met
for to be acceptable
obviously it could be morally acceptable
i don't see where morality
is has relevance here um
morality i if i'm a socialist i'm a
marxist right so
for marx this kind of um
estrangement of morality and ethics and
religion
from the actual uh material reproduction
of society is a result of the division
of labor so for marx
um
the new society kind of reconciles all
of these things
into determinate forms of uh
labor and things like that it's not like
these are all
we approach things from is this morally
correct is this religiously correct for
marx all of these things
become um reconciled
so is factory farming morally accepted
well
it doing away with factory farming would
not
be because of moral considerations
that's your question
i think there are health considerations
and things like that to be investigated
but
from a moral perspective i don't see why
it's the problem
thank you and final question for has um
this is from josh henniosa
i take this to be a accusation of
two fallacies so i'll let you just
respond to them uh the first is
name the trait also you are appealing to
nature and tradition fallacy
i don't know what this name the trait
stuff is from
ask yourself i think i've i'd already
debated it i had i debated someone from
their server and i talked about
why this is not uh i watch that debate i
don't know i'll put it on
louis is familiar with it does he want
to give a quick explication well
just let me answer the second question
please i know what
name the trade is i know what name the
trade is i reject name the trait because
it's on dialectical that's my
summarization
uh the real difference between mankind
and animals
is not because of some kind of formally
and
arbitrarily formally intelligible trait
it's because of something suspended in
actual area it's proven in a dialectic
way not because of some kind of
axiom or dogma the second thing was a
question about
appeal to nature and tradition
um i didn't i didn't actually
appeal to nature and uh tradition if
this is what you're saying
um but that doesn't mean that
traditions attest to a deeper
rationality
um that requires one to possess an
attitude of caution
and more consideration like oftentimes
when people critique
traditions they're taking a one-sided
and very narrow
perspective in relation to those same uh
traditions they're not actually
understanding why those traditions have
stood the test of time and the reason is
not because
people are simply less intelligent than
you are
that would assume that tradition the
reason i have problems with this as a
logical fallacy is because it
assumes that the products of in the
individual use of logic
premise real human traditions but what
premises real human traditions is not
the individual use of logic
um what premises are traditions
is ontological it is our fundamental
relationship
to both our own being and uh nature and
so on and so on
so i reject this kind of uh
bullshit
thank you all right um so that's it for
questions so thank you gentlemen for
participating
um if uh anyone and thank you to the
audience as well for your questions and
for
being extraordinarily civil i greatly
appreciate that if
you are a small content creator and you
are interested in taking part in a
future scientist showdown dm me on
twitter or in the discord server
um if both of you would like to i
realize that i'm the smallest channel of
three of us here but if you'd like to
shout out your
channels and say what you're about um
please feel free
uh how's would you like to go first
yup i'm on uh youtube it's the infrared
just search infrared you'll find me i'm
big enough for that now
twitch.tv slash infrared show um
where marx is landing his channel but
we're not
just about politics you know i'm also
a really entertaining person and really
funny
um and i'm also doing debates a lot and
it's entertaining
especially when i can get uh more than
two hours of sleep
um so yeah come watch me i think for two
hours of sleep you did pretty damn well
uh lewis please yeah so hello and
perspective philosophy
you can find me at respect to philosophy
on youtube uh i do debates
like this one on thoughts on philosophy
veganism um
politics ethics and loads of loads of
other stuff really
um i do and longer form videos as well
even
outlining ontological uh positions and
ethics
and other you know philosophical
positions so yeah just
check us out and my audience check out
president sunday
and you know what actually check out
check out uh um infrared like that this
was actually
pretty productive i wasn't expecting
that so yeah
yeah i agree this is easily the most
interesting discussion i've hosted so
far granted only
only the fourth but um i hope this
pretends uh
the quality we'll be looking at in the
future anyways we're gonna call off now
so
thank you very much everybody and take
care